






# HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

BASED ON ORIGINAL SOURCES

JADUNATH SARKAR, M.A., I.E.S.



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## CONTENTS

VOL. I.

<b>Introduction</b>	...	...	...	xi-xviii
---------------------	-----	-----	-----	----------

Fullest expansion of Mughal empire under Aurangzib, xi—commencing decline, xii—rise of Marathas, Sikhs, and European trading companies, xii—administrative breakdown in Aurangzib's last years, xiii—its causes, xiv—materials of his history, xiv—Court bulletins and contemporary letters, xvi—European travellers; their value criticised, xvi—author's thanks, xvii.

<b>Chapter I. Boyhood and Education</b>	...	1-12
---	-----	------

Birth, 1—education, 3—knowledge of languages, 4—favourite studies, 6—intellectual tastes, 7—fights a furious elephant, 8—speech in scorn of death, 10—first military appointment, 11.

<b>Chapter II. The Bundela War</b>	...	13-26
------------------------------------	-----	-------

Bundelkhand and its ruling clan, 13—Bir Singh Dev, 14—Jhujhar Singh captures Chauragarh, 16—Mughal armies sent against him under Aurangzib, 18—capture of Urchha, 20—Jhujhar pursued, 21—murdered, 22—fate of his wives and children, 23—Urchha temple turned into mosque, 25.

<b>Chapter III. First Viceroyalty of the Deccan</b>	27-48
---	-------

Conquests under Akbar, 27—pause under Jahangir, 28—Shah Jahan extinguishes Ahmadnagar dynasty, 29—Golkonda submits, 31—peace with Bijapur: its terms, 32—treaty with Golkonda, 34—Mughal Deccan: its four provinces, 36—capture of Udgir fort, 38—of Aussa 39—

Shahji Bhonslē submits, 41—exactions from the Gond Rajahs, 42—Baglana annexed, 43-46—Kheloji Bhonslē slain, 47.

**Chapter IV. Marriage and Family—  
Viceroyalty of Gujerat ... 49-72**

Persian princes in India, 49—Aurangzib married to Dilras Banu, 50—his wives: Nawab Bai, 53—Udipuri, 55—Zainabadi, 56—how won, 58—his children, 60—Jahanara burnt, 64—Aurangzib's dismissal, its cause, 67—he is reinstated, 69—Gujrat: the land and the people, 70—his strong rule, 71.

**Chapter V. War in Central Asia ... 73-100**

Badakhshan and Balkh, 73—their peoples, 74—Nazar Muhammad, king of Balkh, 78—Badakhshan invaded, 82—Balkh occupied, 83—Aurangzib appointed viceroy, 85—his march, 87—incessant fighting, 89—hardships, 90—his cool courage, 93—Mughal army evacuates Balkh, 96—losses, 99.

**Chapter VI. Governorship of Multan and  
Sindh ... ... 101-110**

Aurangzib sent to Multan, 101—his letters as preserved in the *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 102—lawless people of the province, 104—he enforces order, 106—a new port opened, 109.

**Chapter VII. First siege of Qandahar ... 111-132**

Qandahar district described, 111—its strategic importance, 113—past history, 114—Persians besiege Qandahar fort; 117—fort surrenders, 120—fort of Qandahar described, 124—Aurangzib besieges it, 127—his weakness in artillery, 128—Persians defeated by Rustam Khan, 131—retreat of Indian army, 132.

**Chapter VIII. Second siege of Qandahar 133-150**

Aurangzib with a second army begins the siege, 134—night attack on Qaitul hill fails, 137—bad gunnery of the Indians, 139—siege abandoned, 143—bitter correspondence between Shah Jahan and Aurangzib, 145—Mughal losses at Qandahar, 149.

**Chapter IX. Second Viceroyalty of the Deccan ... 151-187**

Aurangzib's life in the Deccan, 152—religious bigotry, 153—Aurangabad city described, 155—administrative confusion in the Deccan, 157—Aurangzib's financial difficulties, 159—wrangle between Emperor and viceroy, 164—Murshid Quli Khan, *diwan* of the Deccan, 169—his revenue system, 170—Aurangzib's improvements in Deccan administration and army, 173—causes of Aurangzib's differences with Shah Jahan, 177—minor expeditions: Gond kingdom of Deogarh, 183—invasion of Jawhar, 186.

**Chapter X. Invasion of Golkonda ... 188-227**

Golkonda: its wealth, 188—friction with the Mughal Government, 189—Karnatak conquered by Deccani Sultans, 191—Mir Jumla: his career and conquests, 193—jealousy of Qutb Shah, 195—Mir Jumla's intrigues, 197—his family imprisoned at Haidarabad, 202—Aurangzib's cavalry dash on Haidarabad, 205—plunder, 207—Aurangzib besieges fort of Golkonda, 209—peace made, terms, 215—Aurangzib's quarrel with Shah Jahan about the Golkonda booty, 217—Karnatak, Sri Ranga Rayal, last ruler of the Vijaynagar line, hard-pressed, 222—Did Aurangzib capture Haidarabad by treachery? 227.

**Chapter XI. War with Bijapur ... ... 228-264**

Bijapur kingdom: its growth under Muhammad Adil Shah, 228—relations with the Delhi Government, 230—succession of Ali Adil Shah II., 234—Aurangzib begins the invasion, 238—siege of Bidar, 239—carried by assault, 241—Mahabat Khan fights battle, 243—siege of Kaliani, 245—fall of Kaliani, 250—terms of peace with Bijapur, 251—Shivaji: his negotiations, 254—his raids, how checked by Aurangzib, 255—Shivaji makes peace, 257—Parentage of Ali Adil Shah II., 258—Was Khan Muhammad corrupted by Aurangzib? 260.

**Chapter XII. Illness of Shah Jahan ... 265-291**

Shah Jahan's long reign, its glories, 266—Dara Shukoh: his influence, 269—his religious views, 271—his character, 274—Shah Jahan falls ill, 277—Dara's devoted attendance, 279—Dara nominated as successor, 281—armies sent against his brothers, 283—Aurangzib's doings, 286—Dara stops the sending of news from Court, 287—Shuja and Murad crown themselves, 289.

**Chapter XIII. Murad crowns himself ... 292-312**

Murad Bakhsh: his character, 292—his wazir Ali Naqi, 293—is murdered on suspicion, 295—Murad besieges Surat, 296—Murad corresponds with Aurangzib for an alliance, 300—Murad proclaims himself Emperor, 303—Murad's impatient ambition and Aurangzib's cautiousness, 305—intrigue with Persia, 307—partition of empire between Murad and Aurangzib, sworn to by Aurangzib, 309—Murad starts and joins Aurangzib near Dipalpur, 311.

**Chapter XIV. Aurangzib advances from ...**

**the Deccan ... ... 313-347**

Aurangzib's anxiety and uncertainty, 313—his

dilemma : to attend to Bijapur or to Delhi? 315—retreats from Kaliani and Bidar, 318—waits for news of Court, 322—despairs of getting the treaty concessions from Bijapur, 325—Aurangzib's preparations for disputing the throne, 327—conflicting news from Delhi, and Aurangzib's distraction, 328—his letter to Mir Jumla in cypher, 329—Aurangzib summons Mir Jumla and collusively arrests him, 332—Aurangzib's dealings with Qutb Shah, 335—dealings with Bijapur, 337—his intrigue with nobles at Court, 340—his able officers, 342—Aurangzib marches from Aurangabad, 344—imprisons Shah Nawaz Khan, 345—crosses the Narmada and joins Murad, 346.

## VOL. II.

**Chapter XV. Battle of Dharmat** ... 348-375

Jaswant at Ujjain, his movements, 348—his difficulties, 351—contending forces, 357—Rajput Van charges, 359—Rajputs destroyed, 363—Murad attacks the imperial left, 364—Jaswant's flight, 366—Aurangzib's gains, 368—his memorial buildings, 369—Aurangzib crosses the Chambal, 373—reaches Samugarh, 374.

**Chapter XVI. Battle of Samugarh** ... 376-405

Dara gathers a new army, 377—takes leave of Shah Jahan, 379—Samugarh, evening before the battle, 382—Dara's army: its formation, 383—Aurangzib's battle order, 387—charge of Dara's left wing, repulsed, 390—Chhatra Sal charges Murad, 392—Rajput attack on Aurangzib, 393—desperate fight, 394—Dara's foolish movements, 395—flight of Dara's army, 399—Dara's escape, 401—tactics criticised, 404.

**Chapter XVII. Capture of Agra Fort and  
Captivity of Murad ... 406-439**

News of Samugarh, grief of Shah Jahan, 407—Dara's despondency, 408—his flight from Agra, 409—Aurangzib arrives outside Agra, 411—his correspondence with Shah Jahan, 412—Aurangzib seizes Agra city, 417—besieges Agra fort, 418—Shah Jahan's pathetic entreaty, 420—he surrenders Agra fort, 422—Jahanara's embassy fails, 423—close confinement of Shah Jahan, 425—Murad's jealousy of Aurangzib, 426—his ambition, 427—open rivalry with Aurangzib, 429—Murad invited by Aurangzib, treacherously disarmed and imprisoned, 431-33—Murad in Gwalior prison, 436—attempted rescue, 437—beheaded, 438.

**Chapter XVIII. Pursuit of Dara Shukoh ... 440-465**

Dara goes to Lahor, 442—holds the line of the Satlej, 443—Aurangzib at Delhi, 444—crowns himself, 446—his Van crosses the Satlej, 447—Dara abandons the Bias, 448—his suspicion roused against Daud Khan by a false letter, 450—Dara leaves Lahor, 451—Aurangzib pursues Dara to Multan, 453—history of Dara's flight down the Indus, 455—pursuit to Bhakkar, 457—Dara's miserable condition, 458—deserted by Daud Khan, 459—escapes to Tatta, 463—to Gujerat, 464—return of pursuing army, 465.

**Chapter XIX. Shuja's Struggles for the  
throne ... ... 466-496**

Character of Shuja, 466—he crowns himself, 467—advances to Benares, 468—his camp surprised by Sulaiman Shukoh, 469—Shuja's flight, 470—treaty with Sulaiman, 473—Shuja's second advance, 475—reaches Khajwa, 476—eve of the battle. 479—Aurangzib's camp looted by Jaswant, 483—Aurangzib's coolness, 484—the contending armies, 485—Aurangzib's left wing routed, 488—attack on

his centre repelled, 490—his right wing hard-pressed, 491—reinforced, beats the attack back, 492—general advance of Aurangzib's army, 492—flight of Shuja, 494—tactics, 495.

**Chapter XX. Battle of Deorai ... ... 497-521**

Dara's flight from Sindh, 497—welcomed by the Rao of Cutch, 498—Dara at Ahmadabad, 499—invited to Ajmir by Jaswant, 502—Jaswant deserts Dara, 503—Dara entrenches a pass near Ajmir, 506—battle: attack on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches, 512—flight of Dara's troops, 517—Dara's family escape from Ajmir, 518—plunder, 519.

**Chapter XXI. End of Dara Shukoh ... 522-550**

Dara's flight to Mairta, 522—his sufferings, 523—refused admission to Ahmadabad, 525—flight to Cutch, 526—and Sehwan, 528—Jai Singh's march in pursuit, 528—crosses the Rann: terrible sufferings of troops, 531—loss of horses and cattle, 532—Dara in the Baluch country, 535—death of Dara's wife, 538—Jiwan treacherously imprisons Dara, 539—and delivers him up to the imperial generals, 540—Dara paraded through the streets of Delhi, 542—popular sympathy, 543—riot, 546—murder of Dara, 548—his burial, 549.

**Chapter XXII. End of Sulaiman Shukoh ... 551-565**

Sulaiman hears of Samugarh, 551—deserted by his troops, retreats to Allahabad, 552—marches to Hardwar, 554—his path to the Panjab closed, 555—robbed and deserted by his followers, 558—seeks asylum in Garhwal, 559—Sulaiman delivered up to the Mughals, 562—interview with Aurangzib, 563—drugged to death in prison, 565.

**Chapter XXIII. Pursuit of Shuja ... ... 566-596**

Shuja's flight from Khajwa, 566—at Mungir blocks the

road, 568—Shuja at Sahibganj, 570—Mir Jumla's detour, 571—Rajput contingent secedes from Mir Jumla, 572—Shuja's flight to Rajmahal, 573—Alawardi Khan conspires, 574—is beheaded, 576—scene of the war, 577—strategy of the war, 580—Mir Jumla's first coup, 582—his second coup, 583—his third coup fails, 584—Prince Muhammad deserts to Shuja, 588—Rajmahal water-locked, 589—recaptured by Shuja, 590—campaign renewed, 591—battle of Gheria, 592—Shuja's rear threatened, 593—his retreat, 594—skirmishes, 595—Shuja finally abandons the west bank of the Ganges, 596.

#### **Chapter XXIV. End of Shuja ... 597-612**

Mir Jumla's new plan of war, 598—his base at Samda, 599—grand turning movement, 600—advance on Malda, 601—fords the Mahananda with loss, 602—Shuja's flight to Dacca, 604—Shuja's property and *harem* seized, 605—Shuja's flight from Dacca, 606—Shuja leaves India, 609—his death in Arracan, Dutch account of it, 611.

#### **Chapter XXV. Grand Enthronement of Aurangzib ... 613-624**

Features of a Muslim coronation, 614—march through the streets, 615—appearance of Aurangzib, 616—decoration of the *Diwan-i-am*, 618—his enthronement, 620—audience held in the *harem*, 621—his new ordinances, 622—tributes and presents, 623—fireworks and illumination, 623.

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## INTRODUCTION

The history of Aurangzib is practically the history of India for sixty years. His own reign (1658—1707) covers the second half of the seventeenth century and stands forth as a most important epoch in the annals of our country. Under him the Mughal empire reached its greatest extent, and the largest single State ever known in India from the dawn of history to the rise of the British power was formed. From Ghazni to Chatgaon, from Kashmir to the Karnatak, the continent of India obeyed one sceptre ; and beyond this region, in far-off Ladak and Malabar, the suzerainty of the same ruler was proclaimed from the pulpit. Islam made its last onward movement in India in this reign.

The empire thus formed, while unprecedented in size, was also one political unit. Its parts were governed not by the mediation of sub-kings, but directly by the servants of the Crown. Herein Auangzib's Indian empire was vaster than that of Asoka, or Samudra-gupta or Harsha-varthan. No provincial governor had as yet set up his own rule and withheld revenue and obedience from the central power. There were rebellions here and there, but no other crowned head raised itself to defy the Emperor of Delhi even in any province.

But the reign that saw the formation of the greatest Indian empire of pre-British days, witnessed also unmistakable signs of its commencing decline and disruption. Long before Nadir Shah the Persian or Ahmad Shah the Afghan proved the Padishah to be an impotent

shadow of royalty and Delhi the mere memory of past greatness, long before the Maratha confederacy hid beneath its super-imposed sway the regular monarchy of the land,—even before Aurangzib closed his eyes, the Mughal empire had turned bankrupt in finance and prestige, the administration had broken down, the imperial power had confessed its failure to maintain order and hold this vast realm together.

The reign of Aurangzib is also marked by the up-springing of the Maratha nationality out of the ashes of their short-lived kingship, and by the appearance of the Sikh sect in the role of warriors and armed opponents of the ruling power. Thus, the supreme factors of Indian history, in the 18th and early 19th centuries owe their origin to Aurangzib's reign and policy. In the Deccan, after kings like Adil Shah and Qutb Shah, Shambhuji and Rajaram, had bowed low before the Mughal blast, the people asserted themselves and drove back the spoiler from the North. To the Marathas, alone among the Indian peoples, belongs the glory of giving the first successful check to the onward advance of the Mughal power and saving their fatherland from foreign encroachment. Their development into conquerors and universal raiders belongs to the next age.

In the very reign in which the Mughal crescent rounded to fulness and then began to wane visibly, the first glow of a new dawn was distinctly seen in our political sky. The future lords of our country's destiny gained a firm and safe footing on its soil. Madras and Bombay became presidencies of the English East India Company in 1653 and 1687 respectively ; Calcutta was founded in 1690. The places of shelter thus gained by the Europeans formed a dominion within a dominion,

nd were fortified to defy the greatest onslaughts of the 'country powers.' The foreign "merchant adventurers" were began their first experiments in Oriental government nd legislation,—experiments which were destined in the ulness of time to result in an empire larger than that of he Romans and more populous than that of Charles V., and a civilised and progressive administration to which he world, ancient or modern, affords no parallel.

The end of the seventeenth century reveals the Mughal empire as rotten at the core. The grand edifice which Akbar had built up and Shah Jahan and Aurangzib ad extended, still looked fair as before, but it was ready to tumble down like a house of cards at the first breath of foreign invasion. The treasury was empty. The nperial army knew itself defeated and recoiled from its oes. The centrifugal forces were asserting themselves uccessfully, and the empire was ready for disruption. he moral weakness of the empire was even greater than the material : the Government no longer commanded the we of its subjects ; the public servants had lost honesty nd efficiency ; ministers and princes alike lacked statesmanship and ability ; the army broke down as an instrument of force. In letter after letter the aged Aurangzib iourns over the utter incapacity of his officers and sons nd chastises them with the sharpness of his pen, but in espair of a remedy. Contemporaries like Bhimsen and Hafi Khan sadly contrast the misery and degradation of ie nobles and the people alike in Aurangzib's closing ears with the glory of the empire under his forefathers, nd wonder why it was so.

Why was it so? The ruler was free from vice, upidity, and sloth. His intellectual keenness was pro-erbial, and at the same time he took to the business

of governing with all the ardour which men usually display in the pursuit of pleasure. In industry and attention to public affairs he could not be surpassed by any clerk. His patience and perseverance were as remarkable as his love of discipline and order. In private life he was simple and abstemious like a hermit. He faced the privations of a campaign or a forced march as uncomplainingly as the most seasoned private. No terror could daunt his heart, no weakness or pity melt it. Of the wisdom of the ancients which can be gathered from ethical books, he was a master. He had, besides, undergone a long and successful probation in war and diplomacy in his father's lifetime.

And yet the result of fifty years' rule by such a sovereign was failure and chaos! The cause of this political paradox is to be found in Aurangzib's policy and conduct. Hence his reign is an object of supreme interest to the student of political philosophy no less than to the student of Indian history.

Happily, the materials for a study of it are abundant in Persian, the literary language of Mughal India. First, we have the official annals,—the *Padishahnamat* (in three sections by three writers) and the *Alamgirnamah*—which cover the 41 years lying between the accession of Shah Jahan and the eleventh year of Aurangzib's reign. These works were written by order, on the basis of the State papers preserved in the imperial archives, such as official correspondence, despatches, news-letters, treaties and revenue returns. They are rich in dates and topographical details of the utmost value and accuracy. For the last forty years of Aurangzib's reign we have the concise *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, compiled from the same class of official records, but after his death.

Next come a class of private histories, like those of Masum, Aqil Khan, a Razbhani soldier in Bengal (metrical), and Khafi Khan. These were written by officials, but, not having been meant for the Emperor's eyes, they supply us with many of the facts suppressed in the Court annals, though their dates and names are sometimes inaccurate and their descriptions meagre. They, however, contain many personal traits and graphic touches which the more formal official histories have excluded.

There are even two histories of Aurangzib's reign written by Hindus in the Persian tongue. One is the *Nuskha-i-Dilkasha* by Bhimsen Burhanpuri, the business man of Aurangzib's general Dalpat Rao Bundela. This author was an active traveller, with a good eye for topographical details, and a careful recorder of all he saw from Mathura to Malabar. His work is of special value for Deccan affairs, because he was brought up and spent nearly all his life there. The other is the *Fatuhat-i-Alamgiri* of Ishwardas Nagar, who long served the Shaikh-ul-Islam and lived at Pattan in Gujerat. This work is of great importance for Rajput affairs.

Besides these general histories of the reign, we have monographs in Persian touching only particular episodes or personages of the time,—such as Niamat Khan Ali's account of the siege of Golkonda, Shihab-ud-din Talish's diary of the conquest of Kuch Bihar, Assam, and Chatgaon, the memoirs of Iradat Khan and of some other servants of Bahadur Shah I. which start from the closing years of Aurangzib's reign. Of the two Deccani kingdoms, Golkonda and Bijapur, we have separate histories, which throw light on the dealings of the Mughal Government with them. On the Maratha side there are |

chronicles (*bakhars*) of Shivaji, Shambhuji, and Rajaram written by their officers and others. A vast number of historical letters of the 17th century in Marathi have been printed, but they usually throw only side-lights on history, being of the nature of legal documents and not State papers properly so called. For Assam affairs we have the extremely valuable indigenous annals called *Buranjis*.

Most fortunately, for several portions of Aurangzib's reign I have been able to secure the very raw materials of history,—a source of information even more valuable than the contemporary official annals described above. These are the manuscript news-letters of the imperial Court (*akhbarat-i-darbar-i-muala*) preserved at Jaipur and in the Royal Asiatic Society's library (London) and the LETTERS of the actors in the political drama of the 17th century, of which nearly six thousand are in my possession. In them we see events as they happened day by day, and not as they were dressed up afterwards by writers with a purpose. In them we see the actual hopes and fears, plans and opinions of those who made Indian history. To this class belong the letters of Aurangzib, forming many different and bulky collections. All these different sources,—many of them not even alluded to here,—will be described in the bibliography at the end of this work.

The European travellers, Tavernier, Bernier, Careri, and Manucci, who visited India in this reign, have left long accounts of the country. Their works are of undoubted value as throwing light on the condition of the people, the state of trade and industry, and the history of the Christian churches in India. Moreover, the criticism of Indian institutions by foreign observers has a freshness and weight all its own. But of the political

history of India, apart from the few events in which they took part or which they personally witnessed, their report merely reproduced the bazar rumours and the stories current among the populace, and cannot be set against the evidence of contemporary histories and letters in Persian. This fact will be proved by illustrations in the bibliography.

I cannot place this history before the public without acknowledging the deep debt of gratitude I owe to the late Mr. William Irvine, I.C.S., the author of the *Later Mughals*. He freely lent me his own Persian MSS., took great pains in securing on my behalf permission from European public libraries to take copies of their MSS., and cheap rotographs in London and Paris. In every difficulty and doubt that I have appealed to him, he has given prompt assistance and advice.

Mr. Irvine criticised and emended the first five chapters of this history, as carefully and minutely as if it were his own work.

Dr. C. R. Wilson, the author of the *Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, who encouraged my historical studies and recommended me, unsolicited, to the Bengal Government for aid in paying for transcripts of Persian MSS. in England and the Continent (£ 40), is also beyond the reach of my thanks. The Secretary of State for India and the Royal Asiatic Society of London have lent me Persian MSS. from their libraries on several occasions, for which priceless help I am deeply indebted to them.

My thanks are also due to Sir Edward A. Gait, who secured for me permission to copy the *Buranjis* belonging to the Assam Government and the rich Persian and Hindi archives of the Jaipur State, and to Sir William Foster and M. Gabriel Ferrand who have assisted me in getting

transcripts from the records of the India Office in London, and the French archives in Paris. Kind helpers in India have been too many to be separately named.

\* \* \*

The first edition of these two initial volumes was published in July 1912. In the second edition (issued in April, 1925) I have not only subjected the book to a careful revision and correction, but also utilised the new materials acquired during the intervening thirteen years. The chief among these additional sources are the copious correspondence between Jai Singh and the imperial Court preserved in the Jaipur Record Office, the more slender volume of Mughal-Maratha correspondence printed by Rajwade and others or preserved in the Persian version in Rao Bahadur D. B. Parasnisi's library at Satara, a contemporary metrical history (*Aurangnamah*) in the unique Haidarabad copy, and the letter-books of the Bijapur and Golkonda States.

The printing charges are now exactly double of what they were when the first edition was issued, and the prices of paper and binding materials are half as much again. And yet I have tried to suit the Indian reader by bringing out this second edition at the reduced price of Rs. 5 for the two volumes together (in the place of Rs. 7),—while using a larger type than in the first edition. The introduction and the foot-notes have been somewhat compressed in order to save space, and the bibliography (first part) removed from the end of the second volume to a separate volume of Index and Sources which is now in preparation.

JADUNATH SARKAR.

Patna College.

# HISTORY OF AURANGZIB

## CHAPTER I.

BOYHOOD AND EDUCATION, 1618—1634.

### § 1. *Birth and childhood.*

Muhi-ud-din Muhammad Aurangzib, who ascended the throne of Delhi as Alamgir I., was the sixth child of Shah Jahan and Mumtaz Mahal, the royal couple who lie buried in the famous Taj Mahal. His grandfather, the Emperor Jahangir, after putting down one of Malik Ambar's attempts to revive the Ahmadnagar kingship, was leisurely making a royal progress from Gujrat to Agra, with Shah Jahan and his family in his train, when at *Dohad*,\* on the way to Ujjain, Aurangzib was born, in the night of 15th Ziqada, 1027 A.H. (or, according to European calculation, the night preceding Sunday, 24th October, 1618 A.D., Old Style). A few days afterwards when the imperial Court reached Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, the princely infant's birth was celebrated with befitting splendour. [*Tuzuk*, 250-251.]

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\* Dohad (22°50' N. 74°20' E., *Indian Atlas*, sheet 36 s. w.) is a subdivision of the Panch Mahal district in the Bombay Presidency, and the town stands just south of the Dohad Station on the B. B. & C. I. Railway.

Aurangzib cherished an affectionate memory of the place of his birth; we find him in his old age writing to his son Muhammad Azam, "Noble son, the village of Dohad, in the province of Gujurat, is the birth-place of this sinner. Deem it proper to treat its inhabitants with kindness. Conciliate and retain at his post the old man who has been its *faujdar* for a long time past." [Ruqaat, No. 31.]

Shah Jahan was intensely devoted to his wife Mumtaz Mahal, and never in her life parted from her in weal or woe. Wherever he moved, whether marching on a campaign, visiting different provinces, or, in Jahangir's later years, fleeing from his father's wrath through the wilderness of Telingana to Bengal, —his wife always bore him company. Thus, Aurangzib was born on the return march from the Deccan and Murad Bakhsh in the fort of Rohtas in South Bihar.

From 1622 till almost the end of his father's reign, Shah Jahan was under a cloud; the infatuated old Emperor, entirely dominated by his selfish and imperious consort Nur Jahan, deprived Shah Jahan of his posts and fiefs, and at last drove him into rebellion in self-defence. But the prince's efforts were in general unsuccessful, and he had to flee by way of Telingana, Orissa and Bengal to Jaunpur and back again to the Deccan by the same wild and terrible route, his wife and children accompanying

him. At last he had no help but to submit to his father and give up his young sons, Dara and Aurangzib, as hostages. These two reached Jahangir's Court at Lahor in June 1626, [Tuzuk, 380-391, 397, 410] and remained under the care of Nur Jahan. Shortly afterwards Jahangir died, Shah Jahan ascended the throne, and the two boys were escorted by Asaf Khan to Agra, where a most pathetic scene was acted: their eagerly expectant mother clasped her long lost darlings to her bosom and poured out all her pent up affection for them (26 February, 1628). Aurangzib's daily allowance was now fixed at Rs. 500. [Abd. Hamid's *Padi-shahnamah*, I.A. 70, 97, 177.]

### § 2. Education.

Thus, at the age of ten he came to a settled life; and arrangements were evidently now made for his regular education. Sadullah Khan, who rose to be the best reputed of Shah Jahan's *wazirs*, is said\* to have been one of his teachers. Another teacher was Mir Muhammad Hashim of Gilan, who after a study of twelve years at Mecca and Medina came to India, learnt medicine under Hakim Ali Gilani, and kept a famous school at Ahmadabad, where he was afterwards made Civil Judge (*Sâdr.*)

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\* Hamid-ud-din's *Ahkâm-i-Alamgiri*, § 3. But Sadullah entered Shah Jahan's service in Dec. 1640. (*Pad.* ii. 220).

As Aurangzib's tutor he remained in the prince's service till the end of Shah Jahan's reign, [Pad. i. B. 345.] Bernier (p. 154) speaks of Mulla Salih as his old teacher, but the Persian histories do not bear this statement out. Of one Mulla Salih Badakhshani we read that he was a scholar of Balkh and had his first audience of Shah Jahan on 4th January, 1647, when Aurangzib was already 29 years of age,—too old to go to school. [Pad. ii. 624.]

That Aurangzib had a natural keenness of mind and quickly learnt what he read, we can readily believe. His correspondence proves that he had thoroughly mastered the *Quran* and the *Traditional Sayings of Muhammad (Hadis)*, and was ever ready with apt quotations from them. He spoke and wrote Arabic and Persian like a scholar. Hindustani was his mother tongue, the language used by the Mughal Court in private life. He had some knowledge of Hindi, too, and could talk and recite popular sayings in that language.\* He acquired a mastery over Chaghtai Turki, as he had served in Balkh and Qandahar, and the Mughal army contained a large body of men recruited from Central Asia. Under exactly the same circumstances Jai Singh had learnt that foreign tongue. [Dil. i. 63.]

Aurangzib wrote Arabic in a vigorous and

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\* *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, 334. *Alamgirnamah*, 1095.

masterly *naskh* hand. In this he used to copy the *Quran*, a deed of piety in Muslim eyes. Two manuscripts of this book he presented to Mecca and Medina, after richly binding and illuminating them. [M.A. 532.] A third copy is preserved at the tomb of Nizam-ud-din Auliya near Delhi. Others were sold in his lifetime by this puritan Emperor, who deemed it sinful to eat the bread of idleness, and used to ply the trade of copyist and cap-maker in his leisure hours in order to earn his livelihood. Copies of these *Qurans* are known to exist here and there in India.

"His *nastaliq* and *shikasta* styles of writing were also excellent," says Saqi Mustad Khan, and this we can readily believe, for Aurangzib was the author of a vast number of letters, and made it a point to write orders across all petitions in his own hand. [A.N. 1092-94] The princes of the house of Akbar were taught handwriting with great care, as the signatures of Shah Jahan and Dara Shukoh on some Persian MSS. of their libraries, and the autograph remarks of Jahangir in his book of fate (a copy of the *Diwan* of Hafiz), look remarkably clear and beautiful.\*

In his letters and speeches, he frequently quotes

\* MSS. containing the autographs of these princes are preserved in the Khuda Bakhsh Library, Bankipur.

verses to point his remarks. But these "familiar quotations" were a part of the mental equipment of every cultured Muhammadan, and do not prove any special taste for poetry. Indeed his historian remarks, "This Emperor did not like to hear useless poetry, still less laudatory verses. But he made an exception in favour of poems containing good counsels." [M.A. 532.] The moral precepts of Sadi and Hafiz he had evidently learnt by rote in his youth, and he quoted them to his last day, but he does not seem to have studied these poets in later life. Once he asked for the works of a poet named Mulla Shah. But we may rightly hold that, unlike his grandfather he was not fond of poetry, and unlike Shah Jahan he had no passion for history. "His favourite study was theological works,—Commentaries on the *Quran*, the Traditions of Muhammad, Canon Law, the works of Imam Muhammad Ghazzali, selections from the letters of Shaikh Sharf Yahia of Munir, and Shaikh Zain-ud-din Qutb Muhi Shirazi, and other works of that class."<sup>\*</sup> We also learn that he highly prized the *Nihaiyya* of Mulla Abdullah Tabbakh. Like many other pious

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\* *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, 531-532. He spent his leisure in the afternoon in investigating theological problems, deliberating on the philosophy of truth, (lit., 'the certain sciences,') reading the books and pamphlets of wise men and saints. (*Alamgirnamah*, 1103.) Aurangzib speaks of his having read two books of Ghazzali (A.S.B. Pers. MS. F. 27, 126).

Muslims, and even some ladies of the Mughal royal family, Aurangzib committed the *Quran* to memory. [M.A. 391.]

(Such intellectual tastes made him find delight in the society of dervishes, and when he was viceroy he took care to visit the holy men of Islam in his province, engaging them in talk, and reverently learning wisdom at their feet.)

Painting he never appreciated. Indeed the portraiture of any living being was impossible under an orthodox Islamic king, as an impious imitation of the Creator. Music he banished from his Court, in the outburst of devotion which marked the completion of the tenth year of his reign. Fine China-ware he liked, and these were presented to him by nobles and traders. But he had none of his father's passion for building. No masterpiece of architecture, no superb or exquisite mosque,\* hall, or tomb marks his reign. All that he built took the impress of his utilitarian mind. They were commonplace necessary things, piles of brick and mortar, which quickly decayed. Such were the mosques which marked the scenes of his victories,

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\* Except one, the Pearl Mosque in the Delhi palace, which was begun on 10 Dec. 1659 and completed in 5 years at a cost of one *lakh* and sixty thousand Rupees, (A.N. 468). His mosque at Lahor is not the best one in that city. The tomb of his wife Dilras Banu at Aurangabad was his grandest building.

and the numberless *sarais* which he built along the imperial highways running to the south and the west. [A.N. 1084.]

### § 3. *Fights an elephant.*

One incident of his boyhood made his fame ring throughout India, and showed what stuff he was made of. It was his encounter with a fighting elephant on 28th May, 1633. That morning Shah Jahan, who loved this sport, set two huge elephants, Sudhakar and Surat-sundar by name, to fight a combat on the level bank of the Jamuna near the mansion at Agra which he used to occupy before his accession. They ran for some distance and then grappled together just below the balcony of the morning salute in the fort. The Emperor hastened there to see the fight, his eldest three sons riding a few paces before him. Aurangzib, intent on seeing the fight, edged his way very close to the elephants.

The brutes after a while let go their grip and each stepped back a little. Sudhakar's spirit was fully roused. Losing sight of his opponent he turned to vent his wrath on the prince standing by. Trumpeting fiercely, the moving mountain charged Aurangzib. The prince, then only fourteen years old, calmly stood his ground, kept his horse from turning back, and flung his spear at the elephant's head. All was now confusion and alarm. The

crowd swayed this way and that, men stumbling on one another in their eagerness to flee. The nobles and the servants ran about shouting, fireworks were let off to scare away the elephant, but all to no effect. The animal came on and felled Aurangzib's horse with a sweep of his long tusk. But the prince jumped up from the ground, drew his sword, and faced the raging beast. The unequal combat would have soon ended fatally for the heroic boy, but succour was at hand. His brother Shuja forced his way through the crowd and smoke, galloped up to the elephant, and wounded it with his spear. But his horse reared and he was thrown down. Rajah Jai Singh, too, came up, and while managing his shying steed with one hand attacked the elephant with the other from the right side. Shah Jahan shouted to his own guards to run to the spot.

Just then an unlooked for diversion came to the princes' aid. The other elephant, Surat-sundar, ran up to renew the combat, and Sudhakar, having now no stomach for the fight, or being daunted by the spear-thrusts and fireworks discharged at him, fled from the field with his rival thundering at his heels.

The danger thus passed away, and the princes were saved. Shah Jahan clasped Aurangzib to his bosom, praised his courage, gave him the title of *Bahadur* or 'hero,' and covered him with presents. The courtiers cried out that the boy had inherited his

father's reckless courage, and reminded each other how Shah Jahan in his youth had attacked a wild tiger sword in hand before the eyes of Jahangir.\*

On this occasion Aurangzib gave a foretaste of his lofty spirit and royal contempt for death, in his speech as reported by Hamid-ud-din Khan. When his father lovingly chid him for his rash courage, he replied, "If the fight had ended fatally for me it would not have been a matter of shame. Death drops the curtain even on Emperors; it is no dis-honour. The shame lay in what my brothers did!"†

Three days afterwards occurred his fifteenth birthday. The Emperor had the boy weighed against gold pieces in full Court and presented him with the amount (5000 *mohars*), the elephant Sudhakar, and other gifts worth two *lakhs* of Rupees in all. The heroic deed was celebrated in Urdu and Persian verses. The Poet Laureate, Saidai Gilani, surnamed Bedil Khan, got Rs. 5,000 for his ode. Shuja was praised for his gallant exertions. Another

\* Abdul Hamid's *Pad.*, I.A. 489—495. One MS. reads *Madhu-kar* for *Sudhakar*.

† Hamid-ud-din Khan's *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, or *Anecdotes*, § 1. Dara Shukoh is unjustly taunted with cowardice in the above speech. He was at some distance from Shuja and Aurangzib, and could not, even if he had wished it, have come to Aurangzib's aid as the affair was over in a few minutes. *Pad.*, I.A. 493.

sum of 5,000 gold pieces was distributed by the Emperor in charity.

Thereafter we get occasional glimpses of Aurangzib. Next year the Emperor paid a visit to Kashmir. Aurangzib accompanied him, and was presented with the pargana of Lokh-bhavan near Sahibabad or Achbal (September, 1634).\*

#### § 4. *His first mansab.*

Hitherto Aurangzib had been getting, like other Mughal princes before they were old enough for military appointment, a daily allowance of Rs. 500. But on 13th December, 1634, though not yet sixteen, he got his first post in the Mughal peerage, with the rank of a Commander of Ten Thousand Horse, with an additional following of 4000 troopers. He was also permitted to use the red tent, which was a royal prerogative. The governorship of the Deccan was intended for him, and there, under the guidance of the highest generals of his father's Court, he was expected to receive the best education then possible for a man of action and a leader of men. As a

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\* *Pad.* I. B. 52. Achbal, in the Kuthar pargana, 75-17 E. Long. 33° 41' N. Lat., famous for its beautiful springs described by Bernier (Constable's ed. p. 413). At the western end of the pargana and 5 miles to the s. w. of Achbal is the village of Lokh-bhavan. King Lalitaditya is said to have built a town here. A small garden-palace erected in Mughal times near the spring is partly constructed of old materials. (Stein's *Rajatarangini*, i. 50n, ii. 468).

preparation for this high and difficult post he was given his first lessons in the art of war and the control of men by being sent to the Bundela expedition in September, 1635. [Pad. I. B. 65, 99.]

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## CHAPTER II.

### THE BUNDELA WAR, 1635.

#### § 1. *The Bundela clan.*

As the old road from Agra to the Deccan leaves Gwalior, it skirts on its left hand side an extensive jungly tract known as Bundelkhand. The Jamuna river and the Kaimur range, meeting in a sharp angle near Mirzapur, enclose this district on the north, east, and south. Its western boundary is the edge of the Malwa plateau. The river Betwa flowing north-eastwards to the Jamuna cuts it into two.

The country took its name from its dominant race, the Bundelas, a clan of Gaharwar Rajputs, whose mythical genealogy stretches up to Rajah Pancham, a sworn devotee of the goddess Vindhya-basini, and even beyond him to Rama, the hero of the *Ramayana*. The only element of truth that we can extract from this mass of fiction is that a great ancestor of the family migrated from the Benares, through the Mirzapur district, and established his rule over this tract by dispossessing its older rulers, Afghans and aborigines. Urchha, on the Betwa, was their first capital, (founded in 1531). Here

lived the head of the clan. The Bundelas multiplied fast, and the younger branches established principalities all over the land, each centring round a fort. One of these, Mahoba, sheltered within a network of ravines, rose to prominence in the latter half of the seventeenth century, under, Champat Rao and his son Chhatra Sal, who long troubled the imperial Government. Other scions of the family reigned at Simroha Shahpur, and many another town.\*

### *§ 2. Bir Singh and Jhujhar of Urchha.*

The Bundela power reached its zenith under Bir Singh Dev, the agent employed by Jahangir in murdering his father's beloved minister Abul Fazl. There was hardly any favour which the Emperor could refuse to this Rajah. Bir Singh grew in wealth and power, and towards the close of his patron's reign, when the imperial administration grew slack, he freely levied contributions from the neighbouring princes, for none durst complain against the favourite. As a still higher mark of his master's favour he was permitted to build grand temples at Mathura, Urchha, and other places;—a

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\* *Chhatraprakash* cantos 1 and 2. Elliot's *Memoirs...of the N. W. P.* ed. by Beames, i. 45-46. *Imperial Gazetteer* (ed. 1906) ix, 68, 70; *Masir-ul-umara*, ii. 131, 317. Urchha is situated 7 m. south-east of Jhansi fort. Mahoba is midway on the railway line between Jhansi and Manikpur.

fact which the Muhammadan historian can explain only by supposing that the Islamic Emperor was then sinking into dotage! With all his lavish expenditure on temples and *ghats*, gifts to Brahmans, and construction of palaces, forts and lakes, Bir Singh died in 1627, the master of fabulous wealth, fully two *krores* of Rupees,—which in Bundela fashion was buried in wells and other safe places in the pathless jungles, and their secret confided only to a few.\*

His eldest son Jhujhar Singh had given offence to Shah Jahan by leaving the capital for his home without permission, soon after the Emperor's accession. But an army of 34,500 soldiers—cavalry, foot musketeers, and sappers, penetrated into his country from three directions, stormed the fort of Irich, slaughtered 2000 of the garrison including "many young and old," and quickly forced the Rajah to make submission. He secured pardon only by promising a large tribute and sending a contingent of his clansmen to fight in the Emperor's wars in the South.†

\* Blochmann's *Ain-i-Akbari*, i. 488 and xxv-xxvi; M.U. ii. 197—199; Pad. I.A. 293, I.B. 117.

† Pad. I.A. 240—242, 246—248. Jhujhar's life is given in M.U. ii. 214—217. The cause of his flight is stated to have been his fear lest the stricter administration of Shah Jahan should make him disgorge his father's unauthorised annexations of territory. Khafi

To this race of primitive warriors a peaceful life was impossible. War was their sole occupation, their sole means of earning glory and riches, and their only amusement. This restless spirit made the Bundelas, when not usefully occupied in war, a bye-word for robbery and disturbance throughout the seventeenth century.

Jhujhar could not long remain quiet. He led an army to Chauragarh, an old Gond capital, beyond the Narmada, captured it, and, in violation of his plighted word, slew the Rajah Prem Narayan and seized his ancestral hoard, amounting to 10 *lakhs* of Rupees. The victim's son appealed to Shah Jahan, but strangely enough, the Mughal Emperor's righteous indignation was not roused by this act of spoliation, he only demanded a share of the booty\* and offered to leave Jhujhar in possession of his conquest if he ceded an equivalent territory to the

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Khan, i. 406. Irich is situated on a bend of the Betwa river, 40 miles n. e. of Jhansi (*Ind. Atlas*, sheet 69 N. W.)

\* Abdul Hamid, I. B. 95, gives the Gond king's name as *Bim* (=Bhim) *Narayan*. The *Imp. Gaz.* xviii, 387, has *Prem Narayan*. Shah Jahan's message to Jhujhar ran thus: "As you have shed the blood of Bhim Narayan and his family and seized the country of Garha without my permission, it is best for you to present the country to my officers. But if you wish to be confirmed in that country you must give up your *jagirs* near your home, in exchange of it, and send to me 10 *lakhs* of Rupees out of the cash taken from Bhim Narayan." This is the official account revised by Shah Jahan himself. Not a word is said here about making restitution to the murdered Rajah's son.

Mughals ! This the Bundela was most unwilling to do. Deciding on a policy of resistance, he secretly recalled his son Yograj (surnamed Vikramajit), whom he had left in charge of his contingent in Balaghat. The youth slipped away unperceived. But an energetic Mughal officer, Khan-i-Dauran, was soon at his heels, reached Ashta from Burhanpur by forced marches in five days, and overtook Vikramajit, who fled defeated and wounded to his father at Dhamuni.\*

### § 3. *Shah Jahan's war against Jhujhar.*

A habitual plunderer and refractory chieftain could not be left unsubdued on the edge of the Deccan road. Shah Jahan organised an expedition to hunt him down. Three armies were to converge upon the rebel's country : Sayyid Khan-i-Jahan with 10,500 men from Budaun, Adbullah Khan Bahadur Firuz Jang with 6,000 men from the north, and Khan-i-Dauran with 6,000 men from the south-west. The Bundela army numbered less than 15,000 but were aided by the rocks and jungles of their home.†

\* Pad. I. B. 95-96. *Chauragarh* is in the Narsinghpur district, C. P., about 10 miles s. e. of the Gadarwara Station. *Dhamuni* is near the Dhasan river 24 m. north of Sangor in C. P. (*Ind. Atlas*, 70 S. W.).

† The Bundela army consisted of about 5,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry, whereas in the Mughal army the horsee outnumbered the foot several times.

Among the Hindu mercenaries of the Mughal army was a Bundela claimant in whom Shah Jahan found a useful tool. Devi Singh was the representative of the eldest branch of the Rajahs of Urchha, which had been set aside by Jahangir when he gave the throne to his favourite Bir Singh Dev. Jhujhar had duly succeeded his father; but in Devi Singh's eyes the usurpation continued, and he himself was the rightful heir to the Bundela throne. He was now earning his bread as a captain in the Mughal army, and waiting for some opportunity of winning the Emperor's favour and ousting his rival. Shah Jahan now offered to make him Rajah of Urchha, and got the invaluable help of a Bundela contingent burning with hatred of Jhujhar and eager to guide the invaders through the jungles and disclose all the weak points of their native land. [Pad. I. B. 96—98, M.U. ii. 295, 213.]

The three Mughal generals were of equal rank, and it would have been hard to ensure unity of plan and co-operation among them if they had been left to themselves. A supreme commander was needed, whose high position would of itself enforce discipline and obedience. For this purpose the Emperor sent his son Aurangzib, then a lad of sixteen, with the rank of a Commander of 10,000 and escorted by 1000 archers of the guard and 1000 horse. He was to be the nominal chief of the expedition, and

stay far in the rear. The three generals were to advise him about every military operation, but his voice was to be decisive, and they were not to act without consulting him.\*

In the meantime an ultimatum had been presented to Jhujhar Singh: he must submit, pay a fine of 30 *lakhs*, and cede a district. But these terms had been rejected. After the rainy season the three divisions united together near Bhander, about 25 miles north-east of Jhansi, and marched upon Urchha. Every day the pioneers cut the jungle and extended the road, while the Bundela skirmishers shot at them under cover of the trees, but with no success. On 2nd October, 1635, the army arrived at a village two miles from Urchha; and the Bundela prince in the imperial camp, fired with domestic hatred and ambition, stormed the hillock where the enemy had mustered in force and took many prisoners. At this Jhujhar lost heart, removed his family to Dhamuni and soon afterwards fled thither

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\* *Pad.* I. B. 99-100. Dow's highly coloured and imaginary account is very amusing: "Aurungzebe was sent against him. This was the first opportunity given to that young lion of rioting in blood... The war was protracted for two years... Aurungzebe though but thirteen years of age, displayed that martial intrepidity... which could not be restrained. He was present in every danger, &c." (iii. 132). If the campaign was meant to be Aurangzib's baptism of fire, we must say that the baptism was performed at a great distance from the fire. Throughout the war the young prince was kept by his guardian safe in the rear, many miles behind the fighting line.

himself. Early in the morning of 4th October the Mughals scaled the walls of the Bundela capital, while the small garrison left by Jhujhar escaped through the opposite gate. [Pad. I.B. 98—100, 106.]

A day was spent in taking full possession of the city and installing Devi Singh as Rajah. Then the Mughal army crossed the Betwa and hastened southwards to Dhamuni. But their prey had again fled. Jhujhar Singh had found no safety in Dhamuni, but gone further south, across the Vindhya hills and the Narmada river, to Chauragarh in the land of the Gonds. Dhamuni had, however, been prepared to stand a siege. The houses round the fort had been razed to the ground and a gallant Rajput named Ratnai left in command. On 18th October the imperialists arrived before the fort and began siege operations. The garrison fought till midnight, and then sent a man to Khan-i-Dauran to beg for quarter. But a body of Ruhelas had run their trenches to the edge of the bamboo thicket adjoining the eastern wall of the fort, and occupied the jungle under cover of the darkness. After midnight some of them entered the fort from that side and began to plunder. Khan-i-Dauran soon arrived and tried to restore order in the darkness. The fort was rapidly filling with the victors when suddenly a powder magazine in a tower of the southern wall

took fire from the torch of a careless plunderer; a dreadful explosion followed, blowing up 80 yards of the enormously thick wall and killing 300 Rajputs standing under the wall and also 200 horses. [*Ibid.* 108—10.]

#### § 4. *Pursuit of Jhujhar; extinction of his family.*

News arrived about the exact route of the fugitives, and on 27th October the pursuit was resumed. Arriving at Chauragarh the imperialists found that Jhujhar had evacuated that fort also, after breaking up the artillery, burning all property, and blowing up the old Gond palaces. A Mughal garrison was posted here, but the main army encamped four miles off, at Shahpur. Here they learned that Jhujhar was flying south through the Gond kingdoms of Deogarh and Chanda, with 6000 soldiers and 60 elephants, and making about 16 miles a day. Though he had got a start of 14 days, the Mughal generals took up the chase from Shahpur with a light force which daily covered 40 miles. On the frontier of Chanda they came upon his traces and doubled their speed. Jhujhar turned at bay, fought the Mughals obstinately, but was defeated and driven into the jungle, and the pursuit was resumed. The fugitive, encumbered with women and property, and hindered in his movements by his paucity of horses, had no peace. He could not

snatch any sleep, nor refresh his worn-out horses. As soon as he halted for the night, he heard of the approach of the pursuers, broke up his camp and urged his tired men and beasts on again. All means of escape were tried; the foot-tracks of the elephants were rubbed out; treasure-laden elephants were sent by another path to lure the Mughals away from the road taken by the Bundela chief. But the imperialists were too astute; they neglected everything else and steadily pursued the rebel himself. They also bribed the local land-owners, who showed them the way and kept them regularly informed of the movements of Jhujhar, so that the jungle was now a hindrance rather than a shelter to him. And from the vindictive Gonds no Bundela could expect mercy.

Jhujhar's party was now divided, but all to no purpose. His sons were overtaken, and got no time to slay their women, as was the Rajput custom when death was to be preferred to dishonour. A few of the ladies had been stabbed, when the Mughals fell upon them, slew the guards, and captured the Bundela royal family. [Pad. I.B. 110—115.]

The rebel chief and his eldest son Vikramajit had fled into the heart of the jungle, where their doom overtook them. The Gonds, moved by their instinct of plunder and hope of reward from the Mughals, surprised the exhausted princes in their sleep and cruelly did them to death. Their heads

were cut off and sent to the Emperor (December, 1635), who exposed them on the gates of his camp at Saihur.

But their lot was happy in comparison. Happy too was Rani Parvati, Bir Singh's widow, who died of her wounds. A more terrible fate awaited the captive ladies who survived : mothers and daughters of kings, they were robbed of their religion, and forced to lead the infamous life of the Mughal harem,—to be the unloved plaything of their master's passion for a day or two and then to be doomed to sigh out their days like bondwomen, without knowing the dignity of a wife or the joy of a mother. Sweeter far for them would have been death from the hands of their dear ones than submission to a race that knew no generosity to the fallen, no chivalry to the weaker sex.

Three captives of tender age, (two sons and one grandson of Jhujhar,) were made Musalmans. Another son, Udaybhan, and Shyam Dawa the old and faithful minister of the house, who had taken refuge in Golkonda and been delivered to Shah Jahan, refused to apostatize and were executed in cold blood. [*Ibid.* 116—117, 133, 139.]\*

The fort of Jhansi, with its big guns and war

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\* According to Khafi Khan, i. 519, 523, the converts were Durgabhan, a son of Jhujhar, and Durjan Sal and Narsingh Dev, his grandsons.

material was forced to capitulate at the end of October. The imperial officers now organised a regular hunt for the buried treasure of Bir Singh. The jungle was carefully searched and many wells filled with gold and silver were discovered in its untrodden depths. The spoils of war amounted to one *krore* of Rupees besides other valuable property.\*

As for the Gonds, their services against Jhujhar were forgotten. The imperial forces in pursuit had reached the frontier of Chanda, the leading Gond kingdom. Such an honour had to be dearly paid for. The Rajah of Chanda was compelled to wait on the victors on his frontier, on the bank of the Pranhita river, pay down 6 *lakhs* in cash, and promise an annual tribute of 20 elephants or Rs. 80,000 as an equivalent. [Pad. I. B. 117.] This opened the door to future troubles, and his kingdom was subjected to repeated exactions by the Mughals in the next reign.

### § 5. *Urchha temple turned into a mosque.*

During the campaign in the Gond country Aurangzib had come to Dhamuni, far in the rear of the fighters. At his request Shah Jahan paid a visit to the newly conquered country, reaching Datia and Urchha at the end of November. At the Bundela

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\* Pad. I. B. 119, 133, 139, and (for buried treasure) 110, 117, 123.

capital "the Islam-cherishing Emperor demolished the lofty and massive temple of Bir Singh Dev near his palace, and erected a mosque on its site." [Ibid. 121.] To this Devi Singh, the newly appointed Rajah, made no objection. The temples of his gods might be defiled, his brave and proud clansmen might be butchered, insolent aliens might trample his fatherland down "with the hoofs of their horses," the princesses of his house might be dragged into a shame worse than death,—but he could now enjoy the lordship of the country, he could now sit on the throne of Urchha and call himself a Rajah and the head of the Bundela clan, and therefore he rejoiced. For this he had laboured, and now he had his reward! Among the Hindu Rajputs who assisted at this pious work by fighting under the Mughal banner were Sisodias and Rathors, Kachhwahs and Hadas.\*

\* A large body of Rajputs served in the army sent against Jhujhar. Their captains are named in Abdul Hamid, I. B. 96-97, 99-100. To contrast the Hindu spirit with the Muhammadan let us consider an imaginary parallel. Suppose that when Clive after winning Plassey marched to Murshidabad and placed Mir Jafar on the throne, he had ordered the chief mosque of the town to be converted into a Christian church, where pigs would be sacrificed every year on Atonement Day, would Mir Jafar have consented to take the crown on such a condition, would the Muslim troops in the East India Company's service have submitted to this insult to their religion?

§ 6. *Bundelas of Mahoba keep up opposition.*

But the noblest of the Bundelas did not bow down to the traitor. They gathered under the brave Champat Rao of Mahoba, crowned Jhujhar's infant son Prithwiraj, and raided the territory of Urchha. This boy-king was soon afterwards captured and lodged in the State-prison of Gwalior. [*Ibid.* 136, 193.] But though one faineant Rajah after another reigned at Urchha, Champat Rao and his heroic son Chhatra Sal continued their wars to the end of the century. With them, however, it was a fruitless struggle. They could not hope to hold Urchha for good and unite the Bundelas under one sceptre; they only devastated the territory loyal to the Mughals, and spread havoc and insecurity over the land, till in the next century a mightier race of plunderers appeared on the scene, and Muslim and Bundela alike bowed down to the Maratha. [Ch. 61.]

Aurangzib returned from Dhamuni to wait on his father near Urchha, and together they travelled through the country, viewing its lakes and forts, beautiful scenery, and coverts for game. By way of Sironj they reached Daulatabad, where Aurangzib on 14th July, 1636, formally took leave of the Emperor to act as viceroy of the Deccan. [*Pad.* I. B. 118, 122, 134, 205.]

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## CHAPTER III.

FIRST VICEROYALTY OF THE DECCAN, 1636—1644.

### § 1. *The Mughals enter the Deccan.*

Towards the close of Akbar's reign, the Mughal empire began to extend beyond the Narmada river, which had so long been its southern boundary, except for the coast-strip running from Gujrat to Surat. Khandesh, the rich Tapti valley, was annexed in the year 1599. Taking advantage of the discord and weakness reigning in Ahmadnagar, Akbar wrested from it Berar, the southern portion of the present Central Provinces. The murder of the heroic Chand Bibi by her factious nobles delivered the city of Ahmadnagar into his hands (1600); the boy Sultan was deposed and the kingdom annexed. Thus in a few years the Mughal frontier had been pushed from the Narmada to the upper courses of the Krishna river (here called the Bhimá). But the annexation was in form only. The new territory was too large to be effectively governed or even fully conquered. Everywhere, especially in the south and the west, local officers of the old dynasty refused to obey the conqueror, or began to set up puppet princes as a

screen for their self-assertion. The Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda seized the adjacent districts of their fallen neighbour.

During Jahangir's feeble reign the Mughal advance was stayed and even beaten back. The Emperor lay under the voluptuous spell of Nur Jahan. His generals took bribes from the Deccani kings and let the war languish. A great leader, too, arose in the South. Malik Ambar, an Abyssinian of rare genius and capacity, became prime-minister of the shadowy king of Ahmadnagar, and for a time restored the vanished glories of the house. His wise revenue system made the peasantry happy, while enriching the State. A born leader of men, he conciliated all parties, maintained order, and left a name for justice, vigour and public benefit which has not been forgotten yet.\* Building up a grand alliance of the Deccani Powers he attacked the Mughals in overwhelming force, drove them back to Burhanpur, and closely invested their viceroy in that city (1620). The crisis broke the sleep of Jahangir. His brilliant son Shah Jahan was sent to the Deccan with a strong relieving force, and by firmness and skill he recovered much that had been lost since the death of

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\* For Malik Ambar see *Tuzuk* 153, 191—197, 213. *Pad.* I.B. 34, 182—200. *Khafi Khan*, i. 273—276, 282—285, 291—294, 304, 305, 314—322, 347—350. *Dilkasha*, i. 10—11, 90—92. Grant Duff, i. 94—97, India Office Persian MS. No. 1957 (*Tarikh-i-Shivaji*), 6b—7b.

Akbar. But the internal discords of the Mughal Court during Jahangir's dotage prevented the effectual conquest of the Deccan and the cause of the imperialists did not prosper.

### § 2. *Activity in Deccan conquest under Shah Jahan.*

With the accession of Shah Jahan to the throne of Delhi the scene changed. He began a vigorous policy in the Deccan. His generals soon felt that their new master could not be befooled or disobeyed. Husain Shah, the last king of the Nizam Shahi dynasty, was captured (1633), and the old possessions of his house began to be won by his vanquisher.\*

But a fresh complication now arose. The Sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda cast longing glances at the adjacent forts and districts of Ahmadnagar, and tried to secure parts of the floating wreckage of the ruined kingdom. Nizam Shahi officers entered the service of the Bijapur king or were secretly aided by him in resisting the Mughals. He bribed them

\* This king of Ahmadnagar, a mere puppet in the hands of his minister Fath Khan (the son of Ambar), was given up to the Mughals at the capture of Daulatabad, 17th June 1633, (*Pad. I. A. 523*) and imprisoned in Gwalior in September (540). Shahji set up another prince, whom he surrendered in November or December 1636. This boy is called a son (*I. B. 135*) and elsewhere a kinsman (*khes*) of Nizam Shah (*I. B. 36, 229, 256*).

to give up to him some of their late master's forts. Shahji Bhonslé, the father of the celebrated Shivaji, with his light cavalry gave the Mughals great trouble. He could not be finally subdued without first getting control over Bijapur and Golkonda. [Pad. I. B. 35, 135, 140.]

The occasion called for heroic exertions, and Shah Jahan made his preparations on a befitting scale. For more efficient administration, Daulatabad and Ahmadnagar were now separated from the province of Khandesh and made an independent charge, with its separate viceroy and capital, (November, 1634). Early in the next year a Mughal force from Daulatabad gave Shahji a long chase, but returned to Ahmadnagar without being able to catch the swift Maratha. The Emperor himself arrived at Daulatabad to direct the operations (21st February, 1636). Three large armies, totalling 50,000 men, were held ready to be launched upon Bijapur and Golkonda if they did not submit, while a fourth, eight thousand strong, under Shaista Khan, was despatched to capture the Nizam Shahi forts in the north-west, and to take possession of the Junnar and Nasik districts. [Ibid. 62, 68—69, 135—150.]

The news of this immense armament cowed Abdullah, the king of Golkonda, and without striking a blow in defence of his independence he agreed to become a vassal of the Mughals. With an abjectness

shameful in a crowned head, he promised an annual tribute, coined gold and silver pieces at his capital in the name of Shah Jahan, and caused the Mughal Emperor to be proclaimed from the pulpit as his suzerain, while he stood by in loyal approval ! (April, 1636.)

The king of Bijapur had not fallen so low as to do that. He made a stand for the power and dignity of his ancestors. But the three Mughal armies at once entered his kingdom from three points, Bidar in the N. E., Sholapur in the W. and Indapur in the S. W. With a ruthlessness surpassing that of the French who desolated the Palatinate, the Mughal invaders everywhere destroyed all traces of cultivation, burnt down the houses, drove off the cattle, butchered the villagers, or dragged them away to be sold as slaves. With a refinement of cruelty they forced their prisoners to carry their own property for the benefit of the captors ! Flourishing villages were ruined for ever, and the population thinned.\* But like the Dutch of a generation later, the Bijapuris opposed to their foes the courage of despair. They cut the dam of the lake of Shahpur,

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\* Khan-i-Dauran slew 2000 men at the village of Kalian (Abdul Hamid, I. B. 151). And so also at other places. Khan-i-Zaman in the Kolhapur district sold 2000 prisoners of war, male and female, into slavery (Abd. Ham. I. B. 163). The operations of Khan-i-Dauran's division are described in *Pad.* I. B. 151—154, Sayyid Khan-i-Jahan's in 155—160, Khan-i-Zaman's in 160—165.

flooded the country round the capital, and thus saved the city from invasion. The Mughal raiders returned baffled to their own territory. Both sides now felt the need of peace, and a compromise was soon arrived at.

### § 3. *Terms of peace with Bijapur.*

Shah Jahan made a treaty with the king of Bijapur\* on the following terms—

(1) Adil Shah, the king of Bijapur, must acknowledge the overlordship of the Emperor and promise to obey his orders in future.

(2) The pretence of a Nizam Shahi kingdom should be ended and all its territories divided between the Emperor and the Bijapur king. Adil Shah should not violate the new imperial frontier nor let his servants hinder the Mughal officers in occupying and settling the newly annexed districts.

(3) The Sultan of Bijapur was to retain all his ancestral territory with the following additions from the Ahmadnagar kingdom :—in the west, the Sholapur and Wangi *mahals*, between the Bhima and the Sina rivers, including the forts of Sholapur and Parenda; in the north-east, the *parganas* of Bhalki

\* For the treaty with Bijapur, *Pad. I. B.* 168—173, 203, and with Golkonda, 177—180.

and Chidgupa;\* and that portion of the Konkan which had once belonged to the Nizam Shahs, including the Puna and Chakan districts. These acquisitions comprised 50 *parganas* and yielded a revenue of 20 *lakhs* of *hun* (or eighty *lakhs* of Rupees). The rest of the Nizam Shahi dominion was to be recognized as annexed to the empire beyond question or doubt.

(4) Adil Shah should pay the Emperor a peace-offering of twenty *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and kind. But no *annual* tribute was imposed.

(5) Golkonda being now a State under imperial protection, Adil Shah should in future treat it with friendship, respect its frontier (which was fixed at the river Manjira, or roughly at 78° East longitude), and never demand costly presents from its Sultan, to whom he must behave "like an elder brother."

(6) Each side undertook not to seduce the officers of the other from their master's service, nor to entertain deserters, and Shah Jahan promised for himself and his sons that the Bijapur king would never be called upon to transfer any of his officers to the imperial service.

\* *Wangi*, 18·11 N. 75·12 E. one mile e. of the Bhima and 21 m. s. w. of Parenda (*Ind. At.*, 39 S. E.) *Parenda*, 18·15 N. 75·31 E. (*Ibid.*) *Bhalki*, 18·2 N. 77·15 E., 19 m. n. e. of Kaliani (*Ibid.*, 56.) *Chidgupa* 17·42 N. 77·17 E., 21 m. s. e. of Kaliani and 10 m. w. of Homnabad (*Ibid.*, 57). *Chakan*, 18·45 N. 73·55 E., 30 m. s. of Junnar (*Ibid.*, 39 N. W.)

(7) Shahji Bhonslé, who had set up a princeling of the house of Nizam Shah, should not be admitted to office under Bijapur, unless he ceded Junnar, Trimbak, and some other forts still in his hands to Shah Jahan. If he declined, he was not to be harboured in Bijapur territory or even allowed to enter it.

On 6th May, 1636, Shah Jahan sent to Adil Shah a solemn letter impressed with the mark of his palm dipped in vermillion, promising the above terms with an appeal to God and the Prophet to be witnesses. A portrait of the Emperor enclosed in a frame set with pearls and emeralds and hung by a string of pearls, which Adil Shah had begged, accompanied the letter. The Bijapur king received them on the 20th and in return delivered to the Mughal ambassador an autograph letter sealed with his own seal, formally agreeing to the treaty, and in the presence of the ambassador swore on the Quran to observe its conditions. [Pad. I. B. 167, 173—179.]

For the ratification of the treaty an abstract of it was engraved on a gold plate and delivered to Adil Shah.

A still happier settlement was effected with the Sultan of Golkonda. On 25th June presents worth 40 *lakhs* of Rupees arrived from him, with an autograph letter in which he vowed allegiance to the

Emperor. Out of the four *lakhs* of *hun*, which he was bound to pay every year to the kings of Ahmadnagar, one-half was transferred to the Emperor, and the other remitted for the future. This tribute was stipulated for in *huns*, a South Indian gold coin weighing about 52 grains. But as the exchange value of the *hun* in relation to the Rupee afterwards varied, the king of Golkonda sowed another of the seeds of his future disputes with the Mughals.\*

Thus after forty years of strife the affairs of the Deccan were at last settled. The position of the Emperor was asserted beyond challenge, his boundaries clearly defined, and his suzerainty over the Southern kingdoms formally established. A long period of peace could be now looked forward to, except for the hunting down of Shahji (who still led a shadowy Nizam Shahi king by the string), and the capture of a few forts like Udgir and Ausa, where the old Nizam Shahi officers still defied the Mughals. The Bijapur king, therefore, requested Shah Jahan to return to Northern India, as his continued presence with a large army was scaring away the Deccan peasantry from their homes and fields, and preventing the restoration of cultivation. As for the five forts in Shahji's hands, Adil Shah himself would wrest them from the usurper for the Mughals.

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri* (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 56a.

Nothing being now left for Shah Jahan to do in the Deccan, he turned his back on Daulatabad (11th July, 1636) and set out for Mandu. Three days afterwards he sent away Aurangzib after investing him with the viceroyalty of the Deccan.

#### *§ 4. Mughal provinces in the Deccan.*

The Mughal Deccan at this time\* consisted of four provinces :—

I. KHANDESH or the Tapti valley, between the Satpura range in the north and the Sahyadri offshoots in the south, with its capital at Burhanpur and fort at Asirgarh.

II. BERAR, south-east of Khandesh, being bounded on the north by the Mahadev hills and the Gond territory at the heart of the modern Central Provinces, and on the south by the Ajanta range and the Painganga river. Its capital was Elichpur, and fort Gawilgarh.

III. TELINGANA, a vast and undefined territory of hills and forests, with a sparse and savage population, stretching south and east of Berar from Chanda and the Wainganga river to the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Golkonda. The whole of it was upland (*Balaghat*).†

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\* *Pad. I. B.* 205, 62-63.

† The Golkonda frontier was along the Manjira river, west of Karimungi, 9 m. n. e. of Bidar (sheet 56). *Pad. I. B.* 230, has Kumgir, evidently a mistake.

IV. DAULATABAD, with Ahmadnagar and other dependencies. This was the Deccan proper and contained the seat of the viceroy at the fort of Daulatabad, while the civil station founded by Malik Ambar a few miles off, at Khirki, rapidly grew in size and splendour under Aurangzib and was newly named Aurangabad. The province was bounded on the north by the Ajanta hills and the Painganga river. Its eastern frontier as now defined was an imaginary line drawn about 77.15 East longitude, along the Manjira river, from Nander to Qandahar\* and Udgir. From the last-named fort the line took a sharp turn due west to Ausa (a little above the 18th degree of North latitude), and then bent north-westwards by the northern limit of the Sholapur district, and the forts of Visapur, Parner and Junnar, till it struck the Western Ghats. At this part the Ghod river was the southern limit. Beyond Junnar, the boundary ran northwards along the Ghats, till it met the s. w. frontier of Khandesh at the angle where the Chandor hills branch off eastwards.†

There were in all 64 forts, mostly perched on hills, in these four provinces, and the total revenue

\* Qandahar in the Deccan, 35 miles north of Udgir (*Ind. At.* 56). Nilang, a fort midway between Udgir and Ausa, belonged to Bijapur.

† Chamargunda is spoken of as near the frontier of Mughal Ahmadnagar (*Pad. I. B.* 137). The province of Daulatabad included the *sarkars* of Ahmadnagar, Patan, Bir, Jalnapur, Junnar, Sangannir, and Fatihabad or Dhairur (*Ibid.* 62.)

was five *krores* of Rupees, with which Aurangzib was to meet all the charges of administration. All fief-holders in the Deccan received orders to wait on the prince with their fixed contingents of troops, as ten forts had yet to be conquered.

### § 5. *Capture of Udgir and Ausa.*

Shah Jahan had before his departure deputed two generals, one to besiege Udgir and Ausa in the S. E., and the other to conquer Junnar in the west and crush Shahji.

Khan-i-Dauran with his division arrived before Udgir\* on 19th June and at once took possession of the village under the fort. Trenches were opened on the s., the w., and the s. w., and mines run from the western side. As the mines approached the walls, the garrison lost heart and their leader, an Abyssinian named Siddi Miftah, opened negotiations for surrender. But he demanded too high a price, and the siege was pressed on. A mine was fired and the outer earth-work (*fausse braye*), a hundred yards in circuit, was blown down with all its guns, ballista and other armaments. But as the citadel was unharmed, no assault was delivered. At last on 28th September, after a defence of more

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\* *Udgir*, 18° 21' N. 77° 10' E. *Indian Atlas*, sh. 56) 24 miles north of Bhalki. *Ausa*, 18° 15' N. 76° 33' E., five miles south of the Towraj river which flows into the Manjira (*Ibid.*)

than three months, the fort capitulated; Siddi Miftah was taken into imperial service with the title of Habsh Khan and the rank of a Commander of Three Thousand. [Pad. I. B. 217-219, 248.]

Meantime Ausa had been invested and a detachment left under Rashid Khan to carry on its siege. The fall of Udgir set free a large force for strengthening the attack, while it damped the ardour of the defenders of Ausa. The commandant, a Rajput named Bhojbal, kept up a ceaseless fire on the besiegers. But when the trenches reached the edge of the ditch and mining was started, Bhojbal at last lost heart, gave up the fort (19th October), and was taken into the imperial army as a Commander of One Thousand. [Ibid. 220.]

#### § 6. *Shahji Bhonslé forced to submit.*

Khan-i-Zaman's division had been equally successful in the Junnar district and the Konkan. A Bijapur contingent under Randaula Khan co-operated with him according to the new treaty. Leaving Ahmadnagar about the end of June, he marched on Junnar, of which the town was held by the Mughals and the fort by the Marathas. Two thousand men were told off to invest it, while the general himself marched with the rest of his army to capture Shahji's home near Puna. Heavy rain detained him for a month on the bank of the Ghod

river.\* When at last the Mughals reached Loughaon on the Indrayani river, 34 miles from Shahji's camp, the Maratha chief fled south to the hills of Kondana (Singhgarh) and Torna.†

The Mughals could not follow him at once as they had to cross three big rivers and also waited to see whether Randaula Khan would succeed in inducing Shahji to give up his forts peacefully. At last they crossed the Bhor-ghat in three divisions. Meantime Shahji had fled to the Konkan by the Kumbhá Pass and begged for asylum in vain at Danda-Rajpuri and other places. Then he doubled back by the same pass. But hearing that the Mughals had entered the Konkan, he lost his head, and fled towards the fort of Mahuli, 48 miles north-east of Bombay. Khan-i-Zaman followed hard on his track, leaving his baggage behind. News came to him that Shahji was at Muranjan, 30 miles ahead. The Mughals pushed on thither in spite of the mud; but as soon as they were seen descending from a hillock 6 miles behind the place, the Marathas lost heart and fled, leaving much of their property behind. At this the Mughals galloped on, slew

\* *Pad.* I. B. 225—230. He evidently halted at Sirur, close to which is the cantonment of Ghodnadi (*Ind. At.* 39 N. W.).

† *Lohogaon*, 10 m. n. e. of Puna and three miles south of the Indrayani (*Ind. Atlas*, sh. 39 S. W.) on the way to Sirur. For *Torna* the text has *Tornad*.

many of Shahji's rear-guard, and chased them for 24 miles, till their horses gave up in sheer exhaustion. Shahji then effected his escape; but his camp, baggage, spare horses, and camels and the royal kettledrum, umbrella, *palki*, and standard of his creature, the boy Nizam Shah, were all captured. The Maratha leader fled fast and in twenty-four hours reached Mahuli, dismissed his unnecessary retainers, and prepared to stand a siege. Khan-i-Zaman made another forced march through the rain and mud, seized the village at the foot of the fort with its store of provisions, and sat down before the two gates of Mahuli, stopping all ingress and egress. Shahji, after higgling for terms, at last capitulated: he entered the Bijapur service, and gave up to the Mughals his Nizam Shahi princeling, together with Junnar and six other forts still held by his men. Evidently he got good terms out of the imperial Government, but the Court-historian is discreetly silent about the details. The campaign was over by the end of October, and Khan-i-Zaman returned to Aurangzib at Daulatabad to act as the prince's chief adviser.

#### *§ 7. Exactions from the Gond Rajahs.*

Khan-i-Dauran,\* after capturing Udgir and Ausa, had extorted from the king of Golkonda a

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\* Pad. I. B. 230-233.

famous elephant named *Gajmati*, or "the Pearl among Elephants", priced one *lakh* of Rupees, with another *lakh* of Rupees for covering it with gold plates and *hawda* to make it worthy of presentation to the Emperor. He next marched into the Gond country, between the Wardha and the Wainganga, levying contributions. First he seized the forts of Ashta and Katanjhar (Katanjhiri) from the hands of some refractory Gond chiefs, and then besieged Nagpur, the stronghold of Kukia, the Gond Rajah of Deogarh, who had refused to pay contribution. Three mines were fired, overthrowing two towers and parts of the wall; the assault was delivered, and the commandant Deoji taken prisoner. Kukia now came down on his knees: he interviewed Khan-i-Dauran (16 January, 1637), and made peace by presenting one and a half *lakhs* of Rupees in cash and all his elephants (170 in number) and promising an annual tribute of one and one-third *lakhs* of Rupees. Nagpur was restored to him.

The victorious Khan-i-Dauran returned to the Emperor, with 8 *lakhs* of Rupees levied from the Gond chiefs and others, and was extolled by his master above all his other generals, and given the high title of *Nusrat Jang* or "Victorious in War." [Pad. I. B. 230-33, 246.]

The period of warfare which began with the Bundela expedition in September, 1635, and ended

now, enriched the Mughal treasury with tribute and booty amounting to two *krores* of Rupees, and added to the empire a territory which *when cultivated* yielded a revenue of one *krone*. The Emperor now despatched a pompous letter to the Shah of Persia boasting of these conquests and gains. [*Ibid.* 257-266, 181.]

Aurangzib, however, was not long idle. The new treaties with Bijapur and Golkonda and the submission of the Gond country barred his aggression in the south and north-east. So, the Emperor authorised him to enrich himself and extend his dominion towards the north-west by conquering Baglana. [*Ibid.* 280.]

### § 8. *Baglana conquered.*

Between Khandesh and the Surat coast lies the district of BAGLANA. It is a small tract, stretching north and south for about 160 miles from the Tapti river to the Ghatmatha hills of the Nasik district, and 100 miles east and west across the Ghats. It contained only a thousand villages and nine forts, but no town of note. Small as was its area, its well-watered valleys and hill-slopes smiled with corn-fields and gardens; all kinds of fruits grew here and many of them were famous throughout India for their excellence. The climate, except in the rainy season, is cool and bracing. The State was further

enriched by the fact that the main line of traffic between the Deccan and Gujrat had run through it for ages.\*

A Rathor family, claiming descent from the royal house of ancient Kanauj, had ruled this land in unbroken succession for fourteen centuries. The Rajahs styled themselves *Shah* and used the distinctive title of *BAHARJI*. They coined money in their own names and enjoyed great power from the advantageous situation of their country and the impregnable strength of their hill-forts, two of which, *Salhir* and *Mulhir*, were renowned throughout India as unconquerable.†

But this position and these strongholds became the cause of their ruin when the Mughals conquered Gujrat and Khandesh and wanted to join hands across Baglana. An independent prince and master of mountain fastnesses could not be left in possession of the main route between these two provinces of the empire. The great Akbar had invaded the district,

\* For a description of Baglana, see *Ain-i-Akbari*, ii. 251. *Pad.* II. 105-106. *Imp. Gaz.* vi. 190—192. Tavernier's *Bergram* (i. 37) probably stands for Baglana. *Khaft Khan*, i. 561. Finch and Roe, (Kerr, viii. 277, ix. 256).

† *Salhir*, 20°43' N. 70 E., 5263 feet above sea-level, 9 miles s. w. of *Mulhir* (*Ind. At.* 38 N. W.) *Mulhir*, 20°46' N. 74°7' E., on the *Mosam* river (37 S. W.) *Pipla*, 20°35' N. 74 E., 9 m. s. of *Salhir* (38 N. W.)

but after a seven years' fruitless siege\* he had compounded with the Rajah, Pratap Shah, by ceding to him several villages as the price of protection to all merchants passing through his land. Bairam Shah was now seated on the throne of Pratap.

Aurangzib sent an army of 7000 men under Maloji, a Deccani officer in the imperial service, and Muhammad Tahir Khurasani (afterwards Wazir Khan) to besiege the capital Mulhir.† This fort covers the spacious top of a low hill close to the Mosam river, 9 miles north-east of Salhir. As is the case with all Deccani forts, it shelters a walled village lower down the hill-side, called the *Bari* or in the language of further south the *Pettah*. Here lived the Rajah and his family. On 16th January, 1638, the Mughal army in three divisions stormed the lower fort or *Bari*, with heavy loss on both sides.‡ The Rajah with some 500 men retired to the upper fort and was there blockaded. A month's

\* *Imp. Gaz.* vi. 191. I can find no support of this statement in Abul Fazl or Badauni.

† *M. U.* iii. 937, 522.

‡ Khasi Khan [i. 561-564] says that a dare-devil Mughal officer named Sayyid Abdul Wahhab Khandeshi, with 4 or 5 Sayyids expert in hill-climbing, one standard-bearer, one trumpeter and one water-carrier, made a secret march by an unfrequented jungle path for three successive nights and on the fourth day appeared on the ridge of the *Bari*, and suddenly attacked it with a great noise. Encouraged by his example, the Mughal forces in the plain charged up hill and stormed the *Bari*.

close investment reduced him to submission. He sent his mother and minister to offer to Aurangzib the keys of his other eight forts and to beg for himself a post in the Emperor's service, (15th February). The overture was accepted; he was created a Commander of Three Thousand and consoled with an estate in Sultanpur, a district of Khandesh, north of the Tapti. On 4th June, he evacuated Mulhir; his kingdom was annexed, and its revenue fixed at 4 *lakhs* for the present. A month later, his kinsman Rudbá surrendered the fort of Piplá, 9 miles south of Salhir. One hundred and twenty pieces of artillery, large and small, were seized in the forts. [Pad. II. 106-109.]

Bairam Shah's son-in-law, Somdev, ruled over Rámnanagar. But as the revenue of this petty State fell short of its public expenditure, it was deemed unworthy of annexation. A contribution of ten thousand Rupees was, however, exacted from him.

### § 9. *Other incidents of Aurangzib's first viceroyalty of the Deccan.*

Aurangzib's first viceroyalty of the Deccan extended from 14th July, 1636 to 28th May, 1644. During these eight years he paid four visits to his father in Northern India, leaving some great noble, usually his maternal uncle Shaista Khan, to act for him. He gradually rose in rank, being promoted

to a command of Twelve Thousand (7,000 troopers) on 14th August, 1637, and next to the rank of a Commander of Fifteen Thousand (troopers 9,000) on 23rd February, 1639. Only a few incidents of this period are recorded in history.

Kheloji Bhonslé, the first cousin of Shahji, had held a high rank among the Nizam Shahi officers. In 1629 he came over to the Mughals with his two brothers, Maloji and Parsuji, got the rank of a Commander of Five Thousand, and distinguished himself under the banners of his new master. But in 1633 when the fort of Daulatabad, the last stronghold of Nizam Shah, was about to fall into the hands of the imperialists, Kheloji deserted to Bijapur and repeatedly fought against the Mughal armies. The Maratha general's wife, when going to bathe in the Godavari, was captured by the Mughal subahdar, who sent him word, "A man's wealth is only for saving his honour. If you pay me four *lakhs* of Rupees I shall release your wife without doing harm to her chastity." No husband can resist such an appeal, and Kheloji paid this huge ransom. Soon afterwards, he was dismissed by the Bijapur Sultan who had made peace with Shah Jahan. Ruined by these losses, Kheloji came to the home of his forefathers near Daulatabad and took to a life of plunder and lawlessness. Aurangzib, on getting news of his place of hiding, sent a party of soldiers under Malik

Husain and put the Maratha freebooter to death (about October, 1639).\*

In 1640, "the zamindar of Gondwana" (*i.e.*, the new Rajah of Deogarh) waited on the young viceroy at Burhanpur with a thanks-offering of four *lakhs* of Rupees in return for his being allowed to succeed his late father. [Pad. II. 197.]

On 25th March, 1642, a costly set of presents offered by Aurangzib and consisting of gems, jewelled ware, rare products of the Deccan, and elephants, was displayed before the Emperor, who accepted out of them one *lakh* and twenty thousand Rupees' worth, and suitably rewarded the giver in return. [Ibid. 289.]

\* Pad. II. 166, *Masir-ul-umara*, iii. 520-521.

## CHAPTER IV.

### MARRIAGE AND FAMILY—VICEROYALTY OF GUJRAT.

§ 1. *Persian princes in India marry into Mughal royal family.*

The fort and district of Qandahar had been given by the Persian king Shah Tahmasp I. of the house of Safawi, to his nephew, Sultan Husain Mirza as an appanage. Husain's son Mirza Muzaffar Husain exchanged the lordship of barren Qandahar for a high rank and splendid salary in the service of Akbar. His younger brother Mirza Rustam, too, emigrated to India in Akbar's reign and rose to eminence under Jahangir.

The Mughal Emperor made the most of this opportunity of ennobling their blood by alliances with the royal family of Persia even through a younger branch. Muzaffar Husain's daughter was married to Shah Jahan, and two daughters of Mirza Rustam to the princes Parviz and Shuja. Rustam's son was now a high grandee with the title of Shah Nawaz Khan.\* One daughter of Shah Nawaz, named Dilras Banu, was betrothed to Aurangzib,

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\* For Mirza Muzaffar Husain, *M. U.* iii. 296; Mirza Rustam, *M. U.* iii. 434; Shah Nawaz Khan, *M. U.* ii. 670.

1637, and next year another daughter was married to Murad Bakhsh.\*

§ 2. *Aurangzib married to Dilras Banu Begam.*

On 15th April, 1637, Aurangzib arrived at Agra for his marriage. Shah Jahan wrote him a most loving invitation in verse to come and see him quickly and without ceremony. Next day the prince had audience of his father. The royal astrologers had fixed 8th May as the date of the marriage. In the preceding evening was the ceremony of *henna-bandī* or dyeing the bridegroom's hands and feet with the red juice of the *henna* (*Lawsonia inermis*). Following the Indian custom, the bride's father sent the *henna* in a grand procession of the male and female friends of his house, servants and musicians. With the *henna* came an infinite variety of presents, a costly full-dress suit for the bridegroom, toilet needments, embroidered scarfs for his kinsfolk, perfumed essence, sugar-candy, huge quantities of confects, dried fruits, prepared betel-leaves, and fireworks.

In the Private Hall of the Palace, the prince's hands and feet were stained red with the *henna*, by ladies concealed behind a screen, and he was robed in the bride's presents, smeared with perfumes,

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\* A generation afterwards (4 March, 1683) Azarm Banu, the daughter of Shah Nawaz's son, was married to Aurangzib's youngest son, Kam Bakhsh (M. A. 225.)

and fed with the lucky sugar-candy. Then he held a reception of his male guests, which his uncle Yamin-ud-daula and other nobles attended, while the ladies looked on from behind lattice-screens. In the richly furnished hall the wedding gifts were displayed on trays, the scarfs, confectionary and betel-leaves were distributed, and the fireworks let off outside. All the time singing and dancing went on. The night's work was concluded with a supper to which the bridegroom sat down with all his guests.

Next night the marriage took place. The astrologers had selected four hours before dawn as the luckiest time for the ceremony. A long while before that hour the grand *wazir* Yamin-ud-daula Asaf Khan and Prince Murad Bakhsh went to Aurangzib's mansion on the Jamuna, and conducted him by the river-side road to the fort-palace, to make his bow to the Emperor, who gave him costly presents of all kinds,—robes, jewels, daggers, horses, and elephants, and with his own hands tied to the bridegroom's turban a glittering *sehra* or bunch of pearls and precious stones falling over his face like a veil. Then the marriage-procession was formed. Led by Murad, Yamin-ud-daula and other grandees on horseback, the long line paraded the streets of the capital, with music, lights, and discharge of fireworks that baffle description. When it reached the bride's house, the guests were made welcome and

entertained by her father. Shah Jahan arrived by boat just before the ceremony, and in his presence the Qazi united the young pair in wedlock. The bridegroom promised his wife a dowry (*kabin*) of four lakhs of Rupees; this she was to get from him in case of divorce. Her father kept himself aloof from the ceremony, for such is the custom of the Indian Muslims.

The marriage being over, another reception was held (14th May) in Aurangzib's house at which the Emperor was present. Wedding gifts were presented to the nobles, who bowed their thanks first to the Emperor and then to the bridegroom. The newly married prince spent more than three happy months with his father at Agra and then, on 4th September, took his leave for the Deccan. [Pad. I.B. 255, 267—270, 280.]

### § 3. *Aurangzib's wives.*

We may here conveniently describe Aurangzib's wives and children. *Dilras Banu*, his consort, bore the high title of Begam or Princess. She died at Aurangabad on 8th October, 1657, from illness following child-birth,\* and was buried in that city, under the title of 'the Rabia of the Age' (*Rabia-ud-*

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\* Kambu, 6b; *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 198a; *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat*, 36 & 39a.

*daurani*), Her tomb was repaired by her son Azam under order of Aurangzib, and is one of the sights of the place. She seems to have been a proud and self-willed lady and her husband stood in some awe of her. [Anecdotes § 27.]

The Emperor's secondary wives were styled *Báis* and *Mahals*. To this class belonged Rahmat-un-nisa, surnamed *Nawab Bai*, the mother of Bahadur Shah I. She was the daughter of Rajah Raju of the Rajaouri State in Kashmir, and came of the hill-Rajput blood. [Storia do Mogor, ii. 57n, 276n.] But on her son's accession to the throne of Delhi a false pedigree was invented for her in order to give Bahadur Shah a right to call himself a Sayyid. It was asserted by the flatterers of the imperial Court that a Muslim saint named Sayyid Shah Mir, sprung from the celebrated Sayyid Abdul Qadir Gilani, had taken to a life of retirement among the hills of Rajaouri. The Rajah of the country waited on him and in course of time so adored the holy man as to offer him his maiden daughter. The saint accepted the virgin tribute, converted and wedded her, and thus became the father of a son and a daughter. Then he went on a pilgrimage to the holy land of Islam, where all trace of him was lost. The Rajah brought up his deserted grand-children as Hindus, keeping their parentage a secret. When Shah Jahan demanded

from him a daughter of his house, the Rajah sent him this grand-daughter, who was noted for her beauty, goodness and intelligence. In the imperial harem the girl was taught languages and culture by a set of masters, governesses, and Persian women versed in good manners, and in due time she was united to Prince Aurangzib. Such is one of the many conflicting accounts of the origin of Nawab Bai. Khafi Khan [ii. 604] narrates it as mere hearsay, and we may reject it as the invention of courtiers eager to flatter their master.\*

She built a *sarai* at Fardapur, at the foot of the pass, and also founded Baijipura, a suburb of Aurangabad. [K. K. ii. 605.] The misconduct of her sons, Muhammad Sultan and Muazzam, who disobeyed the Emperor under the influence of evil counsellors, embittered her latter life. Her advice and even personal entreaty had no effect on Muazzam,† who was at last placed under arrest. Nawab Bai seems to have lost her charms and with

\* But there is nothing improbable in the story. In Bhimbhar, another district of Kashmir, Hindus and Muslims used to intermarry, and the wife, whatever might have been her father's creed, was burnt or buried as her husband happened to be a Hindu or Islamite. But in October, 1634, Shah Jahan forbade the custom and ordered that every Hindu who had taken a Muslim wife must either embrace Islam and be married anew to her, or he must give her up to be wedded to a Muslim. This order was rigorously enforced. (*Pad. I. B.* 57).

† *M. A.* 101, 293, (and for Sultan) 30, 121.

them her husband's favour rather early in life, and ended her days some time before the middle of 1691 at Delhi, after many years of separation from her husband and sons. [M.A. 343.]

Another secondary wife was *Aurangabadi Mahal*, so named because she entered the prince's harem in the city of Aurangabad. The bubonic plague carried her off at the city of Bijapur\* in October or November 1688.

Her death removed the last rival of Aurangzib's youngest and best loved concubine, *Udipuri Mahal*, the mother of Kam Bakhsh. The contemporary Venetian traveller Manucci [i. 361, ii. 107] speaks of her as a Georgian slave-girl of Dara Shukoh's harem, who, on the downfall of her first master, became the concubine of his victorious rival. She seems to have been a very young woman at the time, as she first became a mother in 1667, when Aurangzib was verging on fifty. She retained her youth and influence over the Emperor till his death, and was the darling of his old age. Under the spell of her beauty he pardoned the many faults of Kam

\* M. A. 318. Her tomb is thus described by Manucci, "The king caused a magnificent tomb to be erected to the princess, provided with a dome of extraordinary height, the whole executed in marble brought expressly from the province of Ajmer." (*Storia*, iii. 269). He has confounded her with Dilras Banu.

Bakhsh and overlooked her freaks of drunkenness which must have shocked so pious a Muslim.\*

#### § 4. *Zainabadi, his mistress : his youthful romance.*

Besides the above four there was another woman whose supple grace, musical skill, and mastery of blandishments, made her the heroine of the only romance in the puritan Emperor's life. Hira Bai surnamed *Zainabadi* was a young slave-girl in the keeping of Mir Khalil, who had married a sister of Aurangzib's mother. During his viceroyalty of the Deccan, the prince paid a visit to his aunt at Burhanpur. There, while strolling in

\* *Storia*, ii. 107, 108. That Udipuri was a slave and no wedded wife is proved by Aurangzib's own words. When her son Kam Bakhsh intrigued with the enemy at the siege of Jinji, Aurangzib angrily remarked,—

'A slave-girl's son comes to no good.'

Even though he may have been begotten by a king.' (*Anecdotes* § 25). He is also called 'a dancing-girl's son' (*Storia*, ii. 16n). Orme (*Fragments*, 85) speaks of her as a Circassian, evidently on the authority of Manucci. In a letter written by Aurangzib on his death-bed to Kam Bakhsh, he says "Udipuri, your mother, who has been with me during my illness, wishes to accompany [me in death]." From this expression Tod, (*Annals of Mewar*, Ch. XIII, note) infers, "Her desire to burn shews her to have been a Rajpoot." Such an inference is wrong, because a Hindu princess on marrying a Muslim king lost her caste and religion, and received Islamic burial. We read of no Rajputni of the harem of any of the Mughal Emperors having burnt herself with her deceased husband, for the very good reason that a Muslim's corpse is buried and not burnt. Evidently Udipuri meant that she would kill herself in passionate grief on the death of Aurangzib.

the park of Zainabad on the other side of the Tapti, he beheld Hira Bai unveiled among his aunt's train. The artful beauty "on seeing a mango-tree laden with fruits, advanced in mirth and amorous play, jumped up, and plucked a mango, as if unconscious of the prince's presence." The vision of her matchless charms stormed Aurangzib's heart in a moment; "with shameless importunity he took her away from his aunt's house and became utterly infatuated with her." So much so, that one day she offered him a cup of wine and pressed him to drink it. All his entreaties and excuses were disregarded, and the helpless lover was about to taste the forbidden drink when the sly enchantress snatched away the cup from his lips and said, "My object was only to test your love for me, and not to make you fall into the sin of drinking!" Death cut the story short when she was still in the bloom of youth. Aurangzib bitterly grieved at her loss and buried her close to the big tank at Aurangabad.\*

More than half a century afterwards, when this early love-passage had become a mere memory, the following inaccurate version of it was recorded by Hamid-ud-din Khan, a favourite servant of the

\* *Masir-ul-umara*, i. 790—792. Mir Khalil was posted to the Deccan shortly before Aurangzib's second viceroyalty began, so that the earliest possible date of the episode is 1653, when Aurangzib was 35 years old.

Emperor, in his *Anecdotes* § 5. It is extremely amusing, as it shows that the puritan in love was not above practising wiles to gain his end !

“When Aurangzib as Governor of the Deccan was going to Aurangabad, on arriving at Burhanpur .....he went to visit his aunt. The prince entered the house without announcing himself. Hira Bai was standing under a tree, holding a branch with her right hand and singing in a low tone. Immediately after seeing her, the prince helplessly sat down there, and then stretched himself at full length on the ground in a swoon. The news was carried to his aunt. She clasped him to her breast and began to wail and lament. After three or four *gharis* the prince regained consciousness. However much she inquired about his condition, saying, ‘What malady is it? Did you ever have it before?’ the prince gave no reply at all, but remained silent. At midnight he recovered his speech and said, ‘If I mention my disease, can you apply the remedy?’ She replied, ‘What do you talk of remedy? I shall offer my life itself to cure you!’ Then the prince unfolded the whole matter to her.....The aunt replied, ‘You know the wretch, my husband. He is a bloody-minded man and does not care in the least for the Emperor Shah Jahan or for you. At the mere report of your desire for Hira Bai he will

first murder her and then me. Telling him about your passion will do no other good.'

Next morning the prince came back to his own quarters and discussed the case in detail with his confidant, Murshid Quli Khan, the diwan of the Deccan. The Khan said, 'Let me first despatch your uncle, and if anybody then slays me, there will be no harm, as in exchange of my life my master's work will be done.' Aurangzib forbade him to commit a manifest murder and turn his aunt into a widow.....Murshid Quli Khan reported the whole conversation to the prince's uncle, who exchanged Hira Bai for Chhattar Bai, a slave-girl of Aurangzib's harem.'

History records the name of a certain Dilárám, a hand-maid of Aurangzib's early life. But though she is described in the same terms as Aurangabadi Mahal, *viz.*, *parastar-i-qadim-ul-khidmat*, it appears from the context that she was not his mistress, but only a servant.\* Her daughter was married to an officer of the Emperor's bodyguard. On her tomb at Delhi the Emperor placed an inscribed stone in 1702, many years after her death. [M.A. 465, 318.]

\* The same name was borne by an old nurse in Jahangir's harem. [Elliot vi. 398.]

§ 5. *Aurangzib's children.*

Aurangzib had a numerous progeny. His principal wife, Dilras Banu Begam, bore him five children :

1. ZEB-UN-NISA,\* a daughter, born at Daulatabad, on 15th February, 1638, died at Delhi on 26th May, 1702, buried in the garden of 'Thirty Thousand Trees', outside the Kabul gate. Her tomb was demolished to make room for a railway.

She seems to have inherited her father's keenness of intellect and literary tastes. Educated by a lady named Hafiza Mariam, she committed the *Quran* to memory, for which she received a reward of 30,000 gold-pieces from her delighted father. A mistress of Persian and Arabic, she wrote different kinds of hand with neatness and grace. Her library surpassed all other private collections, and she employed many scholars on liberal salaries to produce literary works at her bidding or to copy manuscripts for her. As Aurangzib disliked poetry, her liberality compensated for the lack of Court patronage, and

\* *Pad.* ii. 22; *M.A.* 462, 538; Rieu's *British Museum Catalogue*, ii. 702 b: *M.U.* ii. 828; Muqtadir's *O. P. L. Catalogue of Persian Poets*, iii. 250; *Makhzan-ul-Gharaib* by Ahmad Ali Sandilavi (1218 A. H.) *Khuda Bakhsh* MS., p. 312; *Gul-i-rana*, f. 119. Her life is fully treated in my *Studies in Mughal India*, where the scandal connecting her with Aqil Khan is proved false.

most of the poets of the age sought refuge with her. Supported by her bounty, Mulla Safi-ud-din Ardbeli translated the Arabic *Great Commentary* under the title of *Zeb-ut-tafasir*, the authorship of which is vulgarly ascribed to his patroness. Other tracts and works also unjustly bear her name. She wrote Persian odes under the pen-name of *Makhfi* or the Concealed One. But the extant *Diwan-i-Makhfi* was certainly not her work. That pseudonym was used by many other poets, such as one of the wives of Akbar.

2. ZINAT-UN-NISA, afterwards surnamed Padishah Begam, born probably at Aurangabad, 5th October, 1643. She looked after her old father's household in the Deccan, for a quarter of a century till his death, and survived him many years, enjoying the respect of his successors as the living memorial of a great age. Historians speak of her piety and extensive charity. She died at Delhi on 7th May, 1721 [*Indian Antiquary*, Feb. 1901] and was buried in the Zinat-ul-masajid, a splendid mosque built (1700) at her expense in Delhi, but her grave was removed elsewhere by the British military authorities when they occupied the building.\*

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\* *Pad.* ii. 343; *M.A.* 539; Khafi Khan, ii. 30 (inspires a plot against the Sayyid brothers). Fanshawe's *Delhi: Past and Present*, 68. Cunningham, *Arch. Survey Reports*, I. 230, states "The Zinat-ul-masjid, more commonly called the Kuari Masjid or 'Maiden's

3. ZUBDAT-UN-NISA, born at Multan, 2nd September, 1651, married to her first cousin, Sipihr Shukoh (the second son of the ill-fated Dara Shukoh) on 30th January, 1673, died in February, 1707. [M.A. 540, 125, 154.]

4. MUHAMMAD AZAM, born at Burhanpur on 28th June, 1653, slain at Jajaw, in the war of succession following his father's death, 8th June, 1707. [Waris 79b, M.A. 536.]

5. MUHAMMAD AKBAR, born at Aurangabad, on 11th September, 1657, died an exile in Persia about November, 1704. Buried at Mashhad. [M.A. 547.]

By Nawab Bai the Emperor had three children :

6. MUHAMMAD SULTAN, born near Mathura, 19th December, 1639, died in prison, 3rd December, 1676. Buried in the enclosure of Khwaja Qutb-ud-din's tomb. [Pad. ii. 170; M.A. 534, 159—160.]

7. MUHAMMAD MUAZZAM, surnamed Shah Alam, who succeeded his father as Bahadur Shah I., born at Burhanpur on 4th October, 1643, died 18th February, 1712.

Mosque,' because built by Zinat-un-nisa, the maiden daughter of Aurangzib. The people have a tradition that Zinat-un-nisa demanded the amount of her dowry from her father, and spent it in building this mosque, instead of marrying."

8. BADR-UN-NISA, born 17th November, 1647, died 9th April, 1670. Of her we only know that she learnt the *Quran* by rote.

Aurangabadi Mahal bore to Aurangzib only one child :

9. MIHIR-UN-NISA, born 18th September, 1661, married to her first cousin Izid Bakhsh (a son of the murdered Murad Bakhsh) on 27th November, 1672, died in June, 1706.

Udipuri Mahal was the mother of

10. MUHAMMAD KAM BAKHSH, born at Delhi, 24th February, 1667, slain in the war of succession, near Haidarabad on 3rd January, 1709.\*

### § 6. *Jahanara burnt.*

We shall now resume the story of Aurangzib's career. His first viceroyalty of the Deccan, which extended over eight years, ended strangely in his disgrace and dismissal.

On the night of 26th March, 1644, the princess Jahanara was coming from her father's chambers to her own in Agra fort, when her skirt brushed against one of the candles lighting the passage. As her

\* For Aurangzib's sons, *M A* 538—540. My lives of Bahadur Shah in *Journal of Indian History*, Oct. 1923; Azam in *J. B. & O. R. S.* March-June 1924; Kam Bakhsh in *Modern Review*, Jan. 1924; Akbar in *Studies in Mughal India*.

robes were made of exquisitely fine muslin and were besides perfumed with *atar* and other essences, the flames wrapped her round in a moment. Her four maids flung themselves on her to smother the fire with their persons, but it spread to their own dress and they had to let go their hold in agony. By the time aid arrived and the fire was put out, the princess had been dreadfully burnt: her back, both sides, and arms were severely injured. [Pad. ii. 363—369.]

She was the best loved child of Shah Jahan, and well did she deserve his affection. Ever since her mother's death, her care and forethought had saved him from domestic worries. Her sweetness of temper and gentleness of heart, even more than her mental accomplishments, soothed his mind in fatigue and anxiety, while her loving kindness healed all discords in the imperial family, and spreading beyond the narrow circle of her kinsfolk made her the channel of the royal bounty to orphans, widows, and the poor. In the full blaze of prosperity and power her name was known in the land only for her bounty and graciousness. In adversity she rose to a nobler eminence and became an Antigone to her captive father. Happier than the daughter of much-enduring Edipus, she finally won her father's forgiveness for the son who had wronged him so cruelly. And after death the memory of her piety

and meekness of spirit has been preserved by the lowliest epitaph ever placed on a prince's tomb. The stone records her last wish :

Cover not my grave save with green grass,  
For such a covering alone befits the tomb of  
the lowly in spirit

Shah Jahan was in anguish at this accident. He was ever at her bed-side, for his hand must lay the medicine to her wounds, and hold the diet up to her lips. All but the most urgent State affairs were neglected; the daily *darbar* was reduced to a sitting of a few minutes. Every physician of note from far and near was assembled for treating her. Vast sums were daily given away in charity to win Heaven's blessings on her. Every night a purse of Rs. 1000 was laid under her pillow, and next morning distributed to the beggars. Officials undergoing imprisonment for defalcation were set free, and their debts, amounting to seven *lakhs*, written off. Every evening Shah Jahan knelt down till midnight, weeping and imploring God for her recovery.

For four months she hovered between life and death. Indeed, there was little hope of her recovery, as two of her maids, though less severely burnt, died in a few weeks. By a happy accident, the physician of the late king of Persia, who had fled from the wrath of his successor, reached Agra only twenty days after this mishap. His judicious

medicines removed many of her attendant troubles, especially fever and weakness.

But both he and Hakim Mumana, the Physician Royal of Delhi, laboured in vain to heal her burns. Where the medical science of the age failed, quackery succeeded. A slave named Arif prepared an ointment which entirely healed her sores in two months.

On 25th November began a most splendid and costly festivity in celebration of her complete recovery. Jahanara was given jewels worth ten *lakhs* by her rejoicing father; every member of the household and every officer of the State received a gift on the joyous occasion; the beggars got two *lakhs*. The princes who had hastened to Agra on hearing of her accident, had their share of the imperial bounty. But none of them was so great a gainer as Aurangzib, for, at her request he was restored to his father's favour and his former rank and office, which he had lost in the meantime.  
[*Ibid*, 395—400.]

### § 7. Aurangzib's dismissal: its cause.

Aurangzib had arrived at Agra on 2nd May to see his sister. Here three weeks afterwards he was suddenly dismissed from his post, and deprived of his rank and allowance. The reason as given by the historians is obscure. The Court annalist,<sup>1</sup>

Abdul Hamid Lahori, writes that Aurangzib was thus punished because "misled by the wicked counsels of his foolish companions, he wanted to take to the retired life of an ascetic, and had also done some acts which the Emperor disapproved of." Khafi Khan says that the prince in order "to anticipate his father's punishment of his bad deeds, himself took off his sword and lived for some days as a hermit," for which he was dismissed. But neither of them describes the exact nature of his misconduct.\*

From one of Aurangzib's letters we gather that he resigned his post as a protest against Dara's persistent hostility and Shah Jahan's partiality to his eldest son which robbed Aurangzib of the Emperor's confidence and support. The prince's recommendations were overridden and he was so often interfered with and trusted with so little power that his prestige was lowered in the public eye and he could not govern the Deccan consistently with self-respect or with any chance of doing good service. As he wrote indignantly to his sister Jahanara in 1654, when similar distrust and hostility were shown to him by the Court during his second viceroyalty : "If His Majesty wishes that of all his servants I alone should pass my life in dishonour and at last

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\* *Pad.* ii. 373, 376 : K. K. i. 600, and ii. 398.

perish in an unbecoming manner, I have no help but to obey.....But as it is hard to live and die thus, and I do not enjoy [his] grace, I cannot, for the sake of perishable earthly things, live in pain and grief, nor deliver myself up into the hands of others,—it is better that by order of His Majesty I should be released from the shame of such a life, so that harm may not be done to the good of the State and [other] hearts may be composed about this matter. Ten years before this I had realised this fact and known my life to be aimed at [by my rivals], and *therefore I had resigned* my post,.....so that I might retire to a corner, cause no uneasiness to anybody's heart, and be saved from such harassment." [Adab. 177a.]

A literal interpretation of a Persian phrase\* has given rise in English histories to the myth that young Aurangzib turned hermit in a fit of religious devotion. The fact is that at this time he felt no religious call at all; his motive was political, not spiritual: he merely resigned his office, but did not actually take to a hermit's life. Under the Mughals,

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\* "Turning recluse" (*inziva ikhtiar kardan*) is a phrase commonly used in the Persian histories of India to mean the laying down of (military) rank, office, and uniform in such a manner as not to imply a defiance of the Emperor's wishes. We often read how an officer under imperial displeasure who had "turned hermit" (*manzaoi*) in this sense, was afterwards reinstated in his rank and office on recovering his master's grace.

every officer, civil or military, had to hold a rank in the army and wear the sword as a part of his full dress. Hence, laying the sword aside from one's belt was a visible symbol of resignation.

If we may trust the gossipy anecdotes compiled in Aurangzib's old age by Hamid-ud-din Khan Nimchah, the prince's disgrace was the outcome of his open jealousy of Dara Shukoh, his eldest brother and the intended heir to the throne. It is narrated that Dara invited his father and three brothers to see his newly built mansion at Agra. It was summer, and the party was taken to a cool underground room bordering on the river, with only one door leading into it. The others entered, but Aurangzib sat down in the doorway. To all inquiries of Shah Jahan about the reason of his strange conduct he gave no reply. For this act of disobedience he was forbidden the Court. After spending seven months in disgrace, he told Jahanara that as the room had only one entrance he had feared lest Dara should close it and murder his father and brothers to clear his own way to the throne. To prevent any such attempt Aurangzib had (he said) occupied the door as a sentinel!

#### § 8. *Aurangzib is reinstated and sent to Gujrat.*

On learning this Shah Jahan restored him to his favour. But it was impossible to keep

Aurangzib at Court with Dara, whom he hated so bitterly and suspected so cruelly. [Ane. § 2.] Therefore on 16th February, 1645, he was sent off to Gujrat as Governor. His viceroyalty of this province ended in January, 1647, when he was appointed to Balkh. But even in this brief period of less than two years he showed his administrative capacity and firmness. [Mirat-i-Ahmadi, i. 231-233.]

Of all the provinces of the Mughal empire, Gujrat was the most turbulent. A land subject to frequent droughts and a soil mostly of sand or stone yielded a poor and precarious harvest to reward the labour of man in many parts of the province. All its ardent spirits naturally turned from the thankless task of tilling the soil, to the more profitable business of plundering their weaker and richer brethren. Robbery was the hereditary and time-honoured occupation of several tribes, such as the Kulis and the Kathis, who covered the land from Jhalor to the sea. [Pad. ii. 231.] The Gujrati artisans, whose fame was world-wide, flourished in the cities under shelter of the walls. But the roads were unsafe to trader and traveller alike. The prevailing lawlessness added to the misery of the peasants and the poverty of the land by discouraging industry and accumulation of wealth. Any rebel or bandit leader could in a few days raise a large body of fighters

by the promise of plunder, and if he was only swift enough in evading pitched battles with the forces of Government, he could keep the whole country in a state of constant alarm and disturbance. Thus did the Mirzas violate public peace in Gujrat for a full generation in Akbar's reign. Many a pretender to the throne of Delhi gathered formidable military support here. Indeed, Gujrat bore the evil title of *lashkar-khez*, or a land 'bristling with soldiers.'\*

### § 9. *Aurangzib's strong rule in Gujrat.*

Such a province ever required a strong hand to govern it. A former viceroy, Azam Khan, (1635—41), had vigorously punished the robber tribes, built forts in their midst to maintain order, and forced the ruler of Nawánagar, to promise tribute and obedience to the imperial Government. For a time the roads became safe, and the land enjoyed unwonted peace. [Pad. ii. 231.]

Aurangzib, too, followed an active and firm policy towards the robber tribes and rebels of Gujrat. In order to check them effectually he engaged soldiers in excess of the men whom he was bound by his present rank as a *mansabdar* to keep. The Emperor, pleased to hear of this ardent spirit of duty, gave him a promotion, raising his salary to sixty

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\* *Kalimat-i-Tayyibat*, (A. S. B. MS. F. 27), 87a, 107a.

lakhs of Rupees a year (8th June, 1646). [Pad. ii. 510, 715.] He thus established in his father's eyes a reputation for capacity and courage, and it was not long before he was called away to a far-off scene where there was supreme need of these qualities.

On 4th September, Shah Jahan wrote to him to come away from Gujrat, after making over the Government to Shaista Khan. The prince met his father at Lahor on 20th January, 1647, and was next day created Governor and Commander-in-chief of Balkh and Badakhshan. Three weeks later he was sent off to his distant and dangerous charge. [Ibid, 583, 625, 627, 632.]

## CHAPTER V.

THE WAR IN CENTRAL ASIA, 1647.

### § 1. *Balkh and Badakhshan: the countries and their history.*

To the north of Kabul the Hindu Kush mountain range running north-east and the Oxus river flowing westwards enclose between them two provinces, Balkh and Badakhshan. The eastern half, Badakhshan, is a mere succession of ridges and valleys, with a scanty population and scattered patches of cultivation. The mines of ruby and turquoise which once gave it fame throughout the eastern world, now yield very little. It is a province thrust into a forgotten nook of the world, and hemmed in by fierce mountain tribes; the squalor and poverty of its people is equalled only by their ignorance and helplessness.\*

Balkh is a more open and fertile country. Irrigation canals and numerous streams have given its favoured tracts abundance of agricultural wealth, both of crops and fruits. Its rivers descending from the Hindu Kush form fertile valleys which grow

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\* Leyden's *Memoirs of Babar* (ed. 1826), xxix; Wood's *Journey to the Source of the Oxus* (ed. 1872), lxxv—lxxix, 171, 206, 191, 175, 257, 127; *Pad.* ii. 668.

broader and broader as they wind northwards to the Oxus. The hills are mostly bare and arid. Now and then sandstorms from the western desert sweep over the face of the land.

On the south it is separated from Afghanistan by lofty mountains, wide plateaus, and narrow passes. But its northern boundary, the Oxus river, presents no such natural barrier to an invader, and nomadic hordes from Central Asia have in every age crossed the river and overrun the land. In the southern hills from Kabul to Herat live predatory tribes, the Hazaras and Aimaks,\* hungrily watching for a chance to cut off travellers and traders in the passes or to swoop down upon the flourishing hamlets and orchards of the lowlands near the Oxus in the rear of some foreign invader. Against a regular army their hardiness and ferocity were rendered unavailing by their primitive savagery, ignorance, and lack of organisation. But through the south-western corner, which touches Khurasan, the stream of civilization has flowed into Balkh. By this path came the Persian, the Greek and the Arab, and each has left his stamp on the culture of the conquered people.†

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\* Wood, 127; Elias & Ross, *Tarikh-i-Rashidi*, Intro. 19; Vambery's *Travels in Central Asia*, 263.

† Vambery's *Travels*, 233, 239, 244; Elias & Ross, Intro. 82, 31, 107; Skrine & Ross's *Heart of Asia*, 6, 30, 38, 76, 131; Wood, lxi, lxvii, 155, 162; Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys*, 207.

Placed between two powerful neighbours it has been the fate of Balkh to be the scene of conquest and plunder age after age since the dawn of history ; its people have been relieved of masters from the south or west only by fiercer masters from the north ; their ancient culture and learning, which boasted of a Hellenistic origin, had been all but trodden out under the iron heels of Chenghiz Khan. Their cities were now in ruin and their wealth destroyed beyond hope of recovery.

Besides the wild robbers of the southern mountains and the tame cultivators of the northern lowlands, there was a third element of the population, — “ primitive nomads who occupied tracts of barren steppe land, and drove their flocks from hill to valley and valley to hill, in search of pasture according to season.”

A land of this nature could support but a small population, and was too poor to maintain an army on its own produce. The salaried troops of the king of Balkh numbered only 3000 men, and his revenue (including that yielded by Badakhshan) was only 25 *lakhs* of Rupees,—the stipend of a third-rate peer of the Mughal empire, as the Delhi historian has noted with contempt. His chief minister was paid only Rs. 80,000 a year. [Pad. ii. 542.]

### § 2. *Nomadic raiders of Trans-oxiana.*

Poor as were the resources of the country and tame as were the men of its plains, an invader from the south found it hard to keep hold of his conquest. He had to guard his own communications with the rear over the long and difficult passes of the Hindu Kush. But numberless hordes of savage horsemen, the Mongols and Turkomans, came from beyond the Oxus to oppose him, burning crops and villages, carrying off the loyal peasantry into slavery, hovering round his army on the march, cutting off detachments and stragglers, and when chased maintaining a Parthian fight. Indeed, his camp was ever in a state of siege. On them he could make no successful reprisal, deal no crushing blow which might win for him peace and the growth of revenue. The enemy had "no forts or towns or immovable property, worthy of the name, for an invader to destroy, and no stationary population, left undefended, upon whom he might wreak his vengeance.....Mobility must have been the quality they relied on more than any other, both in attack and retreat, and we find them baffling their enemies more by their movements than by their fighting power." When reduced to the worst, they fled across the Oxus to their homes. Mughal troops who had served in the Deccan, immediately noted

that the Uzbaks fought like the Marathas but were far more hardy. [Elias & R., Intro 55; *Pad.* ii. 705.]

Savage and uncouth as the Uzbaks were, they had at least the faith of Islam in common with their foemen from India. But the Turkoman tribes (mis-called Alamans) were worse still. They had not yet accepted the creed of Muhammad, but clung to their old heathenism.\* Plunder was their sole livelihood. In their forays they burnt the Quran and massacred holy men and children with as little pity as they showed to fighting foemen. In one place, they shut up in a mosque and roasted alive a pious darvish and 400 school-boys whom he had led in a procession to entreat their mercy. Similar atrocities were committed by them elsewhere. These ferocious robbers were not hampered in their marches by any baggage or provisions; the coarsest food sufficed for them. The deepest rivers they crossed by swimming their horses, in a long line, the bridle of one being fastened to the tail of another, while the saddles, which were mere bundles of sticks, could not be damaged by water. The men crossed on rafts made from the reeds that grew plentifully on the river bank. The horses, as hardy

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\* *Alaman* is a Tartar word meaning 'a predatory expedition' (Vambery, 317.) The historian Abdul Hamid took it to be the name of a Tartar tribe, whose manners he describes in ii. 619 and 453.

as their riders, lived on the wild wormwood of the steppe and yet covered a hundred miles a day. From Bukhara beyond the Oxus their forays extended to Khurasan, and the well-mounted Persian cavalry could not overtake them.

§ 3. *Nazar Muhammad, king of Balkh, deposed.*

For many centuries Balkh, with its adjunct of Badakhshan, had been a dependency of Bukhara, and was governed by a viceroy (often a prince of the blood) and garrisoned by the fierce and hardy Scythians from beyond the Oxus. Early in the seventeenth century, the wise and good Imam Quli Khan, of the Astrakhan-ide dynasty, adorned the throne of Bukhara for 32 years, and when in 1642 age and infirmity induced him to leave his weeping subjects for monastic repose in Medina, his younger brother Nazar Muhammad succeeded to the throne. The new Khan had governed the family appanage of Balkh during his brother's reign. As a ruler of Bukhara he was a failure. Its climate disagreed with him after his forty years' residence in the more genial soil of Balkh; his extreme avarice and niggardliness alienated his generals. Yet his ambition led him to annex Khwarizm. The Uzbaks began to hate him for his jealous policy of withdrawing all power from their leaders and doing everything himself. A man without discretion or

force of character, he openly taxed his chiefs with what backbiters had told him about them. The army seethed with discontent at his reduction of their allowances, seizure of pastures, and resumption of grants of rent-free land.\*

So the Bukhara troops mutinied and proclaimed as king his eldest son Abdul Aziz, who was in their midst as his father's viceroy, (17 April, 1645). Rebellion immediately broke out in many other parts of his vast and diverse territory, and savage hordes roamed over the country to take advantage of the disorder by plundering. At last the helpless father had to make peace by yielding Trans-oxiana to his rebel son and retaining Balkh and Badakhshan for himself. But meantime a new combatant had stepped into the arena; Shah Jahan had invaded Badakhshan.

It is difficult to see what drew him into the war, unless it was greed of conquest. True, Nazar Muhammad Khan had not been a good neighbour. Eighteen years ago, on the death of Jahangir, he had invaded Afghanistan, besieged Kabul (29 May, 1628), and fled back precipitately at the approach of Mughal troops. But this raid had been forgiven,

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\* Skrine & Ross, 160, 192, 194—199, Vambery's *History of Bukhara*, 304—333, Pad. II 251—256, 435—456; Skrine has *Nazar* instead of *Nazir*. Howorth's *History of the Mongols*, Pt. II. Div. II. 747—752 (has *Nadir* for *Nazar*)

and since then there had been an exchange of friendly messages and embassies between him and the Emperor of Delhi. Even recently when the Mughal forces were massed in Afghanistan for operations near Qandahar and Imam Quli had feared lest his country should be invaded by them, Shah Jahan had assured him that he would be left in peace. That rebels from Afghanistan were harboured in Balkh could not have been a cause of war, because it has always been recognised among eastern kings as a sacred duty to give asylum to suppliants. The Afghan frontier was exposed to private raids by Nazar Muhammad's subjects, but these could not have extended far, and must have been looked upon as common incidents in that debatable land from time immemorial. The Court historian Abdul Hamid is, therefore, right when he says that Shah Jahan determined to conquer Balkh and Badakhshan, "because they were the heritage of Babar and also lay in the way to Samarcand, the capital of Timur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty." The civil war in Balkh supplied him with an opportunity for carrying out his long-cherished scheme.\*

But if Shah Jahan really hoped to conquer and rule Central Asia with a force from India, we must conclude that the prosperity of his reign and

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\*Pad. I. A. 206-214; ii. 152, 13, 528, 529, 482-483.

the flattery of his courtiers had turned his head, and that he was dreaming the vainest of vain dreams. The Indian troops detested service in that far-off land of hill and desert, which could supply no rich booty, no fertile fief, and no decent house to live in. The occupation of that poor inhospitable and savage country meant only banishment from home and comfort and ceaseless fight and watching against a tireless and slippery enemy. The finest troops might be worn out and the richest treasury exhausted in the attempt to keep hold of such a country, and no gain either in glory or wealth was to be expected. Poor as the revenue of the new conquest was at the best of times, the Mughals during their two years of occupation could collect only one-half and one-fourth respectively of this small sum,\* while their war expenses were sixteen times as high !

#### § 4. *Indian invasion of Badakhshan and Balkh.*

A Mughal officer began the war by marching with a force from Ghorband, on the northern frontier of Afghanistan, and capturing the fort of Kahmard (June, 1645). But he soon abandoned it to the enemy. Shah Jahan disapproved both of the capture and of the abandonment as unwise, and turned his immediate attention to the conquest of

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\* Pad. ii. 542 & 666, M. U. i. 488.

Badakhshan. A strong reconnoitring force moved rapidly north-east from Kabul across the Hindu Kush and along the Panjshir river basin. On its return after examining the Parwan and Tul passes which lead into southern Badakhshan, he sent a large body of sappers to make a road. Rajah Jagat Singh took upon himself the task of conquest, advanced from Kabul (15 Oct., 1645) with a large Rajput contingent, conquered the Khosht district and built a wooden fort between the Sarab and the Andarab. Thence he returned to Afghanistan by the Panjshir valley (4 Nov.). But the Rajput garrison left by him gallantly held the stockade and beat the Uzbaks back from its walls time after time. [Pad. ii. 457, 462—466.]

The way being thus cleared, the grand campaign began next summer. In June, 1646 Murad Bakhsh, the youngest son of the Emperor, led 50,000 men into southern Badakhshan by the Tul pass. With him went Ali Mardan Khan, the premier noble, a Persian of rare genius and ability who had left the Shah's service to adorn the Court of Delhi. Marching by way of the Sarab and Deh-i-Tajikan, they reached Narin, whence a detachment under Asalat Khan pushed on and took possession of the fort of Qunduz on the north-eastern border of Balkh (22 June). The prince met with no opposition and entered the city of Balkh on 2nd July,

1646. The natives gazed with wonder at the Indian army with its huge elephants covered with cloth of gold and silver plates, steeds with bridles set with precious metals, troopers clad in cuirass embossed with gold and gems, endless columns of musketeers and sappers, and gorgeous standards and drums. Such a display of wealth and pomp they had never seen before. Shah Jahan had written to Nazar Muhammad Khan offering to leave Balkh to him if he remained friendly. The Khan had answered by professing submission. But on Murad's arrival at Balkh he doubted the Emperor's sincerity, feared a stratagem, and at night took his flight from his capital towards Persia. His fabulous wealth, hoarded for so many years and estimated at 70 lakhs of Rupees, was mostly plundered by his followers and subjects, and the victorious Mughals could seize only 12 lakhs in cash and kind, besides 2500 horses and 300 camels. Asalat Khan and Bahadur Khan went in pursuit, but were too late to capture him. [Pad. ii. 483—488, 512—541, 548—553.]

The country was conquered without a blow, but Murad was already sick of it. In his very first letter to the Emperor he begged hard to be recalled, and he continued to press the request ever after, in spite of repeated refusal. Most of his officers were no less eager to return to the pleasant land of Hindustan and escape from the dull and uncongenial soil of Balkh.

This news disheartened and distracted the loyal peasantry, and the Mughal soldiers, too, got out of hand and took to plundering.

The matter soon came to a crisis. The infatuated prince, then only 22 years of age, wanted to return home without permission, leaving Bahadur Khan in charge. The Mughal army of occupation, left without a supreme leader, would have been placed in a perilous condition. At Shah Jahan's command the *wazir* Sadullah Khan hastened to Balkh (10th August), tried to move Murad from his foolish purpose, and on his refusal removed him from the command. Arrangements were made for the new government; the army was distributed under different generals and stationed at important centres to keep hold of the country. Bahadur Khan and Asalat Khan were left in Balkh as joint viceroys, and Qalich Khan in Badakhshan. After 22 days of hard toil, the great *wazir* finished his task and returned to Kabul by a rapid ride of four days only (6 September). The prince, who had preceded him, was disgraced, deprived of his rank and government, and forbidden the Court. [*Ibid.* 557, 560—564, 579, 584.]

The Mughal outposts were exposed to attack from the Uzbaks, and many of them lived in a state of siege, fighting frequent but indecisive skirmishes with the enemy. All waited for the arrival of a

supreme commander and reinforcements at the end of winter.

During the recess the Emperor made grand preparations for opening the campaign in the spring of 1647. His sons Shuja and Aurangzib were called up from their provinces, large sums of money were conveyed to Afghanistan, and troops were massed at convenient stations from Peshawar to Kabul, in readiness to move at the first order, [Ibid. 566, 614, 620, 641—657.]

### *§ 5. Aurangzib sent as viceroy of Balkh, renews war.*

Aurangzib was in his government of Gujrat when he received his father's letter, dated 4th September, 1646, ordering him to come away after leaving Shaista Khan, the governor of Malwa, in his place. On 20th January, 1647, he arrived at Lahor with his two eldest sons and had audience of the Emperor. Next day the provinces of Balkh and Badakhshan were conferred on him, with 50 lakhs of Rupees for his expenses. On 10th February he took his leave with a present of 5 lakhs of Rupees, and advanced to Peshawar, where he was to halt till the spring. Thence he reached Kabul on 3rd April, and set out for the seat of war four days afterwards. Ali Mardan Khan accompanied him as his chief adviser and right-hand man, and no better selection could have been made. [Ibid. 625, 632, 670.]

But from the very beginning Aurangzib was handicapped by the smallness of his fighting force. Last year Murad had marched into Balkh with 50,000 men, but after the conquest a part of the army had been recalled. Of the remaining troops many were in garrison at the various forts or guarding the line of communication with the base in Afghanistan. High officers in full strength held important districts like Taliqan and Qunduz in the east, Rustaq in the north-east, Balkh, Tarmiz on the Oxus, north of Balkh, Maimana in the south-west, and Andkhui in the north-west. Aurangzib wisely kept them at their posts, lest the country should pass out of his control. But this step weakened his own immediate command. Some of the Indian nobles under orders to join him lingered at home or reached no further than Afghanistan. So the prince had to fight his battles with less than 25,000 men, while the enemy were a nation in arms and out-numbered the Mughals as three to one.\* True they did not fight pitched battles and had a wholesome dread of musketry-fire; but their "Cossack tactics" wore out the Mughals, and their superiority in number enabled them to bear easily a loss ten times as large as the casualties of the invaders. Against these light

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\* Pad. ii. 702—704. Khafi Khan computes his force at 35,000 and the Uzbak army at 1,20,000 men (i. 671.)

forayers the small imperial army could not hope for a crushing victory.

After leaving Kabul, on 7th April, 1647, Aurangzib marched by the Shibur Pass and Aq Rabat to Kahrmand, which was a half-way depot of the invaders. Thence the road to Balkh runs over a tableland, through which winds the Dehas river with its narrow valley called the Derah-i-Gaz. Here the Uzbaks assembled in force under Qutluq Muhammad to dispute the passage. The prince sent a reconnoitring force of 500 men under Khalil Beg, who charged the enemy, regardless of the odds against him. On hearing of his dangerous plight the vanguard, mostly composed of Rajputs and a force of musketeers, was pushed up. The Uzbaks fled, but only to take post further off (20th May).\*

\* *Pad.* ii. 671—673. Aurangzib advanced from Kabul by the *Abdarah* and *Gaz* passes, according to the Persian account. Yule takes *Abdarah* to be the upper valley of the Surkhab, below Zohak (Wood's *Journey*, lxv). This was therefore "the *Shibr* Pass, which was most commonly used by Baber." (Leyden, 139). Aurangzib's stages are thus named: Kabul—(by way of Ghorband) to Aq Rabat (two stages from Kahrmand)—Bajgah—the pass of Badar Hamid (= Baber's "*Madr* on the *Khulm* road"),—Kishan Dch Khurd—Puni (or Buni) Qara ('which is the beginning of the valley of *Gaz*')—Balkh. He seems to have marched from Kabul northwards to Charikar, thence westwards by way of Ghorband to Zohak and Bamian, next northwards across the Dandan-Shikan Pass to Kahrmand or even to Qara Kotal, whence he turned north-west to the mouth of the valley of *Gaz* (crossing one affluent of the Dehas river on the way). The entire route from Kabul to Balkh city is spoken of as 123 *kos* or 246 miles, (*Pad.* ii. 669).

Next day, Aurangzib led the main army by the eastern bank, while Ali Mardan Khan was sent with the Van across the two upper affluents of the Dehas to dislodge a strong body of the enemy from the hills and ravines that crossed the path.

The front division of the Mughal army, as it issued from a defile, was attacked by the Uzbaks and suffered some loss; but the wings soon came up and broke the enemy's centre. The battle now became general. Ali Mardan Khan drove the enemy from the field and from some hillocks behind it, chased them for four miles over broken ground, and returned to camp with some wounded prisoners. This was Aurangzib's first victory in Balkh.

The city of Balkh was reached without further opposition (25th May). Madhu Singh Hada was left in command of the fort, and the leading citizens were detained in custody in Aurangzib's camp to prevent them from making mischief. Reinforcements in men and money continued to arrive from Kabul, where Shah Jahan himself was present.

At the head of the Bukhara national defence stood Abdul Aziz Khan, the eldest son and supplanter of the weak king Nazar Muhammad. He now sent another army under Beg Ughli across the Oxus river to Aqcha, 40 miles north-west of Balkh. Here the fugitives from the pass of Gaz, under

Qutluq Muhammad, joined the new arrivals.  
[*Pad.* ii. 673—686.]

After a three days' halt at Balkh, Aurangzib left his baggage there in charge of his eldest son, and set out with light kit towards Aqcha to meet the assembled Uzbaks. The imperial army moved with great caution, Bahadur Khan leading the Van, Aurangzib seated on an elephant commanding the Centre which enclosed in its bosom the baggage and camp-followers, and Ali Mardan Khan bringing up the Rear. The artillery supported by foot-muskeeters cleared the line of advance. The Uzbak squadrons charged repeatedly, but only to be broken and driven back. They formed again at a safe distance and took advantage of the many canals and gardens of the region to obstruct the imperialists, who steadily advanced to Timurabad (2nd June).

#### § 6. *Incessant fighting with the hovering Uzbaks.*

Hardly had the wearied force of Aurangzib dismounted at their camp here, when the Uzbaks attacked them from all sides. After a harassing fight they succeeded in driving the enemy back in front and right, and Ali Mardan Khan with the Rear went in pursuit and plundered the camp of Qutluq Muhammad. But the Mughal left wing was weak in number and its leader Said Khan Bahadur Zafar Jang was an old man in bad health. The enemy

quickly discovered this weak spot, and their troops, repulsed at other points, flocked here to swell the attack. Said Khan sent a detachment of 400 men to hold a stream which skirted the camp and to prevent the enemy from crossing it. But a clever ruse of the Uzbaks lured the indiscreet Mughals to the other bank, where they were surrounded and almost exterminated by the mobile enemy. Said Khan sent up reinforcements and at last himself marched out in spite of his illness. But he was wounded and thrown down from his horse, and his two sons were slain with many other soldiers. Just then Aurangzib arrived to succour the hard-pressed division. Two furious elephants were driven before him, and his soldiers rushed into the lane that was thus cleared. The enemy were routed and the left wing saved from extinction. [*Ibid.* 687—694.]

The second of June was a terrible day for the imperialists. They had marched from dawn to midday and then got no rest in their camp, but had to fight incessantly till sunset before they could gain the much needed safety and repose. Ali Mardan Khan now returned with the victorious Rear. The camp was entrenched and carefully guarded, many of the captains doing patrol duty all night, without dismounting.

Next day the tired soldiers and their chief alike wished to halt. But under Ali Mardan's wise advice

they advanced to seize Beg Ughli's base and reap the utmost fruit of their victory. The Uzbaks as usual hovered round the marching army and kept up a running fight. Thanks to their superior mobility, they could attack or retreat as they chose. Leaving screens at safe distances on the Right and Left, their massed troops fell on the Van, but only to be shattered by the Mughal artillery. The same tactics were repeated against the Rear, but with no better success. The march continued, the enemy seizing every disorder or weakness to come closer and gall the imperialists with showers of arrows. But the Scythian militia was no match for regular troops, and their general's camp at Pashai was seized by Aurangzib, and the peasantry whom they had carried off into captivity were released.

After two days of march and fighting the prince could no longer deny his troops a halt. Meantime the baffled enemy slipped away from his front to his rear at Aliabad. Another large army arrived from Bukhara under Prince Subhan Quli, evidently to attack the city of Balkh.

The news made Aurangzib beat a retreat from Pashai (5th June) and hasten eastwards to defend the capital. The enemy became more aggressive than before, and at two places penetrated into his camp for a time.\* Artillery, rockets, and muskets alone

\* Khafi Khan (i. 668) says that three or four thousand Uzbaks,

could keep their hordes at a safe distance. Next day he turned a little aside to Shaikhabad to release two of his officers who were invested in a garden. Thence he marched towards Faizabad on the Balkháb river.

On the 7th the situation grew worse. The Bukhara army put forth a supreme effort. It was now in full strength. Its highest commanders, Abdul Aziz the king, Subhan Quli his brother, and Beg Ughli the Uzbak chieftain, were all present, and directed the attack on three points of the imperial army. But again musketry and superior discipline gave the Mughals the victory. The retreat continued till the 9th with the usual ineffective molestation from an enemy that lacked fire-arms, and whose arrows were powerless except in a close encounter. At last in the evening of the 9th the Bukhara king demanded a parley and sent a friendly message. The Mughals were not molested during the next two days, and they reached Balkh in peace on 11th June.

### *§ 7. Hardships of the Mughals; Aurangzib's cool courage.*

This march towards Aqcha and retreat to Balkh had taken up ten days, during which the Mughal

dashed into the Mughal camp, and carried off many camels loaded with baggage and many women and children of the Mughal troops. Ali Mardan Khan recovered only a little of the booty. *Pad.* ii. 694—697.

army had been a stranger to repose. Day after day a strenuous fight had to be maintained against the tireless and mobile enemy, while hunger raged in the imperial ranks. The soldiers were ever on the move, and food could be cooked only on the backs of the marching elephants! Bread sold at one Rupee or even two Rupees a piece and water was equally dear. Happy were those who could get the necessities of life even at this price, for there was not enough for all. Such was the condition of the prince's personal following. The lot of the common soldiers may be imagined. But in the midst of all this hardship and danger, Aurangzib's firmness and control prevented any slackness or disorder; his watchful eye and active body hastened to the succour of every weak spot, and his wisdom and courage brought the army back to safety.\*

Evil as was the plight of the Mughal army, the enemy were worse off. Aurangzib's grim tenacity had gained its object. Abdul Aziz now desired to make peace. His hope of crushing Aurangzib had failed. He had personally witnessed a striking proof of the prince's cool courage; for, one day the hour of evening prayer arrived when the battle was at its hottest; Aurangzib spread his carpet on the

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\* Khafi Khan, i. 668 and 669. Howorth (752) says, "The devastation caused such a famine that an ass's load of corn cost 1000 florins."

field, knelt down and calmly said his prayers, regardless of the strife and din around him. He was then, as during the rest of the campaign, without armour and shield. The Bukhara army gazed on the scene with wonder, and Abdul Aziz, in generous admiration, stopped the fight, crying, "To fight with such a man is to court one's own ruin." [M.A. 531, *Pad.* ii. 704.]

The Bukhara king could no longer pay and keep his vast host together. The hope of an easy plunder of the imperialists had brought his men together. That design having failed they were eager to return home. The Turkomans in particular sold their horses to the imperial army and decamped across the Oxus.

### § 8. *Peace with Nazar Muhammad.*

Abdul Aziz proposed that Balkh should be delivered to his younger brother Subhan Quli, as Shah Jahan had publicly offered to restore the country to their father. Aurangzib referred the question to the Emperor, and Abdul Aziz left the neighbourhood of Balkh, and from Khulm turned sharply to the north, crossing the Oxus at Aiwanj on inflated skins, his soldiers following his example wherever they could. The historian Abdul Hamid has blamed Aurangzib for not immediately giving chase and killing or capturing Abdul Aziz. But

he forgets that the Uzbak war was a national rising and did not depend on any individual leader, even when that leader was a powerful and able prince like Abdul Aziz Khan. [Pad. ii. 700, 706-9.]

The war was now practically over, at least for a season. But a settlement was still far off. Shah Jahan had no doubt decided to give the country back to Nazar Muhammad Khan, but that king must first offer submission and beg pardon before imperial prestige could be satisfied. Meantime in the Mughal army officers and men alike were sick of their exile and longed to return home. High commanders like Bahadur Khan secretly thwarted Aurangzib, fearing that if they captured the king of Bukhara, the Emperor would annex Trans-oxiana and leave the Indian troops in permanent garrison there, while the failure of the expedition would lead to their speedy return home! The country had been devastated by the Turkoman freebooters, the crops burnt, and the peasantry robbed or dragged away. Aurangzib, therefore, wrote to his father that he could do no good by staying there. [Waris, 3b.]

Soon after the prince's return to Balkh about the middle of June, negotiations had been opened by Nazar Muhammad, then in refuge at Belchiragh.\*

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\* For Nazar Muhammad's adventures in Persia and after his return, see Abdul Hamid, ii. 658-668.

But three months were wasted in a fruitless exchange of messages and vain attempts to allay the ex-king's suspicions of treachery if he interviewed Aurangzib. He demanded this fort and that as a security, and on 13th September sent Qafsh, the Qalmaq chieftain, as his agent to Aurangzib. On the 23rd, he sent his grandsons to the prince, excusing himself on the ground of illness. [Waris, 6b, 7a.]

With this Aurangzib had to be contented, as the winter was fast approaching. The passes of the Hindu Kush would be soon closed by snow. His army was faced with starvation, as grain was selling in Balkh at ten Rupees a *maund*. They had no winter quarters in that poor and desolate country.

Already tribes of Turks and "Alamans" had recrossed the Oxus and begun to cut off small parties of the Mughals. Aurangzib, as his officers urged, had no time to lose; he could not even wait for the Emperor's consent. So at last, on 1st October, 1647, he formally delivered the city and fort of Balkh to Nazar Muhammad's grandsons. His distant garrisons fell back on him at the rumour of peace, without waiting for his order.

On 3rd October the Mughal army marched from the plain outside Balkh and began its retreat to Kabul. Ali Mardan Khan and Rajah Jai Singh commanded the right and left wings, and Bahadur Khan the Rear. The artillery accompanied the Van.

The pass of Ghazniyak was crossed slowly and painfully, the enemy harassing them from the rear and boldly falling upon them at their least disorder or difficulty. Ghori was reached on 14th October, the Uzbaks still hanging on the tail of the retreating force. Shah Jahan had wished to retain this fort and Kahrmand as the southern gates of Balkh, but his officers refused to stay there. [Waris, 7b, 8a.]

### *§ 9. Sufferings during the retreat from Balkh.*

The retreat continued. The wild hillmen called Hazaras now took the place of the Uzbaks in harassing and plundering the Mughals. The winter of that year set in very early and with unusual severity. [Vam. *Hist.* 332.] The imperialists, encumbered with 10 lakhs of Rupees but having few transport animals and porters, toiled slowly and painfully through a narrow and steep pass east of the Surkhab river (21st and 22nd October) and the hardened ice on the Hindu Kush (24th October). South of these mountains lay Afghanistan and safety, and Aurangzib could now hasten in advance to Kabul, which he reached on the 27th.\* Ali

\* Aurangzib returned from Balkh to Kabul by the Ghazniyak—Haibak—Ghori—Ghorband route, which is called in the Persian history the *Khwajah Zaid Road* (*Pad.* ii. 669). He seems to have crossed the Hindu Kush either by the *Kushan Pass*, because "this pass leads under the great peak specially known as that of Hindu

Mardan Khan too crossed with ease. But the rest of the army, especially the Rajputs under Jai Singh, the treasure-escort under Zulqadar Khan, the stores, and the camp and Rear under Bahadur Khan, were several days' march behind. They suffered untold hardships from heavy and incessant snowfall for three days together. Men and beasts of burden alike slipped on the snow or lost the narrow track and went rolling down into the depths below. The exhausted camels lay down in the ice never to rise again. The intense cold drove every man away in search of shelter. Zulqadar Khan alone, with a handful of men, guarded his charge on the bare top of the pass for seven days, regardless of snowfall, till the Rear under Bahadur Khan came up and took him away. This last officer's march had been slow, as he had constantly to face round and drive back the hillmen who clung to him in the hope of plunder. One night, in the midst of wind and snow, he had to bivouac on the top of the pass, and many benumbed men and beasts of his party perished. The last part of the army reached Kabul on 10th November.  
 [Waris, 8b, 9a.]

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Kush", (Wood, lxv) or, what is more likely, by the Chardarya Kipchak Pass, (for which see Wood, lxv. and Leyden, 139). The stages of his homeward march from Balkh are thus given :—Ghazniyak Pass—Ghori—Surkhab river—Bek Shahar—Chahar Chashma—Pass of Hindu Kush—Ghorband—Charikar—Kabul. (Waris, 8a & b).

### § 10. *Mughal losses in the war.*

The total loss of the imperial army in crossing the passes was 10,000 lives, about one-half of the number being men, and the rest elephants, horses, camels and other beasts. Much property, too, was left buried under the snow, or flung into the ravines for want of transport. The horrors of the British Retreat from Kabul were anticipated by these Indian mercenaries, who had blindly gone to an unrighteous war at the call of their paymaster. Next year when the snow melted it revealed the gruesome spectacle of piles of human bones bordering the path ! [Vam. *Hist.* 322.]

Thus ended Shah Jahan's fatuous war in Balkh,—a war in which the Indian treasury spent four *krores* of Rupees in two years and realised from the conquered country a revenue of  $22\frac{1}{2}$  *lakhs* only. Not an inch of territory was annexed, no dynasty changed, and no enemy replaced by an ally on the throne of Balkh. The grain stored in Balkh fort, worth 5 *lakhs*, and the provisions in other forts as well, were all abandoned to the Bukharians, besides Rs. 50,000 in cash presented to Nazar Muhammad's grandsons and Rs. 22,500 to envoys. Five hundred soldiers fell in battle and ten times that number (including camp-followers) was slain by cold and snow on the mountains. Such is the terrible price

that aggressive imperialism makes India pay for wars across the north-western frontier. [Pad. ii. 542, 704; Waris, 7b, 6b, 7a.]

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## CHAPTER VI.

GOVERNORSHIP OF MULTAN AND SINDH, 1648—1652.

### § 1. *Aurangzib's viceroyalty of Multan.*

After sanctioning the retreat from Balkh, Shah Jahan himself returned to India. But steps were taken to guard against any disaster in the rear. Prince Shuja was left behind at Kabul till he should hear that Aurangzib had safely crossed the Hindu Kush again. The expeditionary force was now entirely withdrawn from Afghanistan. But Aurangzib himself, in command of its last portion, was detained at Attock till March next, without being permitted to cross the Indus and enter Hindustan. The object of this arrangement evidently was that he should be near enough to hasten back to the defence of Kabul, in the case of an invasion from Central Asia. But such a fear vanished in time, and in the middle of March 1648 he was appointed Governor of Multan. This post he held till 14th July, 1652, when he laid it down to take up the viceroyalty of the Deccan for the second time. [ *Waris*, 12a, 66a.]

Of Aurangzib's personal history during these four years there is little to tell. He was twice called away to fight the Persians at Qandahar; first leaving Multan on 22nd January and returning in December,

1649, and on the second occasion crossing the Chenab on 20th March 1652 and being sent away to the Deccan directly from Qandahar. On the way back from the first siege he spent a fortnight with the Emperor at Lahor (10th to 26th November, 1649); and he paid another visit to his father at Delhi from 2nd January to 12th February, 1651. Promotion came to him on 16th January, 1649, when his rank was raised by 2,000 troopers of his command being made *do-aspa* and *seh-aspa*, and his allowance being increased in proportion, so that he was now a Commander of 15,000 men by rank, (12,000 troopers, of whom 8,000 were *do-aspa* and *seh-aspa*.)\* In November of the same year the province of Tatta or Sindh was added to his viceroyalty, and the districts of Bhakkar and Siwistan granted to him as his fiefs.

On the public side of the prince's career from 1650 a new and copious source of information is opened to the historian by the *Adab-i-Alamgiri*. Aurangzib took into his service an elegant and facile secretary, Shaikh Abul Fath, afterwards raised to the title of Qabil Khan and the high post of *Munshi-ul-mamalik* (Imperial Secretary) when his master won the throne of Delhi. The scribe served the prince for 26 years and retired only when failing eye-sight made him unfit for his task.† He kept copies of all

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\* Waris, 24a, 39b, 48a, 49a, 59a; *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 3a, 4b, 9.

† *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 1b, 209b; A. N. 420, 751.

the letters he wrote in the name of Aurangzib to the Emperor, the princes, ministers, and generals, and of certain other epistles written to them on his own behalf. These number more than six hundred and fill 427 pages of a foolscap folio manuscript, with 23 lines to the page. They cover the entire period from 1650 to the dethronement and captivity of Shah Jahan. From the commencement of the second siege of Qandahar the letters become more full and frequent, and we get a detailed and most authentic account of Aurangzib's efforts at Qandahar, his feeling at his father's censure, his financial difficulties in the Deccan, the administrative problems that he handled there, the crooked ways of Mughal diplomacy with Bijapur and Golkonda,—and lastly, of his hopes and fears, plans and movements during the war of succession, and his relations with his captive father.\*

The province of Multan contained a warlike and unsettled population divided into a number

\* The *Adab-i-Alamgiri* was compiled in 1115 A. H. (1703-1704 A.D.) by Sadiq at the request of his son Md. Zaman, (2a and b).

Sadiq of Ambala, who collected Qabil Khan's drafts, supplemented them with a history of the war of succession extracted from the *Amal-i-Salih* and the *Alamgirnamah*, added 131 letters which he himself had written as secretary to the luckless prince Muhammad Akbar, and published the whole to the world. These 131 contain many details of the Mughal war with Maharana Raj Singh, and come to a close only a month before Akbar broke into rebellion against his father.

of tribes by differences of race, creed, and traditions, and often engaged in war with one another. The addition of Sindh to his charge brought Aurangzib in contact with the wildest and most untractable Afghan and Baluch clans. For many generations past the royal authority had been hardly obeyed in the western borderland even in name, and the chieftains had lived warred and raided as they liked. Aurangzib was not the man to brook disorder and disobedience. But even he could do no more than make a beginning. The cause of law and order could get no local support among the people governed; everything depended on the strong arm of the ruler. It was impossible for him, in the few years of a viceroyalty, to break to peaceful life and law-abiding habits tribes who had never before known any government and who were in a fluid state of either expansion or extinction. Only justice strictly administered and backed by irresistible force for several generations, could have crushed out the predatory instincts of the Brahuis and Hots and taught them to obey a higher power than their chieftains' will. This moral transformation was reserved for another age and another race of administrators. What Aurangzib, however, could do was to strike down the most notorious brigand chiefs and secure a nominal profession of allegiance to the Emperor from the border clans. The imperial

suzerainty once admitted in theory, its practical working out might be left for better times.

### § 2. *Aurangzib punishes lawless Baluch tribes.*

A large Baluch tribe named Hot had migrated into Sindh and the Panjab under Mir Chakar Rind of Sibi, and split up into branches. One section held the upper Derajat for two centuries with Dera Ismail Khan as their capital. Their chiefs bore the title of Ismail Khan from generation to generation and stretched their lordship over Darya Khan and Bhakkar east of the Indus. In the Sind Sagar Doab stood Mankera, another Hot stronghold, and the capital of a principality which at the beginning of the 17th century stretched from Bhakkar to Leah on the Indus. In course of time the Hots have become assimilated to their Jat and Rajput neighbours, and their power and number have declined.\* But the seventeenth century was the period of their greatness. Their chief, Ismail Hot, sent presents to Shah Jahan and secured a patron in Dara Shukoh. Taking advantage of his position on the boundary between the two provinces, he now claimed to be subject to the Governor of Lahor and refused to admit the jurisdiction of the subahdar of Multan. Aurangzib was prepared for this subterfuge. He had mentioned

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\* Dames's *Baloch Race*, 48 and 55; *Imperial Gazetteer*, xi. 262, 270, xvii. 198, xxiii. 286.

the case in an audience with the Emperor and got his answer that Ismail Hot was in future to be subject to Multan. The Hot chief, on the strength of a letter of Dara's, refused to wait upon the new Governor of Multan, and continued in his career of aggression. He took three forts from Mubarak of Babri, another Baluch chief. Aurangzib, armed with the Emperor's sanction, at once asserted his authority and sent a force to restore the forts to their rightful owner. But during Mubarak's absence, Ismail conquered the forts again. Severer measures were now taken against him; he was compelled to surrender Mubarak's possessions and to pay his respects to the prince at Multan (20th June, 1650). Aurangzib now conciliated him, as he was a rich chieftain with a good body of armed retainers, and could assist the imperial Government in subduing the Nohani tribe and also supply provisions during the Qandahar war.\*

Another Baluch tribe, which has now strangely declined and almost disappeared, is the Nohani,†

\* Pad. ii. 233, (Ismail presents horses and camels, 26 May, 1641.) Waris, 85 a. *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 2b, 3a.

† "Noh or Nuhani.—Not now found. Said to have been on the side of the Lasharis against the Rinds" (Dames's *Baloch Race*, p. 56). "Throughout the Brahui, Baloo, and Lasi tribes, and even among the Sibi Afghans, sections or sub-sections called Nodh, Nodhani, and Nothani, &c. are to be found" (H. Buller's *Census of Baluchistan*, p. 83).

the hereditary enemy of the Hots. But their power in the 17th century was strong enough to cause anxiety to the Government. Aurangzib at first tried to win over Alam, the Nohani chief, whose lands adjoined those of the Hots and lay across one of the shortest roads from Multan to Qandahar. But his friendly letter produced no effect; the proud chieftain refused to wait on the Governor at Multan. So Aurangzib took steps to expel him by force, after getting sanction from the Emperor. [Adab, 3a-5a.]

In the Kirthar and Lakhi hills separating Sindh from Baluchistan, dwelt many lawless men of the Nahmardi and Jukia tribes. In Akbar's time the former clan could place in the field more than 7,000 men.\* Their strongholds were Bela, (the capital of the district of Las), and Kahra, from which they sallied forth to rob and to slay. No ruler of Sindh, from the days of the Tarkhan dynasty, had extorted even a nominal submission from these border brigands. Aurangzib sent his able lieutenant, Malik Husain of the Abdali clan, against them. The force marched for ten days beyond the frontier of Lower Sindh, exacted promises of submission and tribute from Harun and Khatartal (the Nahmardi chiefs),

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\* *Ain*, ii, 337. The *Adab-i-Alamgiri* mentions Kahra and Bela as 10 stages from the frontier of Tatta, and as the refuge of these two clans. The *Ain* speaks of a range of mountains named Karah, evidently west of Bhakkar. (ii, 337).

and Murid (the headman of the Jukias), and caused the Emperor's name to be read from the pulpit as a public mark of his suzerainty. This show of strength evidently had a good effect on the neighbours, for Jafar Nahmardi, a kinsman of the zamindar of Panjghur\* and Kech Makran, and four other chiefs offered their allegiance to the imperial Government.

Another Nahmardi chief named Madh, had descended from the hills of Southern Afghanistan to raid Bela and Kahra. But Malik Husain with the imperial troops made a forced march of 140 miles, and surprised the robber's camp, slaying him and bringing away his daughter and forty of his retainers as captives. Thus the Emperor's suzerainty was publicly declared throughout the coast tract of Makran, and the army returned to Tatta with flying colours.

Sata Hala, the son of the zamindar of Kakrala, paid a visit to Aurangzib at Multan, but in the meantime his rival crossed over from Cutch and seized his lands. A detachment from Malik Husain's force, assisted by a gun-boat, drove away the usurper, who fled without standing a battle. Everywhere

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 3b, has Banchur or Panjur "and Kaj and Makran." I take the place to be Panjghur, 27°30 N. 63°E., north north-east of Kaj (or Kech), described in Masson's *Kalat*, 219. The chief objection to the identification is that it is more than 300 miles away from Tatta.

lawless men and frontier clans felt that they had got a new master, who could not be safely defied.

### § 3. *He develops the trade of Sindh.*

While thus securing internal peace, Aurangzib was equally mindful of developing the trade of the province and increasing its revenue. Early in the century Tatta had been one of the chief commercial centres of India, and trade of great value used to pass up the Indus. But accumulations of sand at the mouth of the river increased year by year and closed the passage to ocean-going ships.\* Tatta ceased to be an emporium. Aurangzib now set about reviving the commerce of the province by affording facilities to the maritime trade. He opened a new port at the mouth of the Indus, and built there a fort and dock to give it security and usefulness. But it took time for the new harbour to become known to mariners, and for some months the only ship that used it was a vessel belonging to the prince. The Emperor excused the duty on merchandise in order to attract trade to it. [Adab. 6a.]

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\* "There is no city of greater trade in all the Indies than Tatta in Sindh; its chief port being Larry Bunder, three days' journey nearer the mouth of the river. From Tatta they go in two months by water to Lahor and return down the river in one... Great trade is carried on at Tatta and ships of 300 tons might be brought up to Larry Bunder." Whittington in 1614, Purchas, I, quoted in Kerr's *Voyages and Travels*, ix. 131 and 130. For the silting up, Tavernier, i. 12.

We read of his financial difficulties at this time. His jagirs produced little revenue, as the results of drought, the locust plague, and floods, in three successive seasons. He begged for financial assistance from the Emperor, saying that he had no hoard of gold pieces, but had spent all his income in keeping his army efficient, as he did not care to buy jewels like other princes. But the Emperor gave him an angry refusal. [*Ibid.* 172a.]

Aurangzib's administrative capacity, however, must not be judged from these few achievements in Sindh. He lived in the province for barely three years, and in the very first year of his viceroyalty Qandahar cast its shadow over his work. Home affairs were subordinated to foreign, and every other question was neglected for the supreme one of recovering Qandahar. Multan became one of the two bases for the war with Persia, and, amidst the bustle of military preparation on a vast scale, the attention and resources of its ruler were necessarily diverted from the internal administration.

## CHAPTER VII.

### FIRST SIEGE OF QANDAHAR, 1649.

#### § 1. *The district of Qandahar: its physical aspects.*

The province of Qandahar occupies the southern part of Afghanistan. It is a comparatively level country, of which the heart is formed by the river Helmand and its tributaries. On the east it is separated from India by the extensive net-work of hills centring round Thal-Chotiali. On the south impassable deserts lie between it and Baluchistan. On the north stretch the hill ranges of Ghazni and Kabul. Westwards, from a little beyond the city of Qandahar up to Isfahan, the country is fairly level, but so very hot and barren that for days and days together not a green herb or blade of grass refreshes the traveller's eye, while the dry sandy soil affords only a scanty supply of brackish water at long intervals. A few forts have been built on the rivers, mainly for military purposes,—to guard the fords, to protect caravans, and to afford resting places to troops on the march. Patches of cultivation and walled hamlets dot the river banks in an otherwise desolate wilderness.\*

Qandahar proper is an open and well-watered

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\* Journey of Richard Steel and John Crowther, in Purchas, I. 519—528.

district penned within hills and deserts. The Arghandab and the Tarnak, two tributaries of the Helmand, give fertility to its north-eastern corner beyond Kalat-i-Ghilzai, on the road to Ghazni. Numberless canals have drawn away water from the Helmand, and turned the environs of Qandahar into one long expanse of orchards and cornfields, vine-yards and melon-beds. The Afghans of this part have used every contrivance that human ingenuity sharpened by want can suggest, to utilise the precious water of their few streams in irrigating their fields. Rightly do the people name their river *Hirmand* or "abounding in blessings," because they owe their all to it.\* But the country is so bare of trees that fire-wood is very dear, and for lack of timber the people build their houses of sundried clay, with earthen domes for roofs. Burnt bricks are seldom used, even in building the walls of forts.† Away from the river, agriculture cannot flourish, and sheep form the chief wealth of the people.

### § 2. *Qandahar: its strategic and commercial importance.*

The great Hindu Kush range running through the heart of Asia, strikes west-wards into Persia, and

\* *Imperial Gazetteer*, i. 12. *Ain-i-Akbari* (Jarrett), ii. 394. Masson's *Journeys*, ii. 186, 189. Forster's *Journey* (1798), iii. 102—104 and 106.

† Masson's *Journeys*, i. 280.

thus completely separates Central Asia from Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India. But north of Herat its formidable heights sink to insignificant levels, with comparatively gentle gradients, which offer an easy passage to an invading host from Central Asia marching to take Kabul from the rear and strike India on her western flank.\* Herein lies the strategic importance of Qandahar: only 360 miles of level country separate it from Herat,—a ten days' dash for cavalry. Through Qandahar must pass, and there must be turned back, if ever at all, any considerable land force, with artillery and other modern impedimenta, coming to invade India from Persia or Central Asia.† The master of Kabul must hold Qandahar and Herat, or his dominion is unsafe. In an age when Kabul was a part of the Delhi empire, Qandahar was our indispensable first line of defence.

In the seventeenth century Qandahar was even more important as a gateway of commerce than as an outpost of the empire. The Portuguese navy then dominated the Indian Ocean, and their quarrels with Persia often stopped the sea-borne trade by way of the Persian Gulf. All merchandise from India and even the Spice Islands had to follow the land route through Multan, Chotiali, Pishin and Qandahar. In spite of

\* Holdich's *Gates of India*, 528.

† *Kandahar* (a pamphlet), with an introduction by Ashmead Bartlett, (1881).

the length and hardships of the road, in spite of the toll levied by every petty chieftain and local officer whose jurisdiction had to be crossed, in spite of the total cost of transport being as high as Rs. 125 for every camel's load,—the traders had practically a monopoly of the Persian market, and their profits were large enough to attract numbers to the traffic. In 1615, the English traveller Richard Steel noted that fourteen thousand laden camels annually passed into Persia by this route. Many merchants of India, Persia and Turkey met at Qandahar and often concluded their exchange of commodities there, and so great was the concourse of trade that provisions grew very dear in the city in spite of the natural abundance of the district, and the houses were extended till the suburbs became larger than the city itself.\*

### *§ 3. Past history of Qandahar.*

From its position Qandahar was naturally a bone of contention between India and Persia. Early in the sixteenth century two powerful monarchies sprang up side by side, when Babar conquered Delhi and Shah Ismail founded the glorious "Sophy" dynasty in Persia. In 1522 Babar finally wrested the province of Qandahar from the Arghun family

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\* Purchas, i. 519—528; Tavernier, i. 90.

who had held it under nominal submission to the ruler of Herat. On his death, it passed as an appanage to his younger son Kamran. In 1545, Humayun, then a fugitive from India, captured the fort from his brother Askari, but broke his promise of ceding it to the son of the Persian king, who had given him shelter and whose forces had aided the conquest. But this breach of faith availed him little. In the troubles following Humayun's death and Akbar's minority, the Persian king conquered Qandahar (1558) and bestowed it on his nephew Sultan Husain Mirza. Akbar's turn came in 1594, when Sultan Husain's successor, Mirza Muzaffar Husain, surrendered his principality to the Mughal Emperor and entered his service as a high grandee. So also did Muzaffar's brother Rustam, the lord of Dawar. For the next twenty-nine years Qandahar remained united to Delhi, though a fruitless attack was made on it in 1606, just after Akbar's death. But the Persians were not to be denied. After negotiating in vain with Jahangir for a friendly cession of the fort, Shah Abbas the Great in 1623 besieged it for 45 days, and took it from Abdul Aziz Khan Naqshbandi, who was holding it for the Emperor. Fifteen years afterwards, Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian Governor of Qandahar, alarmed at the hostile intentions of the Shah, saved himself and his family by betraying the fort into Mughal

hands (Feb., 1638) and entering the imperial service, where he gained the highest rank and office, and the personal friendship of his new master. Shah Jahan, on getting possession spent immense sums in strengthening the defences and replenishing the stores and arsenals of Qandahar and its dependencies, Bist and Zamin Dawar.\*

#### § 4. *Shah II. recovers Qandahar from Mughals.*

It now became a point of honour with the Persian sovereign to recover Qandahar. Shah Abbas II, who had ascended the throne of Isfahan in 1642 as a boy of ten only, wanted to signalise his coming of age by a great exploit. In August, 1648, he began to assemble matchlockmen and pioneers in Khurasan, lay in stores of grain at convenient centres, and mobilise a large force at Herat. At the same time the traffic from Persia to Qandahar by this route was stopped, in order to withhold news from the doomed city. But preparations on such a vast scale cannot be kept secret. At the end of September Shah Jahan learnt of the

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\* History of Qandahar : Eskine's *History of India*, i. 215, 220, 355; ii. 311—319; Blochmann's *Ain-i-Akbari*, i. 313-314, 409, 504; Elliot, vi. 130; *Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 77—79, *Alam Ara-i Abbasi* (Mulla Firuz MS.), ii. 119; *Pad.* ii. 24—40; *Masir-ul-utara*, ii. 795—798 (Life of Ali Mardan Khan), iii. 296 *et seq.*; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, i. 167 and 168.

project; he was even informed that the Persians would make the attack in winter, when the heavy snowfall of Afghanistan would prevent the arrival of relief from India. Shah Jahan, then at Delhi, took counsel with his ministers. It was at first decided to move the Court to Kabul, and to warn the nobles to join the expedition with their quotas of troops. But a winter march to Afghanistan was unpleasant; several provincial commanders delayed joining the Emperor. Courtiers were not wanting to suggest that there was no need for hurry, as a Persian campaign in the depth of winter was most unlikely. In a weak moment Shah Jahan listened to the carpet knights of his Court; the march of the grand army was put off till the next spring. Only the Mughal Governor of Kabul threw 5,000 men and five lakhs of treasure into Qandahar to add to its defensive power.\*

Empire is not for the ease-loving; victory is not

\* Waris, 20b-21a, 23a; Khafi Khan, i. 684—686; Muhammad Afzal Husain's *Zubdat-ut-Tawarikh*, (Khuda Bakhsh MS.) 42a, (very brief). *Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, the Shah's letters to Shah Jahan before and after the siege, 52—64, his letter calling upon Daulat Khan to surrender the fort, 120—126, and some other epistles in which he exults over his victory, 105—120 (including the failures of Shah Jahan's sons). One of the letters to Shah Jahan contains the curious request, "Won't you make a free gift of Qandahar to me, who stand in the relation of a son to you?" (59) *Tarikh-i-Shah Abbas Sani* by Mirza Tahir Wahid (Mulla Firuz Library) has a brief account of the Persian capture and the failure of the Mughal sieges.

for the indolent. The natural consequence of neglecting an enemy followed. The Persian king belied his tender age and character of a drunkard. He triumphed over the depth of winter, his lack of provisions, and other difficulties on which the courtiers of Shah Jahan had built their hopes, and laid siege to Qandahar on 16th December, 1648.

Daulat Khan, surnamed Khawas Khan, the Mughal commandant, adopted a foolish scheme of defence. He threw his picked troops into the citadel, named Daulatabad, as if matters had already come to the worst. Three quarters of a mile from the citadel, on the north face of the hill, stood two projecting guard-towers above a flight of forty steps carved in the solid limestone rock. Daulat Khan durst not hold this isolated position. But it was a fatal omission. The Persians at once seized this eminence,\* which dominated the citadel and the market place of Qandahar. On 5th January, 1649, three big guns, each carrying 74lb shot, reached their camp. Platforms had been already raised for them, and the bombardment of the city began. The parapets and screens above the fort-walls were demolished, and the Persian trenches were safely run to the edge of the ditch. Thence they crossed

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\* Manucci mentions a story that they surprised the Mughal sentry on the hill-top by following a goat-track up the hill at night under the guidance of a goat-herd. (*Storia*, i. 186).

the moat on wooden bridges and secured a lodgement under the walls of the outwork named Sher Haji and began to lay mines. Here the fiercest fighting took place at close quarters, the outwork being repeatedly lost and recovered. The presence of their king spurred the Persians on to heroic exertions.

Early in February, the garrison began to lose heart. They had held their own for a month and a half against superior odds, and no relief was in sight. Nor were traitors wanting to fan their discontent and alarm. Two Tartar chiefs, Shadi Uzbak and Qipchaq Khan, with their retainers, had entered the Mughal pay at the end of the war in Balkh, and were now in Qandahar. These foreign mercenaries thought only of saving their families and property, without caring for their master's honour. They intrigued with the timid and the slothful among the garrison and created a spirit of despair by dwelling on the impossibility of reinforcements arriving before spring, and painting the horrors of an assault by the Persians. Their arts succeeded. A portion of the garrison mutinied, deserted their trenches and opened negotiations with the enemy. Daulat Khan was not the leader for such a crisis : he lost control over his men ; instead of making an example of the ring-leaders, asserting his own authority by a stern suppression of the mutiny, and

animating the loyal by constant visits to the different points, he vainly reasoned with the mutineers, and then left them absolute masters of their quarters. On 5th February, the traitors admitted a Persian envoy within the lines against orders, and soon a crowd of Mughal officers gathered round him to hear the Shah's letters read. An imperial officer from Bist was also brought in to convince the garrison of the surrender of that fort to the Persians. This took away what little courage the defenders had still left in them. The commandant begged for a five days' truce, whch was granted. On 11th Febrary, the garrison surrendered on a promise of safety from the Persian king, marched out of the fort and set out for India. Thus Qandahar with all its stores and armament was lost to India.\* The siege had lasted 57 days, and the relieving force succeeded in coming in sight of the fort only three months after its fall !

No greater blow was ever struck at Mughal prestige than the loss of Qandahar. And the shame of it was equalled only when three grand and costly expeditions, led by the Emperor's sons, failed to wrest it from the Persians. The success of Shah Abbas II. served only to deepen the disgrace of the

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\* (For the siege by the Persians) Waris, 23a—27a; Khafi Khan, i. 686—690 and 693.

subsequent failures of Aurangzib and Dara Shukoh at the same place.

For the fall of Qandahar Shah Jahan and his advisers alone must be held responsible. They had underrated the enemy's powers; they had delayed their own preparations; and above all they had left Daulat Khan in charge. Before the Persians arrived, men and money had been thrown into the fort, but not the man needed for the occasion; and in war it is not men but *the man* that counts.

Daulat Khan\* had risen to be a Commander of Five Thousand. By birth a Bhati of the Panjab, his extreme beauty in youth had gained him Jahangir's favour and the easy office of Captain of the Imperial Body-guard. Under Shah Jahan he had distinguished himself by personal bravery and enterprise in the wars of the Deccan and the arrest of a powerful rebel. But he was now verging on sixty and had evidently lost his old energy and leadership of men. He had neither resourcefulness nor power of initiative, nor the iron will that nerves heroes to hold a fortress till the last moment in scorn of famine and impending massacre. Above all, he utterly failed to keep in hand the diverse races,—Rajputs and Hindustani Musalmans, Afghans and Turks,—who formed the garrison of Qandahar.

\* Life in *Masir-ul-umara*, ii, 24—30.

With an impregnable fort, a garrison of 7,000 men, and provisions and munitions for two years,\* his task was easy in comparison with that of many an English subaltern known to fame for successfully defending a fort against odds, such as Eldred Pottinger; and he failed in it. If he had held out a month longer, the Persians would have raised the siege through lack of provisions. The garrison had lost only 400 men out of 7,000 effectives when he opened the gates to the enemy.

### § 5. *First Mughal Siege of Qandahar.*

Shah Jahan had received news of the Persian preparations for the siege of Qandahar as early as 30th September, 1648, but he suffered his courtiers to persuade him to delay his own march to Kabul till the next spring. On 16th January, 1649 at Lahor he received a despatch from Qandahar stating that the Shah had arrived and begun the siege exactly a month before. Orders were immediately sent to Aurangzib and the prime-minister Sadullah Khan, to hasten to Qandahar with 50,000 men. A bounty of Rs. 100 was paid for every trooper who

\* When the Persians captured the fort, it had a garrison of 4,000 men armed with the sword or the bow, 3,000 men armed with matchlocks, a number of large guns, vast quantities of powder and shot, many thousand stands of arms, besides money, grain, oil and other provisions sufficient for two years. (Waris, 26).

joined the expedition, while the commanders and *ahadis* got three months' pay in advance. [Waris, 23, 27a.]

The troops moved in two divisions,—under Sadullah Khan from Lahor and under Aurangzib from Multan,—and met together at Bhera. Thence the prince himself advanced by way of Bangash, Kohat, Jamrud and Jalalabad, arriving at Kabul on 25th March, while the progress of the army was delayed by the snow on the roads and the lack of fodder for the beasts of transport. Meantime Qandahar had fallen, and Aurangzib received new orders to push on and besiege the fort before the Persians could consolidate their conquest. The Emperor himself proceeded to Kabul to support and direct the siege from the rear.

Leaving Kabul (on 5th April) after a halt of eleven days, Aurangzib reached Ghazni on the 18th, where the absolute want of grain and fodder rendered his further advance impossible. But the Emperor was inexorable. The prince gathered what provisions he could during a fortnight's stay at Ghazni, and then resumed his march. From Qalat-i-Ghilzai Sadullah pushed on with five divisions of the army, and encamped before Qandahar on 14th May. Aurangzib brought up the rear two days later. [Waris, 27a.]

### § 6. *Fortification and environs of Qandahar.*

Two miles outside the modern city of Qandahar, a traveller proceeding towards Herat comes upon the ruins of old Qandahar,\* which Alexander the Great is said to have built and which Nadir Shah destroyed in 1738. It stood on an exceedingly strong position, along the base and eastern slope of a high ridge of bare rock that rises abruptly from the plain. The site of the city is marked by the crumbling walls of houses and confused heaps of bricks and *debris*, which cover several acres of surface. The lines of defence are still traceable by portions of walls that extend with broken intervals along the crest of the ridge. The city consisted of three distinct parts, each on a separate eminence, and capable of mutual defence. On the serrated crest of the hill stood many towers united by curtains.

The highest of these, called Lakah, was almost impregnable. It contained rock-cut tanks of water for the city and commanded the citadel (named Daulatabad), which stood lower down on the second eminence, while the town and market place (*mandavi*), both walled round, were situated further below on the first tableland above the eastern plain. Beyond the city stretched gardens, pleasure-houses

\* This description is based upon Ferrier's *Caravan Journeys* (ed. 1856), 317; Bellew's *Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan*, 232 & 233; Masson's *Journeys*, i. 279; Waris, 26a.

and fields for miles and miles, to the north, east, and south-east. Three walls surrounded the city at such a distance from it as to enclose a large open space for the encampment of a garrison in time of war.

The ramparts\* of the old town were built of dried clay, strengthened by the mixture of chopped straw and stones. The material, thoroughly wetted and stamped out, was laid in layers of eighteen inches high at a time and allowed to dry before the next layer was put on. Their thickness at places was ten yards. An English officer in 1878 wrote of these walls as about the stiffest things of the kind he had seen. On firing a revolver at 10 yards, the bullet was merely lodged in the face of the wall and could be picked out with the nail. Such walls, according to him, might have stood modern battering guns for a length of time, and in fact some of the British artillerymen doubted if any impression to speak of could have been made on them.† Beyond the triple walls, on the side of the plain was a wide and deep ditch, supplied with water from the canals of the Arghandab river.

On the north face of the ridge against which the fort nestled, there are forty steps cut in the rock and leading up to a cave half way up the hill. On

\* Ferrier, 317; Le Messurier's *Kandahar in 1879*, pp. 70 and 71.

† Le Messurier, 130 and 131.

the two sides of the entrance, are two couchant leopards, and the cave itself contains a bow-shaped chamber with a domed roof.\* Two guard-towers had been built during the Mughal occupation on adjacent projections of the rock to oppose an enemy's assault by this path, because from the top of the Forty Steps guns could command both the citadel and the city. The fort of Lakah crowned a peak in the middle of the ridge and defended Qandahar on its western flank, where the hill descended to the plain in a steep scarp. It had a gate named Ali Qábi.† Proceeding along the city wall from the north-eastern corner of the ridge where the wall first leaves the hill, we come in succession to the gates of Baba Wali, Waisqaran, Khwajah Khizir, and Mashuri, till at last the wall strikes the ridge again at the south-western corner of the fort, where stood an earth-work bastion and a redoubt (*hissar*).‡

The outposts of the province in the direction of Persia were Kushk-i-Nakhud, situated about 40 miles west of Qandahar on the right bank of a tributary of

\* *Bellew*, 232 and 233.

† So far as we can judge from the Persian accounts, *Qaitul* was the name of the whole ridge. At places it looks as if it were a peak identical with or adjacent to Lakah, but *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 12b, distinctly calls the whole ridge the hill of *Qaitul*.

‡ For the gates, *Waris*, 24b, 28b, 65a; *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 12b, 14a.

the Helmand which drains the Maiwand valley, the fort of Bist, 50 miles further west on the margin of the Helmand, and Zamin Dawar, north-west of Bist. The Persian frontier station was Girishk, some thirty miles up the Helmand from Bist.\*

### § 7. *Aurangzib besieges Qandahar.*

Aurangzib arrived before Qandahar and began the siege on 16th May, 1649. The Mughals completed their investment by throwing up entrenchments opposite the gates and behind the ridge, and began to run covered lanes towards the ditch of the fort. A body of scouts watched the ferry at Kushk-i-Nakhud, to get early news of the coming of any relieving force from Persia.

Next day a *coup de main* was attempted. Rajahs Man Singh of Gwalior and Bhao Singh of the Kangra Hills, led their Rajputs up the Forty Steps and reached the platform on the top, but the Persian musketeers from within the guard-towers plied their matchlocks with deadly effect at point-blank range, and the Rajputs were driven with heavy loss half way down the hill, where they constructed a stockade and held it for some time. [Waris, 28b,

[29a.]

Despite a heavy fire from the fort-guns, three

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\* Holdich's *Gates of India*, 204, Purchas, i. 519–528; *Ain-i-Akbari* (Jarrett), ii. 393–398.

covered lanes were carried to the edge of the ditch by 4th July. From one of these a transverse was dug along the bank to the front of the Khwajah Khizir gate. Windows were opened in this and through them earth and tree loppings were flung into the ditch to form a bridge, (2nd August). An underground channel was dug which partly drained the ditch and lowered the water-level by one yard. Another mine was carried under the ditch till it reached the base of the outermost wall. [Waris, 34.]

Hitherto the imperial troops had worked under cover and carried out their tasks. Now they had to come out into the open and storm the fort. This could have been effected only after overpowering the batteries of the defenders or breaching the walls. But Aurangzib's expedition had been planned for throwing reinforcements into the fort and was therefore not at all equipped for the unexpected task of conducting a siege. He had not a single piece of large cannon, while the fort in the hands of the Persians contained many. An assault in the face of superior artillery could have been carried out only by troops of desperate courage and markedly higher skill and discipline, and after a heavy sacrifice of lives. But in this case the superiority lay with the defenders. The Delhi historian frankly admits, "The Persians had grown expert in the capture and defence of forts, by their long wars with the Turks

since the days of Shah Abbas. They were masters of fire-arms and artillery. They held such a strong and well-provisioned fort, with big guns and skilful gunners, who in one day fired 25 times on the covered lane which had arrived half way across the ditch and destroyed it. Qasim Khan's mine was also discovered and demolished by the fire from the fort guns... The imperialists had no gun big enough to overthrow the parapet under shelter of which the fort-gunners fired their pieces, not to speak of silencing their fire." [Waris, 33b, 34b.]

"So the imperialists failed with all their efforts." The capture of the fort was hopeless, and on 5th September, Aurangzib, obeying the Emperor's command, began his retreat from Qandahar. He had sat down 3 months and 20 days before the fort, but all in vain. The retreat was hastened by the approach of the terrible Afghan winter which Indians cannot bear, and the news that a large Persian force, estimated at 20,000 strong, was coming to relieve Qandahar.

### § 8. Fighting with the Persians.

An imperial force under Qalich Khan had been posted for two months near the fort of Bist with orders to corrupt its Persian garrison, ravage the district of Dawar, and send supplies of grain to Qandahar. But in August reinforcements from

Persia began to advance towards Qandahar, and make Qalich Khan's position untenable. Khanjar Khan whom he had detached with 4,000 Indian troops to cross the Helmand and loot the district of Kuraishi, was defeated by Najaf Quli, the Persian Master of the Horse, and driven back across the river with a loss of 700 slain besides many others who perished in swimming the stream (during the second half of July). Qalich Khan rapidly fell back before the enemy's superior numbers till he reached Sang Hissar on the Arghandab, some 24 miles south-west of Qandahar. Here strong reinforcements sent by Aurangzib under Rustam Khan Deccani reached him, after driving away a band of Persian cattle-raiders who had penetrated to within a few miles of the prince's camp. [Waris, 34b-36a.]

The two generals joined their forces and on 25th August at Shah Mir fought a great battle with the enemy. The Indian army under Rustam Khan stood in battle order on the bank of the Arghandab, barring the road to Qandahar. The Persians, reported to be 30,000 strong, stretched in a vast line for four miles from the hill of Kushk-i-Nakhud to the river bank. Large reinforcements had reached them that very morning under Murtaza Quli Khan, the Fauji Bashi. The new arrivals, eager to share in the battle, issued from Kushk-i-Nakhud, without stopping to water and refresh their horses. Their

general vowed that he would not break his fast before defeating the Indians !

It was an hour past noon when the rival hosts clashed together. The small Indian army was beset in front and the two flanks, and for three hours waged a fierce struggle. At first the vigour of the Persian charges shook and pressed back the Indian right wing, but the troops were picked men and did not lose order; strengthened by the Reserve under Rustam Khan himself, they made a counter-charge and repelled the attack. A dust-storm put an end to the battle. The Persians, on unrefreshed horses, suffered much from the hot wind and retired, leaving the Indians masters of the field. In the hurry of their flight they abandoned some of their artillery, carts, horses, and arms, which the imperialists captured. Next day the victors advanced, but found that the Persians had evacuated Kushk-i-Nakhud at night and could not be caught up even after a pursuit of 20 miles.\*

This victory cast a dying gleam on the Mughal arms, and Shah Jahan celebrated it with great pomp and pride: the imperial band played for three days, the Court went into rejoicing, and honours and

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\* Waris, 36a-37b. The Persian version is in *Zubdat-at-Tawarikh*, 42b and 43a, where it is stated that as the wind was very hot and their horses not yet watered and baited, the Persians retired and found next day that "the Indian troops in awe of the Persians had retreated and joined Aurangzib!"

promotions were bestowed on the generals. But the siege of Qandahar was already hopeless, and ten days after this victory it was abandoned. Aurangzib had lost two to three thousand men and double that number of horses, camels and oxen in the siege, and his army had been severely tried by scarcity of grain and fodder. [K. K. i. 700.] Mihrab Khan, the Persian commandant of Qandahar, died on the day the imperialists began their retreat; but he had held his trust inviolate.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### SECOND SIEGE OF QANDAHAR, 1652.

#### § 1. *Preparations for the second siege of Qandahar.*

The first siege of Qandahar had failed for want of heavy guns and material. The honour of the Mughal arms required the attempt to be repeated. The next three years were spent in preparations on a scale worthy of the grandeur of the task. Big guns were cast, provisions accumulated at convenient depots on the route, thousands of camels assembled for transport, the friendship of Baluch chiefs purchased along the line of communication from Multan, and money and munitions stored at the base at Kabul.

Aurangzib had been appointed to command the expedition. From his Government of Multan he had sent men to explore the routes to Qandahar, and at last selected the Chacha-Chotiali-Pishin line as the shortest. For years his agents had visited the Baluch country and contracted with the tribal chiefs for the supply of provisions to the prince's army during the march and siege.\*

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 3a, 4a, 5a, 7a, 10a, 11a, 96b.

The force sent against Qandahar numbered between 50,000 and 60,000 men, of whom one-fifth were musketeers and artillerymen. The officers formed one-twentieth of the strength. The artillery consisted of eight big cannon, some of which carried 70lb. shot, twenty of smaller calibre, each carrying 4 or 5lb. shot, twenty swivels mounted on elephants and a hundred on camels. The transport was entrusted to ten choice elephants from the Emperor's own stables, besides many others owned by the generals, and three thousand camels. Two krores of Rupees were set apart for the expenses. The Emperor himself stayed at Kabul with a reserve of 40 to 50 thousand men, to reinforce the besiegers if necessary, and to keep their communication with the north open.\*

The main army, led by the prime-minister Sadulla Khan, entered Afghanistan by the Khaibar Pass and reached Qandahar by way of Kabul and Ghazni. Aurangzib with a smaller body, containing many officers and some five thousand soldiers of his own contingent, started from Multan, followed the western route through Chotiali and Pishin, and debouched through the Panjmandrak (=Khojak?)

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\* Waris, 60a—61a. He says that about 56,000 troops were sent to Qandahar. Khafi Khan (i. 710) wrongly gives the number as 70,000.

Pass.\* The two divisions met near Qandahar on  
~ 2nd May, 1652.

### § 2. *Dispositions of the besiegers.*

On that day the siege was begun. The divisional commanders occupied their appointed places round the fort and set themselves to run trenches and erect batteries. Aurangzib took post on the west of the fort, behind the hill of Lakah; his Chief of Artillery, Qasim Khan, south of the fort, with orders to drain the ditch dry; Sadullah's position was south-east; while in the extreme north-

\* For the details of the marches, Waris 64a, and especially *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 9a—11b, which gives Aurangzib's movements thus:—Left Multan 16th February, but halted long outside it,—crossed the Chenab 20th March (sent his family back to Multan),—reached the Indus by four marches, and crossed it on 26th March—Lakia,—Chacha, 6th April,—Chotiali on 13th April,—Duki on 14th,—Tabaq-sar on 19th,—Pishin (probably on 23rd, because the dates in the above two authorities conflict),—the Panjmandrak Pass on 26th,—reached Qandahar, 2nd May. The whole distance between Multan and Pishin is given as 124 *kos*.

The route followed by the English travellers Richard Steel and John Crowther in 1615 was,—Multan—the Chenab—Patuali village (20 *kos* from the river)—the Indus—Lacca (=Lakia),—enters the mountains 12 *kos* from Lacca,—Chatcza (=Chacha),—Duki—Secotah (=seh kotah, three castles),—crosses a mountain pass,—Coasta—Abdun—Pesinga (=Pishin),—crosses a high mountain, and descends into the plain—Qandahar, 60 *kos* from Pesinga. (Kerr, ix. 210—212, quoting Purchas.) Pishin is spelt in the Persian MSS. as *Fushanj* or *Qushanj* or *Qushakh*. A map of Biddulph's route in 1879 is given in Shadbolt's *Afghan Campaigns*, i. and with Temple's article in the *Royal Geographical Soc. Journal*, 1880, pp. 190-319.

west, facing the Forty Steps, lay Rajah Rajrup with his Kangra hillmen. Four other generals, occupying the intervening spaces, completed the investment.\*

The work of sapping necessarily took time. Meanwhile attempts were made to capture some of the outlying defences by sudden assault. Mahabat Khan and Rajah Rajrup, in charge of the northern line of attack, dragged two heavy guns to their trenches and bombarded the two towers on the Forty Steps, doing some damage to the works. But the position was impregnable; the assault delivered here by Bhao Singh during the first siege had failed with heavy loss, and his son Rajrup now shrank from the hopeless task. He next proposed to

\* Waris, 65a., *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 12b. The following was the distribution of trenches, going from the west, by the north, to the east and south :—

Opposite Lakah Fort—Aurangzib, Qalich Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, Rajah Pahar Singh Bundela.

Opposite the Ali Qabi Gate—Baqi Khan.

„ the Forty Steps—Rajah Rajrup.

„ the Baba Wali Gate—Mahabat Khan and Rajah Anurudh.

„ the Waisqaran Gate—Najabat Khan.

„ the Khwajah Khizir Gate to the Mashuri Gate—Qasim Khan (Chief of Artillery), Sadullah, and Jai Singh.

„ the Earthwork Bastion—Rustum Khan.

The *Adab-i-Alamgiri* places Rustam Khan opposite the Mashuri Gate, but his real position was at the south-west corner of the fort. Qasim Khan's position was also shifted by Sadullah. This explains the slight differences between the two authorities quoted above.

surprise the peak of the ridge, behind the Forty Steps. Rajrup removed his men to a position facing the gate of Ali Qabi on this hill, and entrenched himself. Under him were many foot-musketeers of the Kangra district, expert in hill-climbing. His plan was to send them secretly up the hill after midnight and, when they had surprised the gate and entered the defences, to push up supports and storm the hill-top itself. Preparations were made for this object; materials were collected for building a stockade on the hill-side, and the two chiefs of the army were warned to be ready to send help.

The night of Sunday, 20th June, was chosen for the attempt.\* Sadullah Khan poured in men from the trenches on the right and left of Rajrup's and sent 1,000 picked troops of his own division, to form a body of supports at the Rajah's post. Every one took the positon previously marked out for him by the minister. Early in the night the Rajah sent his own retainers up by a track which they had discovered for reaching the top. He himself followed them at some distance and piled up a shelter of stones in the hill-side as his own station. The supports marched towards the Ali Qabi gate, while their leader, Baqi Khan, with 300 men from among Aurangzib's retainers, joined the Rajah.

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\* Night-attack, Waris, 65b, and *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 16b and 17a.  
Life of Rajrup M. U. ii. 277-281.

The success of this hazardous enterprise depended on silence and secrecy. But the Mughals bungled. Indian troops are not accustomed to silent work at night, especially in a hilly region. The supporting body was too large and too variously composed to be led on smoothly and noiselessly. There was some disagreement between Rajrup and an imperial officer named Muzaffar Husain, and words were exchanged. This created a loud noise. The enemy got the alarm and stood on their defence. A surprise was no longer possible in the face of alert defenders, by men climbing up a narrow hill-track in single file. About three hours before daybreak the moon rose and took away the last chance of Mughal success. Soon afterwards, news came to the Rajah, who had been anxiously waiting so long in his stone shelter on the hill-side, that his troops had found the defenders of the fort on the summit awake at one place and were returning baffled. So he sent his supports back and stayed there for the return of his men. After a while a foolish servant told him that his men had reached the hill-top and entered the fort. The Rajah hastily believed the report, blew his trumpet, and beat his drums. At this signal the returning imperial troops ran back to him. But the truth was soon discovered; the sun rose and presented the straggling assailants on the hill-side as a clear target to the Persian marksmen.

Many were slain and wounded on the Mughal side, but the main portion of the loss was undoubtedly borne by the Rajah's men who were nearest the enemy. For this error of judgment Rajrup was censured by his chief and sent back to his old trenches.

Thereafter the only hope of taking Qandahar was by carrying the sap nearer and breaching the walls. In both of these the Mughals failed. Aurangzib's trenches, west of the ridge, arrived within 22½ yards of the wall, and Sadullah's (east of the fort) to a spot 10 yards from the ditch. But here their progress was arrested. "The trenches could not be carried any nearer in face of the severe fire showered from the fort-walls." "The work [of sapping] was hard, and many of Sadullah's men were wounded and slain...The enemy issued on three sides, and from sunset to dawn fired their muskets incessantly from loop-holes opened in the fort-walls, so as to give no opportunity to Aurangzib's workmen [to make progress.]"\*

### § 3. *Bad gunnery of the Indians.*

In fact the Persian artillery was as excellent as the Mughal was inefficient. The Indian gunners were bad marksmen and their fire produced no effect on the fort-walls. Some of Aurangzib's men were

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\* Waris, 65a and b, *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 16a and 15b.

so ignorant that they overcharged two of his big guns with powder, causing them to burst. Five large pieces of cannon now remained, which were insufficient to breach the wall in two places. In fact so notoriously bad were the Indians in handling artillery that the main reliance of their kings was on European gunners, who are praised in contemporary histories as masters of their craft, and were attracted to the imperial service by high pay and large rewards, though they used to desert as soon as they could get a chance. In the third siege, Dara Shukoh took a body of them with him to Qandahar.\*

There were other difficulties, too. Within a few weeks of the opening of the siege the work of draining the wet ditch and running mines had to be suspended for lack of materials. Aurangzib now realised that the fort could be taken only by storm. And the Emperor had ordered that no assault was to be delivered without making a breach.

[*Adab.* 17b.]

According to Sadullah's plan, all the big guns were assembled on the eastern side, opposite the Mashuri gate. Batteries were raised on the right and left of Sadullah's trenches (17th and 22nd June.) The famous gun *Fatih Lashkar* and three other large pieces were mounted here with

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\* *Waris*, 65b, *Khafi Khan*, i. 713; *Lataif-ul-Akhbar*, 9a; *Storia do Mogor*, i. 95, 226, 232, 259.

great labour. Every day ten rounds were fired from each gun, but the damage done to the screens and towers of the fort was always repaired at night, and the Persian artillery was not overpowered. The Mughal artillery was as weak in number as in efficiency. In the meantime Aurangzib set up four stockades in front of his trenches, holding 3,000 men in all,\* for making a feint against Fort Lakah when Sadullah would breach the wall and deliver an assault on the Mashuri gate.

But the last expectation failed. On 19th June, before Sadullah's second battery was complete, a large armour-clad force made a sortie from the fort and fell on his trenches. From the top of the fort and the side of the hill a shower of musketry fire was kept up. Though reinforcements drove the enemy out after an hour's severe fight, the Persians succeeded in killing and wounding many of the Mughals. On some other nights, too, sorties were made, some Mughal guns damaged, and many of the besiegers carried off as prisoners. The Persians could not be pursued, as they quickly went back within shelter of the fort-guns. [Adab. 16b; Waris 65b.]

By the end of June it was recognised that the

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 14a, 15b, 17b, 18a, 15a. From these stockades to the fort-wall there was a fire-swept zone with no shelter except a few boulders, while the soil was too stony to permit sapping. (16a).

Mughal guns would never breach the wall on that side. So they were removed from the Mashuri gate to the western side. Two of the Surat cannon were sent to strengthen the artillery in Aurangzib's trenches, and two other big pieces, including *Fatih Lashkar*, to a new battery opposite the Ali Qabi gate, on his left hand. Here, too, the besiegers fared no better; besides, they got no more than a week's time to use their artillery before orders arrived to abandon the siege.

From the commencement of the leaguer two months had now passed away. An attempt to corrupt Utar, the commandant of the fort, had brought back the taunting reply, "When you have succeeded in weakening the fort or injuring the garrison in any way, it will be time for me to think of deserting to you!" About the middle of June two high Persian officers (including Mir Alam,\* their Chief of Artillery), were blown away by a 70lb. shot from a Mughal gun. On 26th May, when a magazine was opened for distributing powder to the garrison, the store of sulphur caught fire from the hand of a careless servant who was preparing a pipe of tobacco for the Persian officers present. It soon spread to the powder and there

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\* Called in *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, "Mir Alam, surnamed Mir Kalan Sani, the Bishak Bashi and superintendent of the New Bastion and Earthen Bastion," and by Waris, "Muhammad Beg, Topchi Bashi."

was a terrible explosion. Many houses in the neighbourhood were overthrown, and men and horses wounded by the flying splinters of rock. About 150 sepoys and water-men perished in the fire, and the four officers who had opened the magazine were confined to bed by their burns.\*

§ 4. *Emperor orders retreat from before Qandahar.*

But with all these disasters to the garrison, the imperialists were no nearer success. Shah Jahan had strictly enjoined that there was to be no assault before breaching the wall, and a breach with their few guns and bad gunners was out of the question. Aurangzib therefore wrote to the Emperor on 3rd July, soliciting a distinct order to storm the walls which were still intact. It would have been madness to sanction such an enterprise. Shah Jahan had been already informed by Sadullah Khan that his guns could effect nothing, and that the munitions had run short, and on 1st July he had replied that the siege was to be abandoned. Aurangzib pleaded hard for a short delay; he offered to lead a desperate assault on the walls, for to leave Qandahar untaken after such grand preparations would destroy his reputation for ever. But the news that a retreat had

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\* Waris 65b; *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 13b, 14b, 15a.

been ordered spread through the camp, the scouts fell back on the army, and the trenches were deserted. When Shah Jahan at last grudgingly consented to continue the siege for another month, it was found impossible to carry out the new order.\*

What had hastened the Emperor's resolve to raise the siege was a raid by a body of ten thousand Uzbak horsemen, who had burst through the western hills into the district south of Ghazni, and threatened the Mughal line of communication between Kabul and Qandahar, (about 26th June). The danger was greatly exaggerated by the Court at Kabul, though Aurangzib assured the Emperor that from his experience in Balkh he was sure that a few thousand Mughal troops could expel the raiders. In fact, the Uzbaks fled on hearing of the approach of the imperial army, and were cut off during their flight by the Afghans with the aid of the officer in command at Ghazni. The Delhi historian boasts that not a tenth of the raiders returned to Central Asia alive.† The Mughal army, however, raised the siege and began its retreat from Qandahar on 9th July. A small party, sent back to India by the Pishin-Chotiali-Multan road,—which

\* Aurangzib's letters, (repeating at their commencement the contents of Shah Jahan's letters which are being replied to), are given in *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 18a & b, 19a.

† Waris, 64b & 66a; *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 18b, 19a.

two centuries later Biddulph's division followed at the end of the Second Afghan War,—reported that the Baluch clans had already risen and rendered the road unsafe. So Aurangzib withdrew his outposts from Pishin and Duki, and led the army back to Kabul, joining the Emperor on 7th August. The Van under Sadullah had arrived eight days earlier.\*

*§ 5. Bitter correspondence between Shah Jahan and Aurangzib on the failure.*

Bitter was Aurangzib's humiliation at the ill-success of the expedition. Shah Jahan wrote to him, "I greatly wonder how you could not capture the fort in spite of such vast preparations." Aurangzib protested that he had done his utmost, but the scantiness of siege materials and insufficiency of artillery had rendered the attempt hopeless, as Sadullah Khan himself had testified. But Shah Jahan angrily rejoined, "I am not going to give up Qandahar. I shall try every means to recover it." The prince pleaded hard to be permitted to stay in Afghanistan or the Panjab and to take part, even as a subordinate, in the next attempt on Qandahar, in order to retrieve his character as a general. For this he was willing to forego the viceroyalty of the Deccan which was now offered to him. But Shah Jahan was inexorable: he ordered Aurangzib to go

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 18b; *Waris*, 66b.

to the Deccan at once, and brushed aside the prince's excuses for his failure with the caustic remark, "If I had believed you to be capable of taking Qandahar, I should not have recalled your army... Every man can perform some work. It is a wise saying that men of experience need no instruction." Aurangzib replied by quoting the proverb, "Whoever has a particle of sense can know his own good from his harm" and pointing out that he could not have purposely failed in his task, as he knew that it would involve his father's displeasure. [Adab. 19-20.]

### § 6. *Causes of the failure at Qandahar.*

The Court ascribed the failure to the abandonment of Shah Jahan's plan of operations, which was that Aurangzib should invest the fort with half the force, while Sadullah should advance west with the other half and capture the forts of Bist and Zamin Dawar, when the garrison of Qandahar would see their communication with Persia cut off, lose heart and surrender to the Mughals. But Sadullah Khan opposed such a division of the force and of the scanty supply of provisions and material, and the Emperor himself, on being referred to, confirmed the change of plan.\*

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\* Waris, 65b; Adab-i-Alamgiri, 12a and b, 20b.

The plan, even if carried out, would have availed little. In the

In truth it is unjust to blame Aurangzib for the failure to take Qandahar. Throughout the siege he was really second in command. The Emperor from Kabul directed every movement through Sadullah Khan. His sanction had to be taken for every important step, such as the removal of guns from one battery to another, the disposition of troops, the date, hour and point of assault. Fast couriers brought his orders from Kabul to Qandahar in four days, and the prince had merely to carry them out. Indeed so thoroughly subordinate was Aurangzib that during the first month of the siege only one despatch from him reached the Emperor, while Sadullah corresponded frequently and the Emperor's letters were often written to the prime-minister, to be afterwards shown to the prince.

[*Adab.* 13b, 17b.]

Unjustly held responsible for the defeat, Aurangzib lost the favour and confidence of his father. What added a keener edge to his mortification was that he had given occasion for laughter at his expense to his envious eldest brother and that brother's party at Court. But Dara's crowing did not last long; Aurangzib soon tasted the sweets of

next siege, a detachment from Dara's army did capture Bist and Girishk, but Qandahar held out for five months all the same, and was not taken in the end.

revenge. Dara\* led a still vaster army and a larger park of artillery against Qandahar and vowed to capture it in a week. His siege dragged on for five months and in the end Qandahar was not taken. The long history of Dara's doings there written by the courtly pen of Rashid Khan (Muhammad Badi)† is remarkable only for the sickening flattery offered by his courtiers and the insane pride displayed by the prince. It unconsciously but most effectively condemns Dara and by contrast places Aurangzib in an honourable light.

These failures left a lasting sting in the mind of Aurangzib. Half a century later, when he was a dying man, he heard that his son Shah Alam, then Governor of Kabul, was enlisting troops evidently to dispute the succession on the Emperor's expected death. Aurangzib tauntingly wrote to him, "I hear that in spite of your lack of money you are engaging highly paid soldiers. Evidently you want to recover Qandahar. God help you!" Herein he recognised that the conquest of Qandahar was an impossible feat.  
[*Ruqaat*, 4.]

\* Dara sat down before Qandahar from 28th April to 27th September, 1653, with an army of 70,000 men. Two of his heavy guns carried 112 lb. and 96 lb. shot. He was supplied with 30,000 cannon balls, 5,000 maunds of powder, 1,500 maunds of lead, and 14,000 rockets. (*Waris, 70a et seq.*) Khafi Khan, i. 717—728.

† *Lataif-ul-Akhbar*.

*§ 7. Cost of the three sieges that failed.*

The three sieges of Qandahar cost the Indian treasury more than ten *krores* of Rupees. In addition to this sum, the new fortifications built by the Mughals on taking possession of it from Ali Mardan Khan and the treasure, arms, munitions, and provisions that fell into the hands of the Persians on its capture, must have cost more than a *krore*.\* Thus the Indian tax-payer poured into the sands of Afghanistan about 12 *krores* of Rupees, or more than half the gross annual revenue of the entire empire, for absolutely no return.†

The moral loss was even greater than the

\* We have the following data for calculating the cost of the Qandahar wars. For the second siege 2 *krores* of Rupees were brought from Delhi and Agra, out of which one *krore* was spent on the soldiers and officers in one month. (Waris, 61a). The third siege occupied 5 months (against 2 months in the case of the second) and Dara's army was probably 70,000, as against the 50,000 men who accompanied Aurangzib. Hence the third siege must have cost about seven *krores*. The presents to Dara on the eve of the expedition amounted to 20 *lakhs*, and one *krore* was sent with him (Waris 70a and 71a). When starting for the first siege, the officers were paid a bounty of Rs. 100 for each trooper placed in the field, and as the force was 50,000 strong, this alone absorbed 50 *lakhs* (Waris, 23a). Before the Persians arrived, 5 *lakhs* had been sent to the fort from Kabul. In 1638, when Qandahar was betrayed to Shah Jahan, 20 *lakhs* were sent with Shuja to meet the cost of the expedition for driving away the Persians, and 5 *lakhs* more were spent on the fortifications. (Pad. ii. 40, Waris 21a and 26a).

† The revenue of the Mughal empire in 1648 was 22 *krores* of Rupees. (Pad. ii. 710.)

material. The Emperor of Delhi might dazzle the eyes of foreign ambassadors and travellers by displaying his Peacock Throne and Koh-i-nur, or the superb marble edifices with which he had adorned Agra and Delhi. But henceforth his military prestige was gone throughout the world. The Persian king could rightly boast\* that the rulers of Delhi knew how to steal a fort by means of gold, but not how to conquer it by strength of arm. Shah Abbas II. had conquered Qandahar in less than two months; but two Mughal princes in three long and costly campaigns could not recover it, though they were opposed by mere generals and not by any member of the royal blood of Persia. Naturally the military fame of Persia rose very high. The Indian troops recognised that in the Persians they had met with more than their match. And throughout the rest of the century the rumour of a projected invasion from Persia used to throw the Court of Delhi into the greatest alarm.† For years afterwards the Persian peril hung like a dark cloud on the western frontier of India, and the Emperor Aurangzib and his ministers drew their breath more easily when any warlike Shah of Persia died. ↗

\* For his exultation at the capture and retention of Qandahar, see *Ruqat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 106—120, (his exact words are different).

† *M. A.* 56—58; *A. N.* 974; *Anecdotes* §§ 50, 51, and 52.

## CHAPTER IX.

SECOND VICEROYALTY OF THE DECCAN, 1653—1658.

### § 1. *Aurangzib goes to the Deccan : his journeys and hunt.*

On 17th July, 1652, Aurangzib, then returning from Qandahar, was appointed Governor of the Deccan for the second time. Exactly a month afterwards he took leave of the Emperor in Afghanistan and proceeded to his charge. Crossing the Indus at Attock on 9th September, he passed through Delhi and Agra on 17th and 28th November respectively, and reached the Narmada river on 1st January, 1653. As the palace in Burhanpur was not yet ready for his occupation he encamped outside for some days, while the repairs were being completed, and entered this city, the capital of Khandesh, as late as 30th January. Here he wooed and won the graceful singer Hira Bai, surnamed Zainabadi Mahal, and here he lingered for the next nine months in spite of Shah Jahan's repeated orders urging him to go to Aurangabad, the official capital of Mughal Deccan. At last leaving Burhanpur on 28th October, 1653, he entered the fort of Daulatabad on 25th November.\*

\* Wais, 66a, 67a and b; his journey in south is described in detail in *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 21a—24a, 25b, 26a, 27a, 144a and b.

At Aurangabad he spent the next four years of his life, leaving it only to invade Golkonda and Bijapur, and finally on 5th February, 1658, to contest the throne of Delhi. Here his son Akbar was born (11th September, 1657), and here he buried his wife Dilras Banu (died 8th October, 1657), and his favourite concubine Zainabadi (probably in 1654.)

~~✓~~ Of Aurangzib's life during this period we have his own reminiscences, written in old age to his grandson Bidar Bakht : "The village of Sattara\* near Aurangabad was my hunting ground. Here on the top of a hill, stood a temple with an image of Khande Rai. By God's grace I demolished it, and forbade the temple dancers (*muralis*) to ply their shameful profession. During my viceroyalty, while I was living at ~~Vaulatabad~~ and Aurangabad,—the latter city having been populated by me after its first foundation [by Malik Ambar] under the name of Khirki,—I used in my folly to ride about, and make forced marches under the instigations of Satan and of my own passions. I used to go far on horseback to hunt the *nilgai* and other kinds of game. Other idle deeds did I do. I used to visit the lake of Qatluq in the valley of the watershed, Chamar Tikri and Jitwārā, and to make pilgrimages to the tombs of the saints Burhan-ud-din and Zain-ud-din,† or to

\* On the top of a hill, six miles due south of Aurangabad.

† At Roza or Khuldabad, on the way to the Ellora hill.

climb up the hill-fort of Daulatabad and to the caves of Ellora, (which are wondrous examples of the Creator's art), sometimes with my family, at others alone." [K. T. 7b.]

Game was very abundant in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad. Herds of wild deer grazed four miles from the city, and *nilgaus* were found in plenty in the direction of Lauhgarh and Ambar. Tigers could be shot in the hills which hemmed the valley round. At the lake of Qatluq, near the "valley of the watershed," six miles from the fort of Daulatabad, countless flocks of heron rested. Aurangzib, and afterwards his sons Muazzam and Azam, delighted to hunt the *nilgau* and the heron. The *nilgaus* were shot from a fixed station as they were driven down the narrow valley, and the herons were struck down by trained hawks.\*

### § 2. *Early examples of his religious bigotry.*

It was during his second rule over the Deccan that Aurangzib clearly unfolded not only his administrative skill and energy, but also the limitations of his character which finally blighted his fame and wrecked his empire. We have already seen him boasting "how he had destroyed the temple on a hill six miles south of Aurangabad. He is taxed by Shah Jahan

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\* *Dilkasha*, i. 12 and 49. *Ruqaat*, Nos. 12 and 28.

with being unfriendly to the Rajputs, and tries to answer the charge by recommending a Rajput captain, Rao Karan, for an administrative post. [Adab. 29a.] Evidently there was no love lost between him and the Rajputs already. People perceive instinctively when they are disliked, and though they may be wrong in guessing the cause, their feeling always indicate correctly the spirit in which they are being treated.

A clearer proof of his religious bigotry even in youth is furnished by the following letter which he wrote at this time to the prime-minister Sadullah Khan :

"The Brahman Chhabila Ram, the *qanungo* of property-tax of the city of Bihar, had uttered improper words with reference to the Prophet. After investigation and verification of the charge by order of the Emperor, Zulfiqar Khan and other officers of the place had beheaded him, as was required by justice. Now, the scholar Mulla Muhan has written to me that the brothers of the accursed misbeliever, out of bigotry, have sought justice at the imperial Court against Shaikh Muhammad Muala, the lord justice, and Shaikh Abdul Mani, the ecclesiastical judge of the province. I, therefore, remind you of this affair, as it is proper for all Muslims to do their utmost to assert the rules of the Prophet's religion, and it is the duty of kings and nobles to protect the scholars of Islam in enforcing the injunctions of the Holy Law. You should exert yourself more than your peers to close the road of the complaint of this wretched tribe [to the Emperor's feet].

and to take care of the letters (*i.e.*, explanations) of the guardians of the honour of the Faith." [Adab, 101a.]

### § 3. *City of Aurangabad described.*

The city of AURANGABAD\* bears the prince's name and commemorates his first viceroyalty. Originally it was a petty hamlet named Khirki. When Malik Ambar revived the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar, he transferred the capital to this village, and built a palace for the Sultan known as the *Green Bungalow* and a mansion for himself close to the Royal Market (*Shahganj*). To form a large centre of population in a dry soil like this, the first thing needful is water. So he constructed a big tank close to the town and also brought water to his own house by means of a canal from the river near Arsul. The tank was about four miles round, and the village grew up on its side. Aurangzib at first resided in the fort of Daulatabad. But it could hold only a small body of men. So he looked round for a good site on

\* This description of early Aurangabad is based on *Dilkasha*, i. 9, 11, 12; Tavernier, i. 146; *Masir-ul-amura*, i. 263, ii. 60; *Masir-i-Alamgiri*, 223. Burgess, in his *Cave Temples in the Bidar and Aurangabad Districts* (p. 59) says: In 1616 Malik Ambar built at Khirki the Nurkhanda palace and mosque, and his army raised dwellings for themselves around it; ravaged and burnt by Jahangir's army in 1621. Malik Ambar's son Fath Khan named it *Fatihnagar* (1628). The black stone mosque built by Ambar is described in Murray's *Hand-book to India*. For a description of the city in 1810, see Seely's *Wonders of Elora* (2nd ed.), 367—369, 403.

the plain for the seat of his government, chose Khirki, built a princely palace there close to the tank, and allotted lands to all his nobles and officers to build their quarters on. Then he removed from the fort to the new city, which got his name and grew rapidly as the capital of Mughal Deccan.

The splendid mausoleum or *muqbara* of his wife Dilras Banu, surnamed Rabia-ud-daurani, is an imitation of the Taj Mahal. It was built after his accession and was thoroughly repaired by his son M. Azam. It is still the finest architectural ornament of the city, and next to it stands the vast Jama Masjid which was completed by him. Aurangzib's residence, though greatly altered by later occupants, still remains and is pointed out to travellers as the *Alamgiri Mahal*.

Years afterwards, when he returned to the Deccan in 1682, a wall four miles long was built round the city by his order to protect it from Maratha raids. The work cost three *lakhs* of Rupees and was completed in four months through the active exertions of Dianat Khan Khafi. The city has undergone much change at the hands of the Nizams whose first capital it was, and of their French officers who lived here with almost regal authority.

We now turn to his public life during these five years.

*§ 4. Decay and misery of Mughal Deccan :  
its causes.*

Since Aurangzib had laid down the viceroyalty of the Deccan in May 1644, the Mughal administration there had not prospered. True, the country enjoyed unwonted repose after half a century of war with Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golkonda. True, there was no disturbance of public peace by invasion from across the frontier, and no expedition against refractory feudatories. But agriculture had not been promoted, the peasantry had not been cherished, and new lands had not been brought under tillage. On the contrary, much cultivated soil had lapsed into the jungle, the cultivators had declined in number and resources, and the revenue had fallen off greatly.

This wretched state of things was the natural result of a succession of short viceroyalties and incompetent viceroys.\* Khan-i-Dauran who had succeeded Aurangzib, was murdered a year afterwards. The veteran of a hundred battles, he also worked hard at the administration, transacting public business for twelve hours a day and inspecting everything himself. But he was so pitiless in

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\* Khan-i-Dauran succeeds Aurangzib on 28 May, 1644, and is murdered, during absence in N. India, on 22 June, 1645. Jai Singh then officiates for him. Islam Khan is appointed 17 July, 1645, dies on 2 November, 1647. Shah Nawaz Khan then officiates. Murad Bakhsh is appointed on 15 July, 1648, and Shaista Khan replaces him on 4 September, 1649, and continues till September, 1652.

exacting money from the village headmen, so harsh in squeezing the ryots, and so rough and strict to all the people under him, that the news of his death threw them into a transport of joy and was celebrated at Burhanpur as a divine deliverance.

Islam Khan Mashhadi, a very old man unable to ride a horse, next governed the Deccan for two years, and during this short period he estranged the Deccanis by his harsh and strict conduct and enriched himself by selling the Government stores of the forts when prices ruled high and replacing them with fresh purchases made in the season of low prices! He was keen on settling *ryots* on new lands, but actually effected little during his short term.

Then followed nearly a year (Nov., 1647—July, 1648) of officiating rule by Shah Nawaz Khan. Prince Murad Bakhsh, a dull and indolent youth, not yet twenty-four, was the next viceroy; but he quarrelled with his guardian and *de facto* Governor, Shah Nawaz Khan, the administration fell into confusion, and at the end of a year the Emperor was forced to make another change of viceroys! Shaista Khan replaced Prince Murad in September 1649, and held charge till he was succeeded by Aurangzib. Thus, in eight years there were six viceroys, if we count the acting tenure of Rajah Jai Singh in 1645.\*

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\* For Khan-i-Dauran, *M. U.* i. 749—758; *Pad.* ii. 376, 426. For

The Deccan had long caused a heavy drain on the imperial treasury. The province was large, the country broken, with plenty of jungles, and imperfectly settled and organised, and there were two powerful States across the frontier. Therefore, a very large force had to be stationed there. But as the soil was sterile in comparison with the river-plains of Northern India, and the rainfall precarious and variable, bad harvests and scarcities were too frequent, and the standard revenue was never collected. In spite of an abatement of 12 *lakhs* of Rupees on their first assessment made by the imperial settlement officers in the hope that the collection in future would be more easy and certain, the land revenue still proved to have been pitched too high. For the four provinces which then constituted Mughal Deccan, it stood at three *krores* and 62 *lakhs* of Rupees a year; but the actual collection in 1652 was only one *krore*, or less than one-third.\*

Out of the total territory, land estimated to yield 37½ *lakhs* a year was assigned as *jagir* to Aurangzib and his sons, [Adab. 31a.] and the rest to various officers, excluding the portion which was created Crownland (*khalsa sharifa*) and of which the revenue was collected directly by imperial officers and spent

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Islam Khan, M. U. i. 162—167; Pad. ii. 430; Waris, 6a. Murad (Waris, 19b). Shaista Khan (Waris, 38a).

\* Pad. ii. 712; M. U. iii. 497; Adab, 31a.

at the discretion of the Emperor without being touched by the local governor. The financial condition of the *jagirdars* depended on the actual collection of land revenue. Aurangzib and the higher officers also received a part of their salary in cash from the imperial treasury. This was a fixed amount, not liable to variation with the agricultural condition of the year, as was the case with the income drawn from *jagirs*.

The land revenue actually collected was scanty and variable, and the arrears and remissions from the standard assessment large. Hence, the public income of the Deccan did not balance the expenditure, and the deficit had to be made good by sending money from the older and richer provinces of the empire to support the administration of the South. This had gone on for years. Once only Khan-i-Dauran had tried to reverse the process. By torturing the collectors and mercilessly stripping the peasants he succeeded in collecting a large sum, which he despatched to the Emperor with the boastful remark, “Other Governors had to get money from Hindustan ; I am *sending* money there !” But the policy of killing the goose that laid the golden eggs soon failed. The desolation of the country and the misery of the peasantry became worse than before, and the bankrupt administration of the South had to be kept going by imperial bounties from Malwa and Gujerat.

Shah Jahan was alarmed at this chronic deficit and strongly urged Aurangzib to improve the peasant's lot, extend the cultivation, and relieve the imperial treasury from the annual drain.\*

*§ 5. Financial difficulties of Aurangzib in the Deccan.*

On his arrival in the Deccan, Aurangzib was faced with a serious financial difficulty. The actual yield of the *jagirs* was only a fraction of their nominal revenue. The Mughal officers posted in the Deccan would have starved if they had to depend solely on their *jagirs* in that province. Therefore, during his first viceroyalty, both Aurangzib and his chief officers had been given additional fiefs in other and more prosperous parts of the empire, so that they managed to live on the combined income. And now, also, his officers besieged him with clamour, saying that they could not maintain their quotas of soldiers on the poor revenue of their existing *jagirs*, and demanding that more productive *jagirs* should be transferred to them, so that they might be sure of getting a fixed portion of their income at least.†

Everywhere Aurangzib found signs of mal-administration, the work of his predecessors. The actual collection was sometimes only one-tenth of the

\* *Adab*, 31a; *M. U.* i. 756, iii. 497; *Adab*, 20a, 23b, 28a.

† *Adab*, 31a, 24b, 127b.

normal assessment. Even Baglana, noted for its fertility, was in no better state than the other districts.

"Baglana has not been well administered since Sayyid Abdul Wahhab's time," he writes to his father. And again, "the affairs of Painghat (Lowlands) are greatly in disorder,"—"the Deccan is in disorder, as it has not been governed well for the last ten years;"—"the *ryots* of the Ausa *mahal* complain of Uzbak Khan's oppression...and those of the Trimbak *pargana* about the tyranny of Darvish Beg Qaqshal."<sup>\*</sup>

The new viceroy found it impossible to make both ends meet. At this time the civil and military expenditure of the Deccan, exclusive of the salary derived by the officers from their *jagirs*, amounted to Rs. 31,76,000,—out of which the cash allowances of Aurangzib and his sons absorbed Rs. 25,43,000, and the expenses of the artillery department, the cash salary of certain officers, and other necessary disbursements required Rs. 6,30,000. The only means of providing this sum were, first the revenue of the Crownland which actually yielded Rs. 2,40,000, and secondly the tributes from the rulers of Golkonda and Deogarh, eight *lakhs* and one *lakh* respectively. Thus there was an annual deficit of Rs. 20,36,000, which was made good by drawing on the reserve stored in the treasuries of the Deccan, especially in the fort of Daulatabad. This cash

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\* *Adab*, 24b, 23b, 24a, 25b, 26b, 30a.

balance fell from Rs. 80,60,000 to Rs. 40,50,000, probably in two years. But in such a frontier province it was necessary to keep a large reserve for emergencies. Aurangzib grew alarmed at the rapid decrease of his cash balance and suggested a remedy to the Emperor : he wished to take away from the *jagirdars* and place under collectors of the Crown as much land as would yield the  $20\frac{1}{3}$  *lakhs* needed to make both ends meet. But where were the dispossessed officers to be provided for? Losing their means of support with the resumption of their *jagirs*, they would be forced to return to the Emperor's Court and so decrease the Deccan army by one-third. Such a diminution of armed strength was unsafe with two powerful States, Bijapur and Golkonda, across the frontier. To avoid the evil, Aurangzib proposed that *jagirs* in part should be given to him and his higher officers in other provinces, and that the cash portion of his salary might be made a charge on the flourishing treasuries of Malwa and Surat.\*

Aurangzib shared the difficulty of other *jagirdars* in the Deccan in having to keep up his normal contingent of troops on an income reduced to a fraction of his normal pay. His fiefs in Multan had been fertile and lucrative ; those in the Deccan were

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\* *Adab*, 31a. I have given the figures exactly as in my authority; but the items when added together do not come up to the total stated.

estimated to yield 17 *lakhs* less, and were, besides, liable to frequent and large arrears in collection. He rightly protested to his father, "If your Majesty wishes me to be honoured with a great viceroyalty, give me the means worthy of it." The Emperor ordered him to exchange his own sterile fiefs for more productive ones in the hands of other *jagirdars*.\* Aurangzib took care to leave the estates of his competent officers untouched, but appropriated the fiefs of lazy or minor officers who did not deserve considerate treatment. The revenue department was ordered by Shah Jahan to transfer to him good *jagirs* yielding Rs. 3,17,500 in the place of desolate unproductive lands with the same nominal rent-roll. But the *jagirdars* threatened with dispossession tried to influence the Emperor by accusing Aurangzib of picking out for himself the best villages in each *mahal* and leaving to them scattered possessions. Aurangzib refuted the calumny and asserted that he had taken entire *mahals*, as, in his opinion, a *mahal* divided among a number of owners could not be well administered or made to flourish. So, the Emperor at last confirmed the transfer of lands.†

Aurangzib's second prayer, that the cash portion

\* *Adab*, 19b, 25a, 173a. But when he was Governor of Multan he had complained of his fiefs there being unproductive! (*Adab*, 172a.)

† *Adab*, 25a, 29a, 32b, 33a, 36a, 41a, 36b.

of his pay should be sent to him from the province of Malwa and the port of Surat, was not granted. He was told to select productive *mahals* in the Deccan either from the Crownland or from the fiefs of the officers. The prince, accordingly, asked for Elichpur and Ankot, his cash allowance being reduced by the amount of the revenue of these two districts. But the Emperor fixed the standard revenue of Elichpur greatly above its real collection, and then Aurangzib naturally demanded cash payment as before, instead of taking such a losing *jagir*. The Emperor was displeased and made caustic remarks about the prince in open Court. In 1654 twenty-five *lakhs* of Rupees were sent to Aurangzib from the revenue of Malwa, and for the remaining five *lakhs* he was asked to take away some fiefs from the officers in Nandurbar. But the revenue of that district actually brought in Rs. 92,000, and Aurangzib desired some other *jagir* to make up the balance.\*

The financial wrangle between father and son dragged on for years. Shah Jahan wished to put a stop to the drain of money to the Deccan, and here was Aurangzib asking for cash from other provinces in the place of *jagirs* in the Deccan! The *jagirdars* whose lands he had appropriated by imperial sanction, intrigued at Court and persuaded the Emperor that the prince was realising from these fiefs

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\* *Adab*, 27a-29a, 32b, 33a, 37b.

more than his sanctioned pay, while the ousted officers, with only sterile *jagirs* left to them, were starving. An incorrect reading of the revenue papers deepened the same conviction in the Emperor's mind and he angrily wrote to Aurangzib : "It is unworthy of a Musalman and an act of injustice to take for yourself all the productive villages of a *pargana* and to assign to others only the less productive lands. I order you to take half a *lakh* worth of less productive land in the *pargana* of Asir, and decrease your cash stipend by the same amount, so that your actual income [may be made normal.]" Aurangzib replied in a tone of righteous indignation, "I have never in my life acted unjustly, but always tried to please God and His vicegerent on earth. You have censured me for this lakh of Rupees.....I have not myself taken away these lands; but the revenue officers of your Majesty's Court, by your order before I left for the Deccan, transferred them from Shaista Khan to me at the same [estimated] revenue. I wonder why the revenue officers, especially the *wazir* who has a retentive memory, did not point this fact out to you.....Contrary to the usual practice, your Majesty has, without making an inquiry or calling for my explanation, and on merely receiving a complaint, passed orders [in this case] and brought the term *Musalman* into use in connection with his perishable affair! I am helpless. As they have

made you believe that I am getting more than my fixed salary, and you have ordered half a *lakh* of Rupees to be deducted from my cash stipend,—what need is there of giving me anything in exchange [of the latter]?" [Adab. 41a.]

When appointing him to the Deccan, Shah Jahan had urged Aurangzib to pay special attention to the improvement of the peasantry and the extension of cultivation. Aurangzib had promised to do his best for these objects, and appealed to his exertions in the same direction during his first viceroyalty. He only pleaded for a sufficiently long tenure and the men and money necessary for his purpose. The Emperor, however, soon lost patience. Order after order was sent to the prince to increase the cultivation and population. Aurangzib was hastily censured for his failure as an administrator, as the Emperor imagined it to be, and he was threatened with loss of income in order to make him increase his exertions. But he rightly pleaded that the depopulation and ravage caused by a generation of warfare, followed by ten years of mal-administration, could not be undone in two or three years. He had been (he said) silently and steadily promoting his object and had in three years succeeded in doubling the revenue of many *mahals*.\* Very soon his

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\* Adab, 20a & b, 26b, 28a, 32a & b, 144a.

viceroyalty was destined to become memorable for ever in the history of land-settlement in the Deccan.

### § 6. *The diwans of the Deccan.*

For the purposes of revenue administration, Mughal Deccan had been divided into two portions, each with its own *diwan* or revenue minister. The *Painghat* or Lowlands comprised the whole of Khandesh and one-half of Berar, while the other  $2\frac{1}{2}$  *subahs* formed the *Balaghat* or Highlands. The *diwan* of Painghat was Multafat Khan, a strong civil administrator and a man of pleasant manners, charming by his easy sociability all who came in contact with him. But he was after all a mere departmental head, with considerable executive capacity no doubt, but devoid of any genius for administrative reform or innovation.\* Glory of the latter kind belonged to his colleague, Murshid Quli Khan, the *diwan* of Balaghat, and one of the many noble gifts of Persia to India.

### § 7. *Murshid Quli Khan : his character and revenue system.*

MURSHID QULI KHAN† was a native of Khurasan

\* M. U. iii. 500—503. The *diwans* of this period were, (1) Dianat Khan, from the 14th to the 21st year of Shah Jahan's reign, and again from the 22nd to the 27th (M. U. ii. 37), (2) Multafat Khan, *diwan* of Painghat only from the 25th to the 29th year, (3) Murshid Quli Khan, appointed *diwan* of Balaghat in 1653 and of Painghat also on 28 Jan., 1656.

† Life of Murshid Quli Khan in M. U. iii. 493—500. Khafi Khan,

who had migrated to India in the train of Ali Mardan Khan, the fugitive Persian Governor of Qandahar. He "combined the valour of a soldier with the administrative capacity of a civil servant." As Paymaster of Aurangzib's army in Balkh he had displayed ability, and when Aurangzib came to the Deccan again, Murshid Quli accompanied him as *diwan* of Balaghat. The Emperor highly commended him to the prince as his adviser in revenue matters. The prince, too, valued him as highly, and soon afterwards secured for him the title of *Khan* or Lord. Three years later Painghat was added to his charge, and he became *diwan* of the entire Deccan (28th January, 1656). But it was in Balaghat that he began his revenue reforms and first achieved success for his new system.

A century earlier the revenue collection of Northern India had been brought into system by Todar Mal, the *diwan* of Akbar. But the Deccan had no system at all. Here the marking out of plots, the measurement of land by chain survey, the assessment of revenue at so much per *bigha*, or the sharing of the actual produce between the State landlord and the cultivator, were unknown. The peasant in the Deccan cultivated as much land as he could with a plough and a pair of oxen, grew what-

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i. 714, 732—735. *Adab*, 24b, 27a, 28a, 43a, 99a, 41a, 30b, 47b.  
*Waris*, 67b, 101a, 106a.

ever crop he liked, and paid to the State a small amount *per plough*,—the rate of revenue varying in different places and being fixed arbitrarily, without bearing a definite proportion to the actual yield of the field, because it was not the practice there to inspect fields and estimate the quantity and value of crops.

This utter absence of system and principle in revenue matters laid the peasantry open to the caprice and extortion of the petty collectors. The long wars of Mughal aggression and a succession of rainless years, completed their ruin. The oppressed *ryots* fled from their homes, the deserted fields lapsed into the jungle; many once flourishing villages became manless wildernesses. Shah Jahan had reduced the revenue of Khandesh to one-half in 1631, but even this amount was never fully realised before Murshid Quli's time.

The new *diwan*'s reform consisted in extending Todar Mal's system to the Deccan. First, he worked hard to gather the scattered *ryots* together and restore the normal life of the villages by giving them their full population and proper chain of officers. Everywhere wise *amins* and honest surveyors were deputed to measure the land, to prepare the record of well marked out holdings (*raqba*), and to distinguish arable land from rocky soils and water-courses. Where a village had lost its headman (*muqaddam*),

he took care to appoint a new headman from the persons whose character gave the best promise of their readiness to promote cultivation and take sympathetic care of the peasantry. The poorer *ryots* were granted loans (*taqavvi*) from the public treasury, for the purchase of cattle, seeds and other needful materials of agriculture, and the advance was recovered at harvest by instalments. In one year he granted loans of forty to fifty thousand Rupees to the *ryots* of Khandesh and Berar for making embankments to impound water for irrigating low-lying lands.

To prevent partiality or corruption "this honest and God-fearing *diwan* often dragged the measuring chain with his own hands" and checked the survey work of his subordinates. By personal inquiry in the fields and villages he won the confidence of the peasantry; he allotted the holdings with care and attention to detail, so that the *ryots* prospered at the same time that the revenue increased. He had the wisdom to modify his system according to differences of local conditions. Where the peasantry were backward and the population scanty, or where the villages were situated in obscure nooks, he left the old usage of a fixed lump payment per plough undisturbed. In many other places he introduced the system of metayership or sharing of the actual produce. For this there were three rates: (i) Where the crop

depended on rainfall, the State took one-half of it. (ii) Where agriculture depended on well-irrigation the share of the State was one-third in the case of grain, and from one-ninth to one-fourth in the case of grape, sugar-cane, anise, plantain, pea-wort, and other special and high-priced crops requiring laborious watering and length of culture. (iii) Where the field was irrigated from canals (*pāt*), the proportion of the revenue to the crop varied, being sometimes higher and sometimes lower than in lands irrigated from wells.

His third method of revenue settlement was the elaborate and complex one of Northern India. The standard or maximum Government share was one-fourth of the total produce, whether grain or pot-herb, fruit or seed. The revenue at the fixed *rate* of so many *Rupees per bigha* was assessed and collected after considering the quantity and quality of the crop from seed-time to harvest and its market-price, and actually measuring the sown area. Hence, its name of *jarib* (survey). Under Murshid Quli this became the prevalent system in the *subahs* of Mughal Dcccan and was known for centuries afterwards as "the *dhárá* of Murshid Quli Khan."

His excellent system, backed by his constant vigilance and personal supervision, led to the improvement of agriculture and increase of the revenue in a few years. In 1658 the accurate

observer Bhimsen Burhanpuri saw not a single piece of waste land near Aurangabad; wheat and pulse sold at  $2\frac{1}{2}$  maunds a Rupee, Jawar and bajra at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  maunds, molasses at half a maund, and yellow oil (*ghee* ?) at four seers. [Dilkasha, i. 25, 26, 38.]

### *§ 8. Improvements made in the Deccan administration by Aurangzib.*

Immediately on assuming the viceroyalty, Aurangzib sent off his own men to the different subdivisions to take over charge of the localities. He found that the official staff must be greatly increased before the country could be brought under proper control, and much money must be spent before the administration could be made efficient. And he acted accordingly. First, there was a wholesale redistribution of offices; old and incompetent men were dismissed or removed to minor posts; a number of officers of proved ability were selected by the prince, and to them all situations of trust and importance were given. [Adab, 24-26.] This change of personnel was naturally accompanied by a reshuffling of *jagirs*. As we have already seen, able officers were left in undisturbed possession of their old *jagirs* if these were good, or given better ones if they were unproductive. The loss of the change fell only on the undeserving or minor officers.

After thus securing for himself and his leading

officers the income necessary for maintaining their contingents, he fought and won for them another battle with the imperial accounts department. In order to reduce expenditure, Shah Jahan ordered that every military officer serving in the Deccan should bring his force to the muster, and the troop horses should be branded, so that commanders who had been keeping less than their proper contingents while drawing full pay, might be asked to refund the sums they had thus taken in excess from the State. Aurangzib pleaded for them by pointing out the real state of affairs in the Deccan : no officer could realise the full amount of his nominal pay from his *jagir*; many had failed even to take possession of the lands assigned to them; their main support was the cash allowance paid from the treasury. If, therefore, by reason of the shortage in the regulation number of their retainers, a part of their former salaries was debited against them and the amount recovered by deduction from their pay in future, the officers would be worse off than before. The operation of the order would decrease the strength of the army, which was a dangerous contingency in "a province on the frontier of two rich and armed rulers." Shah Jahan had decreased the stipend of armed followers from Rs. 20 per month to Rs. 17 or even Rs. 15. Aurangzib protested against this order, saying that a horseman who got less than Rs. 20 a month could

not possibly keep himself in proper fighting trim, especially as, under Murshid Quli Khan's metayer-ship settlement, rent was now paid in kind and the rent-receivers had to undergo heavy expenditure in watching and storing their share of the grain. The price of horses (he added) had greatly risen in the Deccan, and to make up the full complements of all the officers in the terms of Shah Jahan's new order would require the entertainment of 9,000 additional mounted retainers by the officers. As the result of Aurangzib's protest Shah Jahan raised the stipend of each trooper to Rs. 20 a month, and the order about muster and branding was apparently dropped.\*

Keen on securing military efficiency, Aurangzib first of all assured that financial support without which an army cannot be kept up to the mark. About his own immediate followers he wrote to the Emperor, "Your Majesty well knows that I seldom make useless expenditure. What I get from you, I spend in supporting the army. Now, as my men are paid in cash, my contingent will decrease in the same proportion as my cash allowance is reduced."

[*Adab*, 33a, 172a.]

The Deccan being far away from the centre of the empire, the officers posted there used to embezzle the public money and to neglect their duty, without

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\* *Adab*, 29b, 35a, 97a.

fear of inspection and detection. We have seen how one Governor, Islam Khan, used to make money by selling the stores of the forts dear and afterwards buying fresh provisions cheap. Fifty years afterwards the Venetian traveller Manucci noted the utterly decayed and neglected condition of the Mughal forts in these parts. But in 1650 Mir Khalil, a very able and energetic officer, was appointed Inspector-General of Ordnance (*darogha-i-topkhanah*) for the Deccan, and he soon made a clean sweep of the old abuses. Though a mere inspector, "his achievements surpassed those of provincial viceroys." He visited every fort, inspected everything, great and small, and supplied every place with the requisite store of food and munitions. Everywhere he found evidence of neglect and corruption. Old and useless men were being borne on the establishment of the artillery and swelling the expenditure, without doing any service at all. Mir Khalil made them undergo an examination in musketry. Setting up a target three yards square, he gathered all the artillery-men and gave them the chance of three shots from their matchlocks at a range of forty paces. Those who could not hit the mark even once were dismissed. Old and disabled soldiers were put on pension in consideration of their past services. Thus in a month and a half this "honest, hardworking, and expert officer" effected a saving of Rs. 50,000

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a year, while actually improving the efficiency of the arm.\* He continued at his post till 18th July, 1653, when he was transferred, on a higher rank and pay, to the responsible post of commandant of Dharur, a fort on the frontier. Aurangzib highly commended his expert knowledge of artillery matters and success as an administrator, saying, "The presence of such an officer in a frontier fort gives me peace of mind." His successor was Hushdar Khan, a capital marksman, who held the Inspectorship of Ordnance for a year only. The next to fill the office was Shams-ud-din (the son of Mukhtar Khan), appointed in the middle of 1654,—who, too, greatly pleased Aurangzib by his ability and received many favours from the prince.†

### § 9. Causes of Aurangzib's differences with the Emperor.

Aurangzib's second viceroyalty of the Deccan was marked by a series of wrangles with his father, for which, as Aurangzib's version alone is before us, the chief blame seems to fall on Shah Jahan. Either Aurangzib's enemies had got hold of the Emperor's ears, or the latter failed to appreciate the prince's difficulties in the South. But the result was that

\* M. U. i. 166, 786, 787; Waris, 39b, 79b; *Storia do Mogor*, iii. 485.

† *Adab* 30b, 27b, 39b; Waris, 67a; M. U., iii. 943—946, 620—623.

Aurangzib was misunderstood, suspected, and unjustly reprimanded from the very beginning of his term of office. And the bitterness of feeling thus roused was one of the reasons why the War of Succession was conducted so heartlessly and unscrupulously. So complete was the estrangement that, during this long viceroyalty of more than five years, Aurangzib was not once invited to visit his father in Northern India, and, what is almost incredible, among the presents made to the Emperor on his birthdays and the anniversaries of his coronation none from Aurangzib is mentioned in the official history, though the other princes made costly offerings! While Dara's sons were basking in the imperial favour and every year receiving jewels and cash gifts worthy of princes, only once did Aurangzib's sons get anything from their imperial grandfather.

At the very time of his appointment to the Deccan Aurangzib objected to it as his *jagirs* there would yield 17 lakhs of Rupees less than the fertile fiefs he was holding in Sindh. "What, I wonder, is the reason of this decrease and of my transfer?" he asked. Before he had reached the Deccan, he was taxed by the Emperor with moving too slowly and taking four months in going from Peshawar to his charge, which had been without a ruler for two months. Aurangzib's explanation was the difficulty

of the roads and the unpreparedness of his troops, who had just returned from the arduous campaign of Qandahar and had got no time to visit their *jagirs* and collect money for fitting themselves out for the transfer to the Deccan. Even after reaching Burhanpur Aurangzib had no peace; the Emperor urged him to proceed to Daulatabad, his capital, as soon as possible after the rainy season. The prince excused himself for lingering ten months at Burhanpur, on the grounds of pressure of work and the heavy rains at the end of the monsoons that year. Then again, his proposal to be given more productive *jagirs* in exchange of the existing ones, was the cause of a prolonged and acrimonious correspondence with the Emperor, as we have seen.

In some cases the viceroy's recommendations for postings and promotions among his subordinates were not accepted by the Emperor, and the prince could only protest his own helplessness in the matter and justify his nominations. In a few instances, such as the Inspectorship of Ordnance, he carried his point after indignantly writing to his father, "I have been a *subahdar* since the age of 18 years, and I have never recommended a single man who has proved unfit for his post.....The Chief of Artillery should be an expert marksman. I recommended such a person. He has not done any dishonest act. But your Majesty has ordered the post to be given to

another."\* On many other minor points, such as elephant catching, sending mangoes to Court, securing skilled weavers for the imperial cloth factory, the Golkonda tribute, &c., there were differences between father and son.†

Next, Shah Jahan quickly lost patience and complained of Aurangzib's failure to restore cultivation and prosperity in the Deccan. Aurangzib rightly answered that it was too early to judge him. "I have always tried to extend tillage and increase the number of houses; but as I am not a vain man I have not reported it to you. A country that has been desolated by various calamities cannot be made flourishing in two or three years!...How can I, in one season or two, bring back to cultivation a *pargana* which has been unproductive of revenue for twenty years?" But Shah Jahan was not satisfied. He often made caustic remarks in open Court about Aurangzib's promise of restoring prosperity to the Deccan and the wretched condition of the province. He even contemplated a change of viceroys as likely to mend matters, and asked Shuja if he would accept the *subahdari* of the Deccan as Aurangzib could not govern the province well.‡

Another cause of friction was the charge of

\* *Adab*, 27b, 28a & b, 29a, 129b.

† *Adab*, 177, 24b, 31b, 32a, 193b, 191b.

‡ *Adab*, 28a, 32; *Faiyaz-nl-qawaniin*, 354.

diplomatic relations with Bijapur and Golkonda. Aurangzib justly contended that the Mughal envoys at these Courts should take their orders from the viceroy of the Deccan and imperial correspondence with them should pass through his hands, "as a better policy and in order to secure greater obedience to the imperial wishes." But this power was conceded to him only towards the close of his administration, and even then not fully. [*Adab*, 24b.]

Later on we find Shah Jahan charging Aurangzib with receiving costly presents from the king of Golkonda without crediting their price against the tribute due. Aurangzib easily showed that these presents were of small value, the precious stones were full of flaws, and they were all a personal gift to himself and his eldest son.\* By a Nemesis of fate, a generation afterwards Aurangzib, then Emperor, suspected his son Muazzam of having formed a secret understanding with the king of Golkonda.

In May 1653 we find Aurangzib replying thus to some charge brought against him in one of the Emperor's letters, "What your Majesty has heard against me is false. I consider such conduct towards others as very improper." The nature of

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\* *Adab*, 84b, 85a and b, 192b, 107b.

the accusation is not known to us. Was it the affair of Zainabadi, which must have happened at this time? [Adab, 26a.]

Again, the Emperor took him to task for employing all the best weavers at Burhanpur in his private factory and thereby depriving the imperial factory of its labour supply. Aurangzib denied the allegation altogether, but the Emperor ordered all cloth factories at Burhanpur to be closed with the exception of the imperial. This was a public humiliation for the viceroy. [Adab, 98b, 176b.]

At one time Aurangzib was so disgusted with being constantly misunderstood, censured, and hampered by the Emperor, that he refused to take a most necessary step on his own initiative. Murshid Quli Khan had recommended an advance of Rs. 50,000 as loan to the peasants of Khandesh and Berar. Aurangzib simply referred the matter to the Emperor, and when he was told that he ought to have advanced the money from the imperial revenue, he replied with bitterness, "No wonder that I did not take the responsibility of doing it, seeing that I have been taken to task for acts which I never did. In my first viceroyalty I did not wait for previous sanction in such matters. But now I have grown more cautious!" Indeed, in one of his letters to his sister Jahanara he complains that though he had served his father faithfully for twenty years

he was favoured with much less power and confidence than his nephew Sulaiman Shukoh.  
[*Adab*, 41, 177a.]

Before turning to the two great wars undertaken by Aurangzib during this period we shall describe his MINOR EXPEDITIONS.

#### *§ 10. The Gond kingdoms of the Central Provinces: expedition against Deogarh.*

In the 16th and 17th centuries much of the modern Central Provinces owned the sway of aboriginal Gond chiefs and was known in history under the name of Gondwana. The great Gond kingdom of Garh-Mandla had been crippled by a Mughal invasion and sack of the capital in Akbar's reign, and, later, by Bundela encroachments from the north. But about the middle of the 17th century another Gond kingdom, with its capital at Deogarh, rose to greatness, and extended its sway over the districts of Betul, Chhindwara and Nagpur, and portions of Seoni, Bhandara and Balaghat. In the southern part of Gondwana stood the town of Chanda, the seat of a third Gond dynasty. A king of Chanda had visited the Court of Delhi in the 16th century, and his family had ever since been loyally attached to the empire, because this was their only protection from their hereditary foe and rival, the Rajah of Deogarh.

For a short time the DEOGARH kingdom became so powerful as to overshadow Mandla and Chanda and to take the first place among the Gond States. Its wealth was vast enough to tempt the cupidity of the Mughals. We have seen how in 1637 Khan-i-Dauran invaded this kingdom, stormed the fort of Nagpur, and forced Rajah Kukia to pay a large contribution down and to promise an annual tribute of  $1\frac{1}{3}$  lakhs of Rupees. Kesari Singh had succeeded his father Kukia in 1640, after presenting a fee of four lakhs of Rupees to the Emperor. [Ch. 3.] But under him the tribute fell into arrears, and repeated demands for it produced no effect. So, in 1655, Shah Jahan ordered the country to be invaded, especially as the Mughal army in the Deccan had its hands free and the Rajah of Deogarh was said to possess 200 elephants, which would be a rich booty. Aurangzib pointed out that by deputing an officer to Deogarh he had ascertained that the Rajah was really very poor and had only 14 elephants. He therefore, asked for orders whether Deogarh should be annexed or only the tribute realised, and then added ironically, "Send me the man who has told you of the Rajah having got 200 elephants, and he will guide my troops to the place where these elephants are!" This false information, as may be easily imagined, had come from the envious Rajah of Chanda. Shah Jahan

ordered Deogarh to be conquered and annexed. Aurangzib wrote back to say, "It can be easily conquered, but not so easily held or controlled. The annual cost of administration will be very high."\*

On 12th October, 1655, the expedition started in two divisions, one under Mirza Khan, the Deputy Governor of Berar, by way of Elichpur, and the other under Hadidat Khan, the Deputy Governor of Telingana, by way of Nagpur,—with orders to converge upon Deogarh. Manji, the Rajah of Chanda, co-operated with the invaders. Kesari Singh was crushed between the two walls of foes. He humbly waited on Mirza Khan, and promised to pay up his arrears and to be more punctual in future. Only twenty elephants were found in his possession, and these were taken away. The Rajah accompanied the victorious troops on their return, and paid his respects to Aurangzib on 8th January, 1656. He promised to pay five lakhs in cash and kind in the course of the year, on account of his tribute, present and past, and to cede certain *parganas*, the revenue of which would be set apart for the payment of the tribute in future. Kesari Singh with a good body of armed retainers accompanied Aurangzib to the siege of Golkonda and

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\* *Adab*, 42a and b; *Waris*, 105a.

rendered good service, praying only for some remission of his piled up arrears of tribute in return.\* The later history of Deogarh will be given in Ch. 61.

### § 11. *Invasion of the Jawhar State.*

The little State of JAWHAR stands north of Bombay on a plateau between the Western Ghats and the Arabian Sea. On the north and east it adjoined the Mughal districts of Baglana and Nasik respectively, and on the south it touched Konkan. Except in some places in the south and west, the country is elevated, rocky, and forest-clad. Its safety lay in the great difficulty which an invader found in crossing the Ghats and penetrating into the country from the land side. A line of Rajahs calling themselves Sisodias, founded the State early in the 14th century, and was at this time engaged in a long but successful struggle with the Portuguese power in Northern Konkan. The Rajah, named Sripat, paid no tribute nor owned the overlordship of the Emperor. So, at Aurangzib's suggestion, Shah Jahan sanctioned a war against him. Rao Karan, the chief of Bikanir, had long served in the Mughal wars of the Deccan. He now promised to conquer Jawhar with his own men, if

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\* *Adab*, 43a, 45a, 46a, 47a; *Waris*, 105b.

it were granted to him as a fief on a tribute of Rs. 50,000. The Rajput general started from Aurangabad on 3rd October, 1655, threaded his way through a difficult pass in the Western Ghats and approached the frontier of Jawhar. At this Sripat offered submission (5th January, 1656), and bought safety by paying an indemnity, promising to alienate a certain portion of his territory for the payment of the tribute in future, and sending his son with Rao Karan as a hostage. The expedition returned to Aurangzib on 20th January.\*

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\* *Imp. Gazetteer*, xiv. 87 and 88; *Waris*, 106a; *Adab*, 37b, 39b, 47a.

## CHAPTER X.

### INVASION OF GOLKONDA, 1656.

#### § 1. *Golkonda: wealth of the kingdom.*

GOLKONDA was a very fertile and carefully irrigated country, with a large and industrious population. The capital, Haidarabad, was at this time the centre of the diamond trade, not of Asia alone, but of the whole world. Numbers of foreign traders assembled here and transacted business. The kingdom was famous for several industries. The steel works of Nirmal and Indur (two villages north of the city) supplied the raw materials for the world-famed Damascus blades, and the local outturn of swords, lances and daggers was distributed in large quantities over all parts of India. The skilled cloth-weavers of Masulipatam were sought after for the imperial factories of Burhanpur and Delhi, and the chintz woven there had a continental celebrity. The carpet industry of Ellore, conducted entirely by Muhammadans, was famous for centuries. To its smiling cornfields, tanks teeming with fish, and flourishing handicrafts, must be added the diamond and gold mines which made the name of Golkonda known even in far-off Europe. The kingdom also possessed in Masulipatam the best anchorage in the

Bay of Bengal and the only place on the East Coast whence ships sailed for Pegu, Siam, Bengal, Cochin China, the Manillas, and even Mecca and Madagascar. The forests of the kingdom sheltered large herds of highly prized elephants, which added to the wealth of the king. Tobacco and the palm flourished exceedingly, and the excise on tobacco and toddy juice yielded a large revenue.\*

### § 2. *Causes of friction between Qutb Shah and Shah Jahan.*

Since his return to the Deccan in 1653, Aurangzib had frequent cause to quarrel with the king of Golkonda. The annual tribute of two lakhs of *hun* was always in arrears, and frequent dunning on the part of the Mughal viceroy only met with excuses and petitions for delay. The Emperor asked the Sultan to pay half his tribute in cash and the other half in elephants, of which he had a vast stable. But even this was not done. At last Aurangzib demanded the alienation of a certain part of Golkonda territory, the revenue of which would be collected by imperial officers and set apart for the payment of the tribute.

Next, the exchange value of the *hun* rose from

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\* Description based on Tavernier, i. 150—158, 175, 274; Gribble's *History of the Deccan*, i. 269; *Imperial Gazetteer*, xii. 23. *Adab*, 55b, 50a, 46b, 37a, 54b.

Rs. 4 in 1636 to Rs.  $4\frac{1}{2}$  and finally in 1654 to Rs. 5 each. Qutb Shah had been paying his tribute at the old rate of eight lakhs of Rupees a year. The Mughals now demanded that the difference due to exchange for *all the past years* should be paid at once. A new burden of 20 lakhs of Rupees was thus thrown on the shoulders of the Sultan who had been tottering under the load of the normal tribute. [Adab, 54, 56; Waris, 113a.]

Then he was rebuked for not having taken his overlord's sanction before conquering the Karnatak. But he was told that the offence could be atoned for by paying a large sum as present to the Emperor! When Aurangzib's agent, Mumammad Mumin, was sent ostensibly to protect Sri Ranga, the Rajah of Karnatak, Qutb Shah was warned not to hinder him, with a clear hint that the proposed intervention could be bought off!\* Lastly there was the affair of Mir Jumla which precipitated war, and of which a detailed account must be given here.

### § 3. *The E. Karnatak conquered by Bijapur and Golkonda.*

The treaties of 1636 had divided the old Ahmadnagar territory between the Emperor of Delhi and the Sultan of Bijapur, made Golkonda a

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\* Adab, 54b-55b, 44a & b.

protected tributary State, and clearly marked out the boundary between the empire and the two Deccani monarchies. [Ch. 3. § 3.] Barred in the north by the strong arm of the Mughals, these two States began to give employment to their troops and a free vent to their ambition by engaging in a career of conquest in other directions. Bijapur took possession of the Nizam Shahi Konkan, which had been ceded to it by the treaty with the Emperor, and even attacked the Portuguese possessions north of Goa with some success. Golkonda was cut off by foreign territory from the west. But it was in the eastern side of Southern India that both the Sultans found free scope for expansion. The whole of the Karnatak, from the river Krishna to Tanjore beyond the Kaveri, was covered with a number of petty Hindu principalities, the jarring fragments of the ruined empire of Vijaynagar. These now rapidly fell a prey to Muslim arms. The Golkonda troops advanced conquering to the Bay of Bengal, and occupied the country from the Chilka lake to the Penner river. Their raiding bands penetrated as far north as Khurda, the seat of the faineant Rajah of Orissa. The Gajapati Rajah of Ganjam had been ousted by the Golkonda Sultan in 1571. Chicacole became the seat of a Qutb Shahi faujdar sometime before 1641, when a handsome mosque was built there by Sher Muhammad Khan, the first faujdar,

In 1652 a Rajput officer of Golkonda seized Vizagapatam and extending his conquest formed a petty Rajahship.\*

Bijapur advanced conquering southwards and then turned east till it occupied the coast between Jinji and Tanjore. Hemmed in the north and south by the conquests of the two Sultans, as between the two jaws of a monster, lay the kingdom of Chandragiri, the last remnant of the Vijaynagar empire, with its territory contracted to the region from Nellore to Pondicherry on the east and the Mysore frontier on the west. On the death of Rama Rajah, the minister and virtual ruler of Vijaynagar, on the fatal field of Talikota (1565), and the subsequent sack of the capital by the Muslims, his brother had removed the seat of government to Pennukonda (1567). This brother's son transferred the capital to Chandragiri (about 1600). At this time the throne of Chandragiri was occupied by Sri Ranga, who gave the site of Madras city to the English in 1639, and whom the Muhammadan historians style *Sri Ranga Ráyal, zamindar of Karnatak*. There was now a race between the Golkonda and Bijapur kings for the

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\* *Imperial Gazetteer*, xii. 23 (Rajmahendri captured, 1572), x. 217 (Chicacole), xii. 145, xxiv. 339. Sewell's *Sketch of Dynasties*, 48 & 69, (the Palnad country and the country about Katnul and Nellore were seized and Kondavidu secured by bribery in 1580).

osorption of his kingdom; the two jaws began rapidly to close from the north and the south upon the doomed Karnatak. In this work of conquest a most conspicuous part was played by Mir Jumla, the *mazir* of Golkonda.

#### § 4. *Mir Jumla, prime-minister of Golkonda.*

Muhammad Said, known to history as MIR JUMLA,\* was a Sayyid of Ardistan in Persia, and the son of an oil-merchant of Isfahan. Leaving his native country in youth, he like other Shia adventurers, sought his fortune at the Courts of the Deccani Sultans who belonged to his sect, (1630). As a diamond merchant he rose to great wealth by shrewdness and business capacity. His wonderful talents gained him the favour of Abdullah Qutb Shah, who made him his prime-minister. Mir Jumla's industry, rapid despatch of business, administrative capacity, military genius, and inborn power of leadership ensured his success in all that he undertook. Great alike in civil government and in war, he soon became the virtual ruler of Golkonda: nothing could reach the Sultan save with his approval. Sent by his master to the Karnatak, he soon effected a complete transformation

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\* Tavernier, i. 170, 259, 273, 284—293, 295; Bernier, 16—19; Ribble, i. 269—271; M. U. iii. 530—555 (*Life of Mir Jumla*). Ch. 31 *ante.*

there. Hitherto Kambam 15°34' N. 79°12' E.), on the n. e. side of the Cuddapa district, had been the limit of Golkonda advance in that direction. All the attempts of the Sultans had failed to conquer the uplands of the Karnatak, where the Rajah of Chandragiri still held sway. Mir Jumla strengthened himself by securing a number of European gunners and cannon-founders, raised his army to a high state of discipline and efficiency, and soon wrested the Cuddapa district. His crowning feat was the capture of the rock-fortress of Gandikota, hitherto deemed impregnable. Sidhout,\* east of Cuddapa, was also conquered, and his captains penetrated as far as Chandragiri and Tirupati in the North Arcot district. By looting the rich old temples of the South and hunting out buried treasure, Mir Jumla amassed a vast fortune. The huge Hindu idols of copper were brought away in numbers, to be melted and cast into cannon! By diligently working the diamond mines which he farmed from his sovereign or discovered by his own exertions, he multiplied his wealth, till he came to be known as the richest private man in the South and the owner of twenty maunds of diamonds. On entering Shah Jahan's service he made presents worth 15 lakhs of Rupees.

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\* Sidhout is nine miles due east and Gandikota 42 miles n. w. of Cuddapa town. Both are situated on the Penner river.

to the Emperor, besides what he gave to Aurangzib and his eldest son. By his conquests he raised his *jagir* in the Karnatak into a kingdom 300 miles long and 50 miles broad, yielding a revenue of 40 lakhs a year, and possessing several diamond mines. At his own cost and under his absolute command he maintained an army of 5,000 well-mounted and well-equipped cavalry, besides the 4,000 troops of the Golkonda king's service, whose captains he had won over. His foot numbered 20,000 strong. An excellent park of artillery and a large number of trained elephants completed his war equipage. Thus he had made himself fully independent of his master and the virtual king of the Karnatak. In short, it has been well said by one historian that though Mir Jumla's rank was that of a noble, he possessed the power wealth and grandeur of a ruling prince.\*

Mir Jumla's growing power and wealth roused the alarm of his master. Envious courtiers were not wanting to whisper to the Sultan of Golkonda that the absent *wazir*'s armed strength was a menace to his own security, and that the servant's wealth over-

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\* At Haidarabad a tank, a garden, and a mansion bear his name. Some distance outside the city a village (*petta*) was founded and named after him. "He has left many memorials of himself in Telingana where he lived long." (M. U. iii. 555); Waris, 102a, 111a and b, 114a, 118a; Adab, 39a, 116a; Tavernier, i. 170n; Bernier, 17.

shadowed the grandeur of the master's Court. Qutb Shah, too, naturally wished to have a share of his *wazir's* gains. In the conquest of the Karnatak the two had acted as partners; Mir Jumla had supplied the brain and leadership, while the Sultan had lent him the necessary men and money and the protection of his name, in the first stage at all events. They now quarrelled about the profits. Qutb Shah tried to treat Mir Jumla as a mere servant and to escheat to the State what he had acquired in its service. Mir Jumla, on the other hand, knowing how weak and worthless his master was, regarded the conquest as entirely his own work and his gains as the fruits of his own exclusive toil. After having tasted regal independence in the Karnatak he was loth to return to the life of a courtier. But he could not long disobey the summons of his master. So, he once went back to Golkonda. The Sultan conspired with other courtiers to seize and blind him, but Mir Jumla learnt of the plot before it was matured, and cleverly managed to escape to the Karnatak, vowing never to visit Golkonda again. The Sultan kept calling him back with increasing persistence, but it only served to confirm Mir Jumla's suspicion. At last the mask was thrown away, and Qutb Shah openly undertook to crush his disobedient servant.\*

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\* *Adab*, 30a, 36b, 72b; *Tavernier*, i. 165.

*§ 5. Mir Jumla intrigues with Bijapur and Persia.*

Mir Jumla now looked around for protection. He offered to enter the service of the Sultan of Bijapur, and to hold the Karnatak of him, and as an earnest presented him with some lockets (*padak*) richly set with diamonds and gems, which he had extorted from the Rajah of Chandragiri.\* Adil Shah was overjoyed at the prospect of acquiring such a precious servant, the ablest man in the Deccan since Malik Ambar's time. But Bijapur was only one of the many strings to Mir Jumla's bow. He was also intriguing with the Shah of Persia† and asking for an asylum with him. What he evidently wanted to secure was a safe retreat to Persia with all his wealth, if matters came to the worst and he found the Karnatak no longer tenable against a combination of his foes. Nearer home he ably turned enemies into friends. The despoiled Rajah of Chandragiri was conciliated and assured that he would not be further molested, if he stood by Mir Jumla. [Adab. 36b, 39a.] Years ago Bijapur and Golkonda had almost come to blows about the partition of the Karnatak. These Muslim

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\* *Adab*, 195b & 196a; *Waris*, 119.

† *Raqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 154—156, gives the reply of the Persian king to Mir Jumla's offer to enter his service. Two letters of Mir Jumla to the Persian premier are given by Abdul Ali Tabrizi, 70a—73a (but earlier than 1654).

conquerors advancing from the north and the south of the province had met near the northern frontier of the South Arcot district and each had wished to push the other back.\* But Mir Jumla now made a peaceful settlement : by mutual consent a line drawn east to west some distance north of Jinji became the boundary between Adil Shahi Karnatak and Qutb Shahi Karnatak. In addition to this, Mir Jumla made friends with Ikhlas Khan,† the Abyssinian Governor of Bijapuri Karnatak, who probably wished to imitate his disloyal example and turn his vice-royalty into an independent State. The Golkonda generals and troops posted in the Karnatak were already bound by close ties of self-interest and favours to Mir Jumla's side. The Sultan had no instrument with which he could punish his refractory servant.

#### § 6. Aurangzib's secret correspondence for winning Mir Jumla over.

Mir Jumla had also begun to coquet with the Mughal power. Indeed, in this case the first solicitation had come from the other side. Aurangzib,

\* *Adab*, 27b. The race between the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi generals for the Jinji district is described in *Guldashia*, 5b—7a, (Abdullah to Shah Jahan, 2 letters), and Abdul Ali Tabrizi (Mir Jumla's letters, 69b).

† *Adab*, 39a, 36b.

secretly nursing his passionate ambition of conquering the rich State of Golkonda, was eager to secure such an able helper and counsellor as the prime-minister of that kingdom. Through the Mughal envoy at Golkonda the prince opened a secret correspondence with Mir Jumla, promising him not only protection for his family and property against his wrathful master, but also boundless favours from the Emperor, if he joined the Mughal service. He also sent an agent, Muhammad Mumin, directly to the prime-minister in the Karnatak. But the prudent *wazir* dallied with the offer and waited to see what turn his affairs would take. So, he sent a secret petition for appointment under the Emperor, in order to ascertain what terms he might expect from that quarter.\*

These intrigues with three different Courts could not be kept secret. Qutb Shah, hearing of them, tried to conciliate his too-powerful officer. To his friendly overtures Mir Jumla replied that after two years he would either attend on his master or resign his post and leave India. All this time Aurangzib kept up a busy but secret correspondence with him, and messengers kept running from one to the other. In his excess of eagerness the prince

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\* *Adab*, 30a, 31b, 34b, 36b, 72b; *Waris*, 102b; *Abdul Ali Tabrizi*, 74a.

even approached Muhammad Amin, the son of Mir Jumla. But Shah Jahan's hesitation in replying to the Mir's petition threw the latter into alarm and doubt about the Emperor's intentions. At last, yielding to Aurangzib's importunity, the Emperor offered to Mir Jumla his protection and favour if he came to his Court.\* But evidently the terms were very vague, and Mir Jumla was in no haste to accept them. He, however, feigned consent, and begged a year's respite in which to collect his property from the ports, and keep his promise to Qutb Shah. So, he urged the Mughal Court to keep this agreement secret till then, for if the Deccani Sultans discovered his successful intrigue with the Emperor, they would, he feared, kill him. [Ad. 38.] In fact three kings were now bidding for his services, and he wished to make the most of the circumstance.

Eager as Aurangzib was to secure Mir Jumla, these delays made his heart turn sick, and he discovered Mir Jumla's duplicity. "I think," he wrote to the Emperor, "that Mir Jumla does not really wish to enter the imperial service, as he now holds a large kingdom with many fortresses, ports, and strongholds, and has disgusted the Sultan of Bijapur by declining to enter his service. His proposal to take the Emperor's pay is only a matter of policy. He

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\* *Adab, 34b, 44a, 35, 36a.*

will not leave that country so long as he can dexterously avert the hostility of the two Sultans."

[*Ad. 39a.*]

Evidently Aurangzib's solicitations ceased, or his agent at Golkonda blundered and the secret of Mir Jumla's understanding with the Emperor leaked out. The two Deccani Sultans, thoroughly angry with the double-dealer, agreed to unite their forces to crush him. It was now Mir Jumla's turn to be as eager as he had been lukewarm before in joining the Mughals. He wrote to the prince, "I am Shah Jahan's servant and beg to be saved by him." But Aurangzib now hung back. He waited for the attack on Mir Jumla to be actually delivered before sending him the "strong force to escort him" to the imperial territory which he had promised before.

[*Ad. 40a, 36b.*]

### *§ 7. Mir Jumla's family imprisoned by king of Golkonda.*

Before Qutb Shah could muster either his courage or his forces for the purpose of chastising Mir Jumla, a crisis was precipitated by the conduct of Muhammad Amin, the *wazir's* son. This young man, haughty and reckless at all times and known as the most audacious of courtiers even when serving a stern master like Aurangzib,\* was acting all these

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\* *M. U.*, iii. 620; *Anecdotes*, § 51.

years as Mir Jumla's deputy at the Court of Golkonda. His father's wealth and glory turned his head. He gave himself the airs of a prince, spoke slightlying of the Sultan, and treated him with scant courtesy in open Court. Abdullah Qutb Shah bore all this meekly. But at last, one day Muhammad Amin came to Court reeling with drunkenness, fell asleep on the king's own carpet, and soiled it in crop sickness. The long-suffering king could not bear this crowning act of insult. His anger boiled over, and he threw Muhammad Amin and his family into prison and attached their property (21st November, 1655).\*

This was the opportunity for which Aurangzib had so long been waiting. Here was a plea for invading and annexing Golkonda, whose wealth had excited his keen longing for years past, though he had had to keep that longing in check in fear of Shah Jahan's sense of justice.

The prince immediately reported the incident to the Emperor and solicited an urgent sanction of war. Meantime, on 3rd December, Shah Jahan had despatched a robe of honour and a letter-patent to Mir Jumla, appointing him a Commander of Five Thousand, and his son a Commander of Two Thousand troopers in the Mughal service, together

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\* *M. U.* iii. 531. *Tavernier*, i. 166. *Adab*, 45a.

with a letter to Qutb Shah bidding him not to hinder them in coming to the imperial Court, nor to detain any part of their property. These letters reached Aurangzib on 18th December, and he at once sent the Emperor's letter on to Golkonda, commanding the king to release the family of Mir Jumla immediately and to send them with all their belongings to the imperial Court in company with the bearer of the letter. If Qutb Shah delayed or disobeyed the order, Aurangzib threatened to send an army under his son against him. In the meantime, anticipating the Emperor's sanction, he mobilised his troops on the Golkonda frontier for a campaign. Hadidat Khan was ordered to hasten his return from Deogarh and to move directly on Qandahar (a fort midway between Aurangabad and Golkonda), while Aurangzib's eldest son, Muhammad Sultan, was sent (26th Dec.) with the Van of his father's army to Nander to wait for Hadidat Khan.\*

While the storm was thus brewing against him, Qutb Shah seems to have been seized with infatuation. He either ignored or underrated his danger, and his anger was still unallayed. Both Aurangzib's warning of 18th December and Shah Jahan's letter of the third announcing the imperial protection of

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\* *Waris*, 102b, 109; *Adab*, 56b & 57a, 45, 77a.

Mir Jumla and Muhammad Amin, were disregarded by him.

On hearing (24th December) of Muhammad Amin's captivity, Shah Jahan wrote a letter to Qutb Shah to release Mir Jumla's family. He felt sure that his letter alone would effect the purpose. But "in order to gratify Aurangzib," he rather reluctantly sanctioned (29th Dec.) the invasion of Golkonda, *in case* Muhammad Amin was still detained. Both these letters reached Aurangzib on 7th January, 1656.\* He now employed finesse to ruin Golkonda. Without giving Qutb Shah time to receive and follow Shah Jahan's letter of 24th December, which explicitly ordered the release of the captives, he declared that the king's refusal to set them free in spite of the Emperor's letter of 3rd December amounted to that flat disobedience of imperial orders which had been laid down as a necessary condition for the invasion of Golkonda.

### § 8. *Aurangzib invades Golkonda.*

At once Aurangzib ordered Prince Muhammad Sultan, (who had reached Nander on 7th January), to cross the frontier. The young prince started (10th January) and made a dash on Haidarabad with his cavalry. Aurangzib waited at Daulatabad with

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\* *Wafis*, 109b; *Adab*, 46a.

the main army for a fortnight, because there was some fear of Bijapur coming to the aid of Golkonda in answer to the earnest appeals of Qutb Shah. Indeed, the Bijapur army under Afzal Khan had been massed on the Mughal frontier. But Adil Shah held back in fear; the danger blew over, and so, on 20th January Aurangzib himself started and quickly marched to join his son. Shivaji had caused some disturbance on the Mughal frontier near Junnar. But as yet he could be safely neglected. Moreover, his aim was not so much to cause a diversion in favour of Golkonda as to profit by the absence of the Mughal troops. [Ad. 46, 47a, 49.]

Meantime, after Muhammad Sultan had entered his territory, Abdulla got Shah Jahan's stern letter of 24th December and at once sent Muhammad Amin with his family and servants to that prince, together with a humble letter of submission to the Emperor. But Aurangzib had so contrived it that his submission should come too late to save him. Muhammad Amin waited on the prince, 24 miles from Haidarabad (probably on 21st Jan.), but the prince refused to stop hostilities and pressed on to the capital on the plea that Abdulla had not yet restored the property of the captives. Qutb Shah's last hope was gone; the Mughal cavalry had arrived so fast that he had been taken completely by surprise. Confronted with utter ruin, he sent off

to the stronghold of Golkonda his children and such valuable property as could be easily removed, and in the night of 22nd January himself fled from Haidarabad to that fort,—leaving the defence of the capital to three officers and some 17,000 soldiers. [Waris, 109b; Ad. 49a, 80b.]

This flight saved his life because Aurangzib's secret instructions to M. Sultan breathed deadly hostility :

"Qutb-ul-mulk is a coward and will probably offer no resistance. Surround his palace with your artillery and also post a detachment to bar his flight to Golkonda. But before doing so, send a carefully chosen messenger to him, saying, 'I had so long been expecting that you would meet me and hospitably ask me to stay with you. But as you have not done so, I have myself come to you.' Immediately on delivering this message, attack him impetuously and, if you can manage it, *lighten his neck of the burden of his head.* The best means of achieving this plan are cleverness, promptitude, and lightness of hand." [Adab, 187b.]

### § 9. *Mughals enter Haidarabad City.*

On 23rd January the invaders arrived at the Husain Sagar tank, two miles north of Haidarabad. Confusion reigned in the counsels of Golkonda. The king had never before ruled his servants, and now he was more helpless than a child and more unnerved than a woman. His officers acted without

concert, having no common leader and no definite plan of action. While one minister waited on M. Sultan with a casket of gems as a peace-offering, others made a demonstration against the Mughal army, but were soon driven back with loss. Next day the young prince entered Haidarabad. A strong party was posted in the city under Muhammad Beg to prevent plunder and violence, to reassure the citizens, and to man the city walls. As the palace and most of the houses were built of wood, strict orders were given to guard watchfully against fire; for, some years before this, the screen of the king's Hall had been accidentally set ablaze by a candle, and the fire had spread to the roof and thence to the neighbouring houses, and smouldered for fully a month. [Waris, 109b; *Adab.* 49.]

These arrangements were made none too soon. Haidarabad was one of the richest cities of India. Besides being the capital of a flourishing monarchy, it was the centre of the diamond trade of the world and the seat of many fine arts. A vast concourse of nobles, officers, traders, and artisans filled the city and its extensive suburb (named Aurangabad) across the Musa river. From the night of the 22nd to the noon of the 24th, plunder raged in the city unchecked. The king had left behind him all his costly carpets, Chinaware, furniture, &c., besides elephants and horses. Muhammad Sultan inspected

the royal property, closed the doors of the palace, and placed a guard over it. The looting of Haidarabad was the talk of all India in that age. As Aurangzib's equerry, Aqil Khan Razi, wrote in his history, "Most of the stores and property of Qutb-ul-mulk, such as precious books and other costly things beyond computation, were plundered by Prince M. Sultan... Much of Qutb-ul-mulk's property,—among the rarities of the age,—was confiscated by Aurangzib. But so rich was the king and so vast his wealth that, in spite of these several acts of looting, so much treasure was left behind at Aurangzib's retreat that nobody could suppose that the treasury and palace had been looted." Another historian, Bhimsen, records that the Mughal army gathered much booty in the city, and a vast amount in cash and kind was seized in the king's palace.\*

Abdullah Qutb Shah continued to send almost daily envoys to the prince offering submission and costly presents in the hope of making peace. He restored Mir Jumla's property. But the prince could settle nothing in his father's absence. Abdullah had, therefore, no help but to solicit aid from Bijapur and to put Golkonda in a state of defence in the meantime.

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\* *Waris*, 110a; *Adab*, 50a; *Aqil Khan*, 13; *Dilkasha*, i. 16.

§ 10. *Aurangzib besieges Golkonda.*

Aurangzib arrived on the scene on 6th February with the bulk of his army. With the vigour and promptitude that marked all his actions, he first made a reconnaissance of the fort and its environs, before retiring to his tent to refresh himself after the fatigue of a fortnight's forced march. A large Golkonda force, about 15,000 strong, appeared in the plain and fired at the Mughals from a distance. The fort-guns co-operated with them. Evidently the position of the imperial army was made untenable, for Aurangzib had to drive his elephant forward and order a general advance of his troops for repelling the enemy. But the struggle was long and severe, and the losses heavy. The fight raged till evening, when the enemy retired, some going back to the fort, others into the jungle outside it.

Next day the siege\* of Golkonda began. The west side was unoccupied, but Mughal officers entrenched on the other three sides. A regular siege was impossible, as Aurangzib had made a quick march with light artillery, while the fort had guns of large calibre. Moreover, Shaista Khan, Shah Nawaz Khan, and other officers in command of reinforcements had not yet arrived, nor had the

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\* Siege in Waris, 110a—112b; *Adab*, 81a; Tavernier, i. 166—169.

big guns ordered from the fort of Ausa.\* Aurangzib, therefore, contented himself with holding the city and surrounding the fort, to prevent the escape of the king, while he waited for reinforcements and Shah Jahan's fresh commands. His first expectation of murdering Qutb Shah and capturing his kingdom by a sudden coup had failed, and he had to resort to slower methods for which he was not prepared. The leaguer of Golkonda lasted from 7th February to 30th March, and was conducted very languidly, because, with the materials at his disposal, he could do no injury to such an impregnable fortress. Sometimes the siege-trenches were attacked by sorties of the defenders. Battles took place with the Golkonda troops hovering round, on 11th and 12th February in the environs of the fort, and on 13th March at a place 20 miles from it. The Deccanis, as usual, retired after some exchange of fire, being unable or unwilling to stand the charge of the dreaded Mughal cavalry. Their mode of warfare was Parthian, and their aim to wear out the enemy and cut off his supplies.

These skirmishes were varied by the almost daily arrival of presents and offers of peace from the beleaguered king to the invader's camp! But Aurangzib steadily refused to make terms. He

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\* Shaista Khan arrived on 21st Feb., and two big guns from Ausa on 1st March, 1656. (Waris, 111a & b.)

coveted the whole kingdom and nothing less. The fertility of Golkonda, the world-wide fame of its diamond mines, the wealth of its kings, the skill of its artisans, had roused his keenest greed. Soon after crossing the frontier, even before he had seen "the rich populous and flourishing city of Haidarabad," he had written to his father, "What shall I write about the beauty of this country—its abundance of water and population, its good air, and its extensive cultivation,—which I saw on the way? At every stage after crossing the frontier I met with many large tanks, springs of sweet water, running streams, inhabited villages with large patches of cultivated land attached to them. Not a piece of land without tillage. Such a money-yielding country, unmatched by the imperial dominions, has fallen into this wretch's hands!" [Ad. 50a.] And again, "Golkonda is a spacious kingdom, well-cultivated, rich in mines of diamond, crystal, &c." He plied his father with all sorts of arguments to secure his consent to its annexation: Qutb-ul-mulk was a godless wretch, ungrateful for imperial favours, sunk in vices unworthy of a king, a violator of the purity of his subjects' homes, an oppressor against whom the people were invoking the Heavens, a heretic who had perverted all his subjects from the pure Sunni faith, and lastly an ally and financial

supporter of the king of Persia.\* Not to punish such a heretical ruler would be a failure of duty on the part of an orthodox Islamic Emperor! To miss this opportunity of crushing such an enemy would be highly impolitic. "I hope your Majesty will order annexation." [Adab, 46b, 50b.]

Aurangzib even begged Shah Jahan not to answer Qutb-ul-mulk's submissive letter, nor to listen to the intercessions of Dara and others on his behalf,—because it would result in a great sacrifice of expected gain! When Mir Jumla's son would reach the Court, he would tell the Emperor all about the wealth and weakness of the Golkonda king, and suggest the means of squeezing the utmost out of him. In short, as he wrote, the Emperor "should make the most of this splendid opportunity." [Ad. 46b, 49b.]

### § 11. *Shah Jahan orders peace in return for an indemnity.*

But these grotesquely mixed appeals to orthodoxy and cupidity, humanity and ambition, were wasted on Shah Jahan. The Emperor was loth to ruin a brother king for merely trying to bring his disloyal wazir under discipline. Dara, who had been bribed,

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\* We have two letters from the Persian king to Qutb-ul-mulk, of a later date than this year, in *Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 19-23 and 89-93, and another in *Guldashta*.

and implored by the Golkonda envoy at Delhi,—to the intense disgust and anger of Aurangzib,—pleaded hard for Qutb-ul-mulk, and secured peace for him on the payment of an indemnity. The Emperor's letter accepting this settlement reached Aurangzib on 24th February.\* But meantime his position at Golkonda had greatly improved. The siege had been pressed closer; many Golkonda officers were deserting to the Mughals daily; and Abdullah was begging for permission to send his mother to Aurangzib to ask his pardon, to promise the payment of the arrears of tribute and a large indemnity, and to propose the marriage of his second daughter with Aurangzib's eldest son. So, Aurangzib suppressed the Emperor's letter of pardon to Qutb-ul-mulk (dated 8th February), lest it should embolden the latter and make him abate his terms. Shah Jahan, on being informed, approved of this device for extortion!†

After long entreaties and through the mediation of Shaista Khan and Muhammad Sultan, the Queen-Mother of Golkonda was allowed to visit Aurangzib's tent and personally entreat him to spare her son.

\* *Adab*, 59a, 69b; *Waris*, 111b.

† *Waris*, 111b. Aurangzib wrote to Mir Jumla (early in March) "Qutb-ul-mulk is now craving pardon, sending his son-in-law Mir Ahmad to me, and proposing that his mother would wait on me and that his daughter would be married to my son. But I wish to send him to the wilderness of destruction." *Adab*, 81a.

Aurangzib agreed to restore his kingdom on the payment of one *krore* of Rupees\* as indemnity and arrears of tribute, and the marriage of his daughter with the Mughal prince. But evidently Qutb-ul-mulk objected to the amount as too large, and there was delay in making the final settlement. In this interval no formal truce was concluded, and a shot from the fort-guns killed Mir Asadullah Bukhari, the son of the Paymaster of Aurangzib's forces. Mir Jumla, whose arrival had been eagerly looked forward to and impatiently hurried by Aurangzib, now reached Haidarabad and waited on the prince on 20th March, a day chosen by the astrologers as lucky for a first visit.†

In the meantime, Abdullah's agent at the Court of Delhi had bought the intercession of Dara Shukoh and of the Princess Imperial Jahanara. [Guldashta.] Through them he unfolded to the Emperor the true story of Aurangzib's manœuvring,—how Abdullah had been tricked and almost slain by treachery, how he had not been given a fair chance of carrying out the Emperor's orders, how the imperial farmans had been withheld from him, how Shah Jahan's kind intentions towards the suppliant ruler had been thwarted, and how an entirely false version of the

\* The amount demanded was  $1\frac{1}{4}$  krores (*Adab*, 138b), but subsequently 25 lakhs were abated.

† *Waris*, 111b and 112a; *Tavernier*, i. 167; *Adab*, 81b.

whole affair had been given in the despatches of Aurangzib. At this Shah Jahan's righteous indignation boiled over. He wrote a sharp letter of censure to Aurangzib, with orders to raise the siege and quit Golkonda territory *at once*. To add to the prince's disgrace, the contents of this letter were not kept secret, but became the talk of the whole camp.\*

### § 12. *Peace with Golkonda: its terms.*

So, on 30th March, in obedience to the Emperor's peremptory orders, Aurangzib raised the siege and withdrew from the environs of Golkonda. Four days afterwards Muhammad Sultan was married by proxy to the Golkonda princess, and on 10th April she was brought away from the fort to her husband's camp. In the presence of Aurangzib's agents Abdullah Qutb Shah swore on the Quran to obey the Emperor in future, and gave them a written undertaking to the same effect under his own hand and seal. On 13th April, Aurangzib sent to Abdullah the Emperor's letter of pardon, dress of honour, and a formal agreement written by Shah Jahan himself and stamped with the impression of his palm dipped in vermillion, promising to protect Qutb Shah. At the entreaty of the Queen-Mother of Golkonda and the ladies of Aurangzib's harem, ten *lakhs* of Rupees were remitted from the

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\* *Adab*, 59a, 69b, 85a. *Storia*, i. 235.

instalment of 25 *lakhs* of indemnity promised for that year.\* Two months later Shah Jahan made a further reduction of 20 *lakhs*, being the accumulated difference in the exchange-value of two *lakhs* of *hun* since 1636. But the king of Golkonda, besides paying the tribute, had to cede the district of Ramgir (modern Manikdrug and Chinoor).† The Mughal army set out on its retreat on 21st April. Marching due north from Haidarabad to Indur (now the chief town of a district of the same name in the Nizam's Dominions), Aurangzib turned westwards to Qandahar (a fort in the Nander district), and thence reached Aurangabad on 17th May. A detachment of 3,000 was left on the frontier, to pass the rainy season there and enforce the payment of the promised tribute. The officers who had joined the expedition from other provinces now returned to their own posts.‡

\* *Adab*, 58a, 57b, 69b; *Waris*, 112.

† *Waris*, 113a. *Guldashta*, 1b—5a. He also gave a written promise making Muhammad Sultan his heir. Aurangzib kept it secret; but Shah Jahan afterwards learnt of it. (*Adab*, 191b), Tavernier, i. 169. This bond (*ahadnamah*) is given in *Guldashta*.

‡ *Waris*, 112b & 113a. The route followed by Aurangzib in his retreat was:—21 April, left environs of Golkonda—22 & 23 Apr., halted at *Mir Jumla's Pettah*—24 Apr., reached Pettah of Qutb-ul-mulk's grandmother (probably Begampett, 17° 38' N. 78° 17' E.) and halted 25—27 Apr.,—30 April, reached the village of Indalwai on the imperial frontier (evidently *Jadalwai*, 15 m. s. e. s. of Indur), where a force of 3,000 troopers was left under Shah Beg.—2 May reached

Mir Jumla had come to Aurangzib's camp at Golkonda on 20th March more as a prince than as a noble. Six thousand cavalry, 15,000 infantry, 150 elephants, and a very good train of artillery accompanied him. The presents he made to Aurangzib and his sons were worth several *lakhs*. Summoned immediately to the imperial Court, he arrived at Delhi on 7th July and presented the Emperor with articles worth 15 *lakhs*, including a big diamond weighing 216 *ratis*. He was at once created a Commander of Six Thousand and appointed prime-minister in the place of Sadullah Khan lately deceased.\*

### *§ 13. Aurangzib's wrangles with Shah Jahan about the Golkonda booty.*

Aurangzib had returned from the siege of Golkonda with his greed of territory unsated and his heart sore against his father. The expedition renewed his wrangles with the Emperor. An exaggerated account of the looting of Haidarabad had reached Delhi. It was also represented to Shah Jahan, probably by the Golkonda envoy, that

*Indar*, 18° 40 N. 78° 10 E.—5 May, reached *Qandahar*, 17° 55 N. 77° 15 E.—6-8 May, Aurangzib made a digression to *Udgir*, while the army pursued its course under M. Sultan,—9 May, Aurangzib rejoined the army on the bank of the *Dadhna* river,—17 May, reached *Aurangabad*.

\* *Waris*, 112, 114a, 118a; *Adab*, 116a.

Aurangzib and his sons had taken costly presents from Qutb Shah, without mentioning the fact in his despatches or setting their price off from the tribute due. Against this charge Aurangzib indignantly protested that the presents he had received were few and too poor to deserve mention to the Emperor.\* Further, he complained that Shah Jahan had not kept his promise as to sharing the Golkonda indemnity with him, so that the viceroy of the Deccan was poorer than before as the result of the war. As a financial speculation, the raid on Haidarabad had proved a failure to Aurangzib. For the last six months his soldiers' pay had been in arrears and he had besides borrowed large sums to equip his force for the war. "At the outset of this expedition, His Majesty had written to me that out of Qutb-ul-mulk's indemnity the jewels and elephants should belong to the Government, and the cash to me....But now the *entire* Golkonda indemnity has been taken by the Emperor and placed in Daulatabad treasury. How can I repay my debt for the war and the arrears of my army, about 20 *lakhs* of Rupees?"† The presents received from Golkonda had, he said, been exaggerated into "chest-loads of jewels" by malicious reporters at

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\* *Adab*, 84b, 85a, 107, 1926.

† *Adab*, 84b, 190.

the imperial Court. The elephants offered by Abdullah were unsound and of low price, and the diamonds dark and full of flaws. So Aurangzib had, as he explained, at first refused to accept them, and at last taken them at the entreaty of the Qutb Shahi agent and on the distinct understanding that the imperial tribute should not suffer a deduction to the amount of their price. There was no element of concealment in the transaction; the presents had been received openly and shown to Mir Jumla and other nobles. Aurangzib had even intended that after returning to his head-quarters he would send to the Emperor all the presents received by him, with other gems purchased with the indemnity, and more than 100 elephants in one grand collection. But before he could carry out this purpose, which would have necessarily taken time,—nay more, even before his return from Golkonda, the Emperor had ordered him to send all the presents and indemnity of Qutb Shah to Court at once. Such indecent haste implied that he feared lest Aurangzib should retain anything or that any portion of it would disappear! “Why,” the prince asked indignantly, “should I grudge to give up a few jewels to His Majesty, when my life itself is at his service?” In disgust he sent *all* that he and his son had received to the Emperor with a request

\* either to keep them or return them to Qutb Shah. Aurangzib would have nothing to do with them.\*

*§ 14. Quarrel with Golkonda about the Karnatak remains open.*

Peace had been made with Golkonda, but one subject of discord remained open. Qutb Shah wanted to keep the Karnatak, and with justice: it had been won by his servant and formed part of his kingdom. But Aurangzib objected, saying that it was Mir Jumla's personal *jagir* and referred the matter to the Emperor. He coveted that rich and large province, and had secured the cession of Ramgir (between the Painganga and the Godavari) to bring the Mughal province of Telingana closer to the Northern Karnatak, and to secure a route for the passing of his armies from the one to the other without having to traverse a wide area of Golkonda territory. [ *Ad. 58, 159b.* ]

Qutb Shah intrigued hard to retain the rich province; his agent at Delhi appealed to Dara; he promised a fresh offering of 15 *lakhs* as the price of

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\* *Adab*, 84b-85b, 192b, Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan stop suddenly during the siege of Golkonda. The last was written shortly after 9th Feb. 1656. In future he corresponds with his father through the *wazir*. Was this the result of strained feelings? I think this explanation improbable. He, however confesses (in a letter to Mir Jumla, written in July, 1656) that he has plenty of reasons to be mortified and angry. (*Adab*, 193b).

the Karnatak being left to him. But Aurangzib counter-intrigued through Mir Jumla; he appealed to the Emperor's cupidity by pointing out the immense richness of the Karnatak,—its diamond mines, its fertile valleys, its hoards of buried treasure of old Hindu dynasties. It was, as he wrote, "equal to the kingdom of Golkonda itself in wealth and extent." Mir Jumla, too, spoke from personal knowledge more fully about the vast resources and wealth of the province.\* At last he prevailed; the Emperor decided to hold the Karnatak in his own hands as Mir Jumla's *jagir*, and Qutb Shah was ordered to recall his officers from that province.† Mughal armies under Shah Beg Khan, Qazi Muhammad Hashim, and Krishna Rao, entered the Karnatak, but the Golkonda officers (especially Abdul Jabbar) were loth to yield the rich prey. They lingered there and threw every difficulty in the path of the Mughals in occupying and settling the country. They even incited Sri Ranga Rayal and other zamindars to recover their lost possessions. During the next two years we frequently read of

\* *Adab*, 59a, 61a, 46b, 59a.

† *Adab*, 59b, 60a, 87a. As Aurangzib wrote with unconscious cynicism to Abdullah, "I had urged you to present all your costly jewels and precious things to the Emperor in order to gain his entire favour. But you did not follow my advice. Mir Jumla, on the other hand, on reaching the Court gave him valuable gems and so carried his point. You cannot now recall the lost opportunity!" (*Adab*, 61a).

Aurangzib rebuking Qutb Shah for this disloyalty and double-dealing.\*

Qutb Shah took advantage of the confusion caused by the Bijapur war and Shah Jahan's illness, to keep hold of some forts and districts of the Karnatak in opposition to Mir Jumla's agents. Aurangzib had to threaten him severely, "The Karnatak belongs to Mir Jumla, and is a part of the empire. Banish from your mind all thought of keeping it. You do not listen to me yet!...Why are you trying in vain to keep it? Recall your officers and troops from the province, or...I shall send Mir Jumla with a vast army to chastise you and annex your kingdom." During the War of Succession, Qutb-ul-mulk made further progress and wrested Gandikota and Sidhout from Mir Jumla's men. It was only after he had firmly seated himself on the throne of Delhi that Aurangzib could enforce the complete surrender of the Karnatak. [Ad. 67a, 89a.]

### *§ 15. Old Rajah of the Karnatak seeks Mughal protection.*

Sri Ranga Rayal, the last nominal king (really viceroy) of Vijaynagar, saw his dominions slipping out of his grasp as the Bijapuris advanced conquering the Karnatak from the south and the Golkonda

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\* *Adab, 90a, 196a, 61b, 62b, 63b, 69a, 87b, 161a.*

generals from the north. He lost Jinji to the former and Chandragiri to the latter, and was practically driven out of both the Arcot districts. As early as 1653 he had sent an agent named Rama Rao to Aurangzib, to seek the imperial protection against the Deccani Sultans. But the viceroy of the Deccan did not interfere, possibly because the Karnatak was too far off, and matters were not yet ripe for putting pressure on Golkonda. In the course of the next two years the Rajah was driven to extremities. In a short time he would be utterly dispossessed of his lands. He sent another confidential agent, a Brahman named Srinivas, to Aurangzib, desperately crying for the protection of his dominions on any terms: he would deliver 2½ *krores* of Rupees, two hundred elephants, and all his hoarded jewels, to the Emperor, he would promise an annual tribute, he would agree to his kingdom being annexed to the empire and then given back to him as a mere *jagir*. Nay more, "if Shah Jahan's grace should be reluctant to fall on him on account of his being a misbeliever," the Rajah promised to turn Muslim with all his relatives and dependents! Only he must be saved from the two Deccani Sultans; his territory should no longer be seized by them.\*

\* Shah Jahan was a bigot. His early hatred of Christians had been noticed by Sir Thomas Roe (Kerr, ix, 262). After his accession

The action taken on this petition throws a lurid light on the character of Mughal rule in India. Aurangzib proposed to send an officer of his to the Karnatak to enquire into the Rajah's capacity to keep his profuse promises. Shah Jahan disallowed the deputation, but ordered Aurangzib, "after frightening the two Sultans of the Deccan, to get from them a good sum" as the price of refusing protection to Sri Ranga. That is, the lion agreed to look on with indifference, if only the two wolves gave him a big slice of their prey. Hearing of these negotiations with the Mughal viceroy, the Bijapuri generals pressed their attack, captured the fort of Vellore, "the best in the Karnatak," and tried to seize the Rajah's elephants. The helpless Sri Ranga importuned the Mughals for help before all was over with him. But Aurangzib played with the miserable suppliant as an angler does with a fish. Outwardly he appointed one of his officers,

he grew averse to giving high posts to Rajputs. (*Adab*, 29a). The demolition of Hindu temples and desecration of idols mark his reign only to a less extent than his son's. He refused to release Rajah Indradyurnna of Dhamdhera (Malwa) from prison for a ransom of Rs. 50,000, and insisted on his turning Muslim as the price of his liberation, though Aurangzib himself pleaded for the abatement of this last condition lest it should hinder his taking possession of his estate and collecting the promised tribute. (*Adab*, 99b, 37a; *M. U.* ii. 265 *et seq.*). In Kashmir Shah Jahan forcibly suppressed the old custom of marriage between Hindus and Muhammadans. (*Pad.*, I. B. 57; *Adab*, 33b, 34b.)

Muhammad Mumin, to go to the Karnatak, but wrote to Shah Jahan, "My real object in doing so is to secure a handsome present from Bijapur at this opportunity." Both the Deccani Sultans, he exultingly adds, "are alarmed at the appointment of Muhammad Mumin. We shall use this posting as a screw to get out of them what they looted from the Karnatak and kept concealed. Please do not write to the Bijapur king before this business (of exacting a present) is brought to completion." He had already instructed his envoy at Bijapur to give the Sultan to understand that if he offered a satisfactory present to the Emperor, Muhammad Mumin would be recalled, and imperial help refused to the Rajah of the Karnatak. [Ad. 44, 34b, 54b-55b.]

Sri Ranga Rayal was thus left to his fate. Crushed between Bijapur and Golkonda, he lost his all and clung only to some petty estates which were too poor to tempt Muslim cupidity or too difficult of access to his aggressors. We hear of him again in 1657 and 1658 as trying to recover some of his former lands,\* when Aurangzib's attention was diverted from the Karnatak by the invasion of Bijapur and the War of Succession. Forced to yield Srirangapatam, the last seat of his

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\* *Adab*, 63a, 90a (not definite).

Government, to the Rajah of Mysore, he took refuge with his vassal the Ikkeri chief of Bednur. His last appearance on the stage of history was about 1661, when he lent the prestige of his name to this vassal in a fruitless invasion of Mysore.\*

Aurangzib's treatment of the Rajah of the Karnatak and his cynical avowal of his utterly sordid motives throughout the transaction, has a deep political significance. To the historian whose eyes are not dazzled by the Peacock Throne, the Taj Mahal, and other examples of outward glitter, this episode (with many others of the same kind) proves that the Mughal empire was only a thinly veiled system of brigandage. It explains why the Indian princes, no less than the Indian people, so readily accepted England's suzerainty.

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\* Sewell, 54; Rice's *Mysore Gazetteer*, ii. 443, 209.

## APPENDIX I.

Did Aurangzib capture Haidarabad by treachery ?

Aqil Khan Razi (12 &13) tells the following story of Aurangzib having falsely thrown Qutb-ul-mulk off his guard just before the raid on his capital, "Aurangzib wrote to Qutb-ul-mulk, 'As my son Sultan Muhammad is going to Bengal [to marry Shuja's daughter], he wishes to march there by way of Orissa. I hope you will give him assistance and let him pass through your territory.' That simpleton at once consented, and made preparations for showing hospitality to the prince...When the prince, with military equipment and war material, arrived near Haidarabad, the king's eyes were opened, and he fled for refuge to the fort of Golkonda." Bernier (p. 20) and Manucci (*Storia*, i. 234) but not Tavernier, tell a similar tale. But the authentic records quoted in this chapter disprove the story. Qutb-ul-mulk could have been under no misapprehension as to Muhammad Sultan's hostile intentions after receiving Aurangzib's letter of 18th December, (*Adab*, 57a); and the fact of his releasing Muhammad Amin some days before Sultan reached Haidarabad shows that he knew why the prince was coming.

Aurangzib, as his instructions to his son clearly prove, wished the young prince to murder the Golkonda king during an interview, in the manner described in his letter quoted in this chapter, §8. Therein lay his treachery.

## CHAPTER XI.

### WAR WITH BIJAPUR, 1657.

#### § 1. *Growth of Bijapur kingdom after 1636.*

The treaty of 1636 had turned the king of BIJAPUR into a friendly ally of the Emperor of Delhi, but left his sovereignty unimpaired. He had not become a vassal prince, nor bound himself to pay an annual tribute. On the other hand, he had been formally confirmed in the possession of a large portion of the territory of the extinct royal house of Ahmadnagar, the whole of which the Mughals had once claimed. [Ch. 3. post.] Secure from his mighty neighbour on the north, the Bijapur Sultan began to extend his dominions westwards into Konkan, southwards into Mysore, and eastwards into the Karnatak. The principality of Ikkeri (or Bednur, in the Shimoga district of N. W. Mysore), had been raided in 1635 at the invitation of a local faction, and a heavy fine of 30 *lakhs* of *hun* imposed on its Rajah, Virabhadra Nayak. Two years later the invasion was renewed and the Nayak deposed.\* Shortly afterwards, a vast Bijapuri army, numbering 40,000 and led by the famous general Randaulah

\* *Basatin-i-salatin*, 302-305. S. K. Aiyangar's *Ancient India*, 293—294. Sewell, 37, has *Bhadrappa*. See my *Shivaji*, Ch. 10 §3.

Khan, took Sira, Bangalore, and the country north of the Kaveri (1639), and then, advancing eastwards into the Karnatak, went on capturing forts and cities for many years. In 1647, the entire Bijapur army under Mustafa Khan, the foremost noble of the State, repeated the invasion, but met with stubborn opposition at first. In a great battle fought east of Bangalore,\* the impetuous valour of an Abyssinian general, Malik Raihan, saved from destruction the lives of the Bijapur troops and the honour of their king : the famous Hindu general Vailuar was routed and his master's cause ruined. Finally starvation opened the impregnable fortress of Jinji to Bijapur arms (17th December 1649), and the whole Southern Karnatak lay open to the Muslims. The prize thus secured was most splendid; besides the vast rich and fertile territory annexed, the treasure captured was valued at four *krores* of *hun*. Westwards, a Bijapur force invaded the Portuguese territory of Goa and Salsette (August 1654) with some success.† In short, in the reign of Muhammad Adil Shah (1626—56) the kingdom of Bijapur attained to its highest

\* In the Persian manuscripts of the *Basatin-i-salatin*, the place of this encounter is indistinctly written like "Antur, between Bangalore and Masti." There is a *Wantur*, 15 m. e. and a *Maloor*, 26 m. east of Bangalore. *Ambur* is far off, but likely.

† *Basatin*, 305—308, 311. Full description in florid Persian in Zahuri's *Muhammadnamah* (my MS.), 276—373. Danvers, ii. 308 and 309.

extent, power, and magnificence. His dominion stretched from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, across the entire Indian Peninsula.

*§ 2. Relations between the Delhi and Bijapur Courts.*

Ever since 1636, Muhammad Adil Shah had lived at peace with the Emperor of Delhi, and we read of friendly exchanges of presents between the two Courts.\* This Sultan's good name for piety, love of justice, and care for his subjects,—which was heightened by a certain simplicity of understanding and ignorance of the world,—greatly pleased Shah Jahan. The Emperor recognised the merits of the king and the increased power of the kingdom by addressing him as *Shah* or King (1648),†—while the former sovereigns of Delhi, in their pride of suzerainty, had styled the rulers of Bijapur as mere *Khans* or Lords. Some years afterwards, differences had arisen between the two.‡ Adil Shah displeased Shah Jahan by departing

\* *Pad. Waris*, 90a, 98b, 101a, 113b, 117b, (in these passages the word *peshk*... is used, but evidently in the sense of 'present' and not in that of 'tribute').

† *Basatin-i-salatin*, 324 and 325. Aurangzib refers to the granting of this title in a letter written to Shah Jahan in September 1654 (*Adab*, 44a.)

‡ In October 1652, also, Shah Jahan was angry with the Bijapur king for some reason unknown to us. (*Adab*, 22a.)

from the practice of his ancestors inasmuch as he held Court in a lofty palace outside his citadel and witnessed elephant-combats in an open plain beyond the fort instead of within it, and lastly by conferring the title of *Khan-i-khanan* on his premier noble. These acts were taken to imply a presumptuous assumption of the prerogatives of the Emperor and rivalry with the Court of Delhi. Shah Jahan wrote him a letter of rebuke, sharply telling him to return to the ways of his forefathers, or a Delhi army would visit his dominion. The letter was discussed in full Court. The captains of Bijapur rattled their sabres and cried out, "Let them come on ! We too are ready and eager for such a day. We shall be glad to measure our swords with the blades of Hindustan." A haughty reply was delivered to the Delhi envoy.

With the night came a change. A charming story is told,\* how the king was amusing himself with his chiefs and favourites on the lofty terraced roof of his palace, under the moonlit sky. Hours rolled on in delight. At midnight, when all other hearts were sunk in pleasure, the pensive king turned his ears to the city of Bijapur and heard only sounds of revelry coming from it on the night wind. "What does the city say, Afzal Khan Ji?" he

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\* *Basatin*, 324—326; another quarrel in *Adab*, 40b.

asked of his favourite general. "It is only singing the praise of your Majesty's love of justice and care for your subjects and praying for your long life, so that the people may continue to enjoy the same peace, plenty and happiness." The pleased king asked again, "What will be the result if we encounter the forces of Delhi?" The reply was, "Only lamentation and grief will be heard in the place of these joyous sounds. Whichever side may win, every house will mourn some deaths and the people will know no peace or happiness." The king brooded over the answer, preferred ease to honour, and next morning took his haughty reply back and sent in its stead a letter of apology and submission to Delhi. This long and prosperous reign of 30 years ended with his death at the age of 47 (on 4th Nov. 1656),\* and the danger he had successfully averted fell on his kingdom.

But before we can proceed to the troubled history of his successor, it is necessary to take up the thread of our narrative where we dropped it at the end of the last chapter.

When returning from the Golkonda expedition Aurangzib had sent Mir Jumla off to the imperial Court (7th May), to fill the high post of prime-minister. In the meantime he had completely won

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\* The glories of the reign, *Basatin*, 304—345.

Mir Jumla over to his interests, and the Mir's arrival at Delhi (7th July, 1656) secured the triumph of Aurangzib's policy of aggression in the Emperor's council.\* Mir Jumla's presents, matchless diamonds, rubies and topazes, dazzled the eyes of the Emperor and brought about the downfall of the peace party under Dara Shukoh. The land from which these jewels came was worth annexing!

The late *wazir* of Golkonda knew all the secrets of the Deccani Courts, the ins and outs of the land, and the exact prices of all the chief officers of Qutb Shah and Adil Shah. [ *Ad.* 49b.] Therefore, as an authority on Deccan questions he was unapproached by any other courtier of Shah Jahan. His expert knowledge was now utilised in intriguing at the Deccani Courts and seducing their officers. With Mir Jumla dominating the Emperor's counsels, Aurangzib confidently matured the plan of invading Bijapur on the expected death of its reigning king who was lingering on the bed of illness. The Mir, as one fully conversant with the country, was urged by Aurangzib to return to him as quickly as possible, "in order that this opportunity might not slip away.†

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\* *Waris*, 113a (Mir Junla took leave of Aurangzib at Indur on 3 May, and left that place for Delhi four days afterwards), 114a. *Adab*, 83a, 205b. *Storia*, i. 239.

† *Adab*, 88, 91, 191a (Aurangzib thanks Mir Jumla for having supported him against Dara). (Aurangzib planned the invasion of

§ 3. *Ali Adil Shah II succeeds.*

On 4th November, 1656, Muhammad Adil Shah, the seventh of the royal line of Bijapur, died. Through the efforts of his chief minister, Khan Muhammad, and the Queen, Bari Sahiba, a sister of the Golkonda king, the crown was placed on the head of Ali Adil Shah II, a youth of 18 years, and the only son of the late king. The news reached Aurangzib on 10th November, and he immediately wrote to Shah Jahan, urging an invasion on the plea that Ali was not really a son of the deceased Sultan, but a boy of obscure parentage whom Muhammad Adil Shah had brought up in the harem. In anticipation of the Emperor's orders, he massed his troops on the Bijapur frontier, and proposed to go himself to Ahmadnagar to be nearer to the point of attack.\*

The death of Muhammad Adil Shah was followed by disorder in the Karnatak he had conquered. The zamindars recovered much of their former lands, and the Bijapuri officers were driven

Bijapur even before the death of its king, *Adab*, 88a). Agil Khan, 15, and Manucci (i. 239) assert that Mir Junla induced Shah Jahan to sanction the invasion of Bijapur.

\* *Adab*, 88b, 60b, 145a, 132b. (Aurangzib writes to Khwajah Abdul Ghaffar that he invaded Bijapur for the good of the people, as the late king had left no heir!) *Basatin-i-salatin*, 326, 347. Waris, 118a. There was even a talk of Shah Jahan going to the Deccan to direct the operations. (*Adab*, 89b).

to the shelter of the forts. Shahji Bhonslé disobeyed his new master, and set up for himself. At the capital things were even worse. Bijapuri nobles had never been kept under proper control by their king, and had been wont to regard themselves as their own masters. They now quarrelled with one another and with the prime-minister Khan Muhammad for the division of power. To aggravate the evil, Aurangzib intrigued with them, and succeeded in corrupting most of them. "I am trying my utmost," he writes to Mir Jumla, "to win the Bijapur army over, for then the chiefs of that country will join us of their own accord." Randaulah Khan's son and several other leading men of the Court promised their adhesion and prepared to desert to the Mughal territory with their troops. After they had reached him Aurangzib hoped to seduce the others with the aid of Mir Jumla. So, he sent Rs. 20,000 to Multafat Khan, the governor of Ahmadnagar, the nearest point on the Mughal frontier towards Bijapur, with instructions to distribute it among the deserters: every Bijapuri captain who brought a hundred men to the muster was to get Rs. 2,000 out of the local treasury, (evidently after the above sum had been spent). The governor was ordered to welcome and conciliate every arrival from Bijapur, even when he was not

a captain of known position and importance.\* An envoy from Shivaji waited on Aurangzib proposing the terms on which the Maratha chieftain was willing to co-operate with the Mughals by making a diversion in the Bijapuri Konkan. He received in reply a letter of vague promises.†

#### § 4. *Shah Jahan sanctions invasion of Bijapur.*

On 26th November Shah Jahan sanctioned the invasion and gave Aurangzib a free hand to "settle the affair of Bijapur in any way he thought fit." At the same time orders were sent to Shaista Khan, the Governor of Malwa, to hasten to Aurangabad and hold it during Aurangzib's absence in the war. A force of 20,000 troopers, partly from the Court and partly from the *jagirs*, with a large staff of officers, was despatched to reinforce the army of the Deccan. Lastly Mir Jumla himself, with most of the officers and a portion of the troops ordered, was sent (1st December) to join Aurangzib.‡

The Emperor's instructions to his son were, first to march with Mir Jumla to the Bijapur frontier and conquer the whole of the kingdom, if possible;

\* *Adab*, 91a, 145, 146b.

† *Adab*, 144b, 146a. Aurangzib's letter of promises to Shivaji (23 Apr. 1657) is given in Parasnis MS. No. 5.

‡ *Waris*, 118 (list of officers sent to the Deccan.) *Adab*, 90a, 118a (Mir Jumla takes leave of the Emperor on 26th November, but actually starts from Delhi on 1st December).

otherwise, to annex that portion of the old Ahmadnagar kingdom which had been ceded to Bijapur by the treaty of 1636, and to spare the territory of Bijapur proper on the payment of an indemnity of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  *krores* of Rupees and the recognition of the Emperor's suzerainty,—*viz.*, the issuing of coins in his name and the public reading of his titles from the pulpit at Bijapur. If the latter alternative was carried out, Aurangzib was to employ the vast army assembled under his banner in the conquest of Golkonda. The prince, however, was keen upon conquering Bijapur first; “I want to put off the conquest of Golkonda, which can be seized at any time we like.” [Ad. 90a, 196b.]

The war thus sanctioned was wholly unrighteous. Bijapur was not a vassal State, but an independent and equal ally of the Mughal Emperor, and the latter had no lawful right to confirm or question the succession at Bijapur. The true reason of the Mughal interference was the helplessness of its boy-king and the discord among his officers, which presented a fine “opportunity” for annexation, as Aurangzib expressed it.\*

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\* *Adab*, 88a, 91b. Grant Duff, i. 155. The Bijapur historian thus points out the wickedness of the Mughals, “After the death of Muhammad Adil Shah, Aurangzib invaded Bijapur, in violation of the treaty and solemn agreement between the Mughals and Bijapur,

Aurangzib impatiently waited for Mir Jumla's coming and pressed him to hasten his movements. "Let not such an opportunity (*viz.*, the revolt and dissension among the Bijapur officers) slip away. Come quickly, so that we may both start together." It was of no use waiting for the rest of the reinforcements ordered from Northern India. Several officers were slow to leave their *jagirs*, in spite of strong letters from the Emperor urging them on; and Aurangzib could not expect to get the whole additional force of 20,000 men before 19th February, 1657.\*

### § 5. *War begun; siege of Bidar.*

Mir Jumla arrived at Aurangabad on 18th January, and that very day at the auspicious hour chosen by the astrologers, the prince set out with him to invade Bijapur. As he was encumbered with heavy artillery and siege materials, his movement was very slow; 240 miles were covered in 43 days. On 28th February, he reached the environs of Bidar, and laid siege to the fort on 2nd March.†

A short distance south of the Mughal frontier

and though Shah Jahan [the maker of the treaty] was alive." *Basatin*, 348.

\* *Adab*, 90b—92a, 195b.

† *Adab*, 92a, 109b, 145b, 118a, 196b. *Kambu*, 2b, (both MSS. wrongly give 14 days instead of one month and 14 days, as the time taken by the march.) *Adab*, 109b, 146a, 118b.

fort of Udgir and across the Manjira river lies the city of BIDAR. It is large and well peopled, and the remains of fine buildings speak of its ancient grandeur. Tradition connects it with the father of Damayanti, the devoted wife of Rajah Nala, who flourished in the mythical age of the *Mahabharat*. Coming down to historic times, we find that Bidar\* was captured by Muhammad Tughlaq in the 14th century, and became successively the capital of the Bahmani Sultans and of the short-lived Barid Shahi dynasty, both of whom adorned it with fine palaces, tombs and mosques, as memorials of their greatness. The glory of the city is the magnificent college, built by Mahmud Gawan, the famous minister of the Bahmanis (1478). On the extinction of the Barid Shahi kings, Bidar passed into the hands of Bijapur.

The city stands on a high plateau, 2330 feet above sea-level. A wall with a dry ditch and glacis surrounds the city itself, and bastions rising at various points of the wall add to its defensive power. The fort or citadel, finished in 1432 and occupying the eastern face of the city, is of immense strength. Its wall is 4500 yards in circuit and 12 yards in height. Three separate ditches each 25 yards wide and 15 yards deep, cut in the solid rock, surround the citadel,

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\* This account of Bidar is based on Kambu, 2b and 3a; *Adab*, 146a; *Dilkasha*, i. 14; Burgess's *Bidar and Aurangabad Districts*, 42-44, and *Imp. Gaz.* viii, 170.

which contains many palaces, mosques, Turkish baths, a mint, arsenal, magazine, and other public edifices built of trap but now in ruin. The only entrance is a zigzag passage from the south-west, protected by three gateways. On the bastions stood several guns, one of them being 23 feet long with a 19 inch bore. In the age before modern artillery, Bidar was rightly held to be impregnable to assault.

Aurangzib's opponent at the siege\* was Siddi Marjan, an Abyssinian who had held the fort for Bijapur for thirty years, and had collected abundance of materials of defence and a garrison of 1000 horse, and 4000 foot, including musketeers, gunners, and rocket-men. In spite of a fierce fire from the fort walls, the Mughal sappers worked hard in the inspiring presence of their chief, and in two days carried the trenches to the edge of the moat. Then they began to fill up the ditch. Siddi Marjan offered a stout defence: he made several sorties, and falling on the trenches tried to arrest the progress of the siege. But the superior numbers of the Mughals told in the end, and Mir Jumla's fine train of artillery did great damage to the fort walls; two towers were demolished and the battlements of the lower-most wall as well as the outer breast-works were levelled to the ground.

\* For the history of the siege, Kambu, 2b—3a; *Dilkasha*, i. 15; *Adab*, 109b—110a, 119b, 122a, 127a, 146a. *Basatin*, 348 (brief.).

The ditch having been filled up, the assault was delivered on 29th March. Muhammad Murad, at the head of a select party, sallied out of his trenches, rushed to the foot of the tower opposite Mir Jumla's post, and planting ladders scaled the wall. An accident favoured the assailants. Siddi Marjan, with his sons and troops, was standing close to the tower ready to repel the attack. But a spark from a rocket thrown by the Mughals fell into a chamber of gunpowder and grenades behind the tower. There was a terrific explosion. Marjan was mortally wounded with two of his sons and many of his followers. The garrison, appalled by the disaster, carried their dying chief to the citadel, while the exulting Mughals swarmed out of all their trenches and rushed into the city, driving the remnant of the defenders back with fearful slaughter. Behind them came Aurangzib himself, with his banners waving and his drums beating a victorious note, and took possession of the city. The Mughals closely followed the retreating garrison and took possession of the gate of the citadel. But the fall of their leader had taken the heart out of the defenders. In response to the Mughal call to surrender and promise of quarter, Siddi Marjan from his death-bed sent his seven sons to Aurangzib with the keys of the fort.

Thus, the stronghold of Bidar, hitherto reputed

impregnable throughout India, fell into the hands of Aurangzib after a siege of 27 days only. Among the spoils of victory were 12 *lakhs* of Rupees in cash, 8 *lakhs* worth of powder, shot, grain and other stores, besides 230 pieces of cannon. Well might Aurangzib exult over such a victory. Well might he boast to Shivaji, "The fort of Bidar, which was accounted impregnable, and which is the key to the conquest of the Deccan and Karnatak, has been captured by me in one day, both fort and town, which was scarcely to have been expected without one year's fighting."\*

On Wednesday, 1st April, Siddi Marjan succumbed to his burns. Aurangzib again visited the city and fort, and had the Emperor's titles publicly read out from the pulpit of the grand mosque built by the Bahmani Sultans two centuries earlier.

### § 6. *Mahabat Khan sent to ravage Bijapur territory.*

Meanwhile the Bijapuris had made some feeble attempts to relieve Bidar. A force under Khan Muhammad, their prime-minister, had been advancing towards it during the siege; but it had evidently retreated without striking a blow. [Ad.

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\* Quoted in Grant Duff, i. 157n. This passage is referred to in a letter of Shivaji to the Mughal officers in 1665 (*Khatut-i-Shivaji*, 2). There is a similar boast in Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and Abdul Ghaffar, (*Adab*, 132b, 130b).

146a.] After the fall of the fort, Aurangzib learnt that a large Bijapuri army was being mobilised near Kulbarga. Their light troopers arrived within six miles of the Mughal camp and carried off some of the transport oxen that were grazing there. So, Aurangzib sent a force of 15,000 well mounted and experienced troopers under Mahabat Khan, to punish the assembled enemy and ravage the Bijapur territory up to Kaliani in the west and Kulbarga in the south, "leaving no vestige of cultivation in that tract." In his march southwards from Kaliani, the Mughal general encountered the enemy on 12th April. The Bijapuris, numbering some 20,000, under their famous chiefs Khan Muhammad, Afzal Khan, and the sons of Randaullah and Raihan, began the attack. Mahabat Khan, leaving his baggage and camp behind, advanced with the Van. The fiercest onslaught was delivered on the Mughal Right under Dilir Khan. The Bijapuris kept up a hot fire of rockets and muskets from all sides, but, as was their wont, did not engage at close quarters. A counter-charge on the enemy's Centre produced no lasting effect on the elusive Deccanis. Mahabat Khan like a good general kept his men well in hand, amidst the ring of his enemies and their distracting mode of attack. Finding his right wing hard pressed, he charged the enemy with his own followers; the Bijapuris fled without standing the

shock, and the Mughal general chased them for four miles; but evidently he found his position insecure, as on the 14th he fell back on Bhalki, without waiting for the reinforcements sent under Najabat Khan.\*

Forty miles west of Bidar, on the old road from the holy shrine of Tuljapur to Golkonda, stands the city of KALIANI,† the ancient capital of the Chalukya kings and of the Kanarese country. With the fall of the Kalachuris in the twelfth century, it ceased to be a capital, and afterwards passed into the hands of the Deccani Muslim powers as a mere dependency of Bidar. But the large mounds surrounding the town indicate its greater extent in days of yore.

### § 7. *Siege of Kaliani.*

Mahabat Khan having cleared the road of hovering bands of the enemy, Aurangzib on 27th April set out with light kit and arrived before Kaliani

\* Kambu 3, (for the battle of 12th April).

*Adab*, 125, (Aurangzib's instructions of 13th April to Mahabat Khan), 120a (Najabat Khan sent on 5th April to reinforce Mahabat). Najabat Khan's force is given as 10,000 on 125a and as 2,000 on 120a; the latter is more likely. Aurangzib's instruction was that the two generals should unite south of Kaliani and advance to attack Chidgupa. But on Mahabat Khan's retreating northwards to Bhalki, he ordered them to meet near fort Nilanga and try to capture it by corrupting the qiladar through his brother Mamaji (or Nanaji) Deshmukh, who had made overtures to the Mughals. The attempt failed. (*Adab*, 125b, 126b-127a).

† Burgess, 23, 37, 38.

in a week's time. The place was immediately invested,\* and through Mir Jumla's exertions and supervision the siege trenches were pushed on to the edge of the ditch by 11th May. Day and night the garrison kept up a ceaseless fire from the walls; they made fierce onslaughts on Mir Jumla's trenches, but to no purpose. The bands of the enemy roving outside gave greater trouble and retarded the siege. They established themselves four miles from the besiegers' camp and molested them at night by the discharge of rockets, the favourite fire-arm of the Deccanis and especially of the Marathas. Expert in partisan warfare, they effectually closed the path for the coming of provisions and couriers. The Mughal army could not be fed unless its food supply was sent under strong escort. Once Mahabat Khan himself on escort duty was hemmed round by the enemy at a place 10 miles north-east of Kaliani. The small Mughal detachment of 2,000 was outnumbered as ten to one, but stood its ground heroically. The battle raged long and fiercely. "The field was obscured by the smoke of artillery and muskets, and the dust raised by horses' hoofs. Fathers could not look after their sons," as the Mughal annalist writes. The brunt of the battle fell on the Rajputs. The horsemen of Khan Muhammad burst in vain upon

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\* For the siege of Kaliani, Kambu, 3b—5a. *Adab* (very meagre, no detail) 113a, 139a, 149b, 156b.

the granite wall of Rao Chhatra Sal and his Hada clansmen. Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, assaulted by the sons of Bahlol Khan of Bijapur, was wounded and unhorsed in the press of the enemy. Sivaram, the captain of the Maharana's contingent, was slain with many followers of Rai Singh. Brahmadeo and others, as is the wont of Rajputs in desperate straits, dismounted, drew their swords, and flung themselves in reckless fury on the enemy, vowed to slay and be slain. Just then relief arrived : a charge by Mahabat Khan broke the enemy's ranks and they fled. Sujan Singh Sisodia and others of his party, though severely wounded, had not quitted the field. Ikhlas Khan, the leader of the Mughal Van, had been wounded during the onset, but in spite of it he had held his ground and even driven back Afzal Khan's division which was opposed to him. The obstinate struggle raged till an hour after nightfall, when the enemy withdrew, and the hard-pressed Mughals at last got the respite they sorely needed. [Kambu, 4a.]

Aurangzib concentrated his efforts on pressing the siege hard and capturing Kaliani as quickly as he had done Bidar. He, therefore, at first paid no attention to the Bijapuri army assembled only four miles from his camp. This emboldened them to acts of greater audacity. A force of 30,000 enemies posted only an hour's journey from his camp could

no longer be neglected. So, he cunningly announced that his army would proceed to Bhalki in the north-east to bring in provisions; but on 28th May, leaving a screen of tents round the fort, he marched with the main body of his troops upon the enemy's position.

The sons of Bahlool Khan attacked the Mughal Van under Mir Jumla and Dilir Khan and fought with valour and obstinacy for some time. Dilir Khan received some sword-cuts, but his armour saved him from harm. The battle soon became general. All divisions of the two armies were engaged with their respective opponents. The fight raged for six hours. The Deccanis kept up a running fight, in their customary manner: four times in succession were they broken and as often did they form again and face the advancing Mughals, regardless of their thinned ranks. But at last the repeated charges of the heavily armed northern horsemen prevailed in the close fight; the Mughal army crowded upon the enemy from left and right, and scattered them finally: their whole army fled in confusion; the imperialists pursued them pell-mell to their camp, slaying and capturing all that they could. Everything found in the Bijapuri camp,—arms, slave-girls, horses, transport-cattle, and all kinds of property,—was plundered; and the tents were burnt down. In the evening Aurangzib

returned to his trenches before Kaliani, his brows adorned with victory.\*

The siege was pressed with vigour, but the defence by the Abyssinian Dilawwar was equally heroic. The sap had reached the moat on 11th May, and by the 23rd of the month three-fourths of the ditch had been filled up, under the guidance of Mir Jumla, with thorny plants. The garrison, by hurling down lighted gunpowder and burning naphtha and grass, reduced these plants to ashes; the work of bridging the ditch had to be begun anew; the assault was delayed. Stones and earth were now thrown into the ditch, but progress in this task was necessarily slow. During this period of enforced idleness detachments from the besieging army were usefully employed in capturing the forts of Nilanga and Chincholy. [Kambu, 5a.]

Since their defeat in the great battle of 28th May, the Bijapuris had not interfered with the siege for nearly two months. At the end of this interval, having repaired their losses they began to assemble in order to oppose the Mughals. So, on 22nd July, Aurangzib sent a large division under his eldest son and Mir Jumla to break up their forces before they

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\* For the battle of 28th May, Kambu, 4b; *Adab*, 112a, 147b, 154b. In his letters Aurangzib speaks of the Bijapuris generally as *Zangis* or *Negroes*. The context shows that the term is merely used by way of abuse, and does not mean any Negro corps in the service of Bijapur.

could gain formidable strength. This Mughal corps advanced forty-eight miles, and then, sighting the enemy's camp at a distance, charged and broke their formation, and pursued them for four miles. The victors proceeded, laying the Bijapuri villages waste with fire and sword, and leaving no vestige of habitation or tillage in their path. They reached the unprotected hamlet near the fort of Kulbarga, the old Bahmani capital, where they reverently spared the tomb of Sayyid Gisu Daraz, the most famous saint of Southern India.\*

At last the end of the siege came in sight; the ditch was filled up with stone and mud, the parapets were demolished by artillery fire, and on 29th July the imperialists scaled a tower on the other side of the moat. But the garrison had built a wall across this tower, and under shelter of it fought the Mughals hard with rockets, bows, and matchlocks. The struggle here was most obstinate. While the Mughals were checked by the unexpected obstacle of the wall and had to demolish it, the Bijapuris flung on their heads lighted bombs, blazing sheets steeped in naphtha, and bundles of burning grass. But

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\* Kambu, 5a. Aqil Khan states that after taking Kaliani, Aurangzib *himself* besieged Kulbarga (pp. 16, 38). Grant Duff (i. 157) makes him besiege Bijapur! But neither the official history of Kambu nor Aurangzib's letters support the assertion. Aurangzib did not advance further south than Kaliani and his son, who had penetrated to Kulbarga, did not besiege that fort.

regardless of all these, the assailants swarmed into the fort and held this portion of the defences. Two days afterwards, the commandant Dilawwar offered to capitulate on condition of a free passage out for the garrison and their families. Aurangzib readily consented to grant them quarter, as the place sheltered many Muhammadans, especially Sayyids. On 1st August the keys of the fort were delivered to him by Dilawwar, who was given a robe of honour with permission to go to Bijapur. [Kambu, 5a.]

Bidar and Kaliani, the guardian fortresses of Adil Shah's north-eastern frontier, had fallen, and the way now seemed open for an advance on Bijapur itself. But a cruel disappointment was in store for Aurangzib; his victorious career was to be suddenly checked. The Bijapur agents had intrigued hard at Court; Dara's jealousy was rising in proportion to the success of his younger brother, and he at last persuaded the Emperor to put an end to the war.\*

#### § 8. *Shah Jahan orders peace with Bijapur; its terms.*

Even in the midst of the siege of Kaliani Shah Jahan had repeatedly written to the prince to patch

\* *Adab*, 177a (Aurangzib complains of Dara corresponding with Bijapur behind his back, but two years before this time). *Aqil Khan*, 16. *Kambu*, 10a (probably two months later). *Alamgirnamah*, 29, 83.

up a peace with Bijapur as soon as possible, because the rainy season was approaching when the Mughal army must retire to cantonments at Bidar, and Shaista Khan, who had been guarding Aurangabad during the prince's absence, must return to his own charge of Malwa without further delay. Aurangzib knew that to raise the siege of Kaliani and retire to Bidar, would only embolden the Bijapuris and take away from them their only motive for offering terms of peace.\* So, he had sat down before Kaliani a month longer, and brought the siege to a successful issue. Negotiations for peace were now opened. The Bijapur envoy, Ibrahim Bichittar Khan, agreed to pay an indemnity of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  *krores* of Rupees and to cede not only Bidar and Kaliani, but also the fort of Parenda with its dependent territory, all the forts in the Nizam Shahi Konkan, and the district of Wangi. The king of Bijapur accepted these terms and sent letters to his officers to deliver the forts in question to the Mughals. Shah Jahan ratified the treaty, remitting half a *krore* from the indemnity, and sending a gracious letter to Adil Shah. He at the same time ordered Aurangzib to return with his army to Bidar; the officers and men sent to the Deccan from Malwa and Hindustan were recalled to their former posts. Mir Jumla was directed to

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\* *Adab*, 112b (dated early in July).

take possession of the newly ceded forts in the west and then return to the imperial Court.\*

Thus Aurangzib received a sharp check in the hour of his triumph. He had gained only the northern fringe of the vast Bijapur kingdom when his father cried halt to him. Small as his acquisitions by the treaty were, he had no power to hold the Bijapur king to his promises. At the imperial order dictating peace, the Mughal officers slackened their efforts and many of them set out for the Court in spite of Aurangzib's entreaty to stay a little longer.† The Bijapuris profited by his distraction and weakened power, and delayed fulfilling the terms of a peace that had no armed strength behind it. Their commandants refused to surrender the forts ceded by the treaty.

### § 9. *Illness of Shah Jahan. Mughal retreat.*

To complete the misfortunes of the Mughal cause in the Deccan, Shah Jahan fell ill on 6th September and for one week lay at death's door. Rumours of his death spread through the empire,

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\* Kambu, 5b, (rewards for the capture of Kaliani, and settlement of peace). *Adab*, 113a, 157a. Aurangzib was commanded to return to Bidar (according to *Adab*, 112b, 198b), or to Aurangabad (Kambu, 5b, unlikely.) Nurullah's *Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II.* entirely silent about this war! <sup>2</sup>

† *Adab*, 197a, 149b, 157b; *Alamgirnamah*, 29. Aqil Khan, 16. Kambu, 6a.

and gave rise to confusion and disorder in every province. Aurangzib, harassed by anxiety and distracted by conflicting plans, at last decided to be content with what could be easily secured from Bijapur. On 30th September he sent Mir Jumla towards Parenda to take delivery of it, and on 4th October he himself began his retreat from Kaliani to the imperial dominion.\*

§ 10. *Shivaji's early negotiations and raids into Mughal territory.*

Only one episode of the war still remains to be recorded. While Aurangzib was busy conquering the north-eastern angle of the Bijapur kingdom, stirring events were occurring in its north-western corner, where the boundary of the Mughal district of Ahmadnagar adjoined Northern Konkan. Here a young and obscure local chief of very small means and no high family influence, was just beginning to peep above the horizon of history and to start on that career of greatness whose noontide splendour was destined to dazzle the Indian world and to leave his name a byword for posterity. Shivaji, the son of Shahji Bhonslé, a Maratha captain in Bijapur service, had taken forcible possession of his father's western *jagirs* and seized hill-

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\* Kambu, 6b; Adab, 157a, 169a.

fort after hill-fort in the Ghats from the agents of Bijapur. When the Mughals were about to invade Adil Shah's territory, he had sent an envoy to Aurangzib's deputy at Ahmadnagar, offering to co-operate with them if they confirmed him in the possession of the Adil Shahi Konkan. He had received in return vague promises of favour and protection.\* Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need of the imperialists would be over. So, on the outbreak of the war, he seized his opportunity, and in concert with the Bijapuri officers in the neighbourhood, he raided the Mughal territory from the south-west. One night (in April) he silently scaled the walls of Junnar with rope-ladders, and after slaughtering the defenders carried off 3 lakhs of *hun*, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewels.† Bands of Maratha light horsemen spread in all directions, cutting off provision trains and foraging parties, plundering the smaller towns and flourishing

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\* Aurangzib to Shiva, 23 Apr. 1657 (Parasnis MS.) *Adab*, 144b (Shiva sends agent, July 1656), 146a (Shiva sends agent, February 1657).

† Contest with Shiva, Kambu 3b; *Adab*, 110b—112a (Aurangzib's letters to Shaista Khan), 147a—149a (to Multafat Khan), 153a—157a (to Nasiri Khan); *Zedhe Shakavali* (2 dates only); *Sabhasad Bakhar*, 8 (4 lines); Chitnis, i. 39 (2 lines); full details in my *Shivaji*, ch. 3 § 1—4.

villages, rendering the roads unsafe, and carrying devastation and alarm to the very gates of Ahmadnagar, the seat of the Mughal administration in that region. An attack on the town (*petta*) which nestled under shelter of the fort of Ahmadnagar was frustrated by a timely sortie of the garrison. But so great was the alarm it caused that the Mughal Governor made the citizens remove their property to within the fort as a precaution. Two other Marathas, Minaji Bhonslé and Kashi, were notably successful in their raids.

§ 11. *Aurangzib orders reprisals against Shivaji, and effectually protects Mughal territory.*

Aurangzib learnt of these disturbances and hurried reinforcements up to Ahmadnagar, with strict orders to punish Shiva. He chastised with his pen those officers who were slow in marching to the scene. His letters to his officers breathe fury and revenge: the Mughal captains must beat the raiders back from the imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shiva's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people without pity, and plundering them to the extreme";—Shivaji's possessions, Poona and Chakna, must be utterly ruined and not the least remissness shown in slaying and enslaving the people;—the village headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who

had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain without compunction.

Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding this tract showed excellent combination and judgment. Kartalab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, Hushdar Khan at Chamargunda and Raisin, and Nasiri Khan and some others at Bir and Dharur. These officers stood facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the imperial *ryots* behind them might enjoy peace and safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. At last in May, 1657, Nasiri Khan, so often rebuked for his slow movements and failure to catch Shivaji up, made a forced march, for once, to the neighbourhood of Ahmadnagar and fell upon Shiva, who escaped with heavy loss. Orders were sent to the victor to pursue Shiva into his own territory and wrest all his lands which had been given up to the Mughals by the Bijapur king in the new treaty.\* But a campaign among the hills of Maharashtra during the rainy season was impossible, and Poona escaped

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\* *Adab*, 153, 154b (rebuke for slowness), 156a (news of defeat of Shiva, in May, 1657); *Kambu*, 4b.

an invasion. When his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony.

*§ 12. Shivaji makes peace with Aurangzib.*

So, he sent an agent, named Raghunath Pant, to Nasiri Khan, with a letter offering submission and promising loyal behaviour in future. To this a conciliatory reply was given. Then Shiva despatched another ambassador, Krishnaji Bhaskar, to Aurangzib himself, begging forgiveness for his raids and offering to send a contingent of 500 horse to the prince's assistance.\* Aurangzib was then about to leave the Deccan to contest the throne of Delhi. He received Shivaji's submission with outward pleasure; but his mind was not really composed about Maharashtra; he omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self-interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received.†

\* *Adab*, 156b-157a. Parasnisi MS., letter 6 (Aur. to Shiva, 24 Feb. 1658.)

† *Adab*, 157a, 163a. "Take care of Ahmadnagar. Keep your

The invasion of Bijapur now ends, and the great War of Mughal Succession begins.

## APPENDICES

### II.—Parentage of Ali II.

The parentage of Ali Adil Shah II is not altogether free from doubt. The Mughals declared him to be a stranger of unknown origin whom the late Sultan had brought up like a son, *pisar-i-khanda*. (Waris, 118a, and *Adab*, 88b). The Bijapur side stated that Ali was born to Muhammad Adil Shah on 27th August, 1638, and that at the fond request of the Queen, Bari Sahiba, the sister of the Golkonda king, the baby was handed over to her to be brought up under her eyes in her apartments, known as the *Anand Mahal*. The boy's birth, initiation into Islam, and commencement of education, were all celebrated with the pomp and ceremony worthy of a prince of the blood, and he publicly rode through the capital in the style of the heir to the throne. His right to ascend the throne was apparently not questioned by the Bijapur nobility and military officers, though they soon afterwards began to quarrel about the division of power and influence. But such internal discords were the usual case at

troops ready, lest when Nasiri Khan goes away to Hindustan, Shiva, finding the field vacant, should begin to plunder" (To Multafat Khan. *Adab*, 149b.) "Don't leave your charge at the call of Shah<sup>III</sup> jahan, lest Shiva should sally out." (To Nasiri Khan, *Adab*, 157b). "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vacant. Attend to it, as the son of a dog is waiting for an opportunity" (To Mir Jumla, *Adab*, 92a). *Dilkasha*, i. 20 and 21.

Bijapur and in every other country where the king is weak and his officers strong and selfish. Against Aurangzib's theory that Ali was a lowborn lad smuggled into the harem, stands the fact that at the time of his birth (August 1638), Muhammad Adil Shah was only 29 years old. Are we to believe that at this early age he and his queen had given up all hope of having any issue, and had contrived the fraud of proclaiming a stranger's child as their son? Some scandalous tale about the private life of Muhammad Adil Shah was told after his death by a Bijapur officer who had deserted to Aurangzib, (*Adab 91a*), but we do not know of its precise nature. Aurangzib himself utters a pious cry of disbelief in it! Who Ali's mother was is not explicitly stated in the Bijapur history. In the record of an event a few years after his accession, the chief Dowager Queen, Bari Sahiba, is spoken of as his *walida*, but the term may mean nothing more than adoptive mother, because in the account of Ali's birth even this lady is never once described as his mother. Possibly he was the son of a slave-girl of the harem. But under Islamic law children of such birth are not debarred from inheritance.

The English merchant Revington, on 10 Dec. 1659, speaks of Ali II. as being "known to be the bastard of Md. Adil Shah." (Foster, x. 249). Manucci (ii. 300) says that "Sikandar Adil Shah was not of the ancient royal family, for his father [Ali II.] was no son of the king [Md. Adil Shah], only a servant of the queen's. When she became a widow, the king having left no sons, she made this servant of hers king."

[The history of Ali Adil Shah II from his birth to his accession is given by Nurullah, (my MS.) 14-57, and in the

*Basatin-i-salatin*, 345—347. Tavernier, i. 183, repeats the prevalent story that Ali was merely an adopted child. Also Bernier, 197.]

### III.—Corruption of the Bijapur Wazir by Aurangzib.

The Bijapur history *Basatin* (349-357) asserts that the prime-minister, Khan Muhammad, surnamed Khan-i-khanan, was corrupted by Aurangzib, and gives the following account of his treachery and its punishment:—

“Adil Shah had appointed Khan Muhammad, with a large army to guard the kingdom. He took post on the frontier. Spies brought him news that the Delhi army was crossing a pass only two or three days’ march off. Khan Muhammad by a forced march at night barred the road. Famine raged in the Mughal camp, but the troops had no way open for escape. Aurangzib then wrote to the prime-minister: ‘If you let me off now, there will be perpetual friendship between the Bijapuris and us, and so long as you or your descendants hold the wazirship of the country, we shall never covet any of its territory.’ The letter reached Khan Muhammad when he was sitting down with some learned men after his evening prayer, and, he remarked, ‘This letter will be the death of me.’ After long reflection, he replied on the back of the epistle, ‘Early next morning, getting your men ready as for a night-attack, make a forced march and escape.’ Aurangzib with his men fell on the Khan’s troops who left a path open for them, and so he escaped. At the news of the night-attack Khan Muhammad’s officers hastened to him, found Aurangzib already fled, and urged him to chase the Mughals as there was yet time. The Khan replied, ‘We shall thus secure peace. But if we slay Aurangzib an ocean of troubles will surge up and [Mughal] armies

will drown the Deccan land. Good, that he has escaped.' So, he forbade pursuit. Afzal Khan after using hot words left with his troops, went to Bijapur, and reported the matter to the Sultan,.....who recalled Khan Muhammad and his army to the capital. The Khan, knowing that his death was certain, marched very slowly, with frequent halts. On the day he entered the city, two Mughals, armed with many sharp weapons, stood on the two sides of the Mecca gate. As the Khan's *palki* entered, they fell on him and despatched him with blows. The date was the year 1068 A. H. [Z. S. gives 11 November, 1657 A. D.]...It is said that Aurangzib ordered that the annual tribute from Bijapur to the Emperor should not that year be paid to him, but spent in building a tomb for Khan Muhammad."

Now, this story of Khan Muhammad having caught Aurangzib in a trap in a mountain pass near the frontier, is clearly false. The detailed official history of the Mughals and Aurangzib's letters show that he only marched from his own frontier to Bidar (a short distance), and then from Bidar to Kaliani, and lastly (28 May) he made a four miles' advance from Kaliani in order to disperse the enemy assembled in the neighbourhood. There is no formidable mountain-pass in this route, and at every one of these steps Aurangzib had a strong base close behind him, *viz.*, the Mughal fort of Udgir when he first marched to Bidar, the conquered fort of Bidar when he proceeded to Kaliani, and lastly the part of his army left to invest Kaliani when he advanced four miles from that fort. Furthermore, the road between Bidar and Kaliani had been cleared of the enemy by Mahabat Khan, before Aurangzib traversed it.

Khan Muhammad might possibly have hemmed round some small Mughal detachment escorting provisions, or even Mahabat Khan's division in its march towards Kullbarga, (12th April) but then Aurangzib himself was too far off to write to the Bijapur *wazir* the letter of temptation described above. I think it most likely that the charge on which he was condemned of treason and murdered was that, having been already corrupted by Aurangzib, he had made a sham fight in the battle of 28th May, when he might have easily annihilated Aurangzib's force.

From the description in the *Basatin-i-salatin* it appears that Khan Muhammad had an opportunity of crushing Aurangzib during the latter's *retreat* from Kaliani or Bidar. This theory receives some support from Aqil Khan Razi, who writes (p. 17), "Aurangzib's army was distracted, but he remained firm, without being at all shaken by the departure of such high officers [as Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal.] With boldness and prudence he returned, unhurt and without loss, from the place, through that ring of enemies."

In a letter written a few days after 8th October, Secretary Qabil Khan reports a rumour that Afzal Khan with the Bijapuri army had crossed the Benathora with a view to invading the *mahals* on "this side," evidently meaning the newly annexed districts of Bidar and Kaliani (*Adab*, 197a). We read (*Adab*, 64b), that the Bijapuri territory north of the river had been previously occupied and administered by Aurangzib's officers. Therefore, his return march from Kaliani to Bidar, 4th—9th October, could not have been molested by Khan Muhammad.

Did the Bijapur prime-minister, then, get and throw away, with fatal consequences to himself, the chance of

capturing the prince, during his retreat from Bidar to the Mughal frontier? The idea is plausible. The Bijapuris were certainly emboldened by the distraction of the Mughals; Aurangzib's army was weakened by the deputation of Mir Jumla and the departure of several other officers for Delhi ; and the report of his intended retreat to the Mughal frontier had totally destroyed the imperial prestige in that region ; the Bijapuris were openly insulting isolated Mughal detachments and officers. But against this theory must be urged that (1) Bidar was only 28 miles by road from the Mughal frontier (*viz.*, the ferry over the Manjira river) ; (2) Kaliani and Bidar were both held by Mughal garrisons, which might have assisted Aurangzib by falling on the rear of any Bijapuri army surrounding him ; (3) Aurangzib left Bidar on 18th October, and Khan Muhammad was murdered on 11th November, as the news of his death reached Aurangzib at Aurangabad in the middle of the month. (*Adab*, 92b.) There was not sufficient interval between these two events for the return of Afzal Khan to Bijapur, the summoning of Khan Muhammad by Adil Shah, and the minister's slow march from Bidar to Bijapur, as described in the *Basatin*.

However, from Aurangzib's letters it is clear that Khan Muhammad was friendly to the Mughals, and advocated a policy of peace with them, while Mulla Ahmad was at that time bitterly hostile to them. (During the war Khan Muhammad openly sent an agent to Shah Jahan, evidently to propose terms on behalf of his master. *Adab*, 125a.) But this need not have meant that Khan Muhammad had been bribed to advocate the peace policy or that he shirked his duty in the field of battle. Before Aurangzib's invasion Mulla Ahmad himself had visited

the Mughal ambassador at Bijapur and professed friendliness, though Aurangzib distrusted him. (*Adab*, 91b).

Aurangzib's own remarks on hearing of Khan Muhammad's murder are given in a letter from Secretary Qabil Khan to Mir Jumla, written in November, 1657. The prince only says that Khan Muhammad fell a victim to the treacherous intrigue of his false friend, Mulla [Ahmad] Navait, and that he almost threw away his life by neglecting to take proper steps to counteract his rival's designs, though repeatedly cautioned by Aurangzib. (*Adab*, 92b, 204b). The other references to his death are in *Adab*, 93b and 179a. The *Zedhe Shakavali* asserts that his death was contrived by Bari Sahiba.

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## CHAPTER XII.

### THE ILLNESS OF SHAH JAHAN, 1657.

#### §1. *Shah Jahan's reign: its glories.*

In December, 1656, the public health of Delhi became so bad that Shah Jahan with his Court proceeded to the bank of the Ganges at Garh Mukteshwar, a place noted for its game. In less than a month he returned to the capital; but as the epidemic continued, he again left it (February, 1657), and went to Mukhlispur on the Jamuna, nearly a hundred miles north of Delhi. The cool climate of this place, at the foot of the Sirmur hills and yet within easy reach of the capital by boat, had led him to choose it as his summer retreat, and he had adorned it with fine palaces for himself and his eldest son, and given it the glorious name of Faizabad.\*

Here a grand Court ceremony was held. He just completed three decades of his reign and began the 31st year on 7th March. In the official annals of the Mughal Emperors written by their command, every period of ten years (called *dawwar*) was taken

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\* Waris, 118b, 119a, 121, (Mukhlispur described); 122a (palaces described).

together and a volume devoted to it. Three such decades formed an epoch (*qarn*),\* which was regarded as a sort of perfect and auspicious number. Shah Jahan had completed one such epoch and begun another. The occasion was, therefore, one of peculiar importance and solemnity.

The reign had been as prosperous as it had been long. The 'wealth of Ind' under this Great Mughal dazzled the eyes of foreign visitors, and on gala days ambassadors from Bukhara and Persia, Turkey and Arabia, as well as travellers from France and Italy, gazed with wonder at the Peacock Throne and the Kohinur and other jewels which cast a luminous halo round the Emperor's person. The white marble edifices which he loved to build were as costly as they were chaste in design. The nobles of the empire eclipsed the kings of other lands in wealth and pomp. Save for two failures of his arms outside the natural frontiers of India, the imperial prestige stood higher than ever before. The bounds of the "protected empire" had been stretched further than in any preceding reign. Within the country itself a profound peace reigned. The peasantry were carefully cherished; harsh and exacting governors were in many cases dismissed on

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\* Inayet Khan's *Shah Jahan-namah* (as quoted in Elliot, vii. 74); Waris, 1b; Kambu, 1b.

the complaint of the people. Wealth and prosperity increased on all hands. As a panegyrist sang :—

"The people are light of heart as the  
Emperor bears the heavy burden  
(of looking after them);  
Disorder has fallen into a deep sleep  
through *his* wakefulness."\*

A kind and yet wise master, Shah Jahan had gathered round himself a band of very able officers, and made his Court the centre of the wit and wisdom of the land.

But some ominous shadows had already been cast on this bright prospect, and with the passage of time they were deepening. One by one the great ministers and generals who had contributed to the glory of the reign were being removed by the pitiless hand of Death. The three best known officers and dearest personal friends of Shah Jahan died within the last five years : Said Khan Bahadur Zafar Jang on 4th January, 1652, Sadullah Khan, the Abul Fazl of his age, on 7th April, 1656, and Ali Mardan Khan, the premier peer, on 16th April, 1657.† And, as the giants of old passed away, the Emperor found no worthy successors to them among the new faces and younger men about him. He had already completed 67 lunar years (24 Jan. 1657), and the

\* India Office Pers. MS. 1344, folio 7b.

† Waris, 57b, 108a; Kambu, 1b; M. U. ii. 436.

life of warfare and hardship that he had gone through in his father's latter years, followed by the long ease of his own tranquil reign, had undermined his body, and he already felt the hand of age. What would happen after him? That was the question now present in all minds. Often and often had he talked with his confidants about the future,\* and that future was most gloomy.

### § 2. *Shah Jahan's sons.*

Shah Jahan had four sons. All of them were past youth, and all had gained experience as governors of provinces and commanders of armies. But there was no brotherly love among them, though the three younger princes,—Shuja, Aurangzib and Murad Bakhsh, were usually drawn together by a common jealousy of the eldest, Dara Shukoh, their father's favourite and intended heir. The ill-feeling between Dara and Aurangzib in particular was so bitter and had continued growing bitterer for so many years past, that it was the talk of the whole empire, and peace had been maintained between them only by keeping Aurangzib far away from the Court and his eldest brother.† Every one foreboded that the succession to Shah Jahan's throne would be disputed, and that a universal and complicated

\* *Ruqaat-i-Alamgiri*, 48 and 54.

† *Anecdotes of Aurangzib* § 2 and 5; *Masum*, 6b; *Kambu*, 8b; *Adab*, 171b, 174b; *Aqil Khan*, 10.

civil war would deluge all parts of India with blood,  
as soon as he would close his eyes or even earlier.

### § 3. *Dara Shukoh, the heir designate.*

Shah Jahan had given clear indications that he wished to leave the crown to Dara. As this prince was the eldest of four brothers *by the same mother*, the choice was not an act of unjust partiality, but simply followed the law of nature which gives to the eldest-born authority and precedence above the younger ones. In order to train him in the administration of the empire and to smooth the transfer of the supreme authority to him, the Emperor had kept Dara by his side for many years past. The vice-royalty of rich and long-settled provinces like Allahabad, the Panjab, and Multan, had been conferred on him, but he was allowed to stay at his father's Court and govern them by deputies. At the same time the Emperor bestowed on him rank and privileges which raised him to an almost royal position, midway between the Emperor and the other princes. Dara now enjoyed the high title of *Shah-i-byuland-i-qbal*, (King of Lofty Fortune), the unprecedented rank of a Commander of Forty Thousand Horse, and an income which many a king might have envied. When he attended Court he was allowed to sit near the Emperor on a gold chair only

a little lower than the throne.\* Dara's sons got military ranks as high as those of the Emperor's younger sons, and his officers were frequently ennobled by the Emperor.† Dependent kings, tributary princes, offenders under the imperial wrath, aspirants to office or title, all bought or begged Dara's mediation before they could approach the Emperor. Government officials and new recipients of titles, after having had audience of the Emperor were sent by him to pay their respects to the Crown Prince.‡ Much of the administration was latterly conducted at Dara's direction in the Emperor's presence, or even by Dara alone with permission to use the Emperor's name and seal. In short, everything was done to make the public familiar with the idea that he was their future sovereign and to render the transfer of the crown to him on Shah Jahan's death easy.

\* Waris, 9<sup>c</sup><sub>a</sub>, (golden chair and title of Shah given to Dara, 3rd February, 1655), 97<sub>a</sub>, 120<sub>a</sub>, (Dara's pay was 1½ krores of Rupees, January 1657), 123<sub>b</sub>, (mansabs of all the princes). Kambu, 6<sub>a</sub> (Dara promoted to a command of 50,000 horse, 14th September), 7<sub>b</sub> (Dara promoted to a command of 60,000 horse, with a pay of above 2 krores, 20th December), 8<sub>b</sub>; Masum, 6<sub>b</sub>.

† Waris, 96<sub>a</sub>, 116<sub>a</sub>.

‡ Waris, 85<sub>a</sub>, (Ismail Hut presents a remarkable horse to Dara), 91<sub>b</sub>, 116<sub>a</sub> (Srinagar Rajah makes Dara his mediator), 87<sub>b</sub>, 97<sub>b</sub> (Dara procures pardons).

§ 4. *Dara's religious views.*

Dara was just turned of forty-two years. He had taken after his great-grandfather Akbar. In his thirst for pantheistic philosophy he had studied\* the Talmud and the New Testament, the writings of the Muslim Sufis, and the Hindu Vedanta. The easy government of Allahabad had assisted his natural inclination, and with the help of a band of *pandits* he had made a Persian version of the *Upanishads*. The title of *Majmua-ul-Baharain* ("the Mingling of Two Oceans") which he gave to another of his works, as well as his prefatory remarks,† proves

\* My account of Dara's philosophical studies is based on the extracts from the prefaces of his works given by Rieu in his *British Museum Catalogue*. Dara wrote in Persian (1) *Sirr-al-asrar*, a translation of 50 of the *Upanishads*, completed on 1 July, 1657. (2) *Majmua-ul-Baharain*, a treatise on the technical terms of Hindu pantheism and their equivalents in Sufi phraseology. (3) *Dialogue with Baba Lal* (really recorded by Chandrabhan). (4) *Safinat-ul-awliya* or lives of Muslim saints, completed 11 Jan., 1640. (5) *Sakinat-ul-awliya* or the life of Mian Mir, completed 1052 A. H. (6) *Risala-i-haqnuma*, published with an Eng. translation, *The Compass of Truth*, by S. C. Basu, Allahabad. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th are in the Khuda Bakhsh Library. See also *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 377—388, for Dara's correspondence with Shaikhs Muhibullah and Dilruba.

† He writes that although he had perused the Pentateuch, the Gospels, the Psalms and other sacred books, he had nowhere found the doctrine of *Tauhid* or Pantheism explicitly taught but in the *Vedas*, and more especially in the *Upanishads*, which contain their essence. As Benares, the great seat of Hindu learning, was under his rule, he called together the most learned *pandits* of that place,

that his aim was to find a meeting-point for Hinduism and Islam in those universal truths which form the common basis of all true religions and which fanatics are too apt to ignore in their zeal for the mere externals of faith. Alike from the Hindu *yogi* Lál-dás and the Muslim *faqir* Sarmad, he had imbibed his eclectic philosophy, and at the feet of both he had sat as an attentive pupil. But he was no apostate from Islam. He had compiled a biography of Muslim saints, and he had been initiated as a disciple of the Muslim saint Mian Mir, which no *kafir* could have been.\* The saintly Jahanara also speaks of Dara as her spiritual preceptor. The manifesto in which Aurangzib as the champion of Islamic orthodoxy denounces Dara for heresy,

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and with their assistance wrote himself the translation of the *Upanishads*. (Rieu, i. 54, quoting preface to *Sirr-ul-asrar*). Elsewhere he states that he had embraced the doctrine of the Sufis, and having ascertained in his intercourse with Hindu faqirs that their divergence from the former was merely verbal, he had written the *Majmua-ul-Baharain* with the object of reconciling the two systems. (Rieu, ii. 828, quoting Dara's preface).

\* During his stay in Kashmir, 1050 A. H., Dara had become a disciple of the great Sufi, Mulla Shah (who died in 1072).....Dara received the initiation into the Qadiri order in 1049 from an eminent master, Muhammad Shah Lisanullah, one of the disciples of Mian Mir. He erected a sumptuous dome over Mian Mir's tomb outside Lahor. Jahanara wrote the *Munis-ul-arwah*, a life of Shaikh Muin-ud-din Chishti, into whose order she was initiated as a disciple or *murida*. (Rieu, i. 54, 358 & 357). Dara used to add to his signature the titles *Qadiri* and *Hanifi*, which is not consistent with a profession of heresy.

ascribes to him no idolatrous practice or denial of Muhammad's prophetic mission, but only the following faults: (i) Consorting with Brahmins, *yogis* and *sannyasis*,—considering them as perfect spiritual guides and 'knowers of God',—regarding the *Veda* as a divine book, and spending his days in translating and studying it.

(ii) Wearing rings and jewels inscribed with the word *Prabhu* (''Lord'') in Hindi letters.\*

(iii) Discarding prayers, the fast during the month of Ramzan, and other canonical ceremonies of Islam, as necessary only in the case of the spiritually undeveloped,—while he believed himself to be a man possessed of the perfect knowledge of God.†

Dara's own words in introducing to the reader his theological works, clearly prove that he never discarded the essential dogmas of Islam; he only displayed the eclecticism of the Sufis, a recognised school of Islamic believers. If he showed contempt for the external rites of religion, he only shared the standpoint of many noble thinkers of all churches,

\* *Prabhu* is simply a Sanskrit word meaning "one able to punish and to bless," "the supreme lord." It is not the name of any *idol*, but an epithet of the Deity, as innocent of any connection with polytheism as the Arabic term *Rabb-ul-alamin* ("Lord of the Universe") applied to God in the *Quran*.

† *Alamgirnamah*, 34 and 35. Some other charges of heresy, such as the drinking of beer made from sugar, were brought against Dara by Aurangzib, if we can believe Masum (71a).

such as John Milton. However, his coquetry with Hindu philosophy made it impossible for him, even if he had the inclination, to pose as the champion of orthodox and exclusive Islam, or to summon all Muslims to his banners by proclaiming a holy war against the people beyond the fold of the faith. In a letter to Jai Singh written in 1653, Dara says that the Rajput race were his special favourites and they knew that he always watched over their interests in all cases arising at the imperial Court. Thus, inclination and policy alike made Dara's attitude in sectarian disputes differ widely from that of Aurangzib.

### § 5. *Character of Dara.*

Then, again, his father's excessive love did him a distinct harm. He was always kept at Court and never, except at the third siege of Qandahar, sent to conduct campaigns or administer provinces. Thus he never acquired experience in the arts of war and government; he never learnt to judge men by the crucial test of danger and difficulty; and he lost touch with the active army. Hence he was rendered unfit for that war of succession which among the Mughals served as a practical test for the survival of the fittest. Basking in the sunshine of his father's favour and flattered by an entire empire, Dara had acquired some vices unworthy of a philosopher and

fatal to an aspirant to the throne. Aurangzib in later life spoke of Dara as proud, insolent to the nobles, and ungovernable in temper and speech.\* The Jaipur archives prove that this charge of his mortal enemy was not true. We have there a complete series of the letters written by Dara to Mirza Rajah Jai Singh, which illustrate how the prince laid himself out through many years to win the heart of this high grandee by uniform courtesy and personal affection, the giving of presents, anxious inquiry about his health, and even making his little son Sulaiman Shukoh send his *salam* to Jai Singh !

But we shall have to concede at least that his unrivalled wealth and influence were not likely to develop moderation, self-restraint, or foresight in him; while the fulsome flattery which he received from all must have aggravated the natural pride and arrogance of an heir to the throne of Delhi. The detailed account of his siege of Qandahar, written by an admirer, shows him in the odious light of an incompetent braggart, almost insane with conceit, capricious and childish in the management of affairs. His history during the war of succession clearly

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\* *Ruqaat-i-Alamgiri*, Nos. 5, 47, 53. *Anecdotes of Aurangzib*, § 3 and 4. In the *Adab* (260b) Aurangzib writes to Shah Jahan that Dara's only qualifications for winning his father's favour were 'flattery, smoothness of tongue, and much laughing, while in carrying out any business entrusted by his father his heart was not in conformity with his tongue.'

proves that, with all the wealth and influence he had enjoyed for years, he could secure very few devoted followers or efficient lieutenants. Evidently he was no judge of character. Men of ability and self-respect must have kept away from such a vain and injudicious master, while the mercenary self-seekers of the army and Court must have recognised that in following him against the astute and experienced Aurangzib they would be only backing the losing side. Dara was a loving husband, a doting father, and a devoted son; but as a ruler of men in troubled times he must have been a failure. Long continued prosperity had unnerved his character and made him incapable of planning wisely, daring boldly, and achieving strenuously,—or, if need were, of wresting victory from the jaws of defeat by desperate effort or heroic endurance. The darling of the Court was utterly out of his element in the camp. The centre of a circle of flattering nobles and ministers knew not how to make a number of generals obey one masterly will and act in harmony and concert. Military organization and tactical combination were beyond his power. And he had never learnt by practice how to guide the varying tides of a battle with the coolness and judgment of a true general. This novice in the art of war was destined to meet a practised veteran as his rival for the throne.\*

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\* Kambu, 9a, 10a, 15a; A. N., 99; Aqil 33.

However dark the future might look, for the present things were going on well with Shah Jahan. The usual Court festivals were celebrated as they came round. The victory over Bijapur led to the playing of joyous music, and the granting of rewards and titles. [Kambu, 5b.] Marriages took place among his grand-children. He held *darbars* with his usual magnificence, and received or sent off generals and viceroys, ambassadors and scholars.

### § 6. *Illness of Shah Jahan, 1657.*

From Mukhlispur Shah Jahan had returned to Delhi at the end of April, 1657. Here, on 6th September, he suddenly fell ill of strangury and constipation.\* For one week the royal physicians toiled in vain. The malady went on increasing; his lower limbs swelled, his palate and tongue grew very dry, and at times symptoms of fever appeared. During all this period the patient took no food or nourishment, and the medicines produced no effect on him. His weakness was extreme and his pain intense, though borne with heroic fortitude.

The daily *darbar* was stopped; the Emperor even ceased to show his face to the public from the balcony as was his wont every morning; the courtiers were denied access to his sick-bed, which only Dara

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\* For the history of the illness, Kambu, 6a, 7a; A.N. 27, 80-81; Masum, 29b—30b; Ishwardas, 7b—9a.

and a few trusted officers watched. Immediately the wildest rumours spread through the empire : Shah Jahan was dead, and Dara was keeping the fact a secret till he had ensured his own succession !

After a week the doctors at last got control over the malady. Soup of mint and manna did him great good, and he felt some relief. But the needs of empire are imperative. So, on 14th September the patient dragged himself to the window of his bed-room (*khwabgah*) and showed his face to the anxious public standing outside, to prove that he was still alive ! Large sums were given away in charity, prisoners were released, and Dara was covered with rewards and honours for his filial care.

But the improvement in the Emperor's condition had been slight; he had still to be carefully treated and nursed; and his weakness continued. It was more than a month (15th October) before he again appeared at the window in view of the public, though papers were taken to his chamber ostensibly to be read out for his order, and royal letters were still issued in his name and stamped with his seal. The acute stage of the disease had passed away, no doubt. But his death was now regarded as only a question of time. He knew it, and in the presence of the nobles appointed Dara as his successor. Then, with his mind freed from earthly cares, he went to Agra to die there [Kambu, 8b]

quietly in sight of the tomb of the wife he had loved so well. A change of air had also been advised by the doctors. On 18th October Shah Jahan left Delhi and moved by easy stages to Agra. Sami Ghat, on the Jamuna, six miles above Agra fort, was reached on 5th November, and here he waited for an auspicious day. The journey had restored him to health and he now discarded drugs as unnecessary. On the 26th, the day chosen by the astrologers, he made a royal progress from Bahadur-pura, down the Jamuna, in a State barge, the people thronging both banks for miles and miles to gaze on their beloved and long-lost ruler. Shouts of prayer and blessings for him filled the air. In this way he entered Agra city and put up in Dara's mansion on the river-bank. After nine days he entered his sumptuous palace in the fort and there held a *darbar*. At Agra he lived for the next five months. To Agra he returned after a short and futile effort to go back to Delhi (April), and from Agra fort he was destined never again to issue in life.

During Shah Jahan's illness Dara constantly watched by his bed-side; but he also stopped the visit of others to the sick-chamber. Only three or four officers of the highest trust and the Court physicians had access to the Emperor. "Dara tended and nursed his father beyond the utmost limit of possibility." But he showed no indecent

haste to seize the crown. All urgent orders were issued by him, but in the Emperor's name. [Kambu, 7b.] He exercised supreme authority and transacted public affairs at his own will, but merely as his father's agent. The transfer of power to his own hands, he hoped, would be easy, and he might wait for his father's death without any harm to the work of the State. He had so long occupied in the public eye the place at the right hand of the Emperor that he naturally expected that his exercise of authority on behalf of his invalid father would be accepted without question.

When Shah Jahan's illness first took a favourable turn (14th September), he heaped on Dara promotion and rewards worth  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of Rupees, and again on 20th December presented him with one crore of Rupees besides jewellery valued at 34 lakhs, in recognition of his filial piety and tender nursing during the Emperor's illness. Dara's rank was raised to that of a Commander of Sixty Thousand Horse, and his eldest two sons were promoted Commanders of 15,000 and 10,000 troopers respectively. [Kambu, 6a, 7b.]

#### § 7. *Dara is nominated by Shah Jahan as his successor.*

After the first week of illness Shah Jahan, as we have already seen, felt some relief, but no hope

of recovery. So he piously set himself to prepare for the next world. Calling to his presence some confidential courtiers and the chief officers of the State, he made his last will before them, and ordered them to obey Dara henceforth as their sovereign in everything, at all times, and in every place. To his successor he gave the advice to seek to please God, to treat the public well, and to care for the peasantry and the army. [Kambu, 8b.] Dara now had the supreme power in his hand, though he did not assume the crown but continued to issue orders in his father's name. The history of the next eight months is the history of his attempt to strengthen his position,—an attempt often thwarted by the necessity of taking Shah Jahan's consent in important matters, and also by his own faults of judgment. His policy lacked that strength and singleness of purpose which it might have gained if he had been the absolute master of the realm, or if Shah Jahan, in full possession of his physical powers, had dictated every step himself.

First of all, Mir Jumla, the confidant and partisan of his rival Aurangzib, could no longer be retained as prime-minister of the empire. Towards the end of September he was removed from the wazirship, and his son Muhammad Amin, who had been acting as his vicar at Delhi, was forbidden entrance to the office. Orders were also sent to Mir

Jumla, Mahabat Khan, and other imperial officers to return from the Deccan to the Court with the reinforcements that they had led to Aurangzib's army for the Bijapur war. [Kambu, 6a, 10a; A.N. 29.]

In the case of Mir Jumla the order of recall was not peremptory : he was first of all to secure the surrender of Parenda fort from the Bijapuris. But Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal were commanded to come away immediately with the Muhammadan and Rajput troops respectively of the supplementary force ; and this they did without waiting to take leave of Aurangzib. They returned to Agra and had audience of the Emperor on 20th December.\*

Meantime Dara's partisans and followers received from the Emperor promotions and high administrative offices, and even the province of Bihar was given to him in addition to the Panjab and Multan. Dara also set about acquiring new friends : Khalilullah Khan was promoted and appointed *subahdar* of Delhi ; Qasim Khan was tempted with the viceroyalty of Gujerat from which it was decided to remove Murad.†

\* Kambu, 5b, 6b, 10b, 8a; Aqil Khan, 16.

† Kambu, 6b, 11a; *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 413, 414.

§ 8. *Armies sent against Shuja, Murad and Aurangzib.*

By the middle of November Shah Jahan was completely recovered, and important matters which had hitherto been kept from him, could no longer be withheld. Dara, therefore, told him how Shuja had crowned himself and was advancing from Bengal. Shah Jahan consented to an army being sent against him, under the leadership of Rajah Jai Singh. But as only a prince could cope with a prince, Dara's eldest son Sulaiman Shukoh was joined in the command. This force, 22,000 strong, left Agra on 30th November and encountered Shuja near Benares on 14th February, 1658, as we shall see. Dara's most trusted friends and best generals were sent to support his son, and thus he greatly weakened himself at Agra.\*

Meantime equally alarming news had arrived from Gujrat. There Murad had murdered his *diwan* Ali Naqi (early in October), looted Surat city (early in November), and finally crowned himself (5th December). At first Dara sent him a letter purporting to proceed from the Emperor, transferring him from Gujrat to Berar. Dara thereby hoped to set one foe against another, as Berar was included in Aurangzib's viceroyalty. Murad saw

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\* Kambu, 9; A.N. 31; K. K. ii. 5; Masum, 32b—40b.

through the plan, laughed the order to scorn, and neither moved from Gujrat nor acted against Aurangzib.\* As yet Aurangzib had done no overt act of disloyalty or preparation for war. But "Dara feared him most." He learnt that Aurangzib had allied himself with Murad and Shuja, and at the same time was secretly intriguing with the nobles of the Court and the officers of the army. Strong letters were, therefore, sent out in the Emperor's name recalling Mir Jumla and the remaining generals from the Deccan (early in December), and on 18th and 26th December two armies were despatched to Malwa, the first to oppose the advance of Aurangzib from the South and the second to march into Gujrat and oust Murad from the province, or, if necessary, to stay in Malwa and co-operate with the first force.†

The leadership of these two armies had gone abegging. Noble after noble had been offered the posts, but had declined, saying that they were ready to fight to the last drop of their blood under the Emperor or Dara in person, but could not of themselves presume to resist to the bitter end a prince of the imperial blood. The rash Rathor chief Jaswant alone had consented to fight Aurangzib and even promised to bring him back a prisoner.‡ So, he

\* Kambu, 10, 11a; *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 414, 420.

† Kambu, 10a; *A. N.* 29, 34; *Aqil*, 20 & 21.

‡ Ishwardas, 16b.

was sent (18 Dec.) to Ujjain as Governor of Malwa, vice Shaista Khan, whose presence so near Aurangzib gave Dara ground for fear. Such a great noble and near kinsman of the Emperor could not be safely left close to the rebel frontier, as his adhesion to the two younger princes would have greatly increased their strength and influence. Shaista Khan had served with Aurangzib in the Golkonda and Bijapur wars and there was a brisk friendly correspondence between the two. Murad had even planned to dash into Malwa, seize Shaista Khan, and force him to join his side! So Shaista Khan was recalled to the capital, where he secretly served Aurangzib's cause.\* Qasim Khan was induced to accept the command of the second army by being created Governor of Gujrat in the place of Murad,

While giving leave to the three armies sent from Agra, Shah Jahan had besought their generals to spare the lives of his younger sons, to try at first to send them back to their provinces by fair words if possible, otherwise by a demonstration of force, and not, except in extreme need, to resort to a deadly battle.†

\* Kambu, 11a; *A. N.* 114; Aqil, 21; *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 426. For Aurangzib's friendly correspondence with Shaista Khan, see *Adab*, 102a—113a.

† Masum, 45b; Aqil, 21; Kambu, 11a.

§ 9. *Aurangzib openly defies the imperial authority.*

In January 1658, the news of further developments reached Agra. Aurangzib had arrested Mir Jumla, who was coming to Delhi in obedience to imperial orders, and seized his property, troops, and artillery. The prince, no doubt, wrote a lying letter to the Emperor, saying that he had arrested Mir Jumla for treasonable intrigue with Bijapur and neglect of the imperial business;\* but Dara knew the true reason. Murad had captured Surat fort, and the preparations of the two brothers to advance into Hindustan could not be kept concealed any longer. Aurangzib's Vanguard began its northward march from Aurangabad on 25th January. At last all the three younger princes had rebelled; they had dropped the mask, or, in the language of the Persian annalists, "the curtain had been removed from the face of the affair."

At Dara's instigation the Emperor threw into prison Isa Beg, the Court agent of Aurangzib, and attached his property. But after a time he felt ashamed of such persecution, released the innocent man, and let him go to his master, whom he joined at Burhanpur early in March.†

\* A.N. 84; K. K. ii. 9. *Adab*, 95a, 67b; Aqil 19, 20, 22.

† A.N., 35 and 39; Aqil, 18 and 23.

§ 10. *Alarm, suspicion and confusion throughout the empire.*

Shah Jahan's severe illness and withdrawal from the public gaze had at once created a popular belief that he was dead. Dara guarded the sick-bed day and night; none but one or two ministers in his confidence had access to the Emperor. Even the people of Delhi, therefore, had reason to suspect that Shah Jahan was no more. The rumour spread to the farthest provinces with the proverbial speed of ill news. The evil was aggravated by Dara's injudicious action. To smooth the path of his own accession, he set men to watch the ferries and stop all letters and messengers going to his brothers in Bengal, Gujerat, and the Deccan. He also kept their Court agents under watch lest they should send any report to their masters.\*

But this only wrought greater mischief. Ignorance and uncertainty are more dangerous than the knowledge of truth. The princes and people in the distant provinces, with their regular news-letters from the Court suddenly stopped, naturally concluded that the worst had already come to pass. What letters they got indirectly only confirmed the belief. While their official news-writers and Court-agents at the capital were being guarded by Dara,

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\* A.N., 28; Kambu, 8b; Faizaz 418; Masum, 30.

other people of the city contrived to smuggle letters out to the princes, offering their devotion and reporting the gossip of the market-place about the condition of Shah Jahan, which was a compound of truth and falsehood. It was clearly the interest of such men, who from their low position had no access to the inner circle of the Court, to send misrepresentations likely to fan the ambition of the younger princes. Above all, the princess Raushanara intrigued vigorously for Aurangzib from within the harem and guarded his interests as against Dara's [Kambu, 8b; A.N. 368.]

Shah Jahan being given up as dead, all the confusion and disorder of a Mughal succession broke out, and the evil was intensified by the expectation of a four-sided duel between his sons, each with the army and resources of a province at his back. Everywhere lawless men caused tumults, the *ryots* refused to pay the revenue, the zamindars disobeyed the local governors or tried to rob and conquer their rivals; foreign powers, especially in the north-east, violated the frontiers and made inroads into the imperial territory. Wicked men of every class took advantage of the political trouble to raise their heads, and thereby added to the disorder. The local authorities were paralysed by uncertainty and anxiety about the future, and law and order suddenly

disappeared in many places.\* Such is the curse of autocracy : when the one central authority, from which all have been accustomed to receive their orders and to which they have ever taught themselves to look up for guidance, ceases to exist, all the officers become bewildered and helpless like children.

### § 11. *Shuja and Murad crown themselves.*

The younger princes in their provinces got ready to contest the throne. Shuja and Murad crowned themselves. Aurangzib played a cool and waiting game, while carefully increasing his resources and army. Even when Shah Jahan began to show his face to the public again, the mischief did not cease. It was openly said all over the empire that Shah Jahan was really dead, and that a slave who bore some resemblance to him, disguised in the imperial robes, personated him on the high palace-balcony, and received the *salams* of the public standing below. [Masum, 32] Letters in Shah Jahan's hand and seal were issued to the princes and the nobles, but they did not remove the

\* *Alamgirnamah*, 27 and 28. Kambu, 8b. Masum, 30b. The Rajah of Kuch Bihar raided Northern Bengal and Kamrup, while an Assamese army occupied Kamrup including Gauhati. (*Fathiyati-brigya*, 6 and 7). *Adab*, 94a. The official history *Alamgirnamah* and Aurangzib's letters to Shah Jahan in the *Adab* speak of the disorder in the country caused by "Dara's usurpation."

suspicion. Murad echoed the sentiments of others when he asserted that these letters were really written by Dara, an expert imitator of Shah Jahan's hand, and that the late Emperor's seal was necessarily in the possession of his successor.\* Even those who did not go so far, thought with Aurangzib that Shah Jahan was either dead or a helpless invalid entirely under Dara's control, so that he had practically vacated the throne. Some even asserted that Dara had wickedly flung his helpless father into prison and was doing him to death.† The three younger brothers, therefore, very plausibly asserted in their letters to the Emperor that their loving minds had been unsettled by these alarming rumours, and they were marching on Agra to see their father with their own eyes and satisfy themselves as to his real condition. Thereafter (they promised) they would return peacefully to their provinces or loyally do whatever their father would personally command them. Their marching on Agra was no sign of rebellion. Had they not hastened thither from their head-quarters without waiting for permission, when they heard of Jahanara being burnt? And was not

\* *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 418, 425, 429. As a matter of fact both Shah Jahan and Dara wrote in the same style of hand, as the signatures of the two in some Persian MSS. of the Khuda Bakhsh Library show.

† Ishwardas, 9a; *Adab*, 200b.

Shah Jahan's present illness a more serious affair  
and a greater cause of anxiety to them? Thus  
argued Murad in one of his letters. [Faiyaz, 425.]

When the agents of Aurangzib and Murad at  
the imperial Court wrote to their masters that the  
Emperor had fully recovered, Murad frankly refused  
to accept such letters as genuine. For, Dara had  
previously imprisoned these agents, and their houses  
were still watched by his men; they could not com-  
municate the truth, but had to write to the dictation  
of Dara's secretary. Hence their letters contained  
only what Dara wished his brothers to believe.  
Nothing (Murad argued) would disclose the truth  
except a march on Agra and an interview with the  
Emperor himself.\* Seeing is believing.

Events moved apace. On 20th March, 1658,  
Aurangzib set out from Burhanpur, crossed the  
Narmada on 3rd April, joined Murad on the 14th,  
and attacked the imperial army the next day. The  
period of intrigue and diplomacy now ends, and the  
appeal to the arbitrament of the sword begins.

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\* Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 418; Masum, 44.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### MURAD BAKHSH CROWNS HIMSELF.

#### § I. *Murad Bakhsh: his character.*

Muhammad Murad Bakhsh, the youngest son of Shah Jahan, was the black sheep of the imperial family. He had been tried in Balkh, the Deccan, and Gujrat, and he had failed everywhere. A foolish, pleasure-loving and impetuous prince, his character had not improved with age. Though too old now to plead the excuse of youth and inexperience, he had not learnt to apply himself to business or to bridle his passions. Worse still, he had not the gift of choosing capable agents, or even of treating them with the necessary confidence and honour when he happened to get any such men.\* Unscrupulous flatterers swayed his counsels, and made his Court no fit place for honest and self-respecting men. But Murad had also the virtues of his defects. Careless of everything else, he was indifferent to money, and his outbursts of violence or sensuality alternated with fits of liberality. Such irregular and indiscriminate gifts from a capricious

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\* He quarrelled with his guardian, Shah Nawaz Khan, during his viceroyalty of the Deccan, and was consequently removed from the province. (Waris, 38a; K. K. i. 701).

master could not, however, win lasting devotion or true gratitude. Secondly, he had the reckless valour of a soldier. Place him in the field of combat, let him face the enemy's array, and the former pleasure-seeker would assume an entirely new character; the martial spirit of Timur would fire his blood, he would resistlessly force his way to close grips with the enemy, and, amidst the carnage raging round him, forget every other feeling save the fierce delight of slaughter. Waverers, no doubt, took heart from the example of such a leader, and a charge when pressed home by a prince of the blood often scattered the enemy's ranks. But his personal valour was a poor compensation for his lack of generalship. The doughty fighter did only the work of a lieutenant, and failed to afford his troops the far-sighted disposition, cool guidance, and timely support which we expect from the supreme commander.

### § 2. *Ali Naqi, wazir of Murad, murdered.*

Knowing the prince's incapacity, Shah Jahan had tried to remedy the mischief by sending to him Ali Naqi as his revenue minister and chief counsellor. This officer,\* conscious of his own ability

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\* My account of Ali Naqi and his murder is based upon Khafi Khan, ii. 7—9, Ishwardas, 10a and b, Kambu, 9a. The date of the murder was most probably some day in the first week of October, as confirmation of the news reached Aurangzib (returning from

and honesty, and proud of enjoying the Emperor's confidence, looked down with scorn on the flatterers and boon companions who formed Murad's Court. He was strict even to harshness in conducting the government, and his honesty and vigilant care of the public revenue raised against him a host of enemies among those who wished to profit by the prince's ignorance and extravagance. As the whole administration was under Ali Naqi's control, he was also envied by the other nobles posted in Gujrat. His draconic punishments left him without a single friend in the province.

And soon his enemies got their chance. The news of Shah Jahan's severe illness and retirement to impenetrable privacy, as well as of Dara's virtual usurpation of the imperial authority, reached Murad towards the close of September, and he immediately set about raising troops and calling up his officers from the districts to take counsel with them. Among these arrivals was Qutb-ud-din Khan Kheshgi, faujdar of Pattan, and the mortal enemy of Ali Naqi. A conspiracy was soon formed between him and Murad's favourite eunuch against the hated minister. A letter in Ali Naqi's hand and seal, professing adhesion to the cause of Dara, was forged and given to a courier, who contrived to get himself arrested

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Bidar) on 29th October, and the first rumours had come some days earlier (*Adab*, 2016). A. N. 135. *Mirat*, i. 249 (secondary.)

by Murad's road patrol, without betraying its real authorship. Murad was revelling in his pleasure-garden when the intercepted letter was brought to him a little before dawn. The prince, who had not slept off his night's debauch, was in no fit mood to reflect wisely or to detect a plot of a type most familiar in Muslim history. He burst into wrath and ordered Ali Naqi to be dragged to his presence. The minister was reading the holy book when he got the summons, and hurriedly put on his Court dress as he went. Murad sat on a chair, spear in hand. Bridling his anger for a moment he asked Ali Naqi, "If a man plans treason against his master, what should his punishment be?" "Death," replied Ali Naqi promptly and boldly. Then Murad flung the letter to him as proof of his treason. The minister read it, and, fearless through consciousness of his own innocence and good service, he scoffed at his rivals who had forged such a clumsy instrument, and taxed his master with lack of judgment in not being able to see through the forgery and to know his true friends from his foes.

This was too much for Murad, who had been so long quivering with pent-up wrath. Starting up he ran Ali Naqi through with his spear, shouting, "Wretch! in spite of all my favours you have turned such a traitor!" The eunuchs present fell on the unhappy victim and completed their master's

work.\* The reign which began with this tragedy was to end in one equally horrible. For the murder of Ali Naqi, Murad had to atone with his own life-blood, four years later, in a dismal prison, before the pitiless eyes of enemies, without a single friend or sympathiser by his side.

*§ 3. Murad sends an army to plunder Surat.*

The honest minister having been removed from the path, the reign of lying flatterers and eunuchs began. Murad was enlisting troops in large numbers and needed money badly. So he sent an eunuch named Shahbaz Khan with 6,000 troopers and war material to levy contribution from the rich port of Surat. The detachment easily occupied the town which had no wall around it at this time, and began to plunder the citizens (early in November).† But the imperial treasury, enriched with the

\* If we can trust Khafi Khan's gossip, Ali Naqi fell a victim to a *faqir's* curse. "Ali Naqi was so strict in administration and chastisement that for a trivial fault he would order the offender's bile to be squeezed out. One day they brought to him a *faqir* arrested on suspicion of theft, and the minister, without making any investigation, ordered his bile to be pressed out. The *faqir* under torture turned his face to the heavens and cried out, 'You are slaying me unjustly. I pray that you too may meet with a similar fate under suspicion.' " But we must remember that a *faqir's* garb is the commonest of all disguises in India and the one first adopted by criminals trying to escape the officers of justice.

† Ishwardas, 10b and 11a. In *Adab*, 205a, Qabil Khan writes that Aurangzib's courier returned from Murad and reached his

custom duties of the greatest Indian port of the age, was situated within the fort, where the chief merchants had also deposited their wealth for safety. As the sea flanked the fort of Surat on three sides and its walls bristled with guns and swivels at every yard's interval,\* its capture was no easy task.

Shahbaz Khan first tried to corrupt the commandant of the fort, Sayyid Tayyib, through his friend Mirza Kamran, by saying that the astrologers had predicted the throne for Murad, and therefore to resist him was to court one's own ruin. The honest *qiladar* held firmly to his duty, and when Shahbaz advanced with his force to attempt an assault, he drove him back by a smart discharge of artillery. So Shahbaz had to encamp at a safe distance and begin the slow and tedious work of cannonading. But his guns being light pieces, no harm was done to the fort walls, and the siege†

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master, north of Bidar, on 23rd Nov. with the news that Murad's army after capturing the city and district of Surat was engaged in besieging the fort.

\* Description of the fort of Surat in Ishwardas, 11a; *Faiyaz-ul-qawani*, 421. William Finch in 1609 thus describes it, "The castle of Surat is on the south side of the river,....well walled, and surrounded by a ditch. The ramparts are provided with many good cannons, some of which are of vast size. In front of the castle is the *maidan* [or esplanade]."

† For the siege of Surat fort, Ishwardas, 11a and b; Tavernier, i. 328-329; *Faiyaz-ul-qawani*, 421, 422 (mine fired on 20 Dec.), 423, 459, 461, 462; A.N., 134 (meagre). In a letter to Shaista Khan, Murad pretends that he had merely sent his men (—six thousand,

dragged on for weeks. Four or five big guns sent from Junagarh were too long in arriving. Success could be secured only by other means. Under the guidance of some Dutch artificers, he ran mines. The garrison tried to discover and destroy them, but without success. One of the mines crossed the wet ditch a yard below its bed, and reached the base of the outer earth-work technically called the Sher Haji. The chamber was filled with 50 *maunds* of powder and the charge fired (20th December). The explosion was terrible. Forty yards of the wall, with 40 swivel guns, 600 artillerymen and some kinsmen of the *qiladar*, were blown up. Sayyid Tayyib retired to the citadel, but disheartened by his losses and hopeless of being relieved, he surrendered on condition of a free passage to Delhi. The fort with its treasures and guns passed into the hands of Murad, whose exultation at it knew no bounds. Shahbaz Khan assembled the merchants and demanded from them a forced loan of ten lakhs of Rupees. After much higgling the amount was reduced to one-half, and this sum was advanced to Murad's agents by the two richest merchants of

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troopers with guns!)—to draw his salary assigned on the Surat treasury as usual, when the *qiladar*, acting in Dara's interest, shut the fort gate in their face and opened fire on them; and that at the same time a letter from the *qiladar*'s son at Court was intercepted reporting the death of Shah Jahan, Murad claims to have acted merely in self-defence. (*Faiyaz*, 454).

the city, Haji Muhammad Zahid (the headman of the traders) and Virji Borah, on behalf of the entire mercantile community of Surat. A bond for the amount, stamped with Murad's seal and endorsed by Shahbaz as security for repayment, was delivered to these two.\*

The despatches of victory and the keys of the fort were presented to Murad at Ahmadabad on 26th December. But money was a more acceptable present, and he pressed his officers at Surat to send him all that they could, loaded on fast camels;† for, in the meantime he had crowned himself and begun to bestow offices and rewards and to enlist new troops on a scale that soon exhausted his treasury.

#### § 4. *Murad forms an alliance with Aurangzib against Dara.*

When the news of Shah Jahan's illness was followed by no tidings of his recovery, but letters from Delhi came fitfully and then stopped altogether, Murad's suspicions deepened into certainty. He concluded that Shah Jahan was already dead,

\* K. K., ii. 7, 250-251. According to *Adab* (205a) the contribution imposed was 7 lakhs, of which a part was realised and a bond taken for the remainder. The money was collected from the merchants in the city long before the fall of the fort.

† *Faiyaz-ul-qawaniin*, 461, 465.

and so got ready to contest the throne. It was necessary to look around for allies, and none was nearer to him than Aurangzib, his immediately elder brother, governing a neighbouring province and united to him by a common hatred of Dara. On 23rd December, 1652, he had met Aurangzib,\* then journeying to the Deccan across his province of Malwa, and the two had evidently formed a vague friendly understanding against Dara. But their plans now took definite shape in the shadow of the Emperor's approaching death. Curiously enough, on almost the same date (middle of October) both brothers suddenly remembered that they had not corresponded with each other for a long time past; their brotherly love welled out; and each wrote to the other a letter mentioning in a neutral tone the news of Shah Jahan's illness. But each letter was carried by a *confidential messenger* who was charged with certain *oral communications* which it was unsafe to put down on paper. The two letters crossed each other on the way. Murad also wrote (19th October) a letter to Shuja proposing an alliance, and it was sent through Aurangzib's province, who helped the courier to proceed to Bengal and entrusted to him a letter of his own to the same purport.† The correspondence thus began went on briskly.

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\* *Faiyaz*, 412; *Adab*, 23b.

† *Adab*, 169, 170b; *Faiyaz*, 433-434, 417.

To hasten the carriage of letters, relays of postal runners were established between Gujerat and the Deccan. Murad stationed two men every ten miles all the way from Ahmadabad to the Deccan frontier, (end of November). Aurangzib continued the system eastwards to his own seat of government, and also proposed to Shuja a similar regular and joint service for the prompt conveyance of letters,—his men supplying the relays of runners from Aurangabad to the frontier of Orissa, and Shuja's servants taking charge of it from there to Rajmahal. Each prince also sent confidential agents to the Courts of the other two.\* Where hearts are set on one purpose, an agreement is soon arrived at. Correspondence with Shuja was slow and interrupted owing to the immense distance and lack of roads, and hence only a general agreement was formed with him. But between Aurangzib and Murad letters passed quickly, and the two soon matured a plan of concerted action. For secrecy of correspondence Aurangzib sent to Murad as early as 23rd October the key to a cypher to be used in future.† From the very beginning Murad places himself helplessly under Aurangzib's guidance. In letter after letter he asks for his brother's advice as to his own future steps, and writes, "I am ready to advance. Inform me

\* *Adab*, 171a, 205; *Faiyaz*, 421, 422.

† *Adab*, 169b; *Faiyaz*, 424.

of your wishes and I shall act accordingly." Indeed so wholly did Murad enter into Aurangzib's policy of throwing a religious cloak on their war of personal ambition, that his letters assume a sanctimonious tone calculated to raise a smile in those who knew his private character. Taking the hint from Aurangzib, the gay reveller of Ahmadabad poses as the champion of Islam; he threatens Dara with extirpation as the enemy of the holy faith; he refers to his eldest brother as the *Mulhid* (Idolator),—the very term adopted by Aurangzib and his Court-historians; and he professes confidence about his future success in "reliance on the strong religion of Muhammad." In short, he was familiarising himself with the phraseology of one who would soon become a *Padishah Ghazi*, or "Emperor waging war on infidels." [Faiyaz, 427, 432.]

### § 5. *Murad sits on the throne at Ahmadabad.*

While his diplomacy was thus making happy progress and Shahbaz had sent him the first fruits of the loot of Surat city, Murad felt that further delay was a mere waste of opportunity. His action was also hastened by the astrologers who declared with one voice that at 4 hours 24 minutes after the sunrise of 20th November there was such a conjunction of auspicious planets as would not happen again for many years to come. The moment was too

precious to be lost. In all hurry and secrecy, at the time indicated Murad mounted a throne in his Hall of Private Audience, with only a few trusted officers as witnesses. Then he appeared at the public *darbar* and conferred titles, posts, and rewards,—the last being as yet in the form of promises only! The news was imparted in absolute confidence to his general Shahbaz in the besiegers' camp before Surat, with instructions to communicate it to one other high officer only. [Faiyaz, 473.] The public coronation took place on 5th December with as much pomp and rejoicing as the low state of his finances would permit. The new Emperor took the title of Maruwaj-ud-din; his name was publicly read from the pulpits, he issued coins of his own, and conferred on his officers high-sounding titles like Murshid-parast Khan Fatih Jang, Sultan Niaz Khan, and Tahawwur Khan. In the district towns, too, the new Emperor's titles were proclaimed from the pulpit, and the band played joyous notes. An envoy with gifts was sent to Persia to announce the glorious accession. The *zamindars* hastened to Court to pay their respects to the newly risen sun.\* Murad thenceforth affected the royal style in his letters. On 19th January, 1658, his victorious troops from Surat joined him† at Ahmadabad; he

\* Faiyaz, 474-475, 464, 460; A.N. 134.

† Faiyaz-ul-qawanin, 464, 426.

was now quite ready to start for Agra, and waited impatiently for Aurangzib's signal.

Before Murad could leave his province and embark on the perilous contest for the throne, there was one matter of supreme importance to be settled. Where was he to leave his wives and children in safety? No man could foresee the distant end of the struggle. He might wade through his brothers' blood to the throne, and then all would be well. Or he might fail; and then would come a day of unspeakable misery for him and his family: the luckless claimant would be done to death in a gloomy prison; his head would be severed by the rude hands of slaves, critically examined by his victorious rival, and finally exposed to the public gaze; his widows would be dragged to the loathsome bed of their husband's murderer; his young sons would be consigned to dungeon and either drugged with opium into imbecility or strangled to death when they came of age.

Murad, therefore, looked about for some stronghold where his family and those of his chief adherents might reside in safety during his absence and even tide over any temporary reverse to his arms, some refuge to which he himself might gallop for shelter after the wreck of his army on an adverse

as too far off; Champanir was finally chosen.  
[*Faiyaz*, 420, 478.]

§ 6. *Aurangzib's cautious policy and Murad's impatient zeal.*

From the very outset Murad was for drawing the sword and throwing the scabbard away, while Aurangzib urged on him a cautious and temporising policy. Murad proposed that the brothers should march at once from the South and attack Dara before he had time to consolidate his power and to win over the captains of the imperial army posted far and near. Aurangzib pressed him not to take any compromising step or set up the banner of revolt openly, but to wait, to dissimulate, and to send hollow friendly letters to Dara, till they should know for certain that Shah Jahan was dead. He, therefore, condemned Murad's siege of Surat and public coronation as acts of too precipitate and open a character. But to such remonstrances Murad replied that Shah Jahan was already dead and that Dara's cunning hand had forged their father's style of writing and affixed the imperial seal to the letters issued in Shah Jahan's name. He rightly pointed out that no reliance could be placed on the letters from their agents at the capital reporting the old Emperor's recovery, because the houses of these agents were watched by Dara's men and they were

compelled to write to their distant masters false news at the dictation of Mir Salih, the brother of Dara's <sup>secretary</sup>, Raushan-qalam.\* In letter after letter, up to their actual starting for Northern India, we see Murad all fire and haste, while Aurangzib is cold and hesitating. Murad urges passionately but in vain, "To wait for true news from the Court is to lose time and assist our enemy;"— "The sooner you advance from Aurangabad to Burhanpur, the better for our work and truer to our agreement;"— "We are losing time and letting our business suffer, by waiting for certain news of Shah Jahan. Our enemy is growing stronger (in the meantime)" ;— "Let us start together for Agra. It only remains for <sup>you</sup> to give the order."†

### § 7. *Intrigue with Persia.*

Aurangzib had suggested to Murad that a diversion should be made against Dara by instigating the Persians and Uzbaks, to invade Afghanistan, which was then a province of the Mughal empire. This infamous counsel to bring a foreign enemy in to settle a domestic quarrel, was at first rejected by Murad as unnecessary; "As I know that the Persians, even without any prompting on our part, will make a move to wreak vengeance for the past,

\* *Adab*, 170, 205a; *Faiyaz*, 418, 429.

† *Faiyaz*, 418, 421, 422, 425, 427; *Adab*, 205a.

it does not seem proper for us to show eagerness and  
to direct them (to an invasion of India).'' A little  
later Murad changed his mind, and, reporting the  
rumour of the death of Shah Jahan, begged armed  
aid from the Persian king. The latter replied that  
he had massed 30,000 men in Qandahar besides  
another force in Khurasan, in readiness to intervene  
in India, but in the meantime he was sending a high  
officer with some presents as envoy to Murad, in  
order to learn the real state of affairs in Hindustan.  
After his coronation (December) Murad sent a letter  
to Shah Abbas II. by the hand of Taqarrub Khan,  
to announce his accession and press for military  
assistance. The Shah in reply assured Murad of  
his friendship, and stated that he had already warned  
the Persian generals and nobles to be in readiness  
and had ordered provisions to be collected for a four  
or five years' campaign in India, and horses to be  
sent to Farah, Bist, and Qandahar, and would  
despatch a force of musketeers by sea to Surat to aid  
Murad, while the rest of the Persian army would  
march inland through Qandahar to Kabul.\* These

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\* This account of the negotiations with Persia is based on *Faiyaz-ul-qawanin*, 422, 427, 430, 464, and *Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, 13—16, 23—28 (to Murad). The Shah also intrigued with the Deccani Sultans and received from Dara a petition for aid and a request to conquer Bhakkar. *Ruqaat-i-Shah Abbas Sani*, to Adil Shah (16—19, 93—100), to Qutb Shah (19—23, 89—93), to Dara (7—10), to the Governor of Multan (290—294).

promises either the Shah did not mean to keep, or they were rendered unnecessary by Aurangzib's rapid and decisive success.

*§ 8. Terms of partnership between Aurangzib and Murad.*

From the first Aurangzib had volunteered to help Murad, but on what terms? Evidently the understanding was that after their common enemy had been vanquished, the brothers would divide the empire among themselves. Yielding to Murad's request, Aurangzib sent him the following definite and solemn written agreement\* just before the march into Northern India :

"Whereas the design of acquiring the throne has now been set on foot, the standards of the Prophet have turned their faces to their goal, and all (my) pious aim is to uproot the bramble of idolatry and infidelity from the realm of Islam and to overwhelm and crush the idolatrous chief with his followers and strongholds, so that the dust of disturbance may be allayed in Hindustan,—and whereas my brother, dear as my own heart, has joined me in this holy enterprise, has confirmed anew with strong (professions of) faith the terms of co-operation (between us previously) built on promises and oaths, and has agreed that after the extirpation of the enemy

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\* *Adab, 78b-79a; Tazkirah-i-salatin-i-Chaghtaiia.*

of Church and State and the settlement of public affairs he will stay firmly in the station of alliance and help, and in this very manner, at all times and places, and in all works, he will be my companion and partner, the friend of my friends, the foe of my foes, and will not ask for any land besides the portion of imperial dominions that will be left to him at his request,—therefore, I write that, so long as this brother does not display any (conduct) opposed to oneness of aim, oneness of heart, and truthfulness, my love and favour to him will daily increase; I shall consider our losses and gains as alike, and at all times and under all conditions I shall help him; I shall favour him even more than now, after my object has been gained and the God-forsaken idolator has been overthrown. I shall keep my promise, and, as previously settled, I shall leave to him the *Panjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sindh* (Bhakkar and Tatta),—the whole of that region to the Arabian Sea, and I shall make no objection to it. As soon as the idolator has been rooted out and the bramble of his tumult has been weeded out of the garden of the empire,—in which work your help and comradeship is necessary,—I shall without the least delay give you leave to go to this territory. As to the truth of this desire I take *God and the Prophet as witnesses!*"

Aurangzib's confidential officer, Aqil Khan

Razi, tells us (p. 25) a few details of the terms of the alliance. "Aurangzib, deeming it politic to be united with Murad, sent him a loving letter begging him to come to him, and making this solemn promise and agreement: (1) One-third of the booty would belong to Murad Bakhsh and two-thirds to Aurangzib. (2) After the conquest of the whole empire, the Panjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Sindh would belong to Murad, who would set up the standard of kingship there, issue coins, and proclaim his own name (*kutub*) as king."

### § 9. *Murad marches out of Gujrat and joins Aurangzib.*

At last Murad's period of impatient and irksome waiting ended. Early in February, 1658, Aurangzib, then starting from Aurangabad, wrote to him to march out of his province about the time when he himself might be expected to reach the Narmada.\* For a long time Murad had been uncertain as to which route the imperial army would take in approaching Gujrat,—whether by way of Ajmir in his north or from Malwa in his east. At the end of January his spies brought him news that Jaswant had arrived near Ujjain with only three or four thousand troopers. So, Murad made light of the enemy and set out from Ahmadabad (25th

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 43; *Faiyaz*, 430.

February) north-eastwards by Modasa, crossed the frontier of his province on 13th March, and reached Mandesor on the 14th, occupying the villages of Malwa on the way.\* We next hear of him a good deal southwards at Dohad, on 4th April. In the meanwhile he had learnt that Jaswant's force was many times stronger than his own, and so he had hurriedly retreated towards his own territory to wait for news of Aurangzib, of whom he had not heard anything during the entire month of March. [Faiyaz 445; Kambu, 11a.]

Jaswant had issued from Ujjain westwards by the Banswara road, and taken post six miles from Kachraud, to wait for Murad. That prince was then 36 miles away, and on learning of the enemy's strength and position, he prudently made a detour to avoid Kachraud and arrive nearer to Aurangzib's line of advance. In pursuance of this plan Murad marched south-east from Dohad, crossed the pass of Jhabua, and encamped at Mandalpur (probably Barmandal).† Here, on 13th April, he received a

\* Faiyaz, 426, 428, 433, 440—444. Modasa, 23°28' N. 73°22' E. (*Ind. Atlas*, 22 N. E.). Mandesor, 24 N. 75°5' E. (*Ind. Atlas*, 35 S.E.).

† Ishwardas, 17a. A. N. 56-57. Aqil, 22. Dohad, 22°50' N. 74°20' E. (Sheet 36 S. W.) Kachraud, 23°25' N. 75°21' E. (36 N. E.), 36 miles n. w. of Ujjain. Jhabua, 22°46' N. 74°39' E. (Sheet 36 S. E.). Barmandal, 22°51' N. 75°8' E., stands 29 miles west of Dipalpur and 46 m. south of Kachraud (Sheet 36 S. E.). There is a place named Mundla 7 miles west of Dipalpur. Dipalpur, 22°50' N. 75°36' E. about 24 miles s. s. w. of Ujjain.

confidential messenger from Aurangzib and the news of the latter having arrived in the neighbourhood. Then Murad resumed his march, and next day he joined Aurangzib on the way, a few miles north-east of Dipalpur. The armies of the two brothers were now united, because the enemy was at hand and a battle was imminent.

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## CHAPTER XIV.

### AURANGZIB ADVANCES FROM THE DECCAN, 1658.

#### § I. *Aurangzib's anxieties before the war of succession.*

From 4th October 1657, when Aurangzib retired from the war with Bijapur, to 25th January 1658, when he began his march towards Hindustan as a claimant to the throne, he passed through a most anxious and critical time. Events which he could not possibly control were moving fast, and he was bound to move also if he was not to perish. And yet the future was so dark and the danger of every possible course of action so great, that a wise decision was extremely difficult to make. His present position was daily growing more untenable, while the future was ominous. But the difficulties, great and complex, which he overcame raise to the highest pitch our admiration for his coolness, sagacity, power of managing men, and diplomatic skill. If it be urged that these do not completely account for his success and that he was also beholden to Fortune, then the impartial historian of the period must admit that Aurangzib had done everything to deserve Fortune's help.

Whichever way Aurangzib turned, he was faced with danger. The exulting Deccanis interpreted his retreat from Bidar as a confession of defeat. The Bijapuris boasted that they had rolled the tide of Mughal invasion back; their armies tried to hem the imperialists round; and their local officers drove out isolated Mughal outposts. Even the Sultan of Gol-konda seized the opportunity of the retirement of Mughal troops: he renewed his efforts to retain a hold on the Karnatak and tried to seize some villages near the frontier fort of Udgir.\*

Yet Aurangzib could not remain where he was. The news had got out that the Emperor had ordered peace to be made and recalled the additional troops sent to the Deccan. It was impossible for Aurangzib to punish the Bijapuris by arms, or to overawe them by a display of superior force. He could not even safely stay in their territory. A cruel fate threatened to snatch away from his grasp the fruits of his long and costly war with Bijapur, just when he was about to taste them. True, Adil Shah had agreed by solemn treaty to pay a huge indemnity and to cede the fort of Parenda and a large tract of land. But how could he be held to his promise now?

\* The Bijapur historian asserts that Aurangzib escaped with his army from the Bijapur territory only by bribing the *wazir* Khan Muhammad (*Basatin-i-salatin*, 349). *Adab*, 70b, 197a.

Concessions wrung by force could be maintained by force alone.

Aurangzib, therefore, determined to play a game of boldness in order to realise the terms of the treaty before the Bijapuris could recover from their recent defeats or learn of the full extent of the weakness and distraction of the imperial Government. He at first gave it out that he would stay at Bidar in readiness to punish the Bijapuris if they broke their word. Later on he announced a wish to march in person to Ahmadnagar, and actually sent his army under his son there, in order to overawe the refractory *qiladar* of Parenda, who was not yielding up his charge. In his letters to Bijapur he frequently invoked his father's authority in demanding the quick payment of the promised indemnity and threatened war in case of default.

*§ 2. Aurangzib is forced to choose between two evils : to lose his chance for the crown ; or to lose all the gains of the Bijapur war.*

But this policy of facing round to Bijapur and making military demonstrations in the South had its drawbacks too. The affairs of Hindustan had necessarily to be neglected. The longer Aurangzib delayed in maturing his plans for contesting the throne, proclaiming himself a claimant, and marching on Hindustan, the greater was the time that

Dara would gain for recalling the chief captains from the Deccan, winning over officers and men far and near, consolidating his own power, and effectually counteracting Aurangzib's possible designs. Moreover, during this period of suspense all ambitious and selfish men were likely to go over to Dara in the belief that the timid and slow Aurangzib would never make himself Emperor. [*Adab*, 94a.]

If, on the other hand, Aurangzib concentrated his forces, made a public claim to the throne, marched northwards and openly broke with the imperial Government by enlisting troops and forcibly detaining with himself the officers ordered back to the Court,—then he would, no doubt, check Dara in time, he would secure the adhesion of ambitious adventurers. But at the same time the helpless condition of Shah Jahan, the civil war among the princes, and the temporary collapse of the imperial authority would become patent to Bijapur, and all hope of getting Parenda or the promised indemnity would be gone. And at the same time his other enemies in the South would raise their heads: Golkonda would recover the reluctantly ceded and eagerly coveted province of Karnatak; Shivaji would raid the Junnar and Ahmadnagar districts. In short, the fruits of the last two years' warfare in the South would be totally lost to him.

The whole history of Aurangzib's changing

anxieties and hopes, plans and devices, and the variations of his policy with every fresh development during this eventful period, is clearly and fully unfolded in his numerous confidential letters to Mir Jumla preserved in the *Adab-i-Alamgiri*.\* Briefly put, his first plan was to realise the terms of the Bijapur treaty as quickly as possible and then, secure about the Deccan, to embark on the struggle for the throne. The success of this plan, depended on the Bijapuris promptly fulfilling their promises, before the secret of Shah Jahan's helpless illness leaked out. The letters tell the story of how the hope of a speedy settlement with Bijapur daily grew fainter and fainter, how he tried diverse means to get the promised territory and money, how he conceded to Bijapur one by one the hard terms wrung out of it by the treaty,—till at last, in despair of getting anything from Bijapur, he gave up all thought of the South, and turned his undivided attention and resources to the pursuit of his schemes in Northern India.

### § 3. *Mir Jumla sent to get Parenda fort.*

Compelled to give up for the present the idea of further conquests from Bijapur, Aurangzib, on

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\* *Adab*, 92a—95a (Aurangzib to Mir Jumla), 197a—206a (Qabil Khan, by order of Aurangzib, to Mir Jumla), 178b (Qabil Khan to Aurangzib).

28th September, sent Mir Jumla towards Parenda to take delivery of the fort in terms of the treaty.<sup>143</sup> Qazi Nizama, who accompanied the Mir, was soon afterwards deputed to Bijapur to realise the promised indemnity. But before the Mir's departure, Aurangzib had held long and secret consultations with him and taken his advice on every possible contingency in anticipation. Even after Mir Jumla had gone towards Parenda, Aurangzib wrote to him almost every day, and important oral messages were delivered and consultations held with him by means of confidential officers like Shaikh Mir and Abul Fath, who made repeated trips between the prince and the minister. Not a step was taken without first seeking Mir Jumla's advice. "I have no friend or confidant but you," as Aurangzib told him.

#### § 4. *Aurangzib retreats from Kaliani and Bidar to Aurangabad.*

The prince set out on his return from Kaliani on 4th October and reached Bidar in five days. A Mughal garrison under Ali Beg was left to hold Kaliani. At Bidar, according to the Emperor's last orders, Aurangzib was to halt and keep hold of the conquered territory. But untoward events rendered his stay here useless and even dangerous. High officers like Mahabat Khan and Rao Chhatra Sal had left for Delhi at the imperial summons. Another

great general, Nasiri Khan, though entreated by Aurangzib to stay till he was relieved, had abandoned his post at Bir to return to his charge of Raisin in Malwa. The retreat of the army from Kaliani was taken to mean an abandonment of the new conquest. The Bijapuris grew bolder and attacked detached Mughal parties wherever they could find them. Their general Afzal Khan with a large army crossed the Binathora river and advanced to recover the Kaliani and Bidar districts. Worst of all, the Bijapuris intercepted near Naldrug Aurangzib's despatch to Mir Jumla together with the deciphered copy of a secret letter he had received from his agent at Delhi, and thus they learnt the truth about Shah Jahan's critical condition and the hostility between Dara and his brothers.\* Aurangzib himself was growing more and more anxious at having got no fresh letter from Delhi for several days past. Was his father dead? If so, he must make an attempt for the throne without further loss of time.

So, he provided for the future with his usual foresight and wisdom. Bidar fort was repaired, the ravages of the late siege restored, its artillery properly arranged, and the necessary provisions and munitions stored. A garrison of 5,500 under Mir Jafar was left here. At this time Aurangzib wrote

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\* Kambu, 6b; Adab, 197a, 203a, 149b, 157b; Aqil Khan, 16. Naldrug, 27 miles n. e. of Sholapur (*Ind. At.* 57).

to Murad a letter which merely said, "You have not written to me for a long time past.....I shall soon return to Aurangabad. You must have heard the news about the imperial Court." But his real message, proposing an offensive and defensive alliance between the two brothers against Dara, was orally entrusted to Allah Yar, the confidential messenger who carried the letter to Murad. He also wrote similar letters to Shuja in Bengal. A communication received from Delhi on the 17th, after a long silence, only confirmed his suspicion that Shah Jahan had lost his control and that affairs at Court had taken a new turn. Therefore, he made up his mind, and started from Bidar on 18th October, 1657.\*

Immediately there was the greatest rejoicing in the Deccani kingdoms. Here were the Mughals abandoning their late conquests as untenable! In vain did Aurangzib try to put a bold face on the matter; in vain did he write to Qutb Shah: "The retreat of my army was due to a wish to reassure the people of Bijapur who were frightened by its presence and had abandoned the cultivation of their lands, and also because I had got news that my Begam's illness had increased." [Adab, 71a.] The plea was too palpably false to be believed.

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\* Adab, 92b, 169, 199a; Kambu, 6b.

While his vanquished enemies were raising their heads in the South, and a storm was brewing against him in the North, Aurangzib received one of the severest domestic shocks: the day after leaving Bidar\* he learnt that his principal wife and the mother of three of his sons had died at Aurangabad on the 8th of the month.

Shah Jahan had ordered Aurangzib to stay at Bidar; but the prince now got a plausible excuse for marching to Aurangabad, *viz.*, to console his children newly bereaved of their mother. For some weeks after leaving Bidar he did not write any letter to the Emperor, nor give any reason for his return to Aurangabad. [Ad. 198.] But he corresponded frequently with Shuja and Murad, especially the latter, who was nearest to him, and thus built up an alliance against Dara. Murad's first letter, sent with a confidential servant named Muhammad Raza on 19th October, had crossed Aurangzib's letter to him (written about the 15th). And now, assured of his support, Aurangzib sent him the key to a cypher in which their future correspondence was to be conducted, as "prudence is needful, and writing in the ordinary alphabet is not proper."<sup>†</sup>

\* *Adab*, 198a, asserts that Aurangzib learnt the news on 19th October one march out of Bidar, but 190a states that the news reached Aurangzib's Court at Bidar in the night preceding the 18th.

† Aurangzib to Murad (*Adab*, 169a-170a), to Shuja (*Adab*, 170a—171a). Murad to Aurangzib (*Falyaz*, 413—435).

*§ 5. He waits in uncertainty for news of Shah Jahan's condition.*

On leaving Bidar, Aurangzib's plan at first was to go to Pathri, some 120 miles north, where the road for Burhanpur and Hindustan branches off from that leading to Aurangabad. If he heard of Shah Jahan's death on the way he would follow the former route and march into Northern India; otherwise he would set his face westwards and return to Aurangabad, the seat of his viceroyalty. But the period of uncertainty was only prolonged; no decisive information came from Delhi, and for weeks after leaving Bidar, Aurangzib passed his time in the greatest anxiety and vacillation. [Ad. 198a.]

On 18th October he learnt from a letter of his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had become helpless; on the 21st came another letter, saying that the Emperor's illness was decreasing. A third letter, received on the 22nd, brought news of an opposite tenor: Dara had become supreme at Court and was daily strengthening his position. A secret message from the collector of Agra, evidently professing devotion, reached Aurangzib at this time. It only confirmed his worst suspicions: the very fact of such a letter being written meant that a demise of royalty had taken place or was very imminent; "one of these two alternatives must have happened,

—Shah Jahan is either dead or a helpless invalid.”  
[Ad. 199-200, 169b.]

In view of these facts Aurangzib proposed to send his son Muhammad Sultan with an army to Burhanpur, to close the ferry over the Tapti river, to detain in the Deccan nobles like Nasiri Khan then returning north at the imperial summons, and also to assemble the local landholders in the prince's service and enlist new troops. But to do so would have been to commit himself openly; it would have been an overt act of rebellion, which he could not have explained away if Shah Jahan recovered. Aurangzib, therefore, hesitated and asked Mir Jumla's opinion, who condemned the proposal and requested that Muhammad Sultan should be sent towards Parenda instead. [Ad. 200a, 201b.]

#### § 6. *Mir Jumla returns after failing to get delivery of Parenda fort.*

In fact, while days and weeks wore on without the expected event taking place at Delhi, Aurangzib and Mir Jumla were wistfully looking towards Parenda. Every letter of Aurangzib to the Mir contained an urgent order “to settle the affair of Parenda as quickly as possible, in order that the most important business of all may be undertaken before it is too late.” The minister still flattered himself that the fort could be secured by threat or

bribe, and both these means were employed in turn. But Aurangzib made a more correct estimate of the character of the Bijapuris and their future line of action than Mir Jumla did. He frankly wrote, "No trust in the words of the Bijapuris...They used to lie even in the lifetime of Khan Muhammad (who was in our interest). There is no hope that the affair (of peace) will be accomplished...No good waiting in vain near the fort of Parenda." [Ad. 200b, 93.]

Mir Jumla, however, persisted in his own view. At his request Aurangzib sent him solemn written promises of high favours addressed to the *qiladar* of Parenda to induce him to give up the fort. But the attempt failed. Then Mir Jumla tried a show of force. To please him, Aurangzib reluctantly sent Muhammad Sultan with a part of the army from his side at Pathri (4th Nov.) to join the Mir near Parenda. The young prince was told to place himself under Mir Jumla's orders, and "to be guided entirely by his judgment." [Ad. 201b, 203.]

Mir Jumla had hoped that the force accompanying Sultan would be exaggerated by popular report and this would cow down the Bijapuri *qiladar*. Aurangzib even made a public declaration that he was himself going to Ahmadnagar to coerce the Bijapuris, and ordered the palace there to be got ready for his use.\* But all these tricks failed.

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\* *Adab*, 71a, 150b.

The news of Shah Jahan's illness became public. The Bijapuris shrewdly guessed the situation. They knew that Aurangzib, with his depleted force and distraction about the succession, was not prepared to renew the war with them, and so they delayed yielding their forts and paying the promised indemnity. Mir Jumla, still hoping against hope, lingered near Parenda, trusting that his envoy at the Bijapur Court would influence the Sultan and his ministers and secure the peaceful surrender of Parenda. Though every moment was precious for "the most important business of all" and Aurangzib was impatient to get Mir Jumla back at his side to make the necessary preparations for war with Dara, yet he permitted the Mir to continue in that quarter with M. Sultan for weeks longer, if by so doing he expected to get Parenda. About 6th December Sultan was recalled to his father's side and Prince Muazzam was sent in his place to Mir Jumla's camp near Bir. [Adab, 93b-94a, 94b.]

But the hope of getting Parenda and the war-indemnity grew fainter and fainter, and, as the complexion of affairs at Delhi grew more and more ominous, Aurangzib relaxed and finally abandoned all his claims on Bijapur and tried to make friends with Adil Shah in a fashion amusing to those who know not the crooked ways of diplomacy. As early as the end of October he had instructed Mir

Jumla to terminate the affair of Bijapur by giving up all claims to Parenda and tribute, and remaining content with Adil Shah's promises and oaths to maintain peace on the withdrawal of the Mughal army. But evidently Mir Jumla still hoped to get the cessions, and so he did not then adopt the policy here recommended. He spent three months in the Bir district, within easy reach of Parenda, in the vain hope of inducing the Bijapuris to keep their promises. At last even he was undeceived; he confessed that there was no good in staying there any longer. His return to Aurangabad was hastened by a peremptory order of recall received from Shah Jahan about 22nd December. Leaving Bir about the 27th of the month, he reached Aurangabad about the first of January, 1658. [Adab, 202b, 94b.]

### *§ 7. Aurangzib's preparations for the war of succession.*

Aurangzib had arrived at Aurangabad on 11th November, 1657, and set himself to the task of preparing the way for his own succession to the throne. He had one eye turned on Mir Jumla at Bir and another on Shah Jahan at Agra. The idea of his marching to Ahmadnagar to overawe the Bijapuri officers was definitely abandoned. On 28th October he had taken a very necessary

precaution by sending a force under Malik Husain to Handia to seize all the ferries of the Narmada and prevent correspondence between Dara and the Mughal officers in the Deccan. He also wrote friendly letters to the Gond Rajahs of Deogarh and Chanda, through whose territories his road to Agra lay. A few men in his camp who had tried to send news to Agra were punished and carefully watched, and a secret courier was expelled. At the same time he urged his friends to collect news: "We should be on the watch to get news from all sides." His alliance with Murad was made strong and its terms clearly defined. Letters were frequently sent to Shuja, both by way of Agra—which route was unsafe, being in his enemy's hands,—and also through Orissa. But distance forbade any useful league or concerted action between these two brothers. So, they were content to vow mutual friendship and a common hostility to Dara.\*

But what line of action was Aurangzib to adopt now? His followers were looking up to him to declare his policy. A prompt decision was required from him; but a decision at this stage was most difficult to make, and beset with dangers. The news from the imperial Court was conflicting. The first intimation of Shah Jahan's illness was followed by a long silence; from about 8th October to the

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\* *Adab*, 93a, 201b, 170b, 203a.

18th he received no tidings of his father's condition. Then (on 18th October) he learnt from his agent at Delhi that Shah Jahan had lost all control and that the state of affairs at the capital had taken a new character. Three days afterwards came a letter (written on the 5th) saying that Shah Jahan's illness was decreasing and that he was conducting business without difficulty. The next day brought another letter (dated the 10th) from his agent at Court, which stated that Dara had virtually usurped the government and was doing everything at his own will,— changing officers, taking away *jagirs*, and collecting men and money, though the orders were issued in Shah Jahan's name. Other communications from Agra only increased his distraction and uncertainty about Shah Jahan's real condition.

### § 8. *Aurangzib's distraction.*

His followers were equally distracted. As he wrote to Mir Jumla, "The army of this province, after a year's hard campaigning, has lost heart on hearing of the Emperor's illness, and has been unsettled in various ways. They are in greater trouble than can be described. Many (of my) officers want to return to the Emperor." [Ad. 93b.] How harassing Aurangzib's anxieties were and how open to objection every possible line of action before him was, will be seen from the

following letter which he wrote to Mir Jumla in cypher :

"The desires of my well-wishers can be realised only when the occurrence of Shah Jahan's death is verified, and the news of it arrives. Otherwise, what probability is there that in the Emperor's lifetime and before the divulgence of the heart's secret desire of my other comrades (allies) such a work will be undertaken, and the project of advancing and crossing the (frontier) river carried out? But I gather from my Court agent's letter that it is impossible for the Emperor to recover from this disease ; he has not strength enough left to pull him back to life. Most probably the affair has (already) become past remedy.

If in such circumstances, I delay in equipping my army and publishing my claim (to the throne), in what hope will men consent to keep my company? If the officers here, seeing my negligence and indifference, return to the Court, and Dara becomes aware of my condition, it will be impossible for me to attract other worldlings and seekers of rank. So, I have determined on this :—if we can quickly conclude the affair of Bijapur, it will be good, because then I can reach Burhanpur before the screen is withdrawn, Shaista Khan recalled to Court, somebody else appointed in his place (as Governor of Malwa), and Dara wins over the zamindars (of that province) and seizes the forts of Raisin, Mandu, etc. The fort of Raisin, which is under Nasiri Khan, can be got (by us) now without effort, and the army of this province can be led by hope to accompany me, and fresh troops may be carefully enlisted.

• But if the Bijapur affair is delayed, and my scattered

forces cannot be concentrated, and, in the meantime, the true news (of Shah Jahan's death) arrives, the time for most of the above works will have already slipped away. That is the reason why I have been hurrying you." [Ad. 94a.]

When, in the 4th week of December, Mir Jumla received a strict order of recall from Shah Jahan, Aurangzib's depression reached its lowest point. He wrote to his confidant: "Friend, God assist you! What shall I write about my own troubled state or describe how the days pass over me? I have no remedy save patience." [Ad. 95a.]

Murad, too, was urging him in letter after letter, to be immediately up and doing, and not to give Dara further time to strengthen his own position and cripple his brothers' power beyond repair. But Aurangzib refused to raise the banner of rebellion before knowing for certain that Shah Jahan was dead. His own army was small, and he was making desperate efforts to collect the sinews of war by securing the payment of at least one portion of the Bijapur indemnity. Possibly also, he waited to let Dara show his hand and divide his strength by attacking one of the brothers first. [Anecdotes § 6; Ad. 205a.]

But the quick march of events forced Aurangzib's hand. He learnt by 24th November that Dara

had decided to send an imperial army against Shuja who was advancing from Bengal. Shah Jahan's policy (he inferred) was clearly this : 'So long as a few days of his life remain and out of regard for him no unfilial movement is undertaken from any quarter, he will make such arrangements that after (his death) no injury may be done by any (of the other three princes) to Dara.' [Ad. 205b.]

Dara's plan with regard to the South was now fully unfolded. He wanted to weaken each of his two brothers there and set one against the other. For this he made the helpless Shah Jahan transfer Berar from Aurangzib to Murad and remove the latter from the viceroyalty of Gujrat. But Murad had discussed with Aurangzib and prepared himself beforehand for such a contingency ; he refused either to take Berar or to give up Gujrat. [Faiyaz. 413-414.] Dara then sent two imperial armies under Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan, the governors-designate of Malwa and Gujrat, to bar the path of Aurangzib and expel Murad from Gujrat. These two forces left Agra on 18th and 26th December. Murad's *jagirs* in Malwa were taken away, and Shaista Khan removed from that province as friendly to Aurangzib. In December, Murad crowned himself and took Surat fort by force ; and such overt rebellion could not be left unpunished by the imperial Government. Lastly, Mir Jumla received

a formal imperial letter of recall which it would have been flat rebellion to disregard. Similar letters reached Aurangzib's officers. [Ad. 94b, 202b; Kambu 10a.]

*§ 9. Aurangzib invites Mir Jumla to his side  
to help in preparing for war.*

The time for action had at last arrived. Further inactivity under these circumstances was impossible if Aurangzib hoped ever to be king or even to live in freedom. His mind was made up. He sent a most flattering letter to Mir Jumla, highly extolling his wisdom, thanking him for his entire devotion to his interests, and placing him above all his other followers :—

"I know you are faithful to your word. Your intention in going to Hindustan was and is no other than to increase my power and grandeur and to make me succeed in my heart's desire. You have often said within my hearing, 'I wish for life only that I may see the master of mankind (=Aurangzib) on the throne ; and in realising this aim I value not my life or property.' Now is the time to display your devotion. I do not need others in making the necessary equipment for this business, while you are alive. I care not for those (officers) who have been estranged from me by reason of my partiality to you. Come to me, so that with your advice I may engage in preparations for the work of gaining the crown."\*

\* Adab, 205b, (a report of Aurangzib's words that Qabil Khan wrote to Mir Jumla).

Mir Jumla returned to Aurangabad about 1st January, 1658, avowing that he was going to Agra to wait on the Emperor. But a plot had been already contrived between him and Aurangzib, and a little play was acted to save the Mir's family at the capital from Dara's vengeance. Mir Jumla feigned fear of Aurangzib's intentions and refused to see him, saying, "As I have been ordered by the Emperor to go to him, I have no choice but to obey." Aurangzib sent him a friendly message through his son Muhammad Sultan, "to drive all suspicion out of his mind" and to persuade him to visit the prince in order to receive an important oral message for the Emperor. As soon as Mir Jumla entered the chamber of Aurangzib, he was arrested at a preconcerted signal,\* and all his property and artillery seized by Aurangzib in the name of the State. But the mask had not yet been thrown off, and so Aurangzib gave an ostensible reason for this act: he publicly announced that Mir Jumla was thus punished because he had not sufficiently exerted himself against Bijapur and was in secret collusion with the two Deccani Sultans! But his real motive comes out in the letter which he wrote to the Mir after defeating Dara, when he set him free and said, "You insisted on going back to the Court at an inconvenient time in spite of my urging you to the

\* Kambu, 10b; Aqil 20; A. N., 83 and 84.

contrary."\* The captive *wazir* was lodged in the prison-fort of Daulatabad, to be released, restored to his property, and promoted to the highest rank of the nobility with the honoured titles of Premier Peer (*Khan-i-khanan*) and Faithful Friend (*Yar-i-wafadar*), as soon as Aurangzib made himself Emperor. [Ad. 96a; A. N. 191, 563.]

Even at this stage Aurangzib was not prepared to break openly with the imperial Court by taking an irrevocable step. He urged Murad to abate his ardour and practise subterfuge. For himself he announced that his loving heart had been distracted by hearing sad rumours about Shah Jahan, and that like a dutiful son he was going to Agra to see his father in his illness, release him from Dara's control, and thereby save the empire from alarm, confusion and tumult. As his pious journey to his father was likely to be resisted by Dara's creatures, he was taking his army with himself; but his mission was entirely pacific. So he wrote to Shah Jahan and the new *wazir* Jafar Khan.† .

\* Aqil, 20. Adab, 67b, 95a (Aurangzib writes, "That I imprisoned you was not due to any disloyalty on your part. Only you showed remissness in exertion and insisted on going back, &c.") Khafi Khan writes "Aurangzib imprisoned Mir Jumla at Daulatabad as a stroke of policy to prevent his ill repute." (ii. 9). The official history, *Alamgirnamah* also admits that Mir Jumla was arrested "for political reasons" (84).

† A. N. 41. Kambu 11a. A. S. B. MS. F. 56, pp. 54-57. Masum 44a-45a (incorrect paraphrase.) Adab, 123a, (after the battle of Dharmat). Faizay 466-467 (Murad to Jafar Khan).

§ 10. *Aurangzib conciliates the king of Golkonda.*

In the meantime, from the beginning of January he had been pushing his military preparations most vigorously on. First, he wanted to settle the problems of the Deccan and secure the sinews of war. Letters were written to Qutb Shah pressing him to pay up the balance of his indemnity. Since his return from Haidarabad Aurangzib's tone towards the Golkonda king had been harsh and chiding. He was particularly displeased at Abdullah having intrigued with Dara and poisoned the Emperor's ears against him. He frequently duns him for the arrears of tribute and the balance of the promised indemnity, urges him to banish from his mind the vain dream of keeping hold of the Karnatak, and warns him to withdraw from that province his officers (especially Abdul Jabbar), who were obstructing Mir Jumla's agents there. Further the Golkonda king is commanded to restore the relays of postmen established by Mir Jumla from Mughal Deccan to the Karnatak across the Golkonda territory. When Qutb Shah prayed for the remission of a part of his indemnity, Aurangzib tauntingly replied, "What can I do? You had better appeal to Jahanara and Dara, and through their mediation submit a petition to the Emperor." And again,

"You do not keep your promises but are listening to wicked and ruinous advice. I cannot save you!"\*

During the invasion of Bijapur, Qutb Shah is asked to send a contingent of auxiliaries. "You have kept 12,000 horsemen in spite of your (pretended) poverty. Send me 5,000 of them quickly, as you promised. Do not delay in providing the arrears of tribute. Recall your men from Mir Jumla's estates in the Karnatak." A harsh and rude officer, Mir Ahmad Said, was sent as Mughal envoy to Golkonda to hustle the defaulting king and exact the arrears of tribute. When Aurangzib retreated from Bidar, he thus rebuked Qutb Shah : "I learn that on hearing of the march of the imperial army from Bidar and the circulation of some false rumours (about Shah Jahan's death) among the vulgar, you have changed your attitude of fidelity, and your silly ministers have given you improper counsels,—so that you are making delay in sending escort and despatching the collected arrears of tribute; you are trusting to a fox-like policy and are passing your time idly under a false hope...Relying on false news, you have ceased to keep your former promises!" [Ad. 69-71.]

But soon afterwards his own needs forced Aurangzib to assume a gentler tone. First, he instructed Mir Ahmad not to pain the king's mind

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\* *Adab*, 59a—63b, 69a-70a (Aurangzib to Qutb Shah).

in realising the tribute due. Later on, the objectionable envoy was recalled and one more acceptable to the king was sent in his place, with instructions to behave gently to him. When his Vanguard was being sent to Burhanpur, Aurangzib urged Qutb Shah thus : "Now is the time for you to show your friendship and exert yourself that nothing unfriendly may be done." A little later, when Aurangzib himself marched northwards to contest the throne, he sent a most conciliatory letter to Qutb Shah, urging him to guard the frontiers of Mughal Karnatak from mischievous persons and not to encroach on the imperial territory.\*

*§ 11. Aurangzib tries to buy the friendship of Adil Shah.*

Aurangzib also sent friendly epistles and presents to the Queen Mother of Bijapur, urging her to expedite the payment of the indemnity, and next despatched a secret oral message to her. Just before marching to Burhanpur he wrote again to her : "I hope the Deccani Sultans will remain quiet (during my absence) and you will keep your promise (about sending the indemnity money), so that I may reward you after I have become Emperor." [Ad. 51b-52b.]

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\* *Adab*, 64, 71b, 65, 72a.

We have seen how as early as October Aurangzib had proposed to Mir Jumla a friendly settlement with Bijapur by abandoning all claims to the territory and indemnity promised by that State in the recent treaty. [Ad. 202.] This policy, held in reserve at that time, was now put in practice. Adil Shah was informed by the prince, "At Mir Jumla's wicked advice I had attacked your kingdom as well as Golkonda. Guard your people well. Let there be peace and happiness. Remain loyal and keep your promises...I agree that (1) the fort of Parenda and its dependent territory, the Konkan, and the *mahal* of Wangi, which have been annexed to the empire, together with that portion of the Karnatak which had been granted to the late Adil Shah,—should be left to you as before, and (2) out of your promised indemnity of one crore of Rupees, thirty lakhs are remitted.

Protect this country; improve its administration. Expel Shiva who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him *jagirs* in the Karnatak, far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them. Send the reduced indemnity. Be loyal, and you will be amply rewarded.—I am going to Hindustan with my army. Now is the time to show your loyalty and friendliness. The late Adil Shah had promised to send a contingent to me, should an

occasion for it arise. Do you send me at least 10,000 cavalry. I shall grant you the territory up to the bank of the Banganga. I promise not to accept the offer of Shahji or of the sons of Bahlol and other officers of yours to enter my service. So long as you remain faithful, no officer of this Court will molest your dominion. Should any one come from Hindustan to invade your country, I shall defend it." [Adab, 162-163.]

The concessions here made were ample beyond Adil Shah's fondest dreams, and he knew that they would be withdrawn as soon as Aurangzib's need was over. Indeed the above offer contained conditions liable to great latitude of interpretation; and afterwards, in his hour of victory over his rivals, Aurangzib seized this loophole to repudiate his promises and to demand more than all that Bijapur had agreed to yield by the treaty of August, 1657. [Ad. 167b.]

But some money realised from the Deccani Sultans now fell into Aurangzib's hands and helped to equip him for the arduous struggle for the throne.\* Mir Jumla's wealth and excellent park of

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\* The public money in the Deccan just before the invasion of Bijapur was 64 lakhs of Rupees,—viz., Reserves of 20 lakhs at Daulatabad and Asir, and of 30 lakhs in the other public treasuries, Golkonda indemnity of 2 lakhs of *hun* (=10 lakhs of Rupees) realised by Ahmad Said about Dec. 1656 (Adab, 195b; Waris, 121b), Bijapur present of four lakhs of Rupees in cash and kind brought to

artillery, served by European gunners, were of inestimable use to Aurangzib, who had attached them early in January. These "supplied the much-needed means of Aurangzib's progress towards his object, at this critical time," as the historian Aqil Khan Razi points out.

§ 12. ✓ *Aurangzib intrigues with the nobles at Court and the generals.*

All this time Aurangzib was intriguing actively but in secret with the courtiers at the capital and the high officers in the provinces (especially Malwa). Some anecdotes have come down to us which prove that Aurangzib was regarded by the ministers and even by Shah Jahan himself, as the ablest of the princes. I find it impossible to reject them entirely as prophecies made after the event. Of all the four sons of Shah Jahan he had the best reputation for capacity and experience; the known record of his actual performances was most varied and distinguished. Evidently all self-seeking nobles and officers recognised him as the coming man, and hastened to secure their future by doing him friendly

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Aurangabad by Abul Hasan, in the 3rd quarter of 1656 (*Adab*, 191a). From this total must be deducted the cost of the war with Bijapur and bribes to Bijapuri deserters, against which the 12 lakhs worth of booty taken at Bidar was a partial set off. What wealth, if any, Aurangzib and Muhammad Sultan secretly took from Qutb Shah we know not; but popular report greatly magnified it.

turns or at least by sending him secret assurances of their support. As Dara reported to Shah Jahan, "Aurangzib is winning over the nobles and the pillars of the State. He is doing his work by means of secret epistles."\*

The enlisting of new soldiers had been going on apace. A bounty of one month's pay was advanced to all recruits. Muhammad Beg in Kandesh was ordered to select and engage as many Bundela infantry and Buxari artillerymen of reputation as he could get. Two officers were sent to bring 2,000 maunds of saltpetre from Balapur and to buy sulphur and arsenic at Surat and convey these materials to Burhanpur for manufacturing gunpowder. Lead for making shot in sufficient quantity was stored at Burhanpur and Handia. A quantity of gunpowder and fuses, evidently taken from the Deccan forts, accompanied the Vanguard led by Muhammad Sultan. A thousand soldiers were enlisted by Sultan Beg in the *sarkar* of Bijaygarh. Many Maratha chiefs also joined Aurangzib with their contingents. In this way his army was swollen to 30,000 picked troopers, besides Mir Jumla's excellent train of cannon served by English and French gunners.†

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\* *Ruqaat-i-Alamgiri*, Nos. 54 and 5, India Office Pers. MS. 370, f. 81a; Kambu, 8b, 10a; Aqil, 23.

† *Adab*, 93b, 168b-169a; Ishwardas (16a) and Aqil (25) both

*§ 13. His band of able officers.*

Aurangzib was even stronger in officers than in men and material. During his rule of the Deccan he had gathered round himself a band of very able servants, all attached to him by gratitude and some by personal affection. They did him signal service during the contest for the throne, often giving up their lives in stemming the enemy's onset in the hard fights of the War of Succession. Those who survived naturally rose to the highest offices, and were at once the pillars of his throne and ornaments of his Court during the early years of his reign. Such were Murshid Quli Khan the *diwan*, Shaikh Mir the warrior and confidential adviser, Aqil Khan Razi the equerry and personal attendant, Qabil Khan the facile and trusty secretary, Khan-i-Zaman the energetic Inspector of Ordnance, Muhammad Tahir, a veteran captain raised to the peerage as Wazir Khan, the faithful envoy Isa Beg (created Mukhlis Khan), the highborn and experienced Shams-ud-din Mukhtar Khan, and above all that jewel of a servant, Mir Jumla, great in war, greater still in counsel. Of the imperial officers who had served in the Deccan, besides Multafat Khan, his able son Hushdar Khan, Najabat Khan, Qazi Nizama and some others,

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estimate Aurangzib's army at 30,000 strong. Also Kambu, 11b; A. N. 42.

Aurangzib secured the adhesion of Nasiri Khan, recently transferred from the Deccan to Malwa. Lastly, he released from prison and took with himself Rajah Indradyumna of Dhamdhera,\* a valiant Rajput of Malwa. Two other of the most devoted Hindu followers of Aurangzib were Rao Karan the Rajah of Bikanir and Subh-Karan the Bundela chieftain of Datia and father of the more renowned general Dalpat Rao.

Before leaving the Deccan he took steps to maintain his hold on the country during his absence. Shah Beg Khan was recalled from the Karnatak with his detachment, and ordered to guard the province. Prince Muazzam was left at Aurangabad with two high officers and a strong force to carry on the government and to prevent the public peace from being broken by Shivaji. Aurangzib did not lose his fear lest that "son of a dog," as he called the youthful Maratha leader, should seize the opportunity of his absence. His new-born son Muhammad Akbar was left in Fort Daulatabad with his harem, but two other sons, Muhammad Sultan and Muhammad Azam, accompanied him to the war. Some forts were also repaired and a wall of defence built round the suburb of Karan-pura, as the absence of the main army in Northern India might tempt spoilers. The officers were ordered to engage houses at Aurangabad and

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\* *Adab*, 99; *M.U.* ii. 265.

Burhanpur and leave their families there. Money was given to them in aid of these necessary arrangements.\*

*§ 14. He openly marches northwards to contest the throne.*

On hearing of Murad Bakhsh's coronation and Mir Jumla's arrest, Shah Jahan sent letters of reprimand to his two sons, ordering them to return to the path of obedience and duty. But they pretended to see only Dara's hand in these imperial letters, and insisted on going to the capital to pay their respects to the Emperor in person. At last, his preparations being well advanced, Aurangzib considered further delay useless, especially as Jaswant Singh and Qasim Khan on reaching Malwa were sure to strengthen Dara's interest there and organise the local zamindars to bar the road from the South. So, after giving to Murad the impatiently expected notice to start, he sent his eldest son with the Van towards Burhanpur (25th January, 1658) and himself left Aurangabad with the rest of his army eleven days afterwards (5th Feb.). He now began to exercise royal prerogatives, bestowing titles, posts, and promotions of *mansab* (rank). Muazzam was created viceroy of the Deccan and Wazir Khan that of Khandesh.†

\* *Adab* 201a, 168b, 92a, 123a; *A. N.* 43—46; *Dilkasha*, i. 18—21.

† *A. N.*, 42—46; *Aqil*, 24—26; *Kambu*, 10b; *Masum*, 42b—45a.

Burhanpur was reached on 18th February, and here the organisation of the army and the preparations for the march were completed. A month's halt was made in this town. Aurangzib had written a letter to Shah Jahan inquiring about his health and hoping that the Emperor would soon completely recover, look after the administration himself, and put an end to Dara's usurpation of the supreme authority. But day by day only alarming news of the Court reached him. His agent Isa Beg, too, arrived from Agra and fully unfolded the state of affairs there, saying how after his illness Shah Jahan doted on Dara to an extreme and that prince had made himself Emperor in all but the name. Isa Beg was the bearer of secret messages from many nobles, professing devotion to Aurangzib and asking him to push on to the capital, without fearing the largeness of the imperial army, as it was at heart hostile to Dara.

Encouraged by these promises of support and unwilling to let Jaswant Singh have more time to consolidate his power in Malwa or close the northern road effectually, Aurangzib set out from Burhanpur on 20th March. From Mandwa he sent his eldest son back to arrest and imprison Shah Nawaz Khan, who was unwilling to accompany Aurangzib in his open rebellion, and had lingered behind at Burhanpur under false pretexts. This high officer, though

he was the father-in-law of Aurangzib and descended from the royal blood of Persia, had to sacrifice liberty to loyalty, (26th March). By Aurangzib's order, he was kept a prisoner in the fort of Burhanpur for seven months.\*

*§ 15. Aurangzib crosses the Narmada and joins Murad.*

At Mandwa there is a parting of the roads to Hindustan. One path running north-eastwards crosses the Narmada at Handia. But Aurangzib took the other route, turned to the north-west, and in seven marches reached Akbarpur on the bank of the Narmada, the stream that has divided Southern India from Northern since time immemorial. Here he forded the river without the least opposition (3rd April) and then marched due north towards Ujjain, through the pass overlooked by the hill-fort of Mandu.

On 13th April he reached the environs of Dipalpur and learnt that Murad had arrived some miles west of him. A messenger was sent to invite the younger prince to join him without delay. Next day, both the armies resumed their march, and on the way, near the lake of Dipalpur, the brothers met together;

\* A. N. 46-53, 209; *Anecdotes*, § 6; Kambu, 10b; Aqil, 23-24. Mandwa is a station on the G. I. P. Railway, 19 miles n. n. e. of Burhanpur, (*Ind. Atlas*, Sheet 54).

their armies were united ; and with redoubled strength and confidence they pushed on towards Ujjain to encounter Jaswant, who was only one day's march in front. In the evening Aurangzib encamped at the village of Dharmat, on the western bank of the Gambhira (an affluent of the Chambal), and decided to fight the enemy next day.\*

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[Here in the original edition the first volume ended.]

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\* Akbarpur, 22° 9 N. 75° 32 E. on the Narmada, 13 miles west of Mandesar (*Ind. At.* Sh. 37 N. E.) The hill-fort of Mandu is 14 miles north of Akbarpur. Dipalpur, 22° 50 N. 75° 36 E. (Sh. 36 S. E.) Dharmat, 23 N. 75° 43 E. is 12 miles north of Dipalpur, 2 miles s. w. of the Fatehabad Railway Station, and 14 miles s. s. w. of Ujjain. (Sh. 36 N. E.) A. N. 53—56; Aqil Khan, 26; Ishwardas, 17.

## CHAPTER XV.

BATTLE OF DHARMAT, 15 APRIL, 1658.

### § 1. *Jaswant takes post at Dharmat.*

Reaching Ujjain with his army at the end of February, 1658, Jaswant was quite in the dark about Aurangzib's intentions and movements. So strictly did that prince watch the roads and ferries of the Narmada river that no news from the Deccan reached Jaswant. The Rajput general, however, learnt that Murad was coming from Gujerat. So, he issued from Ujjain, took post near Kachraud to bar the enemy's path, and sent his spies towards Murad's camp for further news. Murad was then 36 miles away, but on finding Jaswant's force greatly superior to his own, he prudently avoided a battle and making a wide detour round Kachraud arrived south of it, in order to be near the Narmada and Aurangzib's line of advance.

Jaswant heard of this movement, and in his present state of ignorance could not account for it. Just then he got a letter from Mandu fort telling him that Aurangzib had crossed the Narmada. A party of Dara's troops, who had fled from the fort of Dhar at the approach of Aurangzib, now joined Jaswant and confirmed the news. The Maharajah

was at his wits' end; so well had Aurangzib's movements been kept secret that Jaswant had not heard of his march from Burhanpur, begun as early as 20th March, nor of his having crossed the Narmada. The first news that he got of Aurangzib was that the prince was already in Malwa and rapidly marching on Ujjain.\* At the same time, from Murad's present position, a junction between the two brothers seemed most likely.

In utter perplexity Jaswant returned to Ujjain. Here a Brahman envoy, surnamed Kavi Rai, delivered to him Aurangzib's message advising him to give up his opposition and return peacefully to Jodhpur as the prince was only going to Agra to visit his father without any thought of waging war. Jaswant declined, saying, "I must carry out the Emperor's orders. I cannot retrace my steps without disgrace."

He then advanced 14 miles south-west of Ujjain and encamped opposite Dharmat, to block the path of the enemy coming up from the south. Here another startling news reached him: Murad had joined Aurangzib (14th April) and the two were within a day's march of him. This was a contingency that Jaswant had not thought of before. His waiting strategy had failed to keep the two

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\* A. N., 56-57; Kambu, 11a; Aqil Khan, 22.

princes apart. How was he to meet their united forces now? He quailed at the prospect.

### §2. *Jaswant's parley with Aurangzib.*

Next morning when Aurangzib's army had already begun to march to the encounter, Jaswant "in mortal fear" attempted to parley. He sent a messenger to Aurangzib to beg the prince's pardon and say, "I do not want to fight, and I have no power to show audacity to your Highness. My wish is to visit and serve you. If you pardon me and give up your project of a fight, I shall go and wait on you." But Aurangzib knew his own advantage and was not willing to strengthen the enemy by granting him time. His reply was, "As I have already started, delay is out of place now. If you really mean what you say, leave your army and come alone to Najabat Khan, who will guide you to my son Muhammad Sultan, and that prince will introduce you to me and secure your pardon."\*

Such a humiliating submission before striking a blow, the chief of the Rathors could not bring himself to make. He prepared for fight. But a general who shrinks in terror, changes his mind, and attempts to gain time by parleying before a battle, is not likely to win in the clash of arms; he

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\* A. N., 58, 64-65; Aqil, 27-28; Ishwardas, 19; Masum, 46b-47b.

has already lost that confidence which is half the victory.

Jaswant had come to Malwa in the hope that the mere prestige of the imperial banners would send the rebellious princes back to their provinces, and that all that he would have to undertake was a mere demonstration of force. Now, when too late, he realised that his adversaries were in deadly earnest and ready to fight to the bitter end. He marshalled his forces against them, but most reluctantly, as if he were going to commit a high crime; his spirit quailed before that of Aurangzib. A battle fought between two such generals can have but one issue.

### § 3. *Jaswant's difficulties.*

Jaswant had been charged by Shah Jahan to send the two rebellious princes back to their own provinces with as little injury to them as possible, and to fight them only as a last resource.\* At all times, a subject opposing two princes of the blood, a servant fighting for a distant master against two chiefs who acknowledge no higher authority than their own will, is severely handicapped. In Jaswant's case the natural inferiority of his position was aggravated by the commands he had received from Shah Jahan.

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\* Kambu, 11a; Masum, 46b; *Storia*, i. 258; Bernier, 37, 38.

While Aurangzib followed his own judgment only, knew his own mind, and fired by the highest ambition, pursued his object with all his resources and singleness of aim, ready to do and dare his utmost,—Jaswant was hesitating, distracted by the conflict between the instructions from Agra and the exigencies of the actual military situation in Malwa, and entirely dependent for his own line of action on what his opponents would do. A general so situated cannot have the advantage of taking the aggressive and forcing the enemy to abandon his plans; nor can he pursue his aim with iron will to the bitter end.

His army, too, was an ill-knit group of discordant elements. The various Rajput clans were often divided from each other by hereditary feuds and quarrels about dignity and precedence. Unlike Jai Singh, Jaswant was not the commander to humour and manage them, and make all obey the will of one common head. Then, again, there was the standing aloofness between Hindus and Muhammadans. It had been found next to impossible to brigade these creeds together for a campaign under one general. Hence, in the first siege of Qandahar all the Rajputs of the Mughal Van marched under Rajah Bithaldas and all the Muslims under Bahadur Khan, two co-ordinate authorities subject only to the commander-in-chief.

[Waris, 27b.] In the Bijapur war also all the Rajputs of the reinforcements sent from Hindustan were led by Chhatra Sal Hada, and all the Muslim troops by Mahabat Khan. It was only a commander standing in a position of unquestioned superiority above the heads of the other generals, that could make the two creeds work in amity. Aurangzib was one such by birth as much as by merit. But Jaswant was a mere *mansabdar*, only two grades higher than Qasim Khan, and socially equal to him, as both were governors of provinces. There could not, therefore, be unity of command in the imperial army. Indeed, Qasim Khan's orders were to co-operate with the Maharajah, and not to act as his subordinate.

This division of command accentuated the difference of creeds in the imperial army and rendered its success difficult. Several of the Muslim officers moreover, were, secretly friendly to Aurangzib or had been corrupted by him. The history of the battle that followed proves this suspicion true: while the imperialists lost 24 Rajput chiefs in the conflict, only one Muhammadan general was killed on their side. "Qasim Khan and all the imperial troops who in this battle had not become the target of the arrows of Fate, fled," as the official history issued by Aurangzib records. This circumstance lends colour to the theory that they had kept them-

selves out of harm's way. The day following the battle four Muhammadan officers of the imperial army came over to Aurangzib and were rewarded by him.\* Such men could not have fought loyally twenty-four hours earlier.

#### *§ 4. Jaswant's plan of battle.*

Finally, Jaswant as a general was no match for Aurangzib, who had "aged in war." Contemporary historians† blame him for his incapacity, inexperience and faulty plans. He chose his ground badly and so cramped his men that the horsemen could not manoeuvre freely nor gather momentum for a charge; he failed to send timely succour to the divisions that needed it most, and, the battle once begun, he lost control over his forces as if he were a mere divisional leader and not the supreme commander of all. Lastly, he made the fatal mistake of despising artillery. It is said that the night before the battle, his chief officer Askaran, surnamed Kirtiwant, had urged him, "The two princes have drawn up their guns in front of us. The brave Rajputs do not love their families or own lives very much, so that when they move to the encounter they will never step back. The artillery of the other side will annihilate them. If you only

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\* *A. N.*, 72, 78; *Storia*, i. 258; Bernier, 37-38.

† Kambu, 11; Aqil, 28, 30; *Faiyaz*, 469.

give the order, I with 4000 of our men shall fall on their artillery at midnight, slay the gunners and capture the guns. Thereafter the enemy will not have strength enough to defeat us in a pitched battle." But Jaswant replied, "It is inconsistent with manliness and Rajput usage to employ stratagem or make a night-attack. Next morning, with God's grace, I shall use a plan by which their artillery will lie at its place on one side, and the Rajputs coming upon their troops will gain the victory. Not a man (of us) will be hurt by the guns." [Ishwardas, 20a.]

Evidently Jaswant's plan was to skirt the enemy's artillery and come to close quarters with their troops, disregarding the gun-fire during the first few minutes of the wild gallop. But such tactics could have succeeded only if the charge had been made on a wide level plain and also if the opposing artillery had been served by Indians proverbially slow in turning and firing their pieces. But when the battle began, the Rajputs were penned within a narrow space with ditches and entrenchments on their flanks, and subjected to a deadly fire before they could spread out for a charge. Secondly, after they had passed by the enemy's artillery and engaged Aurangzib's troops, the French and English gunners of the prince quickly turned their guns sideways and began to mow down

the Rajputs in their new position. It was truly a contest between swords and gunpowder, and artillery triumphed over cavalry.

The ground\* where Jaswant took his stand was

\* Kambu says, "These two inexpert generals, through faulty counsel, took post in a narrow swamp and uneven ground. Next morning when they marshalled their troops, a large body was packed in that narrow pass, one behind another, and some stood here and there on the sides, without order or method.....Owing to the narrowness of the field and the pressure [of the enemy] from the two sides, the imperialists found no space to manoeuvre." (11b). Aqil Khan supports this statement and adds, "Jaswant drew up his troops on uneven ground, on the bank of the Narmada (!); having pouled water he made 200 yards of ground near it muddy." (28, 30.) Murad's own description is, "Jaswant encamped on a plot of land which had ditches of water on all the four sides [joined to] swamps, and set up entrenchments round it." (Faizaz, 469). Bernier's description of the battle-field is imaginary; the Persian histories do not speak of any "disputed passage" across the river, as the fight seems to have taken place more than a mile from the bank. I have visited the scene and found there not a single "rock in the bed of the river"; and the banks are not of "uncommon height," as is asserted by Bernier, (38-39).

The battle evidently took place west of Fatihabad, close to the Ratan Singh Monument, and not east of the village of Dharmat. (*A. N.*, names the village *Dharmat-pur*, but the *Ind. Atlas*, sheet 36 N. E., and the villagers call it *Dharmat*). We read in *A. N.*, "One *kos* from Dharmatpur Jaswant barred the prince's road.....Jaswant encamped opposite Dharmatpur, one *kos* from Aurangzib's army.....Aurangzib's tent was pitched on the bank of the *nala* of Churnarayanah." The right bank of the river, facing Dharmat, slopes gently, and could not have presented any difficulty to the attacking cavalry and guns.\* There is no swamp opposite Dharmat, but some damp soil and *nalas* near Ratan Singh's Memorial, I conclude from the Persian accounts that the battle was fought in a plain and not in the bed of a river.

narrow and uneven, with ditches and swamps on its flanks. One historian asserts that Jaswant had deliberately poured water on 200 yards of ground in front of him and trodden it into mud, evidently to arrest the enemy's charge. His position was also surrounded by trenches thrown up during the previous day, as the usual precaution against night-attacks. In short, the imperial army seemed to be standing on an island, ready for a siege. No worse disposition can be imagined for a pitched battle to be fought by cavaliers on mettled horses.

Of the forces engaged, we know that Aurangzib had 30,000 men with him. To this must be added Murad's contingent, probably less than 10,000. The imperial army is variously estimated. Aurangzib puts it at "30,000 horse and many infantry," Ishwardas at 50,000; Murad goes even further and counts the enemy as 50 or 60 thousand. Aqil Khan estimates it at 30,000. So, we may conclude that the two armies were almost equally matched and numbered a little over 35,000 men each.\*

On Aurangzib's side the divisions were thus formed: The Van, said to have consisted of 8,000 steel-clad veterans, under Prince Muhammad Sultan

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\* *Adab*, 164a; *Ishwardas*, 19a, (but, on 17a, he puts Murad's army at 70,000 men !) *Faiyaz* 469; *Aqil Khan*, 28.

and Najabat Khan, with Zulfiqar Khan and some guns guarding its front,—the main artillery under Murshid Quli Khan,—the right wing under Murad,—the left wing under Multafat Khan, with the boy-prince Muhammad Azam as honorary commander,—the Advanced Reserve (*iltimsh*) under Murtaza Khan with Aurangzib's own guards,—the Centre under Aurangzib himself, with Shaikh Mir and Saf Shikan Khan guarding his Right and Left sides. Some pieces of artillery were posted with the latter. As usual there was a screen of skirmishers in front, composed of the scouts and the servants of the hunting department.

Jaswant's Van, 10,000 strong, was formed in two columns, one under Qasim Khan, and the other, composed of several thousand Rajputs, under Mukund Singh Hada and six other Hindu chieftains. The Centre he led in person, with 2000 of his devoted clansmen, besides other Rajput and imperial troops at his back. On his two wings were Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia and his clansmen (the Right), and Iftikhar Khan with the Muslim troops of the imperial service (the Left). The Advanced Reserve was also composed of Rajputs, led by a Gaur and a Rathor, while the skirmishers were a party of warriors from Central Asia, expert in the use of the bow. The camp and baggage, left close behind the battle-field,

were guarded by Maluji, Parsuji (two Maratha auxiliaries) and Rajah Devi Singh Bundela.\*

### § 5. *Battle of Dharmat.*

It was a little over two hours from sunrise when the rival hosts sighted each other. The battle began with the usual discharge of artillery, rockets, and muskets at long range. The distance gradually decreased, as Aurangzib's army advanced slowly, keeping its regular formation. Suddenly the kettle-drums struck up, the trumpets pealed forth, and the conflict began at close quarters. The Rajputs densely packed within their narrow position, were severely galled by the *barqandazes* and archers of the princes' army from front and flank, without being able to manoeuvre freely and give an effective reply. Their losses began to mount up every minute. Death has no terror for the Rajput, but then it must be death in conflict. If he is to die, it is better to perish after killing some of the enemy, than to be butchered while standing motionless in a dense column. So thinking, the Rajput leaders

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\* A. N. 61—66. Aqil, 28-29. Ishwardas, 20b. For the battle our main authorities are A. N. 66—73, Aqil 29—31, and Ishwardas 20b—21b, (extremely valuable for Jaswant's doings), and secondarily Kambu 11b, and Masum (inaccurate as usual), 48b—51a. *Faiyaz*, 469-470, and *Adab*, 164a and b, 206b, 123a, 133b, are very meagre. Bernier is entirely unreliable. Tod (ii. 875) merely records the wild fiction of the Rajput bards.

of the Van,—Mukund Singh Hada, Ratan Singh Rathor, Dayal Singh Jhala, Arjun Singh Gaur, Sujan Singh Sisodia and others, with their choicest clansmen, galloped forward. Shouting their war-cry of *Ram! Ram!* “they fell on the enemy like tigers, casting away all plan.” The flood of Rajput charge first burst on Aurangzib’s artillery. The guns and muskets fired at point-blank range, woefully thinned their ranks, but so impetuous was their onset that it bore down all opposition. Murshid Quli Khan, the Chief of Artillery, was slain after a heroic resistance and his division was shaken; but the guns were not damaged. The artillerymen probably fled before storm, and returned as soon as it passed away. Victorious over the artillery guard, the assailants fell on the front part of Aurangzib’s Vanguard. Here an obstinate hand-to-hand combat raged for some time. The Rajputs at first outnumbered their opponents. Zulfiqar Khan, the commander of the front division of the Van, when pressed hard by the enemy, followed the custom of Indian heroes in the sorest straits. Getting down from his elephant, he made a firm stand on foot in the centre of the carnage, fighting with the valour of despair, without caring for his own life or stopping to count how many backed him. But this heroic sacrifice could not stem the tide of Rajput onset: two wounds stretched him low, and the Rajputs, flushed with

success, swept on and pierced into the heart of the Van. This was the most critical moment of the day. If the Rajput charge were not checked, all would be over with Aurangzib; the assailants, gathering impetus with each victory, would shatter his defence, and then all the divisions of his army would catch the contagion of panic and rush headlong out of the field.

But the Van was composed of his most picked troops, "eight thousand mail-clad warriors," many of them hereditary fighters of the Afghan race, and their generals were reliable men. Muhammad Sultan, Najabat Khan, and other commanders of the Van, on their elephants kept their ground like hills, while the flood of Rajput charge raged round and round them in eddies. Here the most stubborn and decisive fighting of the day took place. Sword and dagger alone could be plied as the hostile cavaliers grappled together at close quarters. "The ground was dyed crimson with blood like a tulip-bed." The Rajputs, being divided into many mutually antagonistic clans, could not charge in one compact mass; they were broken up into six or seven bodies, each under its own chieftain and each choosing its own point of attack. Thus the force of their impact was divided and weakened as soon as it struck the dense mass of Aurangzib's Van. Each clan engaged the enemy for itself and whirled round its

own antagonist, instead of battering down all opposition and cleaving through the Van in resistless career by forming one solid wedge, moving with one will.

Only a few men from Jaswant's Centre and Advanced Reserve had moved up to support their victorious brethren. But the Maharajah had chosen his position so badly that many of the imperialists standing on the uneven ground could not join in the fight, and many others could not charge by reason of their being cramped within a narrow space. Half the imperial Van, *viz.*, the Mughal troops under Qasim Khan, rendered no aid to their Rajput comrades now struggling hard with Aurangzib's Van; they were suspected of collusion with the enemy or of antipathy to the Rajputs. The charge of Jaswant's Vanguard was not followed up. Aurangzib's troops, who had parted before the rushing tide, closed again behind them, and thus cut off their retreat. Jaswant, too, was not the cool and wise commander to keep watch on all the field and send timely support to any hard pressed division. And the development of the action now made the sending of aid to the Van impossible, and even rendered his own position untenable.

### § 6. *Heavy losses of the Rajputs.*

For, by this time the watchful eye of Aurangzib had taken the situation in, his Advanced

Reserve had been pushed up to reinforce the Van, and he himself moved forward with the Centre to form a wall of support and refuge close behind them. Above all, Shaikh Mir and Saf Shikan Khan with the right and left wings of the Centre struck the Rajputs in the waist from the two flanks, while they were engaged with Aurangzib's Van in front. Hemmed in by foes on all sides, their ranks getting constantly thinned, without support or reinforcement arriving from their own army, the Rajputs were disheartened and checked. Mukund Singh Hada, their gallant leader, received an arrow through his eye and fell down dead. All the six Rajput chieftains engaged in the charge were slain. Hopelessly outnumbered now, assailed in front, right, and left, and cut off from their rear, the Rajputs were slaughtered after performing frantic deeds of valour, as was their wont. "The dead formed heaps. The daggers grew blunt with slaughter." "Vast numbers of ordinary Rajput soldiers were killed." Thus the first attack was annihilated.

Meantime the action had become general. Recovering from the shock of Mukund Singh's charge as soon as the Rajput cavalcade swept on to another point, Aurangzib's gunners, with their pieces mounted on high ground, concentrated their fire on the enemy's Centre under Jaswant himself.

The imperialists, crowded together on a narrow ground flanked with impassable ditches and swamps,<sup>2</sup> could not manœuvre freely, and "sacrificed their lives like moths in the flame of war." At the sight of the annihilation of their brave Vanguard and a triumphant forward movement on the part of Aurangzib, defection appeared in the Maharajah's ranks. Rai Singh Sisodia from the right flank of the Centre, and Sujan Singh Bundela and Amar Singh Chandrawat from the Van, left the field with their clansmen and returned home.

But in the heart of the imperial Centre, under the banner of Marwar, stood 2,000 Rathors, ready to live or to die with their chieftain, besides many other Rajput and Mughal auxiliaries; and these offered a stubborn opposition. But it was of no avail. For, meantime Murad Bakhsh with his division had fallen on Jaswant's camp, close to the field, secured the submission of one of its defenders, Devi Singh Bundela, and driven off the rest. Then advancing into the field itself, Murad fell on the left wing of the imperial army. Iftikhar Khan, the commander of this division, worn out with the day's struggle and now attacked by fresh troops in overwhelming number, fought valiantly to the death; many of his colleagues, traitors at heart, fled to join Aurangzib the next day; and the imperial left wing soon ceased to exist.

*§ 7. Flight of Jaswant and his troops.*

Rai Singh's flight had already uncovered Jaswant's right flank; the fall of Iftikhar Khan exposed his left. Meantime his Van had almost entirely melted away: part of it had perished around Mukund Singh in his heroic charge; of the rest, the Chandrawat Rajputs and Bundelas had fled, and the Musalmans under Qasim Khan, who had kept aloof from the fighting, prepared to run away as they saw Aurangzib's host advancing on them. Only one course was left to a Rajput general under such circumstances; he must charge into the thickest press of the enemy and die amidst a heap of the slain. And this Jaswant wanted to do. He had fought valiantly for four hours and by firmly keeping his own ground he had so long saved the imperial Centre, the pivot on which his whole army rested. In spite of two wounds, his voice and example had cheered the Rajputs. But now Aurangzib from the front, Murad from the left, and Saf Shikan Khan from the right, were converging on him like a tumultuous flood, to envelop his small remnant of clansmen. Such a combat could have only one issue: victory was impossible, but a hero's death—no less dear to the Rajput heart—was within his reach. He wanted to drive his horse into the advancing

enemy's ranks and get slain.\* But his generals Askaran and Maheshdas Gaur, and Govardhan and other ministers seized his bridle and dragged his horse out of the field. Mughal princes might cut each other's throats, but why should the head of the Rathors and the hope of Marwar give up his life in their domestic quarrel? With a few Rathors, mostly wounded,—the sole remnant of his gallant band, the vanquished general took the road to Jodhpur.

The battle had been already lost, and the flight of the Rathors removed the last semblance of resistance. There was now a general rout of the few divisions of the imperial army that had still kept the field. The Rajputs retreated to their homes, the Muslims towards Agra.

The soldiers had been under arms for more

\* Ishwardas (21b).—"Jaswant wanted to ride into the struggle and get slain, but Maheshdas, Askaran and other *pradhans* seized his bridle and brought him away." Masum (50b).—"The Mahrajah was wounded and fell down from his horse. His devoted Rajputs wanted to take him to a safe place. He forbade it, saying, &c.....They did not listen to him, but removed the wounded man full of severe pains." Aqil Khan (31).—"The Rajah, in spite of his receiving two wounds, stood firmly and encouraged the Rajputs as far as possible." Bernier (39).—"Qasim Khan ingloriously fled from the field, leaving Jaswant Singh exposed to the most imminent peril. That undaunted Rajah was beset on all sides by an overwhelming force, and saved only by the affecting devotion of his Rajputs, the greater part of whom died at his feet." Manucci (i. 259).—"The Rajah never ceased to fight most desperately, until at length he saw himself left with only the smallest remnant of his force."

than eight hours of a hot April day. Victor and vanquished alike were worn out by the strife. So, Aurangzib "mercifully forbade pursuit, saying that this sparing of human life was his tithe-offering (*zakat*) to the Creator." But the Creator in Aurangzib's creed is evidently the Creator of Muslims only. The prince's instructions to his officers were to spare the life of every Musalman found in the field and to respect the property and chastity of the Musalmans found in the enemy's camp. The Hindus were outside the pale of his mercy, though several thousands of this creed had fought loyally under his banners, and out of his four high officers wounded one was a Hindu.\*

### *§ 8. The gains of the victors at Dharmat.*

There was another and more probable reason for not ordering a pursuit. The deserted camp of the imperialists close to the field, contained "booty beyond imagination." Hither the victors flocked. The two brothers must have jealously watched that neither should seize more than his fixed share of the spoils,—two-thirds for Aurangzib, and one-third for Murad. The entire camp of Jaswant and Qasim Khan with all their artillery, tents, and elephants, as well as a vast amount of treasure, became the

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\* A. N. 73; Masum, 51a. But Kambu (11b) and Aqil (32) say that there was a pursuit for 3 or 4 *kos*.

victorious princes' spoil, while their soldiers looted the property equipment and baggage of the vanquished army. Long strings of camels and mules, laden with various articles, were seized as prize or pillaged by the common soldiers and camp-followers. [A. N. 71-72; Kambu, 11b.]

But far greater than all these material gains was the moral prestige secured by Aurangzib. Dharmat became the omen of his future success in the opinion of his followers and of the people at large throughout the empire. At one blow he had brought Dara down from a position of immense superiority to one of equality with his own, or even lower. The hero of the Deccan wars and the victor of Dharmat faced the world not only without loss but with his military reputation rendered absolutely unrivalled in India. Waverers hesitated no longer; they now knew beyond a moment's doubt which of the four brothers was the chosen favourite of Victory. Even on the field of battle Aurangzib was hailed with "shouts of congratulation from the earth and the age," as his servant wrote with pardonable exaggeration.

No sooner had Jaswant and Qasim Khan turned their backs than Aurangzib's band struck up the notes of victory: the drums beat, the *kurka* sent forth a merry peal, and the clarion sounded, proclaiming far and near that the battle had been won. Aurangzib knelt down on the field and with folded

arms rendered thanks to the Giver of Victory. Then he marched to the deserted encampment of the enemy, pitched his own small campaigning tent there, and afterwards performed the evening prayer in full concourse of Muslim officers and men. Murad now arrived, congratulated him on his victory, and presented the deserter Devi Singh Bundela. Murad's co-operation in the victory was rewarded with 15,000 gold pieces, offered delicately as "surgeons' fee for his wounded followers," besides four elephants and other presents. [A. N. 74; K. K. ii. 19.]

### § 9. *Battle memorials at Fatihabad.*

On the site of the conflict the victorious prince ordered a village to be founded, with a garden, mosque, and *Sarai*.\* The village, bearing the usual name of *Fatihabad* or 'Abode of Victory,' has now grown almost into a small town, as it is a railway junction. The mosque stands on a high platform, the front part of which has sunk in the middle, through the havoc of centuries and badness of masonry work. One of its three domes has fallen down and the red sandstone facing of the edifice has slipped down in many places, revealing the ill-laid concrete within. But its boundary walls enclose a

\* Ishwardas, 22a; Dilkasha, i. 23. My description of the present condition of the place is based on a visit paid in October, 1909.

vast area, and from their top a good view of the country can be commanded, especially on the west and north. The *sarai* has entirely disappeared in two hundred and fifty years of neglect, unless the fragments of a few cloisters on the north wall of the quadrangle belong to it. The garden is probably represented by a patch of jungle north of the mosque.

Heavy was the loss on the imperial side, and the main portion of it was borne by the Rajputs. Nearly six thousand dead enemy were counted by Aurangzib's officers. At least five hundred Rajputs had fallen in Mukund Singh's charge, and 2,000 Rathors were afterwards slain.\* Every clan of Rajasthan contributed its quota to the band of heroes who sacrificed their lives in their master's service (*swami-dharma*). As the bardic chronicle records it, "The onset cost seventeen hundred Rathors, besides Gehlots, Hadas, Gaurs, and some of every clan of Rajwara." "This was one of the events

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\* *A. N.*, 73; *Adab*, 164b. Bernier puts the loss among Jaswant's Rajputs alone at 7,400 (p. 39). Kambu's language is significant, "after some Musalmans and a great many Rajputs had been slain" (11b). *Dilkasha*, i. 23, says, "About 5,000 slain on the two sides together," (a distant hearsay, recorded a generation later.) Ishwardas's estimate is "24 eminent Rajput chiefs, 2,000 Rajputs of Marwar, and 6,000 troopers and officers of the imperial service were slain" (21b). Aurangzib lost a priceless servant, Murshid Quli Khan, but no other officer of note. Ishwardas makes the absolutely incredible assertion that 7,000 troopers were slain on his side.

glorious to the Rajput, shewing his devotion to whom fidelity had been pledged,—the aged and enfeebled Emperor Shah Jahan, whose salt they ate, —against all the temptation offered by youthful ambition...The Rajput sealed his faith in his blood; and none more liberally than the brave Hadas of Kota and Bundi. The annals of no nation on earth furnish such an example, as an entire family [the house of Kota], six royal brothers, stretched on the field.” [Tod, ii. 875.] Among the chiefs of note who fell were Mukund Singh Hada, Sujan Singh Sisodia, Ratan Singh Rathor, Arjun Singh Gaur, Dayaldas Jhala, and Mohan Singh Hada, besides eighteen other high Rajputs and Iftikhar Khan, an imperial officer. To Ratan Singh of Rutlam a noble monument was raised by his descendants on the spot where his corpse was burnt. Time overthrew it, but in 1909 its place was taken by a lofty structure of white marble, decorated with relief work of a bold but conventional style, illustrating the phases of the battle, and surmounted with a stone horse. It is the most striking sight of the place.

#### § 10. *Aurangzib's march to Agra.*

The day after the victory, the two brothers reached the environs of Ujjain, and issued a gazette of honours and promotions to their meritorious officers. Many traitors who had left the imperial

army during the battle, now joined Aurangzib and were welcomed with titles and posts. A three days' halt was made here for repairing his losses, making administrative arrangements, and transacting urgent affairs of State;—and then, on 20th April, the march northward was resumed, and a month afterwards (21st May) Gwalior was reached.  
[A. N. 75-78.]

Here Nasiri Khan, a high commander who had won honour in the Bijapur war, joined Aurangzib, leaving the service of Shah Jahan, and was created a Commander of Five Thousand with his father's title of Khan-i-Dauran, which Aurangzib had solemnly promised to him in writing. It was now learnt that Dara had come to Dholpur with a vast army and seized all the well-known and frequented fords over the Chambal river. His entrenchments frowned on the crossing places ; his artillery crowned the opposite bank ; and everywhere strong parties of his troops were on the alert for the enemy's arrival. To cross the river with its steep rocky banks and wide ravine-intersected approaches, in the face of such opposition, would have led to a heavy loss of life. So, Aurangzib cast about for some secret and safe path and offered high rewards to the neighbouring landholders. One zamindar told him that forty miles east of Dholpur there was an obscure and out-of-the-way ford with only knee-deep water, by which

no army had ever crossed before. Dara had omitted to guard it, as it was a petty ford unfrequented by travellers and Aurangzib was still far from the river bank.

No time was to be lost. In the very evening after the arrival near Gwalior (21st May), while the main army halted, a strong division under three generals and some artillery made a forced march all night, reached the ford next morning, and crossed safely to the other bank. That day Aurangzib himself set out from Gwalior, covered the interval in two long marches and crossed the river at the same place with the rest of his army (23rd May). In these two marches, "the path was rough, the soldiers underwent much hardship before arriving at the ford; and on the way nearly 5,000 men died of thirst,"—these last being probably camp-followers. But Aurangzib's unrelenting firmness overcame every obstacle and carried the army through, regardless of loss.\* The military

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\* A. N., 79-80, 85; Ishwardas, 23; Kambu, 12b; Aqil, 33-34; *Storia*, i. 269-270; *Dilkasha*, i. 26. A. N. and Aqil name the place of crossing *Bhadauriyah* and *Bhadaur* respectively, and place it 40 (or 50) miles east of Dholpur. Ishwardas calls it *Kantra*, and Bhimsen *Gorkha*. Now, *Gorkha* is only 6 miles east of the Dholpur ferry, and therefore could not have been Aurangzib's crossing-place. (*Ind. At.* 50 S. E.). There is a *Bhadoli*, 26°45' N., 78°36' E., 40 miles east of the old Dholpur fort on the Chambal, in a straight line; *Kanera* is 3 miles s. e. of it. (*Ind. At.* 68). The map gives a village road coming from the south-west (Gwalior side), crossing the Chambal

advantage of the movement compensated for the heavy death-list, equal to that of a pitched battle. By one stroke he had turned the enemy's position and rendered Dara's elaborate trenches and batteries useless. The road to Agra now lay open before him. It was now Dara's turn to abandon the line of the Chambal and fall back on the capital, if he did not wish to be cut off from his base. In the hurry of his retreat he had to abandon many of his heavier guns on the river bank, and thus weakened himself in artillery in the next battle. [Dil. i. 26.] By this detour to the right Aurangzib had left the high road to Agra and arrived a good deal north-east of it. From the Chambal he marched north towards the Jamuna and in three days came in touch with the enemy near Samugarh.

As the Jamuna sweeps eastwards by Agra fort and the Taj, some eight miles down the stream we have the ferry of Raipur, and opposite it, on the southern bank, the village of Imadpur, with some fine mansions built by Shah Jahan for his residence when out hunting. (These are probably represented by the *Badshahi Mahal* of the modern maps.) One

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a little west of Bhadaoli and then continued northwards to the Jamuna. According to the *Chhatra-Prakash* (followed by Manucci and Bhimsen also), Aurangzib's guide to the ford was Champat Rao Bundela (Pogson, 32). Ishwardas (23b) calls him "Hathiraj Jat, zamindar of Gohad, in the *sarkar* of Gwaliqr." Aqil (34) has only "the zamindar of Bhadaur."

mile east of them stands the village of Samugarh, containing the ruins of Jahangir's hunting-lodge. East and south of Samugarh, as far as the bend of the Jamuna, stretches a wide plain\*, a fit arena for the decisive combat for the lordship of Agra.

\* Ishwardas spells the name as *Sambhugarh*. "At Imadpur, one mile from Samugarh in coming towards the city, on the bank of the river, mansions were built by order of Shah Jahan at a cost of Rs. 80,000, and completed in November, 1653." (Waris, 81b.) *Samogar* is given in *Indian Atlas*, Sheet 50 S. E., as 8 miles due east of Agra fort. The Jamuna is half a mile north of it and again four miles on the east. The day after the battle, Aurangzib halted in the hunting-lodge at Imadpur. (Aqil, 49.) Ishwardas 23a; Aqil 42. "At Rajpura 10 *kos* from Agra, near the Jamuna, Dara chose a field for the battle." A. N. 86.

For Samugarh, Atkinson's *N.-W. P. Gazetteer* (ed. 1884), vii. 765. Aurangzib's camp on the eve of the battle was at a large village 21 m. s. e. of Agra, which he renamed Fatihabad, and where he founded a *sarai* and a mosque called the *Mubarak Manzil* on the spot on which he rested after his victory, [here pp. 612 and 725 disagree; p. 612 being undoubtedly wrong, as *Mubarak* there should be *Nur*], constructed a tank, and planted a large grove to the s. e. of the place. The mosque was used as a custom-house, and the *sarai* as the *tahsil* office, the tank was nearly silted up and the grove remained in tolerable preservation in 1884. (*Ibid.*, 611-612 and 724-725.)

## CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF SAMUGARH, 29 MAY, 1658.

### § 1. *Dara assembles a new army after Dharmat.*

Shah Jahan had been staying at Agra since November, 1657. He was not his former self again, and still suffered from weakness and traces of his old complaint. As the summer season approached, the doctors feared that his malady would increase in the hot climate of Agra, which was subject to sand-storms and heat-waves from the Rajputana desert. So, they advised a change to Delhi as a cooler place, with breezes constantly blowing from the south in summer, and possessing fresh gardens, flowing canals, and more commodious palaces. The imperial Court set out from Agra on 11th April 1658, and had reached Baluchpur, eighty miles north-west on the way to Delhi, when the news of the defeat at Dharmat reached it (25th April). All the hopes built on Jaswant were gone. If the rebellious princes were to be stopped Dara must hasten to Agra, equip a new force, and personally supervise the operations. Shah Jahan, though unwilling to turn back, was overcome by his

favourite son's importunity, and the party came to Agra again on 2nd May.\*

A new imperial army was assembled in all haste. Dara summoned the nobles and commanders from all the provinces and *jagirs* within easy reach of him, equipped their men with armour and weapons from the arsenal of Agra fort, and lavished money from the treasury to pay for new recruits and to bind the captains over to his side. The numerous guns and elephants of the Government were at his disposal. A force of about 60,000 troopers was assembled under his banner in a short time. But this army was formidable in appearance only : it was composed of a miscellaneous host of diverse classes and localities, hastily got together, and not properly co-ordinated nor taught to act in concert. Moreover, many of its commanders were carpet knights of the Court, having neither the experience nor the courage of the veterans from the Deccan. Dara's main reliance was on the Rajputs and Sayyids, while the other Muslim troops of the imperial army (especially the Mughals) were mostly traitors to him, or at least indifferent to his cause.† He had made the fatal mistake of sending away his trustiest adherents and ablest lieutenants with

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\* A. N. 81-82; Kambu, 12a; Aqil, 32.

† A. N. 82-83; Aqil, 33; Ishwardas, 22b; *Storia do Mogor*, i. 265; Kambu, 9b.

Sulaiman Shukoh to oppose Shuja, and now he felt sore need of such efficient instruments. Wherever he could not be present in person, his business was ruined by incompetent or faithless subordinates.

§ 2. *Shah Jahan's plans and advice.*

And he was also hampered by Shah Jahan. Even now the Emperor urged him to avoid war; he still fondly hoped that the quarrel among his sons could be peacefully ended by diplomatic messages. His nobles, already corrupted by Aurangzib or caring for their own interests only, took advantage of this natural feeling of a father. They pointed out to the Emperor that it would be a family disgrace if the brothers fought with one another, and worse still if Shah Jahan identified himself with any of them. He should let his two sons visit him, and then use the awe of majesty and his personal influence to detach the ambitious nobles from their sides and send the princes, shorn of strength, back to their provinces. Shah Jahan approved of this advice, which echoed his feelings. But Dara taunted the givers of such counsels with cowardice and treason, and indiscreetly boasted that though they might not follow him, he would drive Aurangzib's men back like hares with the help of Chhatra Sal Hada. The foreign Muhammadans (both Persian and Central Asian mercenaries) resented

this speech. They withdrew their hearts from Dara\* and secretly resolved to desert to Aurangzib at the first opportunity. Dara had professed no need for their services; well, then, they would not help him; they would leave him to his Rajput friends.

The advanced division of Dara's army set out for Dholpur on 9th May, to guard the ferries of the Chambal. The rest of his troops were to march on the 18th under his own leadership. The leave-taking of the prince from his father was most pathetic. To the aged Emperor it seemed "indeed as the parting of life from the body." He presented Dara with jewelled ornaments, robes, arms, horses, elephants, and a chariot, which last is held in Indian belief to be the most lucky conveyance for a prince to ride in starting for a campaign in the southern direction. In excess of love the father held the son

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\* "Shah Jahan constantly advised Dara not to engage in war, and always recommended peace;.....but he had grown too weak and so yielded to Dara" (*A. N.* 84-85, cf. *Kambu*, 10a.) Again, "Shah Jahan wrote to Dara [before Samugarh] urging him to make peace and give up the design of fighting, but in vain. At last the Emperor determined to extinguish the war by going in person to the camp, and make peace by his own exertions and speeches. So he ordered his advance-tents to be pitched between the two armies," (*A. N.* 86-87.) *Khafi Khan*, ii. 21, *Masum*, 56b, and *Aqil Khan*, 33-34, support the statement. *Storia*, i. 264—267. For the treachery of the Mughals (explained by *Aqil Khan* as "both Turanis and Iranis"), in the imperial army, see *Aqil Khan*, 34 and *Storia*, i. 267, 263.

to his bosom long and tightly, "like his own life and soul." Dara replied with bows and thanks and begged leave to go. Shah Jahan, moved to uncontrollable emotion, turned his face towards Mecca and lifting up his arms prayed for Dara's victory and recited the prescribed texts of the Muslim scripture (*fatiha*) for his safety and success. As a mark of special favour he ordered the prince to mount his chariot at the steps of the Hall of Public Audience, to beat his drums and march out in full regal pomp from that very spot.

On taking leave of his father, Dara entered his car, which he afterwards changed for an elephant. The nobles and officers surrounded him in due order of precedence. On his right and left were massed captains with their cavalry beyond count, while the rear was formed by footmen, retainers, spearmen, and rocket-throwers. So the procession set out. Behind them, in the half-deserted Hall of Forty Pillars stood a thin old man, with a long fair face and grey beard, leaning on his mace and gazing pensively on the scene till the cavalcade filed out of the gateway of the palace quadrangle. What was his long and glorious reign to end in? What would be the fate of his beloved son and chosen heir? "He knew not that Heaven's will was adverse or that the issue of the contest would be other (than what he had hoped for) and that he would lose his

throne". Little did either father or son imagine that this was destined to be their last meeting on earth.\*

§ 3. *Dara reaches Samugarh.*

Dara reached Dholpur on 22nd May, and with the local zamindars for his guides he seized all the fords of the Chambal in the neighbourhood. Throwing up earth-works and mounting guns on the bank, he commanded the roads and crossing-places. His aim was to retard Aurangzib's advance without precipitating a battle and thus to gain time for Sulaiman Shukoh's army to join him. But he had underrated his rival's genius for military organisation and far-sighted plans. After passing a few days in a state of expectancy, he learnt to his consternation that Aurangzib had crossed the Chambal at Bhadaur, forty miles east of Dholpur, on 23rd May. Dara's rear was now threatened; he hurriedly fell back towards Agra. Eight miles east of the city he encamped close to the plain of Samugarh to offer battle to the enemy. Here Aurangzib arrived from the bank of the Chambal, on the 28th.

\* The parting scene is very graphically described in Kambu, 12a; *Storia* i., 267. Masum, 57a, is brief. Ishwardas describes the farewell (26b) but wrongly places it in the night following Samugarh. Of the march of Dara's army Manucci has left a most vivid picture. (*Storia*, i. 268).

That day, Dara on hearing of Aurangzib's approach, drew up his troops and rode out as if to fight. But a short distance in front of his camp he came to a halt, refusing to advance any further and waiting to let the enemy take the initiative. It was a most unwise step: Aurangzib was numerically inferior and his troops were worn out by a ten mile march in the sun over a waterless dusty plain, while Dara's army was fresh. As their general hesitated to engage, the soldiers lost confidence in Dara, and Aurangzib, without striking a blow, gained a moral victory over his foolish brother. The victor of Dharmat was a foe to be dreaded, even by the lord of 50,000 horse.

Then, again, as Dara's army stood to arms in battle formation hour after hour throughout that May afternoon, the fierce sun overhead, the sandy plain under foot, and the scorching wind around, dealt havoc among his steel-clad troops and horses. "Many perished from the heat, thirst, and lack of drinking water." While the prudent Aurangzib rested his men all the evening and night for the morrow's contest, Dara's soldiers were worn out and his horses and elephants were prostrated by the extreme heat. As one of his men narrated his experience, "With all our armour on, we were dried up even as we stood. Our feet could not move. The field seemed a blazing hell to us." At sunset

Dara retreated to his camp,—a movement prophetic of his defeat in battle. His soldiers lost heart, because his genius had quailed before that of his rival in the sight of both the hosts.\*

All that night Aurangzib's officers patrolled round their camp, while their master heartened his followers by a spirited harangue : "Tomorrow is the day of valiant deeds. My capital (Aurangabad) is very far from this place. It is necessary that with one heart and with your faces turned one way, you should attack the enemy and, with the blows of your keen blades, seize the records of the office of Fortune and make your names famous in the world for victory and (power of) breaking up enemies." [Aqil, 43.]

#### § 4. *The rival armies at Samugarh.*

At last the eventful 29th of May arrived. Long before the early dawn of the Indian mid-summer, there was the stir of preparation and movement in both the camps. Squadron after squadron was formed in battle array and marched out to take up its appointed position. Hearing of Aurangzib's advance, Dara marshalled his ranks on a wide sandy plain, two miles in front of his camp. His army numbered about 50,000. Its backbone was

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\* A. N. 85—91; Aqil Khan, 42—43; Masum, 57b—60a (for the heat); *Storia*, i. 271—273.

composed of the Rajput contingent and Dara's own retainers, all devoted to his interests. But nearly half of his army belonged to the Emperor's service, and these men could not be relied on. Most of their captains made a show of fighting, but took care not to put forth earnest effort or run into danger, and several of their chiefs, notably Khalilullah Khan, were rightly suspected of having been corrupted by Aurangzib.

All his artillery was drawn up in one row along his entire front. Behind it, as if sheltered by a wall, stood a dense body of foot-musketeers, numbering several thousands. Next were placed 500 camels carrying swivel-guns on their backs, and, further behind, the elephants clad in barbs of steel. Then came masses of cavalry formed in the conventional divisions of an Indian army.

In the Van were contingents of Rajputs,—Hadas, Rathors, Sisodias, and Gaurs, led by Chhatra Sal, the chief of Bundi, whose firmness in battle had passed into a proverb in the entire Mughal army,—and also Dara's own retainers, consisting of 4,000 Afghans under the doughty fighter Dilir Khan, and 3,000 choice cavalry under his Paymaster Askar Khan. It was the most efficient and reliable portion of Dara's army, the edge of steel which he hoped would cleave a way for others through the hostile ranks. But so far as

we can see, this division had no artillery specially attached to it. The left wing was commanded by Dara's second son, Sipihr Shukoh and the renowned Deccani hero Firuz Jang, popularly called 'the Rustam of the age'. Here were posted a band of the Sayyids of Barha, famous throughout India for their obstinate valour and love of fight,—together with mace-bearers and troopers of the imperial escort,—their total strength being from ten to fifteen thousand. An Advanced Reserve was stationed between the Van and the Centre as a sort of flying column, ready to follow up the success of the Van or the wings, and to succour them in distress. It was composed of ten thousand troopers, partly Rajputs and partly Dara's Muslim retainers. Their commanders were Kumar Ram Singh, the heir of Jaipur, and Sayyid Bahir Khan.

In the Centre sat Dara himself, on a lofty elephant visible from all parts of the field, with other elephants carrying his musical band in charge of his retinue. Immediately under his orders were 3,000 of his best cavalry and most devoted followers, besides many imperial troops, the whole numbering 2,000. The two flanks of this division were led by his intimate followers Zafar Khan and Fakhar Khan.

The right wing was placed under Khalilullah Khan, an old courtier and a noble of the first rank,

but destined to earn a shameful notoriety by his treachery on this day. Here stood many mercenaries from Central Asia and a few Rajputs. These five divisions completed the army; there was no Main Reserve and no Rearguard, for the small unserviceable and miscellaneous body left in charge of the camp took no part in the battle.

To a superficial observer Dara's army looked like a magnificent host, as it moved to the encounter with its noisy music, fluttering banners, gaily caparisoned elephants and horses, and warriors clad in polished or ornamented armour and flowing vests of embroidered and many-coloured cloth. But as an instrument of war it had some fatal defects. Apart from Dara's incapacity and Khalilullah's treachery, there was first, the mutual jealousy, lack of co-operation, and even positive ill-will between Dara's own followers and the imperial troops under his banner; he had had no time to weld the two into one harmonious whole. The cleavage was widened by the Rajputs being an important element of the host, for they always formed a class apart, fighting in their own style and obeying their own chiefs, but incapable of carrying out the supreme commander's tactics implicitly, readily and efficiently, or of acting in exact concert with Muslim and foreign troops. Secondly, Dara's artillery was less mobile than Aurangzib's and all posted in one place. His

horses and transport animals were out of condition; many of them, having been overfed in the imperial stables, were more fit for a showy procession than for the stern tasks of war, and all were half dead from yesterday's futile manoeuvring in the sun.\*

In opposition to this host stood Aurangzib's hard-bitten troops, seasoned veterans on seasoned horses, and his excellent train of field-pieces handled by the European gunners of Mir Jumla and well supplied with munitions. There was absolute unity of command in his army, and all the officers had been taught to obey without hesitation or question that master will which brooked no disobedience or delay in a subordinate.

His Van was formed by some 10,000 troopers, all Musalmans, commanded by his eldest son Sultan Muhammad, who acted under the guidance of the experienced general Najabat Khan, recently created Khan-i-Khanan. Its front was protected by artillery in two divisions under Zulficar Khan and Saf Shikan Khan.

\* Dara's army, *A. N.* 95-96; *Aqil*, 44; *Storia*, i. 275. Its inherent defects, (*Storia*, i. 266-267, 273, 282). The numbers engaged are differently estimated: Dara's force is given as 60,000 troopers (*A. N.* 82); 70,000 (*Adab*, 166b, 133b); "70 or 80 thousand" (*K. K.*, ii. 24); "about a hundred thousand" (*Aqil* 33, but on p. 44 he gives a total of 45,000 excluding the right wing under Khalilullah, which on p. 46 he estimates at 15,000.) *Manucci* gives 120,000 (*Storia*, i. 265 and also 275.)

The right wing was commanded by Islam Khan. Here fought Indradyumna of Dhamdhera, Champat Rao Bundela, Bhagwant Singh Hada, besides many Muslim captains. Murad with his own men, probably less than 10,000, formed the left wing. The Advanced Reserve under Shaikh Mir was a small body, about 5,000 strong, but all good men and true, ready to press into the thickest of the fight and restore the wavering battle. In the Centre, as usual, rode Aurangzib on a towering elephant, supervising the whole field. His right and left flanks were placed respectively under Bahadur Khan and Khan-i-Dauran (known to us as Nasiri Khan in the Deccan wars). Tall and fierce elephants, covered with barbs and steel plates, and having many sharp instruments tied to their trunks, were stationed here and there amidst the dense masses of horse and foot, to stiffen the ranks. With their steel-coated *hawdas* they looked like towers rising out of the sea of human heads.\*

### § 5. *Battle of Samugarh.*

By eight o'clock the marshalling of ranks was complete, and Aurangzib's army was set in motion.

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\* Aurangzib's army, *A. N.* 91—94; *Aqil*, 44; *Storia*, i. 274. His total strength is given as 40,000, plus about 10,000 under Mutad (*Aqil*, 44), 60,000 men besides the camp-guards (*Storia*, i. 274.) Manucci's numbers and positions are unreliable, when opposed to the *Alamgirnamah*, as he wrote from memory long after the event.

The few miles' interval was covered in about three hours as the mighty host moved slowly and in good formation towards its adversary standing on the plain of Samugarh. Towards midday, "the steel-ball standards and crescent-marked banners of Aurangzib appeared in the distance." Dara at once took up the offensive. He discharged all his artillery, making a frightful noise, and "covering the air with a thick cloud of smoke, like the manile of dark night," but doing little damage to the enemy at that long range. Aurangzib gave a very short reply, and wisely reserved his powder and shot for closer range.

An hour passed in this kind of cannonade. Dara misjudged the effect of his own fire and the silence of Aurangzib's guns. He was deluded by the smoke or by his own ignorance of war, and decided to follow up his seeming success by a charge upon the timid enemy. The gun-fire ceased; pipe and trumpet pealed forth; kettle-drums and big brass drums struck up, and amidst the deafening clangour of musical instruments, the rattle of musketry, and the trumpeting of excited elephants, the battle joined.\*

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\* For the battle, chief authorities *A. N.* 96—105; *Storia*, i. 276—282; and *Aqil*, 45—48. Kambu (13b—15a) loses his usual fulness and accuracy of detail. Ishwardas (24a—25b) is meagre and unsatisfactory. Masum (58a—64b) is invaluable for the closing scene. Khafi

It was already past noon. Suddenly a multitudinous shout was heard on Dara's left, and then, out of the dark curtain of smoke hanging between the two armies, burst the sheen of ten thousand swords and lance-heads as a whirlwind of cavalry swept down upon Aurangzib's host. It was Dara's left wing, led by Rustam Khan. Filing out through the spaces between his guns, it formed a mass and attacked the opposing artillery with flashing blades and wild battle-cries. Aurangzib's chief of artillery, Saf Shikan Khan, and the musketeers behind his guns stood their ground well and received the charge with one deadly volley from the guns and a shower of bullets, arrows, and javelins. The flood of onset could not reach and overwhelm the guns; its speed slackened as the cannon balls ploughed up its ranks. So Rustam Khan swerved to his right hand in search of an easier prey, and galloped towards Aurangzib's Van, leaving a cloud of dust behind. But Bahadur Khan with the right flank of Aurangzib's Centre had hurried up to the front into the gap between the Van and the artillery, and barred the path of Rustam Khan. A close hand to hand combat now ensued; sword and dagger were freely plied. But superior numbers bore down the gallant defenders; Bahadur

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Khan, ii. 24—30. *Adab*, 133b, and *Dilkasha*, i. 27, (both meagre.)  
Tod, ii. 1341, (for Chhatra Sal of Bundi.)

Khan fell down wounded; two of his captains, Sayyid Dilawwar and Hadidat Khan were slain; and his division seemed at the point of being routed, when Islam Khan came to its aid from the right wing and Shaikh Mir with the Advanced Reserve. It was now the turn of Rustam Khan to be outnumbered: assailed in front, right and left, plied with musketry-fire and a heavy discharge of arrows, he still maintained the combat on even terms. While the engagement was at its hottest, and (to borrow a hyperbole of the Persian history) "the blood had mounted waist-high," a bullet lodged in Rustam Khan's arm and he felt that his end had come. Quickly changing his elephant for a fleet horse, "he set his heart on the last voyage", and with a dozen other desperate men hewed his way to the centre of the enemy's ranks and there fell amidst a heap of the slain. It was a glorious end for the scarred veteran of many battles in diverse lands. Islam Khan cut off his head and flung it on the ground before Aurangzib as a token of his victory. The small remnant of Dara's left wing fled back under Sipihr Shukoh.

### § 6. *Rajput attacks on Murad and Aurangzib.*

At the same time a more terrible fight was being waged on Aurangzib's left. There Khalilullah Khan had made a dash forward with his

Uzbak contingent and assailed with a discharge of arrows Murad, who had impetuously advanced to the front. Beyond this demonstration Khalilullah seems to have done little. But the Rajputs of the imperial Van under Chhatra Sal slipped through the interval between Zulfiqar Khan's artillery and Murad's division and attacked that prince with fierce vigour. They drove a wedge separating Murad from Aurangzib's army. An incessant discharge of arrows darkened the air.

War is as the breath of his nostrils to the Rajput. To war he goes forth dressed as a bridegroom to a marriage. His favourite colour in battle is yellow,—the dye of the Indian Spring carnival. Rajah Ram Singh Rathor, wearing such a robe and with a string of priceless pearls tied to his turban, fell on Murad's elephant, crying out in derision, "You want to wrest the throne from Dara!" Shouting to the driver to make the elephant kneel down if he valued his life, the Rajah flung his spear at Murad, but it missed the aim, and the prince shot him dead with an arrow. Other Rajputs fell as they swarmed round Murad's elephant, and with their robes "made the ground look yellow like a field of saffron"! The Rajput horsemen could not reach the prince on his lofty elephant; but Murad received three wounds in his face; his driver was killed, and the *hawda* of his elephant bristled with arrows like

the back of a porcupine.\* The prince defended himself with the valour and skill which he never lost in battle. But he was also attacked by Daud Khan's hardy clansmen, and borne backwards by the combined onslaught; his officers Yahya Khan, Sarfaraz Khan and Rana Charib-das were slain, and his men scattered.

The victorious Rajputs pressed on to the Centre and fell on Aurangzib who was hastening to the aid of Murad on hearing of the disaster on his left. The clash between these two powerful forces was terrible. Rajput and Pathan grappled together in deathless hate. The fight that raged here is spoken of as without a parallel in the annals of that age. The Rajputs forced their way to Aurangzib himself, but that prince's guards offered an opposition equally heroic, and being themselves in fresh condition they prevailed over the Rajputs who were half worn out by the struggle with Murad and whose ranks had been greatly thinned by this time. Enveloped by superior numbers, shot down with arrows, bullets, and rockets, to which they could not reply on equal terms, the Rajputs fought on with the wonted valour of their race, "in utter contempt of life". Even

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\* This *hawda* was long afterwards preserved in the store-rooms of Delhi fort as a memorial of the valour of the race of Timur. (Khafi Khan, ii. 29-30). Manucci (*Storia*, i. 280) gives a slightly different account of the death of Ram Singh Rathor.

Aurangzib's Court-historian praises them for "their very heroic fight." But it was of no avail against overwhelming odds. One by one all their leaders fell,—Chhatra Sal Hada, Ram Singh Rathor, Bhim Singh Gaur and Shivaram Gaur. But the remnant only made a more frantic struggle, "like ravening dogs", as a European eye-witness describes the scene. Rajah Rup Singh Rathor in reckless audacity jumped down from his horse, with his drawn blade hewed a way to the elephant of Aurangzib, and tried to cut the girths of the *hawda* in the hope of hurling the prince down to the ground. He slashed the beast's leg, but was himself cut to pieces by the bodyguard, though Aurangzib, in generous admiration, shouted to them to spare such a hero's life. The rest of the Rajputs "perished like moths in the fire of the hostile blades."

Thus both the left and right wings of Dara had been annihilated by this time. We now turn to see how that aspirant to the throne had employed himself so long.

### § 7. *Dara's own movements at Samugarh.*

At the very beginning of the battle, as soon as Rustam Khan and Chhatra Sal had charged with his left wing and Van, Dara quitted his position in the Centre, rode through his artillery, and went towards Aurangzib's right wing in order to support

Rustam Khan. No more fatal mistake could have been committed. Enveloped in a cloud of dust and smoke, whirled along with a dense body of cavalry within range of the enemy's guns, he virtually abdicated his position as a general and became a mere divisional commander. He could no longer survey the whole field and control the battle. His troops at once lost the one supreme leader who could have directed their movements aright with every fresh development of the action, given unity to their efforts, and sent reinforcements where most needed. At once "everything fell into confusion". Secondly, by advancing in front of his artillery he obstructed their fire, while Aurangzib's guns continued to mow down his ranks without any chance of reply. When Dara discovered his mistake and made frantic signals to his gunners to bring their pieces up to him, it was too late; all the artillery servants had in the meantime abandoned their position and scattered to loot, because there was now no force behind the fighting line to punish such acts; the transport animals had perished of heat and fatigue, and there was none to drag the guns forward.\* This mistake ruined Dara far more than all other causes put together. The contemporary

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\* I follow the graphic account of Manucci who was in charge of some of Dara's guns, *Storia*, i. 277-278.

historians\* condemn him for this unwise step. The Italian Manucci, then a captain of his artillery, clearly describes Dara's successive movements and the evil consequences of his action thus :

Issuing from his Centre, Dara advanced by his left side towards Aurangzib's right front, beating all his drums as if the victory had been already achieved by Rustam Khan's charge and nothing was left but to follow it up and annihilate the enemy. But he was soon undeceived. Aurangzib's artillery had, as we have seen, already repelled Rustam's cavaliers, and stood calmly reserving their fire "until Dara had come quite close. Then all of a sudden the enemy discharged his cannon, musketry, and swivel pieces, which struck us and frightened numbers of our men, who scattered this way and that." Finding himself in imminent peril, Dara did not yet lose heart but turned to the right, to avoid the enemy's artillery, rallied his men, and fell upon Shaikh Mir's division. Aurangzib had pushed up

\* "Dara, who was ignorant of the rules of war and lacked experience in command, foolishly hastened with the Centre and the Advanced Reserve in person, after the charge of Rustam Khan, and placed his own Van and Artillery behind himself." (A. N., 99.) "Dara, in great excitement and helplessness, forgetting true generalship, foolishly drove his elephant beyond his own artillery, charged with a party of Sayyids of Barha and Mughals, and thus forced his own guns to be silent." (Kambu, 15a.) "Dara like an inexpert fighter disordered his own arrangement of troops and advanced beyond his artillery." (Aqil, 47).

so much reinforcement to the front and so many of his men had dispersed before Dara's advance, that for a time he was left without any guards. If Dara could then have forced his way to his rival's side, the victory would have been his. "But he made a short halt, owing to the difficulties of the ground and to the fatigue that overcame him." His force lost its growing momentum, the rate of its progress and the vigour of its onslaught greatly slackened, and the golden chance was lost for ever. [*Storia*, i. 278.] For, in the meantime Aurangzib had dressed his ranks and made new dispositions, and Dara was soon afterwards called upon to abandon his forward movement straight on his rival's elephant and to turn aside towards his own right wing in order to back the troops of Chhatra Sal. Thus Dara made a long movement across his entire front from the extreme left to near the extreme right. The frightful heat struck down his men and horses during this unprofitable manœuvre, while the artillery stationed in the enemy's front fired volleys straight into his left flank. Those who still kept up with him were exhausted by this long and toilsome march over loose burning sand, amidst suffocating dust, and under a blazing sun which made their armour blister the skin, while not a drop of water could be had to quench their thirst. By the time he

arrived behind his Van, now acting as his right wing, his party was more dead than alive.

And they were assailed by a fresh body of the enemy. During these early stages of the battle, Aurangzib's Van, in obedience to his rigid discipline, had kept its proper position, where it had not been attacked either by the enemy's Left or by the Van. Seeing Dara's two Wings and Van overthrown, and his Centre in disorder and out of its proper place, Muhammad Sultan sprang forward with his own division (*viz.*, the Van) to attack Dara. At the same time Aurangzib's victorious Right wheeled round to envelop Dara's division, while the right batteries under Saf Shikan Khan and the left ones under Zulfiqar Khan alike assailed it without the fear of a return of fire.

### § 8. *Rout of Dara's army.*

This was the beginning of the end. Dara had learnt of the death of his best generals, but he set his teeth and for a time exerted himself to stem the disaster. "He now utterly despaired of victory, but made a stand with outward firmness and encouraged his men. But Aurangzib's troops, like the waves of the sea, approached him with countless guns in front of them." So heavy and well-directed was the enemy's fire that every minute Dara's diminished host met with heavy losses : "Near him the deadly

fire fell so thick that Wazir Khan and some other newly created peers who stood in front of him were slain. Cannon balls carried off heads or limbs; shots weighing 16 lbs and 20 lbs flew (through the air.)" A number of rockets from the artillery accompanying Aurangzib's division fell in quick succession amidst Dara's followers and around his elephant. His friends and servants cried out to him to "dismount from his elephant which had become a target" (for the enemy's guns.) There was no help for it. The wretched prince hurriedly got down from his elephant and took horse, "leaving his armour, weapons, and shoes behind" in the *hawda*.\*

At once all was over with him. A little before this, while he was busy trying to force his way to Aurangzib's side, "during the hottest of the fight, some imperial commanders who had stood idle and many who by hiding themselves in holes had received no hurt in the battle, had fled." And now his remaining troops, scattered far and near over the field, saw that his *hawda* was empty and concluded

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\* That Dara dismounted from his elephant at a time of extreme danger, when he had lost all hope of victory, is asserted by A. N. (104), Aqil (48), Masum (63b), and Kambu (15a, bottom.) These contemporary and first-rate authorities refute the bazar gossip reproduced by Manucci and Bernier that Dara changed his elephant for a horse at the treacherous advice of Khalilullah Khan at a time when he had almost completely defeated Aurangzib, and that this act on the part of Dara turned his assured victory into a rout. (Storia, i. 281-282; Bernier, 53-54, also Ishwardas, 24b-25a.)

that their master had fallen. For whom should they fight any longer? Already they were half dead with yesterday's fruitless toil in the field, to-day's march and fight in raging thirst and under a burning sun from dawn till near sunset. To fill up the cup of their misery, a desolating hot wind sprang up and struck Dara's fainting troops in the face. "Most of his officers and men, without strength to ply bow or spear, with thirsty lips and parched tongues cried out *Oh the thirst! Oh the thirst!* and gave up the ghost on all sides of the field." Staying in such a place was no longer possible. The imperial army had been only waiting for a decent pretext for flight, and the sudden disappearance of Dara from the back of his elephant gave them the wished for opportunity. At once the whole army broke up into small confused groups and fled from the field in the utmost disorder.

Dara stood almost alone, deserted by all save a few hereditary followers and friends whose fidelity was stronger than love of life. Just then one of his body-servants, in strapping his quiver to his belt, was shot down. To delay any longer there was to court a fruitless death. Dara was distracted, and his son Sipihr Shukoh was crying. But some of his close attendants seized the bridles of the two and turned their horses' heads towards Agra.\*

\* Masum, 62b—64b; Aqil, 47-48 (esp. the hot blast); A.N. 104-105; K. K. ii. 28.

The fugitive prince galloped for 4 or 5 miles and then sat down utterly exhausted under a shady tree, in the hope of taking breath and unlacing his burning helmet. But there was no rest for him. The roll of kettledrums was heard. Dara's attendants started up in alarm, and urged him to mount again and flee, if he wished to avoid capture. The prince in utter prostration refused to move, saying, "Let what is destined to happen (to me) happen now. What can be better than this that one (of the enemy) should come and release me from this life of shame?" At last with much entreaty he was induced to mount again, and reached Agra at 9 P.M. in an unspeakably wretched condition. [Masum, 64b.]

Meanwhile, in the field, as soon as Dara had left his elephant, Aurangzib sounded the music of rejoicing and pressed forward as to an accomplished victory. His soldiers heartened by the joyous notes advanced from all sides. Dara's remaining troops at once submitted to the victor or took to flight. The last trace of resistance vanished; but there was no pursuit: the victors were as much worn out as the vanquished by that long midsummer day's life and death struggle.

### § 9. *Heavy loss on Dara's side.*

Nor was any pursuit needed. No victory could be more complete. On the vanquished side ten

thousand men had fallen, besides horses and transport animals beyond count. The fierce sun and the waterless plain had been as fatal to them as the enemy's blades. All over the ten miles from the field to Agra a sickening spectacle met the eye when the sun arose next morning on the horrors of this day's war. Every few steps the road was bordered with groups of wounded men, who had dragged themselves away from the field in the vain hope of reaching home and nursing and then died of exhaustion and agony, and with fugitives struck down by the murderous hot blast but unscathed by the enemy's sword. Mingled with the men, in the field and the road-side, lay the carcases of the dumb victims of war,—oxen, mules, camels, horses, and elephants. Many of the soldiers also died after entering the city.\*

Among the commanders who poured forth their life-blood in the service of the throne, nine Rajputs and nineteen Muslims are mentioned by name. Bravest among so many brave men was Rao Chhatra Sal Hada, the chieftain of Bundi and the hero of fifty-two fights. "With his Hadas clad in their saffron robes, the ensigns of death or victory, the Bundi prince formed the vanguard of Dara on this day...A panic ensued, which was followed by

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\* A.N. 105-106; *Adab*, 167a, 133b; Ishwardas says that 15,000 were slain (26a.) *Storia*, i. 282.

confusion and flight. The noble Hada, on this disastrous event, turned to his vassals, and exclaimed, 'Accursed be he who flies! Here, true to my salt, my feet are rooted to this field, nor will I quit it alive but with victory.' Cheering on his men, he mounted his elephant, but whilst encouraging them by his voice and example, a cannon-ball hitting his elephant, the animal turned and fled. Chhatra Sal leaped from his back and called for his steed, exclaiming 'My elephant may turn his back on the enemy, but never shall his master.' Mounting his horse, and forming his men into a dense mass, he led them to the charge against Prince Murad, whom he singled out, and had his lance balanced for the issue, when a ball pierced his forehead." With Chhatra Sal fell also his youngest son Bharat Singh, his brother Muhakam Singh, three of his nephews, as well as the choicest of his clansmen. "In the two battles [of Dharmat and Samugarh] no less than twelve princes of the blood, together with the heads of every Hada clan, maintained their fealty even to death. Where are we to look for such examples?"—Tod (ii. 1341) asks in generous admiration. Four Rathor and three Gaur chieftains were slain on Dara's side, and one Sisodia of note on Murad's.

The most renowned victim of the day, however, was Rustam Khan, surnamed Firuz Jang, the

hero of the Uzbak and Persian wars, and the main prop of Dara's power. Muhammad Salih, the *diwan* of Dara, two sons of Ali Mardan Khan, a brother of Dilir Khan Ruhela (second only to the latter in martial renown), besides five Sayyids of Barha,—a clan whose tried valour gave them the right to stand in the Van of Mughal armies in the post of the greatest danger and honour,—swelled the death-list on Dara's side.

The army of Aurangzib lost only one chief of the first rank, Azam Khan, formerly known as Multafat Khan, *diwan* of the Deccan and elder brother of Mir Khalil, the active Inspector of the Deccan Artillery—who died of the excessive heat, and three minor officers,—Sazawwar Khan, Sayyid Dilawwar Khan, and Hadidad Khan. Eight others, including Zulfiqar Khan and Bahadur Khan, were wounded.\* The right wing suffered the heaviest portion of the loss, as it bore the brunt of the enemy's attack in the earlier stages of the contest and had long to defend itself against superior odds.

Dara's plan of battle was extremely simple and primitive: he would penetrate his enemy's line at any point found vulnerable to cavalry attack, then force his way to his hated rival, and by killing him end the war at one blow. With Aurangzib dead or

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\* Casualties, *A.N.* 105—107; *Ishwardas*, 24a, 26a.

captured, his army would submit as a matter of course. So he sent on wave after wave of cavalry in successive charges. Aurangzib, on the other hand, like Wellington at Waterloo, kept himself strictly on the defensive: he reserved his power patiently but firmly, waited to let Dara exhaust himself,\* and met the enemy's onset stage by stage as it developed itself. Unlike his tactics at Dharmat, he did not here assume the aggressive. Dara's folly and inexperience alone contributed to the victory of the defensive game of his rival. The general advance of Aurangzib's army and the utter dissolution of Dara's vast host at the close of the day afford another parallel of the final defeat of Napoleon, though here there was no newly arrived Blucher to carry on a relentless chase of the vanquished. Lastly, the imperialists ascribed their defeat to the treachery of Khalilullah Khan, just as the French after Waterloo raised the cry *Nous sommes trahis.*

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\* *Storia*, i. 279, 276-277; *Kambu*, 13b.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### CAPTURE OF AGRA FORT AND CAPTIVITY OF MURAD BAKHSH, JUNE 1658.

#### § 1. *Scenes in Agra after Samugarh.*

The livelong day of 29th May had been passed by the Court and the people of Agra in the greatest anxiety. Reports from Dara's camp had made it known that the decisive battle would take place that day. From noon the distant booming of cannon had been heard. What would be the result of the clash of arms? Would the heir-apparent confirm his power and end the troublous dispute about succession? Or, was their city to be subjected to slaughter and rapine by his victorious rivals? Such questions filled all minds,—the private citizens no less than the kindred of the soldiers or the members of the imperial Court.

Fugitives from the field had begun to arrive in the city as early as 2 o'clock in the afternoon. But as they had evidently fled from the battle at an early stage, their reports only agitated the citizens without confirming the belief of a disaster. As the day wore on, the public anxiety deepened. At last about 9 P. M. a small group of riders on panting horses, without torches, clattered over the streets and passed

by the gate of the fort to Dara's house in the city. It was Dara and all that was left of his retinue. He entered his house and shut the door. Loud lamentations broke out from within.\*

At once the dismal news spread about; the city was filled with alarm and mourning. The scene within the fort was equally sad. There Shah Jahan and Jahanara learnt of the disaster to their favourite son and brother, and burst into grief. The women of the harem lifted up their voices and wept.

### § 2. *Shah Jahan's message to defeated Dara.*

When the first paroxysm of grief was over, Shah Jahan sent word to Dara by means of an eunuch, saying, "What has brought you down to such a state is only the decree of Fate. It is better for you now to come to the fort and see me. After hearing what I have to say, you may go wherever Fate leads you. What is predestined for you will happen in every place that you may be in."

But Dara was broken down in body and in spirit. The exertions of the last forty hours, his two days' marching in the sun, the long and desperate struggle of to-day, and the hurried ride from the fatal field, had left him prostrate. Moreover, the iron had entered his soul: he had lost all, not

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\* *Storia*, i. 287, 288-289; *A.N.* 107; *Masum*, 65.

excepting honour. He remembered that he had risked a battle with Aurangzib against Shah Jahan's wishes; he had prevented his father from going out to meet the princes and ending the quarrel by his personal influence; and now the worst foreboded by his father had come to pass. He had been lavishly furnished with men, money and arms by a bountiful father, and he had thrown everything away in the gamble for the throne. He had left Agra shouting "Victory or a grave,"\* and now he had returned without victory. A bankrupt in fame and fortune, he hid himself in shame from friend and stranger alike, and sent this touching reply to his father, "I have not the face to appear before your Majesty in my present wretched plight. Then, again, if I stay here longer, the troops of death will encircle and slay me. Give up your wish to see my abashed face and permit me to go away. Only I beg your Majesty to pronounce the benediction of farewell (*fatiha*) on this distracted and half dead man in the long journey that he has before him."

The arrival of this message doubled the grief of Shah Jahan; he seemed to feel "the parting of his own life from the body." But cruel necessity

\* *Ya takht, ya tabut*, literally, 'Either the throne or a tomb' (*Storia*, i. 242, 'a proverb current among princes laying claim to a crown'.) Dara's exact words are given on p. 262 of *Storia*.

did not allow him even a full expression of his sorrow. Preparations had to be immediately made for Dara's flight, if he was not to be intercepted by his victorious rivals. Mules laden with gold coins from the palace treasury were sent out to him to provide for his journey, and imperial orders were despatched to the Governor of Delhi to open the stores of the fort there to Dara as freely as to the Emperor in person.\*

### § 3. *Dara's flight from Agra to Delhi.*

The miserable prince, after snatching a few hours' rest in his mansion, resumed his flight. His wife Nadira Banu, his children and grand-children, and a few choice slave-girls were placed in covered litters on elephants. Taking as much of his jewels, gold coins, and other valuable property as could be easily carried, he set off towards Delhi at about 3 A.M. with only a dozen servants and guards on horseback. All his other retainers were utterly overcome by the heat, the defeat, and the abandonment of their property in the field, and could not move that night. For the next two days, some of his soldiers and followers in small groups left Agra and joined him, and thus his force was raised to 5,000

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\* Masum, 65b-66b; *Storia*, i. 287-288; *A.N.* 107; Khafi Khan, ii. 30. Against these authorities Ishwardas (26b) wrongly asserts that Dara visited Shah Jahan that night.

men. Shah Jahan also continued to send him money and stores, till Aurangzib seized Agra city and closed the road to Delhi.

The slave-girls, musicians, and other women abandoned by Dara, took shelter in the fort with Shah Jahan; but the property in his mansion at Agra, especially his furniture, elephants, horses, &c., was mostly looted soon after his departure.\*

#### *§ 4. Aurangzib arrives outside Agra.*

We now return to the victors at Samugarh. At Dara's flight Aurangzib descended from his elephant and kneeling down on the ground rendered thanks to God. Twice did he do it, to show his sense of the crowning mercy vouchsafed by the Giver of Victory. Then he proceeded to Dara's tent, but all its rich furniture and treasure had already been looted. The chiefs of the army flocked round Aurangzib to offer their congratulations, while they received praise for their exertions. Murad Bakhsh, too, arrived there and was received with every kindness, Aurangzib saying that the victory was entirely due to his younger brother's heroism and that Murad's reign would date from that day. Expert surgeons were appointed to treat Murad's wounds.

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\* *A.N.*, 108-109, 120; *Storia*, i. 287—290; *Khafi Khan*, ii. 30-31; *Masum*, 66b—67a; *Kambu*, 15b.

If we may believe Khafi Khan, while the doctors were examining the wounds, Aurangzib laid the head of Murad on his own knees, wiped the blood with his own sleeves, and wept pathetically at the sight.

After a time his own tent arrived from the rear and Aurangzib retired to it. Here a grand audience was held, and those officers who had distinguished themselves in the fight were rewarded. All night the sound of revelry and merriment filled the two camps,\* and the sky was lit up by the countless fires at which the Hindus burnt their dead.

In two marches the victorious prince reached Agra and halted in the garden of Nur-manzil or Dhara, outside the city (1st June). Here he stayed for ten days. Every day large numbers of courtiers, nobles, and officers deserted the imperial side and hastened to the garden to worship the rising sun. Some of them had been so enterprising as to leave Agra and welcome him on the way the very day after the battle. The highest nobles of the capital, like Shaista Khan and Muhammad Amin Khan (the son of Mir Jumla), and Dara's chief officers all proffered their homage and devotion to the victor. The vanquished troops who had escaped the sword entered the armies of Aurangzib and Murad, some

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\* A.N. 110; Aqil, 49; Ishwardas, 25b; *Storia*, i. 283.

being unable, but most being unwilling to follow their fugitive master. Many new appointments and promotions were made, and the strength of the army rapidly increased.\*

*§ 5. Shah Jahan's negotiations with Aurangzib for a peaceful settlement.*

The appeal to arms having been decided against him, Shah Jahan next tried diplomacy. We have seen how as early as January, on hearing of the arrest of Mir Jumla, he had written to Aurangzib† rebuking him for this act of disobedience and ordering the release of that noble. Aurangzib took up the false plea that Mir Jumla had treacherously intrigued with the Deccani Sultans. After reaching Burhanpur Aurangzib had written a letter to Shah

\* A.N. 111—115; Aqil, 49.50; Kambu, 15b.

† Correspondence : *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib*, on hearing of Mir Jumla's arrest (Kambu, 10b); *Aurangzib's reply* (purport only, Aqil Khan, 20); *Aurangzib to Shah Jahan* after reaching Burhanpur (A.N. 48, purport). *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib* urging him to give up the march to Hindustan (*Insha-i-Farsi*, A. S. B. MS. F. 56, pp. 59—61); *Aurangzib's reply* complaining of Dara's usurpation and protesting his own pacific intention to see the Emperor (*Ibid* 54—57. Cf. Masum 44a-45a, incorrect paraphrase). *Jahanara to Aurangzib* before Samugarh (*Faiyaz*, 117—119; Kambu, 12b. Aqil Khan, 34—37, gives a long paraphrase of this letter, which differs from the short text given by Kambu). *Aurangzib to Shah Jahan*, really in answer to Jahanara, (Kambu, 12b-13a; *Faiyaz*, 119—121; Aqil Khan, 37—42, a paraphrase). *Aurangzib to Jafar Khan* same time, (*Adab*, 123a & b); *Murad to Jafar Khan* (*Faiyaz*, 465—468).

Jahan (middle of February), inquiring about his health and hoping that the Emperor would put an end to Dara's usurpation of authority and would personally conduct the government. To this no satisfactory reply had come. Again, after defeating Jaswant, Aurangzib had asked the new prime-minister, Jafar Khan, to explain to his master how the two princes had marched from the South only to pay their filial respects to the Emperor, see him with their own eyes in order to disprove the alarming rumours current about his condition, and unfold to him all the bad turns Dara had done to them and the disorder into which his usurpation had thrown the whole empire. The battle with Jaswant, he said, had been forced on him by the Maharajah's obstinate resolve to bar the path to Agra, and must not be regarded as a war against the Emperor's authority. A month later when he was crossing the Chambal, he got a letter written by his eldest sister Jahanara, but really expressing Shah Jahan's views. It said, "The Emperor has recovered and is himself administering the State and trying to remove the disorders that cropped up during his late illness. Your armed advance is therefore an act of war against your father. Even if it is directed against Dara, it is no less sinful, since the eldest brother, both by Canon Law and common usage, stands in the position of the father. If you value your good name

in this world and salvation in the next, you should obey your father, and report your wishes to him in writing, without advancing any further."

To this Aurangzib had sent a long reply, following his usual line of defence: "Shah Jahan has lost all real power and control. Dara is doing everything himself and trying to ruin his younger brothers. Witness how he has crushed Shuja already. He also foiled my invasion of Bijapur, when complete success was at hand, and he emboldened the Bijapuris to defy me. He has poisoned the Emperor's ears against his two younger brothers, and taken away Berar from me for no fault whatever. Against such overt hostility I am bound to take up arms in self-preservation. My wish, however, is only to go to Shah Jahan's presence and reveal everything to him personally. I shall not brook any obstacle to this loving design. See, how Jaswant fared in making the attempt. Dara should, therefore, be sent away from the imperial Court to his province of the Panjab, to avoid mischief."

The day after Samugarh, Aurangzib wrote to Shah Jahan directly, excusing his late conduct as forced upon him by his enemies. On reaching Nur-manzi<sup>l</sup> he received a reply in Shah Jahan's own hand (1st June), inviting him to an interview, as he had come so near and his old father longed to see

him. The two bearers of this letter,\*—the aged chamberlain Fazil Khan and the chief justice Sayyid Hedaitullah,—also delivered a loving oral message from the Emperor, and took their leave after getting Aurangzib's consent to the proposed interview. Next day they visited him again with another kind message and many presents from the Emperor, including costly jewels and a famous sword known as *Alamgir* ('Conqueror of the Universe'), and repeated the Emperor's desire for an interview. But they found the prince changed. Last evening his confidential advisers had told him that Shah Jahan still loved Dara best and was exerting himself actively to promote Dara's cause, so that the invitation of Aurangzib to Agra fort was only a trap laid for his arrest. Fazil Khan pleaded hard to remove these suspicions, but all in vain, and he had to return to his old master and report his failure. Shaista Khan

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\* Correspondence : *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib*, inviting him to an interview, (Kambu, 15b; Aqil Khan 50-51.) *Aurangzib's reply* (*Ibid.*) *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib*, protesting against the suspicion of his good faith (Kambu, 16b; Aqil Khan, 53). *Aurangzib's reply* (Kambu 16b; Aqil Khan, 54). *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib*, complaining of the cutting off of Jamuna water, translated by me in this chapter, (A.S.B. MS. F. 56, pp. 91-92, and, in a shorter form in British Museum Or. MSS., Addl. 18,881, folio 77a, which alone gives Aurangzib's reply, "on the back of his father's letter," as '*Karda-i-khwesh ayed pesh; ziyadah hadd-i-adab*'). *Shah Jahan to Aurangzib* towards the close of the siege of Agra fort (Kambu, 16b-17b; Aqil Khan 56-57; Masum, 69b-70b.) *Aurangzib's reply* (Kambu, 17b; Aqil Khan 57-58; Masum, 70b-71b).

must have deepened the prince's distrust of his father, for he was always friendly to Aurangzib and Shah Jahan taxed him with setting that prince against the Emperor. On the 5th the grey-bearded Fazil Khan came a third time, with a letter from Shah Jahan protesting against the suspicions as cruel calumnies and asking Aurangzib to come and see for himself the full extent of his father's love and kindness. Khalilullah Khan, who accompanied Fazil Khan, had been already won over by Aurangzib. He was now granted a private interview by the prince, in which he confirmed his fears of his father's hostile designs and urged him to imprison the aged sovereign as the only means of making him harmless. The good old Fazil Khan who was waiting outside all this time, was told that Khalilullah had been placed under arrest by the prince, and that he must return alone to the Emperor with Aurangzib's reply declining the proposed interview on the ground of his mind not being composed about what his Majesty intended to do during it. The chamberlain came back to Shah Jahan and said that "the matter had now gone beyond the stage of sending letters and messages."\*

\* For the embassies of Fazil Khan, Kambu, 15b-16b; Aqil Khan, 50-54; *A.N.* 112. Shaista Khan is said to have visited Aurangzib on 5th June (*A.N.* 114), but he may have sent messages to the prince before that date. For Shaista Khan's suspected partisanship of Aurangzib, see *A.N.* 114; *Adab*, 261a; Khafi Khan, ii. 21; *Storia*, i. 255, 292.

So, indeed, it had; for, that very night the siege of Agra fort began. At last the last shred of pretence was thrown off; the mask was dropped altogether, and the Emperor himself was attacked.

The arrival of the victorious armies in the environs of Agra threw the citizens into the greatest alarm and confusion. Murad's troops, strangers to discipline and fearless of their gay and indolent master, entered the city to plunder and ravish, in defiance of Aurangzib's order to spare life and property at the capital. These unruly soldiers, aided by the low class ruffians of the city and the camp, threatened to create a great disturbance. So, on third June Aurangzib sent his eldest son into the city to keep the peace and protect the people. According to one account the prefect of the police (*kotwal*), Siddi Masaud, was executed, and a Tartar officer of Aurangzib appointed in his place.\* The whole city fell under Aurangzib's control, but the fort was still in Shah Jahan's hands.

### § 6. *Aurangzib besieges his father in Agra Fort.*

On the return of Fazil Khan (5th June), the Emperor learnt that Aurangzib was bitterly estranged from him and that he could not hope to meet and induce him to make a friendly settlement with his

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\* Ishwardas, 26b; A.N. 113-114; *Storia*, i. 292.

brothers. The old monarch therefore prepared to stand a siege, and shut the gates of the fort, lest some traitor should murder or imprison him in the hope of gaining Aurangzib's favour.\* The defence of the walls was entrusted to some officers whom he believed to be devoted to him, and there was a garrison of 1,500 foreign slaves,—Qalmaqs, Abyssinians, and Turks, who usually proved faithful to their salt.

At night a detachment from Aurangzib's army, led by Zulfiqar Khan and Bahadur Khan, crept to the foot of the fort walls and began the attack. Bombardment was tried at first. One gun was mounted on the terrace of the Jama Masjid, facing the western gate of the fort, and another on Dara's mansion by the Jamuna. They are said to have done some damage to the fort guns and the upper stories of the palace. But the fort was one of the strongest of that age, "no assault, mining or sapping could capture it, with its deep moat and its towers and walls too thick to be battered down."<sup>†</sup>

The artillery of the besiegers was ineffective. Success by breaching and assault was out of the question. The musketeers on the fort walls fought

\* Kambu, 16b; Aqil, 54-55.

<sup>†</sup> Siege of Agra, in Masum 68a—72a; Ishwardas, 27b—28b; Aqil, 55—58; Kambu, 16b—18a A.N. entirely silent. Khafi Khan (ii. 32) brief. Storia, i. 293—295 (useless.)

boldly and faithfully, and shot down every one who showed his head below. But most of the besiegers had taken shelter under the projecting eaves and porches of the fort and the neighbouring trees, and in the houses which then closely adjoined it, while their officers lodged in Dara's mansion. They, therefore, suffered little loss of life. But at the same time they could not touch the garrison, and the capture of the fort seemed as far off as ever.

A regular investment would have caused a long delay, detained the army there, and given Dara time to gather strength at Delhi. So, Aurangzib took counsel with his generals, and after a long discussion they hit upon a clever device, which reduced "this extremely strong fort in only three days." Thirst opened the gates of Agra more speedily than assault or bombardment.

Acting on this plan, Aurangzib's men by a sudden rush possessed themselves of the Khiziri gate which opens on the river. The arch of the gateway protected them from the fire of the defenders on the ramparts, and they could safely prevent the taking of water from the river into the fort. The garrison now began to suffer the horrors of a siege. With the Jamuna at hand, all other sources of water supply had been neglected in the fort. It had a few wells no doubt, but their water was bitter and they had been long disused. The Emperor and his

Court, so long accustomed to the "molten snow" of the Jamuna, found the well-water intolerable. Many of his officers, pampered idlers of the Court, being unable to bear the hardship for more than a day, slipped out of the fort under the plea of looking after the admission of water. Others were corrupted by Aurangzib's gold. The rank and file had indeed courage and fidelity, but all were disheartened at being led by an old and invalid master, and wanted to beg for quarter. Shah Jahan, compelled in his old age and sickness to quench his thirst in the burning heat of June with the bitter well-water, wrote the following touching letter to his cruel son :—

"My son, my hero ! (verses)

Why should I complain of the unkindness of Fortune,  
Seeing that not a leaf is shed by a tree without God's will ?  
Only yesterday I was the master of nine hundred  
thousand troopers, and to-day I am in need of a  
pitcher of water ! (verses)

Praised be the Hindus in all cases,

As they ever offer water to their dead.

And thou, my son, art a marvellous Musalman,

As thou causest me in life to lament for (lack of)  
water !

O, prosperous son ! be not proud of the good luck of this treacherous world. Scatter not the dust of negligence (of duty) and pride on thy wise head. (Know) that this perishable world is a narrow pass (leading) to the dark region, and that eternal prosperity comes only from remembering God and showing kindness to men."

To this appeal Aurangzib sent the brutal reply, "It is your own doing." For three days Shah Jahan held out. Then, amidst raging thirst, with only despair and treason around him, he decided to yield. For the fourth time Fazil Khan was sent to Aurangzib with a letter in which the Emperor sadly mourned his own fate,—unprecedented in the history of Emperors—ascribed everything to God's decree, warned his son not to be too proud of his power nor to put too much faith in his good fortune, and urged him to obey his father as the *Quran* enjoins, if he valued his good name in this world and feared the Day of Judgment in the next. He finally entreated Aurangzib to do his filial duty and not to ruin the Mughal imperial family, then famous throughout the world for its splendour and power, nor lower its prestige abroad (especially in the eyes of the king of Persia).

Aurangzib replied by professing deep obedience and defending all that he had done as forced on him by the acts of his enemies. He pointed to his own loyalty to the throne in spite of Dara's acts of manifest hostility, and concluded, "Owing to certain occurrences I am afraid to interview your Majesty... If your Majesty surrenders the gates of the fort to my men and gives them free ingress and egress, and thereby removes my suspicion, I shall go and wait

on you, consent to whatever you wish, and do nothing displeasing or harmful to you."

*§ 7. Agra fort capitulates : Shah Jahan made prisoner.*

On 8th June Shah Jahan opened the gates of the fort to Aurangzib's officers, who took possession of it and expelled the Emperor's officers from *all* parts of it. The treasure, jewels, rich robes, furniture, and Government stores within were seized by them and placed in several rooms which were strictly kept under lock and seal. Thus Agra fort with its immense hoards of treasure and well-filled arsenals and magazines,—the accumulations of three generations of Emperors of the richest country in the world,—passed into Aurangzib's hands almost without a blow.

Muhammad Sultan waited on his grandfather and was received with great kindness. For some days he acted as the captive Emperor's keeper under minute instructions from Aurangzib as to what he should do and whom he should admit. Shah Jahan was deprived of all power. From being "the king of kings" (*Shahan-shah*), he sank at once into the condition of a helpless captive, dependent on others even for a change of dress. He was confined within the harem of the palace, behind the Hall of Public Audience. A strong force was posted in and

around the fort to prevent any attempt at rescue, and careful watch was kept on the eunuchs and other servants leaving the palace, lest they should communicate with the outside. "For a long time none except a few servants were allowed to come and go to his Majesty on any account, or even to speak a word to him from a distance!" Physicians of Aurangzib's own choosing attended the old man.\*

On the 10th the Princess Jahanara visited Aurangzib to try the effect of her personal influence and sisterly persuasion. She told him of their loving father's wish to see him and proposed in Shah Jahan's name a partition of the empire between the four princes: Dara should have the Panjab and the adjacent provinces, Murad Bakhsh Gujarat, Shuja Bengal, Muhammad Sultan the Deccan, and Aurangzib the remaining portion of the empire with the rank of heir-apparent to the throne and the title of *Buland-iqbal* (which was to be taken away from the eldest-born).

Aurangzib was ready with his plea for declining these terms: "Dara," he said, "is an infidel to Islam and a friend of the Hindus. He must be

\* For Shah Jahan's captivity, Kambu, 18a; Aqil 58-59, 63; A.N. 116 (silent about the object of Jahanara's visit); Masum, 72a and b, 77b—79a; Adab, 187b—189a (Aurangzib's instructions to Muhammad Sultan as keeper of Shah Jahan, a few days later), 260a—264a (Aurangzib to captive Shah Jahan), 137a and b (Aurangzib to Fazil Khan, in charge of Shah Jahan); A.N. 124; K. K. ii. 32.

extirpated for the sake of the true faith and the peace of the realm. I cannot visit the Emperor before concluding this business." [Aqil, 59-61.] But after long discussion and entreaty, he was once more induced to promise to visit Shah Jahan, and next day marched in a splendid procession from the garden to the city,—the streets being lined with dense crowds of sight-seers who cheered and blessed him. But on the way Shaista Khan and Shaikh Mir galloped up to him and dissuaded him from making the visit, as a needless running into danger. They told him that Shah Jahan had laid a plan to get him murdered by his fierce Tartar slave-women, as soon as he would step into the harem of the fort. Aurangzib's purpose was shaken; he stopped his elephant, hesitating what to do. Just then a slave named Nahir-dil arrived from the fort and betrayed into Aurangzib's hands a secret letter which the Emperor had ordered him to smuggle out to Dara. It ran thus :

"Dara Shukoh! stay firmly at Delhi. There is no lack of money and troops there. Take care not to pass beyond that place, as I myself shall despatch the affair here."\*

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\* Aqil 61-62. Masum (79b—82a) says that Shah Jahan wrote a secret letter to Murad to murder Aurangzib! We read of Nahir-dil *chela* or slave having been appointed *kotwal* of Agra in 1656. (Waris, 106b.) Manucci (*Storia*, i. 296) and Bernier (65) declare this letter to

The warning of Aurangzib's advisers was thus verified. Finding that his father's whole heart was still devoted to Dara, Aurangzib was greatly displeased : he gave up his intention of an interview, passed by the gate of the fort, and occupied Dara's mansion in the city. Shah Jahan's captivity was now made stricter, and communication between him and the outside world cut off.

§ 8. *Aurangzib openly exercises the imperial authority and takes control of the government.*

Ever since Samugarh Aurangzib had been daily receiving deserters from the imperial service and enlisting new troops and officers in large numbers. When Agra fort surrendered, he became truly the sovereign, and the whole administrative staff submitted to him. A grand *darbar* was now held (10th June) in his camp. He sat on a couch of State and granted audience to the public, eager to see their new master. The new chancellor Rai-i-raian, the grand wazir Jafar Khan, and all other departmental heads with their staffs did him homage. Hosts of men were passed before him by the paymasters and courtiers, and were given suitable rank at his command by the marshals (*mir tuzak.*) Fresh appoint-

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Dara as a forgery of Aurangzib's. For Aurangzib's refusal to visit Shah Jahan, see also *A.N.* 122-123; K. K., ii, 34-36.

ments were made on the 11th and 12th, after he had entered Agra city.\* His preparations being now complete, and his mind at peace about Shah Jahan, Aurangzib on the 13th set out from Agra towards Delhi in pursuit of Dara, and arrived near Mathura† ten days later. His march had been slow and hesitating, because an alarming, but not unforeseen development had taken place in the meantime. Murad was trying to assert himself and cross the purposes of his masterful brother. This source of danger had to be crushed before it could grow too strong for control or remedy, and Aurangzib decided to settle the affair of Murad before proceeding further.

### *§ 9. Murad grows jealous of Aurangzib.*

Since the battle of Samugarh Murad‡ had kept to his own camp on account of his wounds. His courtiers showed him how power was daily slipping out of his grasp while Aurangzib was becoming all in all. They flattered his vanity by saying that

\* A.N. 111—119; Ishwardas 29a.

† *Storia*, i. 300n (the place where Murad was arrested.) Agil 65; Ishwardas 31b (at Brindaban); A.N. 138 'the further side of Mathura.'

‡ The reasons for arresting Murad are given by Aurangzib in *Adab*, 188b, and in his official history, A.N., 134—138. See also Kambu, 18b; Ishwardas, 29b—31a; Agil, 64—66; Masum, 79a—81a (probably a mere story); *Storia*, i. 263, 283—284, 298—300; Bernier, 66—67.

both the victories over the enemy had been won by his own valour, while Aurangzib had kept himself out of the heat and burden of the day; and yet now all the imperial officers were making their bow to Aurangzib and he was issuing orders in everything as the sole master. The surrender of Agra fort had made this prince Emperor in all but the name. Was it to promote his brother's elevation to the throne that Murad had bled? And what certainty was there that Aurangzib would peaceably deliver to him the full lordship of the western provinces as agreed in their treaty of alliance? With his senior partner daily growing stronger, Murad must soon lose the power of enforcing respect to that treaty.

A keen disappointment is said to have aggravated Murad's jealousy and alarm. Ever since their meeting at Dipalpur Aurangzib had done everything to soothe and flatter Murad. His own interest in the war of succession, he said, was merely that of a pious Muslim, who could not bear to see Dara openly slighting his creed and cherishing the infidels. He aimed not at the crown, but at the extirpation of the heretical heir-apparent, the 'Idolator' as styled him. As soon as that object had been attained, Aurangzib would place Murad on the throne and himself take a low unambitious place as his minister, or retire to the life of a religious recluse. Hence in their conversation

Murad used to address Aurangzib as His Holiness (*Hazrat-ji*), while Aurangzib referred to his younger brother as His Majesty (*Padishah-ji*). Again, after the victory of Samugarh, Aurangzib had congratulated Murad on the commencement of *his* reign, and yet he had now monopolised all power! Such is the story told by all the unofficial historians of that age.

But I find it difficult to credit this account. Murad must have been a greater fool than he really was if he ever truly believed in such delusive promises. It is possible that Aurangzib had pretended to defer to Murad's judgment in public, and also by smooth words raised in his mind a vague hope that he would give Murad much more than the territory promised in the treaty. At least Murad might have imagined that Aurangzib would not seize the supreme power in the life-time of Shah Jahan, as he had hitherto avoided wearing the crown and had even urged Murad to desist from such a course in Gujrat.

At all events, Murad was keen on reigning as king. He could not banish the fond dream of royalty from his mind, but had kept with himself his throne, golden umbrella, and other insignia of kingship since leaving Ahmadabad, in the hope of using them in Northern India; and now he saw his hopes threatened with disappointment. With

every successive victory and march, Aurangzib's power was growing greater and his position higher, while Murad's grew less and less. Flattering courtiers fanned the young prince's jealousy and ambition and prompted him to assert himself: the crown of Delhi would best become a hero like him. If Aurangzib could usurp the supreme power, why could not Murad?

Led on by such counsellors who fed his vanity, Murad began to act in opposition to Aurangzib and to assert his own will. In order to rival his brother he began to increase his army, seduced from Aurangzib's side many of the recently joined imperial troops by the promise of higher pay, and even intercepted and diverted to his own camp men who were coming to enter Aurangzib's service. His lax discipline and reckless generosity made him the darling of a certain class of soldiers. The Mughal mercenaries in particular were attached to such a liberal and lenient master. Many self-seekers, too, gladly deserted the strict and parsimonious Aurangzib for higher rank and pay under Murad. Thus, in a short time Murad's army was swollen to 20,000 men. In imitation of Aurangzib he conferred titles and *mansabs* on his followers, as if he had already become king. Lastly he gave up visiting Aurangzib as beneath his dignity.

Thus an open opposition to Aurangzib's

authority was set up. The malcontents and plotters against him found a camp in which to take refuge and a regular organisation by means of which to display their hostility. The situation became very critical for Aurangzib, and a solution of it had to be reached before the chase of Dara could be undertaken with safety.

When Aurangzib started from Agra, Murad stayed behind in that city; but his advisers told him that if Aurangzib entered Delhi alone he would easily crown himself Emperor. So, Murad changed his mind, and followed his brother, always encamping a few miles behind him, as if waiting to deal a shrewd blow from the rear. The public mind was greatly disturbed by this open rivalry, and turbulent men rejoiced at the prospect of a civil war, which would leave them free to plunder the country. The acts of violence committed by Murad's men could not be punished, as Aurangzib had no influence over his brother now. The work he had still in hand was thrown into disorder.

### *S 10. Aurangzib invites Murad to a feast.*

His plan was quickly formed.\* With his in-born cunning, he first lulled Murad's suspicion to

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\* For the arrest of Murad, Kambu, 19a; Aqil, 66—70; Ishwardas, 31b—33b; Masum, 82b—86a; (the last two very detailed); A.N. 138 (merely mentions the event); Khafi Khan, ii. 38, and Dilkasha, i. 30,

sleep. Two marches from Agra he presented 233 horses and 20 lakhs of Rupees to Murad, as the latter had complained of being too poor to equip his troops for the march. Aurangzib further promised to send him soon one-third of the spoils of war, as previously agreed upon. Then he invited his brother to a feast in celebration of his complete recovery and also to hold a council of war for the projected operations against Dara. For some days after this Murad's chief followers dissuaded him from putting himself in his rival's power. That prince, though professing firm faith in Aurangzib's promises and oaths, seems to have been shaken in his purpose, and declined to make the visit, offering polite excuses. Aurangzib repeated the invitation daily. He had secretly corrupted Nur-ud-din, a personal attendant (*khawas*) of Murad's, and this traitor induced the hapless prince, when returning from a hunt, to enter his brother's camp, (25th June.) The other officers protested, but in vain.

Murad was received at the gate by Aurangzib and taken within his tent. His officers were seated in a pavilion outside the portico and made welcome by his brother's marshals. The courtyard was filled with the same prince's officers of the guard.

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(both meagre); *Storia*, i. 300—306; Bernier, 66—69. Aurangzib's public reasons for the arrest are given in *Adab*, 188b (for communication to Shah Jahan.)

Murad was led into Aurangzib's private chamber, attended by one servant, the eunuch Basharat. The two brothers sat down together on the same carpet. Aurangzib was all kindness and attention to Murad, smeared him over with essence and asked after his health, professing the utmost pleasure at his recovery and showering "favours beyond imagination and computation" on him. After some time a royal dinner was laid for both, and the hungry hunter did full justice to it. According to one account, Aurangzib even plied Murad with wine and overcame his natural delicacy in drinking before an elder brother by saying, "Drink in my presence, as I long to see you supremely happy after so many adversities."

Conversation followed the dinner. Gradually the fatigue of the chase and the fulness of the repast made Murad doze and yawn. Aurangzib told him to take a nap in a bed spread close at hand, while he himself retired to the harem on the plea of similarly reposing. The plan of campaign was left to be discussed till after the siesta.

### § 11. *Murad is treacherously made prisoner by Aurangzib.*

Murad took off his sword and dagger, loosened his dress, and stretched himself at ease on the bed. Basharat sat down rubbing his legs. Soon a lovely

slave-girl entered the tent and, making a sign to the eunuch to go away, took his place at Murad's feet and began to shampoo him. The soft touch of her palms soothed Murad and threw him into a profound slumber. Then she arose and stealthily left the room, taking away Murad's weapons from the side of his pillow. The time long waited for had now arrived. Immediately after her departure Shaikh Mir with a dozen of the most trusty servants of Aurangzib entered the chamber and surrounded Murad's bed. They seem to have made a clatter, which awoke Murad. Starting up at the sound, he first tried to seize his weapons, but they were gone. In a moment he understood the meaning of this "strange change:" he had been caged! Resistance was hopeless. Sinking into despair, he upbraided his brother with treachery to a guest and ally and falsehood to his plighted word and to vows sworn on the *Quran*. Aurangzib, who was lurking in suspense behind a screen, replied, "As at the instigation of your wretched advisers, you have recently done acts likely to cause disturbance, trouble, and injury to the people and ruin to the country, and as your head has been filled with pride and insolence, wise people apprehended from this state of affairs the destruction of public peace, injury to property, and confusion in the government. Therefore, with a view to reform your

temperament and to promote the good of the kingdom and the congregation, I think it necessary to make you pass some days in patience and repose, in a retreat full of composure, and under my eyes, that you may not have to rack your head about issuing commands and prohibitions and may be freed from the hardships of the world. God forbid that I should, with regard to this 'light of the royal eye,' entertain the idea of doing any act to put your dear life in danger! Praised be Allah! the foundations of my promise and vow (to you) have not been at all weakened. My brother's life is safe in the protection of God. Eating the bread of wisdom daily...and knowing this (confinement) to be purely beneficial (to yourself), give no place to sorrow or fear in your heart."

Murad found expostulation and entreaty alike vain; resistance would have been suicide. He yielded in silence. Shaikh Mir placed before him a pair of golden fetters and with a courteous *salam* tied the prince's feet together.

After midnight the prisoner was placed in a covered litter, such as is usually used by ladies, mounted on an elephant, and sent away under a large escort of cavalry, in charge of Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan, two of the trustiest generals of Aurangzib. By rapid marches they soon reached the fort of Salimgarh at Delhi and deposited Murad in the

State-prison of that stronghold. To throw his friends off the scent, three other elephants, with similar covered *hawdas* and escort of cavalry, were sent out east, south, and west !

This "excellent stratagem," as it is called in the history written by Aurangzib's order and revised by him,—had been carried out so smoothly that Murad's followers did not hear of his fate till it was too late. They had imagined that he was feasting or holding secret council with his brother all the time. Next morning his leaderless soldiery, to the number of 20,000, were taken into Aurangzib's service. Even his faithful officers,—blaming their master for his obstinate rushing into a trap in contempt of their loyal warning, and hopeless of attempting a rescue in the absence of a head,—submitted to the victor, who soothed their feelings with rich favours. The entire establishment of Murad,—generals, ministers, clerks, soldiers, camp-followers,\* and servants, as well as his property, became Aurangzib's. His son Izid Bakhsh was sent to Delhi to share his father's captivity. The traitor Nur-ud-din and several others who had connived at their master's fall, or at least had not stirred a finger to rescue him, were highly rewarded by Aurangzib.\*

His mind being thus set at rest about Murad,

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\* *Aqil*, 70; *Ishwardas*, 34; *Storia*, i. 305, 306; *A. N.* 139.

Aurangzib on 27th June resumed his march and arrived in the environs of Delhi on 5th July.

### § 12. *Murad's captive life in Gwalior fort.*

We may here complete the history of Murad. In January 1659 he was sent with his son to the State-prison of Gwalior, where he was suffered to live for nearly three years more. But he did not cease to be a political danger even in captivity. His prodigality of money and his spirit of gay comradeship with the soldiers had made him very popular. Songs in praise of the captive prince were sung in the bazars. At last a clever conspiracy to release him, which all but succeeded, roused Aurangzib to the need of removing his rival beyond the reach of his earthly friends. Murad had cherished the Mughal mercenaries greatly in the days of his power, and even now he spent half his prison-allowance in supporting the Mughals who resided as *faqirs* in the plain below Gwalior and the Mughal wayfarers and merchants who arrived there. Some of his former officers, including the father of the historian Khafi Khan, also lived there in disguise. The grateful Mughals now planned a rescue; one night they contrived to fasten a rope-ladder to a battlement of the fort, kept a horse saddled ready below it, and sent word to Murad to escape. The prince was infatuated with

the beauty of his concubine Saraswati Bai, whom he had taken to his prison by entreaty with Aurangzib. At midnight, when all was ready for his flight, he went to take a lover's farewell of her. There was little hope of their meeting together again. At the news, the woman set up a loud lament, crying, "To whom are you leaving me?" Hearing the noise the guards awoke, lighted their torches and search-lights, and soon discovered the ladder.\*

§ 13. *Murad is accused of the murder of Ali Naqi, and beheaded by sentence of the qazi.*

When the news of this abortive attempt reached Aurangzib, he determined to remove all anxiety on the score of Murad for ever. At his instigation a son of Ali Naqi, whom Murad had murdered at Ahmadabad years ago, now demanded justice for the shedding of their father's blood. The eldest son declined to seek vengeance. Not so the second son, who lodged a complaint in the law courts. Aurangzib, now Emperor, directed the criminal judge (*qazi*) of Gwalior to decide the case according to the evidence and the Quranic law. The plaintiff arrived at the fort in charge of

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\* Khaf Khan, ii. 155-156. The word 'Mughal' is now a days used in India for the Persians, and sometimes for the people of Central Asia also, but never for the Mongols. Bernier, 3, 209.

an eunuch of Aurangzib and opened his case before the *qazi*. Murad indignantly refused to plead,<sup>\*</sup> saying, "If the Emperor, in accordance with his promises and vows to me, abstains from this miserable creature's blood, no harm will be done to his State and power. But if he wishes needlessly for the death of this helpless being, what merit or propriety is there in my meeting such low people as these face to face? Do what you wish."

The *qazi* convicted Murad. As the avenger refused to accept any price for his father's blood, death was the only sentence possible under Islamic law. On Wednesday, 4th December, 1661, two slaves with their swords "released this prince from the narrow cell of his prison." His corpse was buried in the 'Traitors' Cemetery' of Gwalior fort. Forty years afterwards, Aurangzib, then an old man hastening to his latter end, refers to the grave of his murdered brother, but without a word of remorse or pity.\* Kingship does not admit of love for brother

\* Murad was sent to Gwalior at the end of January 1659, (*A. N.* 291, 304). Khafi Khan, 156, says that Murad was beheaded in the month of Rabi-us-sani, 1072 A. H.; Kambu 24b (both MSS. in the Khuda Bakhsh Library) gives the date as 21 Rabi-us-sani, 1070 A. H. Here the final figure 2 has been dropped by mistake; the year was certainly 1072 and not 1070, because in Jamadi-ul-awwal, 1071 A. H., Murad is spoken of as still in Gwalior (*A. N.*, 603).

or tenderness to the fallen who may possibly become  
strong again.

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For the execution of Murad, Kambu, 24b; Khafi Khan, ii. 156;  
*Storia*, i. 382-383; *Dilkasha*, i. 35. The reference to his tomb is in  
Aurangzib's letters, Inayetullah's *Ahkam*, 289b, 302b.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### THE PURSUIT OF DARA SHUKOH THROUGH THE PANJAB AND SINDH, JUNE—NOVEMBER, 1658.

#### § 1. *Fugitive Dara's doings at Delhi.*

We have seen how Dara reached Delhi with about 5,000 troopers on 5th June. Taking up his quarters in the ruined fort of Babar in the Old Town, he turned to his own use the Government property, horses, and elephants in the capital, and also seized the money and goods of some of the nobles. His plan was to raise and equip a new army with these resources and to wait here till he was joined by his eldest son, whom he had ordered to hasten back from Bengal and reach Delhi by the eastern bank of the Jamuna, so as to avoid Aurangzib at Agra. He also busily sent off letters to all sides to secure the support of the imperial officers and nobles, and kept up a correspondence with Shah Jahan for a few days.\*

But it was soon found that Sulaiman Shukoh could not possibly reach him quickly, and that Aurangzib was not going to let Dara stay in peace at Delhi. The surrender of Agra fort (8th June) left Aurangzib free to go in pursuit of his defeated brother, and he openly made preparations for

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\* A. N. 120-121; Agil, 63 (meagre); Masum, 75b.

✓ marching northwards. At this news Dara at once resolved on flight; with the victorious enemy coming from the south in overwhelming strength and the approach of the rainy season threatening to cut him off from the Panjab, it would have been fatal for him to linger at Delhi. Should he march east, join his eldest son's 22,000 victorious troops, make the impregnable fortress of Allahabad (then held by one of his devoted officers) his stronghold, and then, forming an alliance with Shuja, confront Aurangzib with their united forces? But Shuja was the ally of his foes, Aurangzib and Murad, and was besides smarting under his recent defeat at the hands of Sulaiman. His friendly co-operation was no more to be hoped for than an alliance with Aurangzib. Therefore, for Dara to move from Delhi to Allahabad would be to let himself be crushed between two enemies,—Aurangzib in the west and Shuja in the east. On the other hand, the Panjab strongly attracted him. It was the home of soldiers, and close to the Afghan border where the hardiest mercenaries could be enlisted. The province had long been his viceroyalty and was held by his faithful deputy, Sayyid Ghairat Khan. Lahor fort contained much of his property, as well as one *krore* of Rupees of imperial money, and a vast arsenal and magazine. So, Dara turned to Lahor, instructing his son to join him by making a wide

detour round Agra and Delhi and crossing the Ganges and the Jamuna at the foot of the Himalayas. This decision ruined both father and son. [A. N. 125.]

Leaving Delhi after a week's halt, on 12th June, with an army swollen to 10,000 men, Dara reached Sathind, where he seized the property of the revenue-collector and dug out 12 *lakhs* of Rupees which that officer had buried underground before his flight. Then, after crossing the Satlej, he destroyed all the boats found at the ferries within his reach, in order to hinder the enemy's passage. Reaching Lahor on 3rd July, he spent there a month and a half in enlisting new men and completing his military preparations in order to meet Aurangzib on equal terms again. Even before leaving Agra he had instructed his Lahor agent, Sayyid Chairat Khan, to raise troops and collect guns, and he had also "written to every quarter of this martial province inviting the tribes to enlist, and sent robes of honour to the zamindars...and *faujdars* of the Panjab, Multan and Tatta (then in his viceroyalty) and to the troops near Peshawar, inviting them to join him."

### § 2. *Dara's military preparations at Lahor; he holds the line of the Satlej.*

"After entering Lahor he opened the rich imperial treasury and began to distribute money

lavishly to the soldiery, and to give *mansabs* and titles freely. In a short time 20,000 men were assembled under him. Some imperial commanders also joined him, such as Rajah Rajrup (zamindar of the Jammu hills) and Khanjar Khan (*faujdar* of Bhera and Khushab.) His strength daily increased. He secretly wrote to Aurangzib's officers and to the Rajputs in their homes inciting them to rebel against Aurangzib.\*

At the ferry of Talwan, on the bank of the Satlej, he had left his chief general Daud Khan to oppose the enemy's crossing, and now he sent there a reinforcement of 5000 troops with artillery and material out of his increased resources at Lahor. A second party under Sayyid Ghairat Khan and Musahib Beg was told off to guard the ferry of Rupar, several miles above Talwan. Letters were also sent to Shuja, urging him to make a diversion against Aurangzib from the east and promising a partition of the empire with him after the fall of their common foe.†

Dara had hoped that the exhaustion of Aurangzib's men and horses after their long march from the Deccan and two severe battles, the heavy

\* A. N. 142-143, 178-179; *Storia*, i. 310.

† A. N. 143, 180. The text has *Izzat Khan* for *Ghairat Khan*. *Talwan*, 31 N. 75°40 E. is 4 miles north of the battle-field of Aliwal (*Ind. At.* 30); *Rupar* is sixty miles east of it (47 S. W.).

rainfall of the monsoons, and the many rivers and miry roads of the Panjab would prevent them from following him, and that he would get a long respite at Lahor to organise his power anew. But in hoping thus he had counted without Aurangzib's energy and strength of will, before which every obstacle,—human or physical, gave way. A month after Dara's arrival at Lahor, his dreaded rival's vanguard crossed the Satlej (5th August) and a few days afterwards Aurangzib himself reached that river with his main army (14th August.)

### § 3. *Aurangzib at Delhi.*

That prince had left Agra on 13th June, and two days afterwards heard of Dara's flight from Delhi. There was no need to hurry on after him, at least for the present, while Murad's open hostility raised a formidable danger nearer at hand which cried out for remedy before everything else. So, Aurangzib contented himself with sending Khan-i-Dauran to wrest Allahabad from Dara's men and thus secure the eastern flank of Agra, while he detached Bahadur Khan to follow Dara (21st June). Then he devoted himself to the all-important but delicate task of arresting Murad. This being accomplished he pushed on to Delhi.

Here urgent affairs of State and uncertainty about Sulaiman Shukoh's movements detained him

for three weeks. His army also required some rest after their long marches and strenuous fights, before they could be called upon to undertake a campaign in the Panjab during the rainy season. Therefore, he only sent off Shaista Khan to hold the right bank of the Ganges and Shaikh Mir to bar the Jamuna against Sulaiman Shukoh, and reinforced the pursuing army under Bahadur Khan with a fresh division commanded by Khalilullah Khan, the newly appointed Governor of the Panjab. Meantime he set himself to construct a new administration in the place of the old one which his victories over the imperial Government had shattered. New officers had to be appointed and sent off to their charges; arrangements had to be made for re-establishing authority over districts which had lapsed into lawlessness during the civil war; a thousand details of the public services had to be considered and orders issued on them; the detachments marching to the Satlej had to be furnished with supplies, material, and supports; and lastly the throne left vacant by the imprisonment of Shah Jahan had to be filled. At last the time had come for Aurangzib to throw away the mask and openly realise his long-cherished ambition. The gaoler of Shah Jahan could not pretend that he was only conducting the administration as that Emperor's faithful servant and obedient agent. Aurangzib must assume the crown.

to give validity to his acts and appointments and to end the last remaining possibility of a conflict of authorities.\*

#### § 4. *Aurangzib crowns himself Emperor.. .*

The astrologers pointed out 21st July as an auspicious day for sitting on the throne. There was no time to make grand preparations for the coronation or to furnish the palaces in Delhi fort in a style worthy of Mughal tradition. But the lucky day was not to be missed. So, with hurried preparations and curtailed ceremonies he sat on the throne at the appointed hour in the garden of Shalamar outside the city of Delhi, and assumed the title of *Alamgir* ('Conqueror of the Universe') with the usual additions of *Padishah* and *Ghazi* (*i.e.* Emperor and Holy Warrior). Six days afterwards he resumed the march towards Lahor.

Meantime he had taken every step to expedite the pursuit of Dara and to leave to that unlucky prince no time to recoup his power. With admirable foresight he made his naval department construct

\* A. N. 125, 126, 128, 144—148, 155—159; Kambu, 19a (brief); Aqil, 63-64, 70-71, 72-73; Khafi Khan, ii. 39. The garden in which Aurangzib was crowned was then called *Agharabad* and contained some fine imperial palaces. Since Khafi Khan's time it has been known as *Shalamar*. It is situated about 8 miles n. w. of Delhi, close to another imperial garden named *Sahibabad*.

portable boats which were sent on waggons across country to the vanguard. [A. N. 164.]

Bahadur Khan hastened to the Satlej at Talwan, but found the opposite bank held too strongly by the enemy. Then, guided by some friendly zamindars, he made a forced march to the ferry of Rupar, sixty miles further up stream, which was negligently guarded. Here he collected 25 boats,—partly brought on waggons from Delhi and partly secured locally with the help of the zamindars. In the night of 5th August, he crossed the river by means of these, with 800 men and some pieces of artillery, and advancing along the opposite bank “charged the slothful enemy like a dashing wave.” They fled to Talwan and imparted their panic to its defenders, who all fell back on Sultanpur, on the eastern bank of the Bias.

All the ferries of the Satlej were at once evacuated, and the second division of the pursuing force (led by Khalilullah), on hearing the news in the night of the 6th, made a forced march and crossed the river at Rupar the next day. [A. N. 164-166.]

Only the Bias now lay between Dara and his enemies, and this river he held strongly. Daud Khan was sent from Lahor with orders to cross the Bias and fight the imperialists if possible, otherwise to retreat across the river and hold its western bank.

He hastened to the ferry of Govindwal and learnt of the exact strength of the imperial host which had been doubled by the junction of Khalilullah with Bahadur Khan. A battle against such odds was beyond his power. He, therefore, recalled the troops from Sultanpur and held Govindwal, where Siphr Shukoh (Dara's second son) joined him from Lahor with reinforcements and instructions to engage the enemy. But Aurangzib had ordered Khalilullah Khan to halt for reinforcements, without forcing an action. The Emperor himself reached the Satlej at Rupar on 14th August, and, while he halted there for eight days to take his vast army across in the few boats and to ascertain if the road to the Bias was clear, he sent off Jai Singh and Dilir Khan with the artillery under Saf Shikan Khan to join Khalilullah and make his strength superior to the enemy's. This division reached the Van at Garh Sarang (18th) and there learnt that Dara had fled from Lahor after recalling Siphr Shukoh from the Bias and ordering Daud Khan to burn his boats and fall back on him when the imperial army would actually arrive on the left bank at Govindwal.\*

\* A. N. 182—186; Kambu, 19b; *Sultanpur*, 31·12 N. 75·15 E. on the eastern bank of the Kalna river, and 5 miles east of the Bias. Govindwal, on the western bank of the Bias, 11 miles n. n. w. of Sultanpur. (*Ind. At.* 30).

§ 5. *Pursuit of Dara towards Lahor; his despair; treachery and desertion in his army.*

In fact, when the new Emperor's army crossed the Satlej and he himself arrived at that river, once more Dara's genius quailed before that of Aurangzib. How could he hope to resist a rival, who with inferior forces had conquered Jaswant Singh and Rustam Khan, who had triumphed over fatigue, bad roads, and rain-swollen rivers, and who was now coming up with a large army of veterans that had never known a defeat? Against these Dara's raw recruits and heartless fugitives from Samugarh could make no stand. The traitors in his ranks and the mercenaries whose lukewarm services he had bought, became a source of danger to him as the enemy came nearer and made it easier for them to desert or mutiny. Dara now despaired of success in war and confessed to his confidential advisers, "I cannot resist Aurangzib. If it had been any one else, I should have fought him here." Their leader's despair infected the army; they lost heart and confidence in a chief who had no confidence in himself; most of the newly assembled troops abandoned the losing side and marched off to join the banner of victory and hope that waved over Aurangzib's head. That prince had been busily sending letters full of temptation to Dara's officers

and succeeded in seducing many of them, such as Rajah Rajrup, Khanjar Khan and some others.\* Worse than the defection of these men, a clever ruse of Aurangzib paralysed Dara's right arm by sowing suspicion in his mind about his bravest and most devoted officer, Daud Khan, "to whom his whole army looked up for encouragement and the example of steadfastness."

Aurangzib wrote the following letter to Daud Khan and contrived that it should be intercepted by Dara's patrols and placed before him : "I learn from your letter, which has reached me at such and such a place, that you wish for my success beyond limit. I praise and approve of your conduct. As requested by you I am proceeding very quickly towards that side. God willing, you will soon have the honour of waiting on me. The proper course for a devoted servant (like you) is to act in this matter in the way mentioned in your letter, so that my mind may be entirely placed at rest about these affairs and Sipihr Shukoh,—nay, all the enemies of the Prophet's path, and all deniers of the Prophet's faith,—may be made prisoners by the troops of Islam."

Every word of the letter was false, because the faithful Daud Khan had never corresponded with Aurangzib, still less had he conspired to seize and betray his master and his master's son. But the

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\* A.N. 181—182; Masum, 88b—89a; Kambu, 19a.

lying epistle coming at a time when so many others were turning traitor, did the work intended. "The future grew absolutely dark to Dara as he read it. He sank into grief. Suspicion got possession of his mind." He recalled Sipihr Shukoh from the side of Daud Khan and weakened the party that held the Bias river. Daud Khan on returning to his master found him a changed man, ever turning a clouded face and suspicious looks at him. Hearty co-operation between the prince and his chief lieutenant ceased.\*

### § 6. *Dara abandons Lahor for lower Sindh.*

When Daud Khan reported from Govindwal that with his inferior force he could not attack the imperial Van, then about to be swollen by the union of four high generals—Bahadur Khan, Khalilullah Khan, Jai Singh, and Dilir Khan,—and armed with Saf Shikan's artillery, Dara yielded to despair, and put into practice the flight he had long meditated and secretly discussed with his confidants. On 18th August he left Lahor with his family and all the treasure of the fort (amounting to more than a *krore* of Rupees) besides the precious articles and stores of Government, and many guns and artillery material. Loading most of them in boats, and a small portion

\* Masum, 89b—93b. (There is no other authority for this incident except Manucci, *Storia*, i. 311-312.)

on transport animals, he hastened to Multan. Sipihr Shukoh by a forced march from Govindwal joined him outside Lahor, and so did Daud Khan after destroying the boats on the Bias. Nearly 14,000 troopers accompanied the prince, "attracted by his hoard of gold."\*

But the pursuer was not far behind. At the news of Dara's flight from Lahor, Khalilullah, then at Garh Shankar, had sent a party hurriedly to Govindwal to procure boats from the zamindars and raise those sunk by the enemy, and then throw a bridge over the Bias. Another party was sent under Tahir Khan to reach Lahor by forced marches in order to keep order in the masterless city and to save Dara's abandoned property and the Government stores from being looted. They arrived there on the 25th, exactly a week after Dara had left, and at once took possession of it.

The Van itself, led by Khalilullah Khan, after making long marches, arrived near Lahor on the 29th, and the very next day, without entering the city, set off towards Multan at the heels of Dara.† Aurangzib himself spent three weeks (from 14th August to 4th September) on the two banks of the Satlej in transporting his vast army, then crossed the

\* A. N. 186—188; Aqil Khan, 73 (meagre); *Storia*, i. 312.

† A. N. 186—188. *Garh Shankar*, 32 miles n. n. w. of Rupar. The text wrongly reads *Garh Sarang*.

Bias on 11th September, and next day reached Haibatpur Pati. Here alarming news arrived from his Van; Khalilullah had reported, "It is expected that Dara will make a firm stand at Multan. The pursuing army has no general high enough to encounter a prince of the blood and to secure the obedience of the entire army. If a battle is precipitated now, a disaster may befall our army. So, we have slackened our pursuit."

*§ 7. Aurangzib leads the pursuit from Lahor up to Multan.*

At this Aurangzib determined to lead the chase in person. Sending his big camp, heavy baggage and unnecessary troops on to Lahor with his son Azam, he turned south-west towards Multan with a small tent, the indispensable stores and the pick of his soldiery, making forced marches of 14 to 22 miles a day.\* By way of Qasur and Shirgarh, he reached Mumanpur on the 17th, and there got the news that Dara had fled from Multan (13th September) southwards to Bhakkar, and that his army was daily decreasing through desertion. There was no need now for Aurangzib to tax the endurance of his men and animals. He henceforth travelled shorter stages, but Saf Shikan Khan with

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\* A. N. 189, 192, 197—201; Kambu, 19b (brief.) Pati, 31·16 N.  
74·55 E., 11 miles north of the battle-field of Sobraon (*Ind. At.* 30).

6,000 men from the Van was ordered to push on after Dara beyond Multan and expel him from the province. Twenty thousand gold-pieces were sent to pay his troops. Khalilullah with the rest of the Van was ordered to stay at Multan till the Emperor's arrival. Aurangzib reached the environs of Multan\* on the 25th; but from this point he turned back towards Delhi five days later, because an alarming situation had been developed in the east, which required his presence there, while Dara's power was now so reduced that his pursuit might be safely left to divisional commanders.

### *§ 8. Dara's movement in the Indus valley.*

We now leave the hunters and take up the history of the object of their chase. After Dara's flight from Lahor, the imperial vanguard followed him only twelve marches behind. Every day men deserted the hapless heir to the throne; even his own paymaster, Khwajah Sadiq, went over to the winning side. On 5th September he reached Multan, but he was in no position to make a firm stand anywhere. Taking from the local treasury its cash balance of 22 lakhs, he loaded all his wealth

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\* A. N., 201—212; Aqil Khan, 73. Qasur, 32 miles s. of Lahor, is a station on the N. W. R. Shirgarh, 10 miles s. e. of the Satghara Station (*Ind. At.* 30). Mummanpur is said to be 38 miles from Shirgarh. I can find only a Mumandwala, 4 miles north of Harappa (*Ibid.* 17.)

in large boats and sent them down the Indus to Bhakkar in charge of his trusty general Firuz Miwati and the eunuch Basant, while he himself started (13th September) by land towards Uch. At Multan half of his officers and men left him. Uch was reached on the 23rd, but there was rest for him nowhere. His pursuers had made up the distance by incessant and long marches : at Lahor their Van was 12 days behind him, at Multan only 8 days, and at Uch the interval had been reduced to four days' march. So Dara fled further away and reached Sakkar on the west bank of the Indus (opposite Bhakkar) on 13th October. Here he stayed for five days only and then resumed his painful flight down the river (18th October.) [A. N. 203-205.]

### *§ 9. Pursuit of Dara from Multan.*

Meantime, Aurangzib's Van under Khalilullah had reached Multan on 21st September, eight days after Dara's flight from it. The scouts sent forward lost the trail of the fugitive ; they could not learn whether he had gone south-eastwards to Rajputana or south-westwards to Sindh. After following the former route for some days they returned baffled. Soon the news arrived that Haji Khan Baluch, a great zamindar of the province had disputed in vain the passage of Dara's treasure-boats down the river. The route of his flight was now ascertained. On

the 22nd a courier arrived at Multan with Aurangzib's instructions and 20,000 gold coins, and immediately afterwards Saf Shikan Khan marched out of Multan in pursuit. On the 26th Aurangzib sent Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan with a corps of 9,000 men to reinforce the pursuers. By making long marches, Saf Shikan reached Uch on the 30th, four days after Dara's flight from it. The work of bridging the Satlej (probably near Jalalpur) and the need of waiting for stragglers and treasure, delayed the advance. On 2nd October Saf Shikan received a party of musketeers, hatchetmen and water-carriers, 80,000 gold coins and many necessary stores sent by the Emperor, and resumed his march. As Shaikh Mir's party was still 60 miles behind, Saf Shikan did not wait for him, but marched on to a place 126 miles north of Bhakkar, where he halted till the 17th, when Shaikh Mir's force joined him. Here scouts brought the news of Dara having crossed to the right bank of the Indus on the 13th and entered Sakkar.\*

The pursuing force now numbered 15,000, and was too large to march conveniently by the same path in one body. So, it was divided: Shaikh Mir with his division crossed the Indus and marched

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\* A. N. 205—209, 272—273. *Uch*, 29·15 N. 71·7 E. (*Ind. At.* 18 N. W.). Three marches south of Multan the Mughal army had to cross the Bias, which then flowed in its old bed here (A. N. 272).

along the right bank, while Saf Shikan Khan moved along the left bank, towards Bhakkar and Sakkar,—the length of the two routes being 200 and 126 miles respectively.

On the 18th the two generals parted company near Kan, and while Shaikh Mir halted for two days to throw a bridge of boats over the Indus, Saf Shikan pushed on by the left bank, and in three long marches reached Bhakkar on the 21st. Shaikh Mir on the other bank of the Indus covered 160 miles in three days, suffering great hardship from the jungles briars and difficult ground crossed on the way; many transport cattle perished; the camp-followers were exhausted; and on the 3rd day of the march the baggage and tents lagged so far behind that the troops had to live on scanty rations. On the fourth day, after travelling 24 miles, he reached Sakkar.\*

#### *§ 10. Dara's miserable condition.*

Here the imperialists learnt that their prey had again given them the slip. Dara had left much of his property, many ladies of his harem, some treasure, all his heavy gold and silver plate, and some of his big guns, in the fort of Bhakkar, and

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\* A. N. 273-274. Sakkar is on the western bank and Rohri on the eastern bank of the Indus, while the island-fortress of Bhakkar is in midstream, between the two towns. (Postans's *Sindh*, ed. 1843, pp. 30-31.)

entrusted its defence to his eunuch Basant and Sayyid Abdur Razzaq, with plenty of munition, a body of musketeers, bowmen and *barqandazes*, together with many European gunners under Manucci. The rest of his property was conveyed down the river in boats, while he moved south (18th October) with his troops by the right bank of the Indus, cutting a way through the jungle. Only 3000 men accompanied him. The 14,000 troopers who had left Lahor with him, had been reduced by desertion to one-half when he abandoned Multan. And now when he refused to make a stand even in the impregnable fortress of Sakkar, his followers grew sick of their incessant toilsome and inglorious flight, their hopeless cause and their timid leader. As he left Sakkar, he was abandoned by four thousand of his soldiers, including nearly all the chiefs of his army and his most devoted adherents. Some of them returned to their *jagirs*, but most joined Aurangzib's army.\* Even the trusty Daud Khan at last left his cold and suspicious master.

Disgusted with the treatment he had been receiving, he had asked Dara bluntly for the cause of his being suspected, and had protested his loyalty. This speech Dara took to be the outcome of hypocrisy, and dismissed Daud Khan from his service, saying, "My circumstances are so bad that even those whom

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\* A. N. 270-275; *Storia*, i. 318, 326-327 (siege of Bhakkar.)

I have brought up are now ungratefully leaving me. On you I have conferred no such benefit that I can ask you to be a fugitive from your home and a wanderer in misery for my sake. It is proper that you should leave me at this point and go wherever your heart desires...Don't insist on accompanying me beyond it."

Daud Khan, astonished to hear such an order, again asserted his devotion and refused to desert his master even at his bidding. He murdered the honourable ladies of his harem, in order to be free from anxiety about them, and then reported to Dara how he had "composed his mind about certain objects which make men hesitate and shrink from (desperate) exertion and fighting at such times (of danger.)" He entreated Dara to banish all doubt of his good faith from his mind, now that he had no family tie which might counteract his constancy and fidelity. But even this proof of devotion did not convince Dara; he sent away Daud Khan from his side. The Afghan general had to leave the army perforce, and afterwards joined Aurangzib who raised him to a high rank.\*

With less than 3,000 men Dara reached a place (probably Larkhana) 50 miles south of Sakkar, where the road to Qandahar begins. But his servants and

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\* Masum, 93b—96a (for the above details); A. N. 274, 275; M. U. ii. 33 (life of Daud Khan); *Storia*, i. 317-318.

wives flatly refused to go to the land of the ferocious and inhospitable Baluches. He had no help but to give up this plan and flee further south. By land he reached Siwistan (Sehwan), while his boats glided down the river.\*

### § 11. *Pursuit of Dara to Sehwan.*

Saf Shikan Khan, who had reached Bhakkar on 21st October, only three days after Dara's flight from the opposite bank (Sakkar), halted one day to take possession of the city, posted a garrison at Rohri and a force at Sakkar to blockade the gates of its fort, and then on the 23rd resumed his march, without waiting for Shaikh Mir who had a longer journey to make and was three days behind. [A. N. 275.] On the 30th he got a letter from the *qiladar* of Sehwan, which was 26 miles ahead, reporting that Dara had arrived within ten miles of that fort and urging him to hurry up and intercept the enemy's treasure-boats coming behind. At once he despatched a force of 1000 mounted *barqandazes* with 14 swivel guns on the backs of camels, and rockets, to outstrip Dara's boats and entrench on the left bank of the Indus further down, near Sehwan, where the river was narrow, and thus prevent the escape of the boats. That very night he himself made a forced

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\* A. N. 275. *Sehwan* is always mentioned in the Persian histories as *Siwistan*. (See also Postans, 8).

march of 24 miles down this bank and, leaving Dara on the right bank behind him, next noon overtook the *barqandazes* by the edge of the river, one mile below the fort (which was on the opposite bank.) Entrenching two miles of the river-side, he waited for the enemy's boats.

Dara's men removed their boats on the right bank to a point three miles above the imperial trenches. Behind them could be seen part of Dara's army—some 1000 cavalry, 10 elephants, and a few banners. This was the most critical stage of the pursuit. Now, if ever, Dara's flight was to be barred. He had been placed between the two divisions of the imperial army,—Saf Shikan Khan's before, and Shaikh Mir's behind; and these two together outnumbered his force as five to one. His boats had to run the gauntlet of the fire of Sehwan fort on the right bank and that of Saf Shikan's light artillery on the left. But one way of escape still remained open: these two divisions of the enemy were posted on the opposite banks of a large swift river, at a great distance from each other, and with no adequate supply of boats for communication with each other. Dara with great promptitude and dash seized this weak point to effect his escape.

As the imperialists were very weak in boats, their immense superiority on land could be effectively used to close the river if only the fort and the army

co-operated from the two banks. Saf Shikan Khan's rapid march had left all his boats far behind; and now Dara's superior flotilla, stationed between, prevented them from passing down the river to his entrenchments. The Khan, therefore, asked for some boats from the fort of Sehwan in order to cross over to the right bank and fight Dara on land. He further instructed the qiladar to sally out and seize a narrow pass which lay in front of Dara's path, and also to direct the full broadside of the fort guns and muskets on Dara's boats if they tried to slip down the river along the right bank close to the fort wall. But the qiladar, Muhammad Salih Tarkhan, could not rise to the height of the occasion: he feared to risk a battle on land with his small garrison without reinforcement from Saf Shikan Khan, and yet he durst not take the only step by which such reinforcement could have reached him. His few boats, he said, in crossing the river to Saf Shikan's trenches would be cut off by Dara's superior naval power. He further reported that as the river was shallow near the right bank, Dara's boats would have to hug the left bank where Saf Shikan's guns would be easily able to overpower them.

The day wore on in corresponding with the fort. Saf Shikan could not cross over, but spent all the night and the next day (1st November), standing on the alert in his trenches. The news

reached him that Dara had come to a halt and that Shaikh Mir expected to overtake the enemy on the right bank in two or three days.

But about 9 A.M. on 2nd November a cloud of dust filled the western sky : Dara's army was on the move. Soon his boats too were sighted from Saf Shikan's position. The imperialists stood armed and watchful on the left bank, waiting for the approach of the hostile flotilla. But a cruel disappointment was in store for them. In an hour it became clear that Dara's boats were passing by the further bank (near the fort) and not coming to the entrenched side. The artillery of Saf Shikan opened fire, but the width of the river was more than their range. Only two of the boats were damaged; all the rest passed safely downstream. The land-force, too, escaped capture. Dara issued from the narrow defile of Sehwan and hastened towards Tatta, which he reached on the 13th.

On the 3rd Saf Shikan Khan learnt of Dara's successful flight from Sehwan the day before, and he at once marched down the left bank for two days in the hope of keeping up touch with the enemy. Then he halted for Shaikh Mir, who arrived opposite him on the 6th and ordered a junction of their forces. Some days were taken in ferrying Saf Shikan's army over to the right bank, as the boats were few. By making forced marches he overtook Shaikh Mir on

the way to Tatta (14th November) and was again sent in advance of his colleague. On the 17th he got the news that at Tatta Dara had crossed over to the left bank of the Indus the preceding day, and that the imperial scouts who had entered the city had had a brush with the remnant of the enemy's troops in it, but that Dara was still halting on the other side. At this Saf Shikan made a forced march of 28 miles and reached the Indus two miles above Tatta. Next day (the 19th) he halted, took possession of Dara's abandoned property in the town, and was joined by Shaikh Mir. [A. N. 276-282.]

### § 12. *Dara leaves Sindh for Gujrat.*

On the 20th Saf Shikan Khan resumed his march from Tatta, advanced six miles south of the town and halted to collect boats for bridging the Indus. This work being accomplished, he crossed the river on the 23rd and encamped on the left bank. But the bird had flown away ; no trace of Dara could be found in Sindh. Taking advantage of the imperialists' enforced halt at Tatta, the prince had hurried eastwards away from the Indus, reached Badin (the 24th) and was marching along the Rann towards Cutch and Gujrat.

Just then orders arrived from the Emperor recalling the pursuing force in hot haste to the Court, to repel Shuja's invasion. The troops, utterly

exhausted by their incessant marching over long stages through the dreary sands and jungles of Sindh and with most of their remounts and transport animals dead of fatigue, welcomed the command, and set their faces homewards up the Indus (5th December). [A. N. 282.] They had failed in their quest, but had still won glory. Their supreme feat of endurance had missed success when almost within their grasp, through their lack of boats. The pursuit which had been so relentlessly carried on for three months since Dara left Lahor, now ended. Nor was it any longer necessary ; for Dara's ruined condition and the terribly inhospitable region that lay before him promised little that he would ever again threaten the imperial throne.

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## CHAPTER XIX.

### SHUJA'S STRUGGLES FOR THE THRONE—BATTLE OF KHAJWA (5 JANUARY, 1659).

#### § 1. *Shuja advances to contest the succession.*

Prince Muhammad Shuja, the second son of Shah Jahan and now governor of Bengal, was a man of great intelligence, elegant taste, and amiable disposition. But his constant devotion to pleasure, the easy administration of Bengal, and his 17 years' residence in that enervating country, had made him weak, indolent and negligent, incapable of arduous toil, sustained effort, vigilant caution, and profound combination. He had allowed his administration to drift, his army to grow inefficient, and all his departments to fall into a slack and sleepy condition. "Small things like the *Chameli* flower escaped his eyes," as a writer of the time puts it. [Talish's *Continuation*, 155 b.] His health had been impaired by the pestilential climate of Bengal, and he already felt the touch of age, though only turned of forty-one. His mental powers were as keen as before: but they required great emergencies to call them forth, and shone only by flashes; he was still capable of vigorous action, but only fitfully.

The story of Shah Jahan's illness, with its

embellishments by rumour, reached Shuja at Rajmahal, the then capital of Bengal. He immediately crowned himself king, took the pompous title of Abul Fauz Nasir-ud-din Muhammad, Timur III, Alexander II, Shah Shuja Bahadur Ghazi. The *khutba* was read in his name in the mosques, coins were struck bearing his title,\* and the assumption of royalty was complete. It only remained to defeat his rivals and seize the throne of Delhi.

For this purpose he started with a large army, an excellent park of artillery, and the highly useful war-boats (*nawwara*) of Bengal. After overrunning the province of Bihar (Patna), he reached Benares about 24th January, 1658. Meantime Dara had despatched an army of 20,000 cavalry, 2,000 foot-musketeers, and 200 *barqandazes*, with a well-filled war-chest and many elephants.† The nominal command had been given to his eldest son, Sulaiman Shukoh, a mere youth; but the real power lay in the hands of his associates, the politic and experienced Rajput chief Jai Singh, and the doughty Afghan leader Dilir Khan Ruhela. The old Emperor had entreated the generals to do their best to avert the fratricidal war; they were not to molest Shuja if he retired peacefully from Bihar to his own province of Bengal, and should fight him only if he persisted in

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\* Khafi Khan, ii. 5 ; Masum 32b.

† Adab, 215b; A. N., 31 ; Masum, 34a ; Kambu 9a.

advancing. This army came into touch with Shuja's at Bahadurpur, 5 miles north-east of Benares,\* about 25th January.

*§ 2. Sulaiman Shukoh surprises Shuja near Benares.*

Here on the high bank of the Ganges Shuja formed an entrenched camp, with his flotilla moored close at hand. Sulaiman's army halted three miles off. For some days there was a distant artillery duel, and now and then skirmishes between the scouts of the two armies; but the Bengal army refused to come out into the open and fight a pitched battle. The Delhi troops had no such decided superiority of strength as to storm Shuja's position with the certainty of victory. Sulaiman, therefore, carefully studied the enemy's position and habits. He found out that they did not take ordinary military precaution nor patrol round their camp, and that Shuja was grossly indolent, letting things drift and sleeping till late in the morning.

So Sulaiman made his own preparations. Early in the morning of 14th February, 1658, he marched his troops out on the pretence of changing their ground, and suddenly fell upon Shuja's camp.†

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\* *Adab-i-Alamgiri*, 216b; Jaipur Rec. *Bahadurpur* (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 88) only 2 m. east of the right bank head of the Railway bridge over the Ganga at Benares.

† *Masum*, 34a-40b (graphic description); *A. N.* 31.

"The Bengal soldiers after rubbing their sleepy eyes found that the enemy were already around them; they had no time to put on their tunics, but took the shortest road to safety."

The tumult broke Shuja's sleep on a couch hung round with mosquito-nets. He took an elephant and hurried out to retrieve the day, but the battle had been already lost. The enemy had swarmed into his camp and were looting it. "All his captains from their respective quarters had fled, without caring to ask what became of their master." Here and there a few knots of men were facing the enemy and offering resistance, but more with a view to win their way to safety than to gain a victory. Some three thousand of the enemy encircled his elephant and plied their muskets and bows at him. Their arrows rained down on his *hawda*, and some even glanced off his coat of mail. But he boldly kept them back, emptying two quivers of arrows with his own hands. He shouted to his own men to rally and form behind his elephant, but it was of no avail. The enemy pressed closer still, and tried to capture the elephant, one of them coming near enough to slash its leg with his sword.

Only one path of safety lay open. The elephant was driven to the rivet-bank, where the fire of the naval guns checked the enemy's approach. But even this retreat had to be effected in the teeth

of the enemy's keenest opposition and after repeated counter-charges by a band of his devoted followers under Mir Isfandiar Mamuri and Sayyid Ismail Bukhari. They gained time for the elephant to break through the enemy's cordon and reach the bank, where Shuja quickly dismounted and sought safety among his boats.

Sulaiman's men now plundered the entire camp. The tents, jewels, furniture, and all sorts of other goods, besides money, horses, and elephants, were seized by the victors. The Bengal troops had escaped with their bare lives, and left everything behind. Shuja's own losses were estimated at fifty *lakhs* of Rupees; his chief minister, Mirza Jan Beg, lost six *lakhs* worth of property in addition to horses and elephants. Even the humblest private had abandoned his little all. The total loss could not have fallen short of two *krores* of Rupees.

### § 3. *Flight of Shuja; sufferings of his men.*

The fugitive prince immediately weighed anchor and sped down the river. Some of his followers who reached the bank shortly after him, were too late to embark, and perished helplessly by the enemy's swords. For ten miles the flotilla was rowed in selfish haste, without a halt being made to pick up their own men running in distraction on the

bank. At last the boats drew up in exhaustion on the further side, and here Mirza Jan Beg, the *wazir*, who had ridden away from the field with only 400 men, was taken on board. The nature of their panic may be judged from the fact that "he congratulated his master on his having saved his life, which, in such a carnage, was equivalent to a thousand victories!"

But the main portion of the army fled by the land route through Saseram to Patna. So thoroughly demoralised were they that disgraceful scenes marked their precipitate flight. Every small group of half-naked peasants, walking behind them stick in hand, was magnified by their terror-stricken imagination into the pursuing army, whose arrival they dreaded every moment. The vanquished warriors, though ten to fifteen thousand strong, clad in mail and cuirass, and mounted on chargers, quietly let themselves be stripped of their all by small bands of such villagers! Some even threw away their own accoutrements and money to facilitate their flight! The village women lured the soldiers aside, promising to give them drinking-water, and then snatched away their clothes and property, while the heroes durst not protest even by a word! The entire road to Patna was littered with numbers of abandoned elephants, horses, load-camels, mules,

costly articles and sacks of coins. These were quickly appropriated by the villagers.

Shuja reached Patna on 19th February, and rallied his men to some extent. But the victorious Sulaiman Shukoh, after freely looting the Bahadurpur camp, was now coming in pursuit. So Shuja pushed on to Surajgarh, where he halted for some time (end of March), and then on the advance of the imperialists he retreated to Mungir (Monghyr), where he stopped to arrange for making a stand against the pursuers. By great efforts and daily supervision he built a wall two miles long from the hill to the river, across the plain outside the city. The rampart was strengthened with trenches, stockades, and batteries; soldiers manned them day and night, on the alert for the enemy's approach.\* This unforeseen obstacle brought Sulaiman to a sharp halt. He wavered, halted at Jaitpur for several days in order to find out a safe path of advance with the help of the local zamindars, and then marching 14 miles further east encamped at Surajgarh, 15 miles south-west of Mungir, and took time to mature new plans.

#### *§ 4. Shuja's treaty with Sulaiman Shukoh.*

Here, on 4th May, alarming news reached him from the Court. His father wrote urging him to

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\* Masum, 40b and 41a : Jaipur Records

patch up a truce with Shuja and hasten back to Agra to meet a new danger coming up from the south. Aurangzib and Murad had advanced from the Deccan, joined their forces on the way, crushed the imperial army which barred their path at Dharmat (15th April), and were now in full march on the capital.

Terms were quickly arranged between Shuja's *wazir*, Mirza Jan Beg, and Rajah Jai Singh, and confirmed by the principals. It was agreed that Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar to the east of Mungir should be left to Shuja, but his seat should be Rajmahal, as his presence at Mungir, on his western frontier, would be a menace to the ruler of Delhi. As soon as the treaty was signed (about 7th May, 1658), Sulaiman set out on his return towards Agra, but, alas! too late to save either his father or himself.\*

A complete change now took place on the political chess-board. Aurangzib pushed steadily on, defeated Dara himself at Samugarh, got possession of Agra fort, deposed his father, treacherously imprisoned Murad Bakhsh at a banquet, and made himself the supreme ruler of Hindustan. While halting at Delhi to organise a new administration, and ascend the throne as Emperor, Aurangzib, to make sure of his rear, sent a most friendly letter to

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\* Masum, 52a—56a The Delhi army was at Surajgarh from about 10th April to about 7th May, (Jaipur Rec.)

Shuja, adding the province of Bihar to his appanage and promising him other favours, in territory and money, when the affair of Dara would be over.

In Shuja's darkest hour (the beginning of May, 1658), the clouds that lowered over him were blown away by an unexpected side-wind. He not only got breathing-time and respite from pursuit, but was confirmed in his own possessions with some increase of territory. Aurangzib's letter to him breathed the tenderest brotherly love, "As you had often before begged the Emperor Shah Jahan for the province of Bihar, I now add it to your viceroyalty. Pass some time peacefully in administering it and repairing your broken power. When I return after disposing of the affair of Dara, I shall try to gratify your other wishes. Like a true brother I shall not refuse you anything that you desire, be it land or money."\* In the light of Aurangzib's treatment of Shah Jahan, his loving father, and of Murad Bakhsh, the very ladder by which he had mounted the throne, his protestations of brotherly love were estimated by Shuja at their true worth. He sent in reply a polite letter of thanks and—prepared for war.

### § 5. *Shuja's second advance towards Delhi.*

The news of his brother's absence in the far-off Panjab at the heels of Dara, revived Shuja's

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 211, 223 and 224.

ambition. He could not let slip this golden opportunity. To the objections of his chiefs and ministers he answered, "Aurangzib has left between this place and the capital no general strong enough to oppose me. If Prince Sultan Muhammad bars my path, I shall win him over, and by a quick movement secure the person of Shah Jahan and restore the old government. And then I shall stay at Court as my father's obedient servant." [Masum 96; A. N. 224.]

So he went to Patna. There his general Mir Isfandiar Mamuri, who had been wounded and captured by Sulaiman Shukoh at Bahadurpur and had escaped from his prison at Agra in the confusion following Dara's flight, joined him. He, alone among the Bengal chiefs, fed Shuja's vanity and urged him to make a bold bid for the crown. [Masum, 97a, 99a.]

At the end of October, 1658, the Bengal army, 25,000 cavalry, with artillery and a vast flotilla, set out quickly from Patna. At first Fortune seemed to smile on the expedition. Dara's officers in charge of the forts in the eastern provinces had been ordered by that prince, just after his defeat, to surrender them to Shuja and thus save them from falling into Aurangzib's hands. Rohtas, Chunar and Benares all opened their gates to Shuja, and the commandant of Allahabad wrote to him proffering submission.

A detachment sent to the north of the Ganges captured Jaunpur. At Benares his war-chest was replenished with three *lakhs* of Rupees extorted from the merchants and rich men of the city, both Hindu and Muhammadan. Allahabad was reached on 23rd December. A small division of Aurangzib's troops under Khan-i-Dauran, which had been besieging the fort, fell back at the mere approach of Shuja.\*

But that prince's victorious advance was soon to receive a check and he was to confront enemies of a different stamp. Three stages from Allahabad he reached Khajwa† (30th December) and found Sultan Muhammad, the eldest son of Aurangzib, barring his path. Three days afterwards the imperial camp became the scene of unusual life and bustle: Aurangzib himself rode into it and took over the supreme command. Now for the decisive battle!

\* *Alamgirnamah*, 224, 225, 239, 240. K. K., ii. 45—47. Masum is strangely silent about the details of this march. In 1764 the English exacted a ransom of 4 lakhs from Benares as the price of not looting the city. (Broome, 485.)

† *Khajwa* (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 69 N. E., *Khajuha*) is in the Fatehpur district, 5 m. s. s. w. of the Bindki Road Station on the E. I. R. It is situated at the same distance, 10 miles, from the Ganges on its north and the Jamuna on its south. Eight miles west of it stands Kora, which has given another name to the battle. A century afterwards (3rd May, 1765) General Carnac routed the Maratha allies of the wazir of Oudh on the plain of Kora. (Broome, 513.)

§ 6. *Aurangzib's return from the Panjab  
to meet Shuja.*

To understand this startling development we must hark back to the end of July last, when Aurangzib, after crowning himself at Delhi, set off for Lahor, to chase Dara. His mind was not at ease about his brother in Bengal. He had several agents in the eastern parts, who watched every movement of Shuja, and fast couriers who sped with their reports to the Emperor. Shuja's suspicious march from Rajmahal to Patna and his openly hostile action in advancing towards Allahabad had duly reached his ears. But he had a poor opinion of Shuja's ability, military strength, generalship, or rapidity of movement, and, therefore, decided to finish the hunt after Dara first. Hence the pursuit was pushed on down the Indus. But Dara fled like the hunted hare before Aurangzib's generals, without their being able to catch him anywhere. Meantime the news from the east grew more and more alarming. So, Aurangzib at Multan deemed it unwise to neglect Shuja any longer. Leaving Dara's pursuit in the hands of his officers (30th September, 1658), he with a select cavalry escort hastened back to the capital, travelling two stages every day to make up for lost time.\* It was a splendid feat of endurance, and one supremely

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\* *Alamgirnarah, 212 et seq.; Masum, 100.*

needed. Delhi was reached on 20th November. Three days afterwards he despatched a strong force from Agra with artillery under Sultan Muhammad, to join Khan-i-Dauran's division at Allahabad, block Shuja's path, and report the situation to the Emperor. A picked body of veterans lately returned from the Panjab was sent from Delhi to join the prince. Shortly afterwards the army near Allahabad was still further strengthened by the arrival of Zulfiqar Khan with more artillery, one *krone* of Rupees from Agra fort, and several other officers, mostly Rajputs, with their contingents.\* While these arrangements were taking place, Shuja was still at Benares : his one chance of swooping down on Agra was thus lost; the open road on which he had counted was now blocked, and the Emperor himself was within hail at Delhi.

Thus the state of the game was completely changed, and Aurangzib naturally expected that Shuja would now retire quickly from his vain quest, as any wise man would have done. So, he slackened his own speed, halted twelve days at Delhi, and then went to the hunting-lodge of Soron, to wait for news. If Shuja retired, Prince Muhammad would be recalled and the Emperor would return as from a hunt; otherwise he would hasten from Soron to join the campaign. Shuja, however,

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 226, 234 and 235.

pushed blindly on and reached Khajwa, as we have seen. The Emperor, constantly informed of the enemy's movements, left Soron on 21st December, ordering Sultan Muhammad not to precipitate an action but wait for him. On 2nd January, 1659, father and son united their forces near Kora, eight miles west of Shuja's position.\* That very day, by a happy coincidence, Mir Jumla arrived from the Deccan by forced marches, and at once took his place as the confidential adviser and right hand man of the Emperor.

### § 7. *The rival armies at Khajwa.*

No time was now lost on the imperial side. Next day, 3rd January, Aurangzib formed his plan of battle and assigned to each division its proper position. Early at dawn on the fourth, the order of battle was issued : the artillery was to be planted opposite the enemy's guns, and the army was to advance there. All was stir and bustle in the camp. The marshals and orderlies galloped about to arrange the ranks ; trumpets sounded ; the kettle-drums struck up ; the standards were borne aloft. Before each division moved the elephants and guns ; behind them tramped the serried ranks of steel-clad

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\* *Ibid.*, 235—238, 241.

cavalry. "A dense cloud of dust" raised by 90,000 horses' hoofs "hid the earth and sky."\*

From 8 A.M., Aurangzib himself rode out on a huge elephant inspecting his troops and cheering them by his presence in the field. Under his leadership the army advanced slowly and in perfect order, till about 3 P.M., when it halted one mile from the enemy's force, behind the imperial artillery, at a spot chosen by the scouts for the battle. Shuja, too, marshalled his ranks, but did not leave his position. Only his artillery was sent half a mile in front of his camp. The imperial artillery replied to their fire, but little execution seems to have been done on either side.†

At nightfall Shuja's artillery retired on his army, in order to keep touch with it. Mir Jumla, with a born general's instinct, at once seized the deserted position,—which was a high ground commanding the enemy's camp. By hard labour he dragged 40 guns to it and mounted them, aiming at the enemy and ready for action on the next morning. By Aurangzib's order his soldiers did not take

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\* A. N., 242, 245, 250. Aurangzib's disposition of his troops is minutely described in the *Alamgirnamah*, 245—250, and Shuja's on pp. 250 & 251; also Aqil 75 Khafi Kh. (n. 49) merely gives an abstract of the *Alamgirnamah*.

† Masum (101b) says that the fire was continued all night, and many were slain. But this is very unlikely. The *Alamgirnamah* gives the more credible account, which I have followed.

off their armour, their horses were not unsaddled; the men only dismounted and slept each at his own post. The Emperor himself occupied a small tent pitched on the field. His generals hastily entrenched in front of their divisions, and kept watch. Mir Jumla went his rounds during the first part of the night, superintending the entrenching and urging the sentinels to remain on the alert. [A.N. 252.]

### § 8. *Jaswant's treacherous attack on Aurangzib's Camp.*

The eventful 5th of January was about to dawn. A few hours of the night still remained; the Emperor was engaged in the prayer of the last watch (*tahajjud*), when a vague clamour arose in the far-off Van of his army and grew louder every moment.\* The alarm and confusion rapidly spread through the camp. The air was thick with the yells of assailants, the cries of startled sleepers and timid fugitives, and the tramp of horsemen recklessly galloping away and of cattle stampeding in fright. The ruffianly element among the camp-followers seized the opportunity of plundering on their own account. The darkness heightened

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\* A. N. 253. The *Ahkam* gives the time as "two and a half prahars of the night" (4b); Khafi Khan (ii. 51) says, "when 4 or 5 gharis of the night remained"; the *Alamgirnamah* is vague, "towards the morning" (255.)

the confusion, and the ignorance of its cause added to its terrors.

Messengers began to come running up to the Emperor to report the truth. An act of treachery, disgraceful in any servant, doubly disgraceful in a Rajput,\* was the root of all this trouble. Maharajah Jaswant Singh (of Jodhpur), who commanded the imperial right wing, had brooded over some fancied slight or neglect and matured a deep plan of vengeance. He had, it was said, sent a secret message to Shuja saying that he would attack the imperial camp behind the field at the close of the night,† and that while the Emperor would hasten to the rear to repel him Shuja should swiftly fall on the disordered army and crush it between two adversaries. So, shortly after midnight he got his 14,000 Rajputs‡ ready, turned his back

\* Aurangzib's own words, in a letter to Jai Singh, given in the Paris MS., 2b.

† For the attack on the Base Camp, see *Masum*, 110b-111b; *Alamgirnamah*, 253-256; *Khaf Kh.* ii. 51-53; *Kambu*, 19b, (meagre); *Aqil Kh.* 76 & 77 (brief and confused), and *Ahkam*, Irvine MS., 4b (India Office MS. 34a gives a few lines more.) The best accounts are those supplied by the *Alamgirnamah* and the *Anecdotes*, § 7. *Khafi Khan* supplies a few interesting details.

‡ This number is given by the *Ahkam*. *Masum* says "5 or 6 thousand." I have taken the larger number because Jaswant as commander of the right wing could not have had less than 10,000 men; in the reduced Mughal army of the next day that wing had 10,000 men, with a reserve of 3,000 more. Secondly, the *Alamgirnamah* admits that at dawn Aurangzib found that "nearly one half of yesterday's force had been scattered by the tumult" (256.)

to the field, and rushed the camp of Prince Muhammad, which lay in the path of his flight. The few guards of the camp were soon overpowered, the followers who were found in the way were slain, and everything that the Rajputs could lay their hands on was carried off. Some of the camp people, roused by the noise and mistaking it for the approach of the enemy, hastily loaded their goods on their beasts to prepare for flight. These now fell into the hands of the Rajputs, who were saved the trouble of packing their booty! Horses and camels beyond number and an immense amount in cash and kind were carried off. The baggage, stores, and draught-cattle of the imperialists, from the Emperor to the meanest private, which lay in the camp behind the bivouacking army, were looted. "Everything in the prince's camp was swept away with the broom of plunder." Much of the Emperor's own camp suffered the same fate before the Rajputs gained the road to Agra. The confusion spread to the army at the front. Men assembled in broken groups, and rumours of a disaster spread through the ranks. "The news caused distraction among the troops; their order was broken; cowards and traitors fled away with or after Jaswant; some double-dealers went over to Shuja. Many commanders left their posts and hastened to the rear-camp to look after their property."

But the situation was saved by Aurangzib's wonderful coolness and Shuja's hesitation. Shuja received Jaswant's message, heard of the tumult, but did not leave his own camp at night, fearing it might be a mere *ruse* contrived between Aurangzib and Jaswant to lure him on to destruction! So great was Aurangzib's repute for writing feigned letters, making false professions, and practising all the stratagems of war and policy, that Shuja durst not take advantage of his seeming distress. The general who hesitates is lost; the psychological moment passed away, never to return.

The Emperor was at his *tahajjud* prayer in his field-tent, when the news of Jaswant's attack and desertion reached him. Without uttering a word, he merely waved his hand as if to say, "If he is gone, let him go!" After deliberately finishing the prayer, he issued from the tent, mounted a *takht-i-rawan* (portable chair), and addressed his officers, "This incident is a mercy vouchsafed to us by God. If the infidel had played the traitor in the midst of the battle, all would have been lost. His flight (now) is good for us. Praised be God that by this means friends have been winnowed from secret enemies in my army. The occurrence is a God-send and an omen of victory to us!"\*

So Aurangzib firmly kept his own position, and

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\* A. N., 255 and 256; K. K., II. 53; *Ahkam* 4b.

prevented the confusion from infecting his division too. His example put heart into others. Orderlies were sent off to urge the leaders of the various corps not to stir from their places; any one found away from his assigned post was to be dragged to the Emperor with insult. [K. K. ii. 53.] Islam Khan was ordered to command the right wing in the place of Jaswant, and Saif Khan was given independent charge of the front section of that division. In all other respects yesterday's battle formation was retained. But Mir Jumla was empowered to make any change that he deemed necessary. The rest of the night wore on in watching and caution.

At dawn Aurangzib rode out on an elephant to inspect. Jaswant's exploit had scattered nearly half the imperial army. But with the return of daylight many faithful officers, who had not been swept too far away by the tide of flight, hastened to rejoin the royal banner. Thus Aurangzib saw around himself more than 50,000 soldiers, as against Shuja's bare 23,000.\* He issued the order of battle with an assurance of victory which the flattering Court

\* Aqil Khan (p. 76) gives Shuja's numbers thus :

Right wing	5,000	This gives a total of 23,000.
Left "	4,000	
Right Reserve	2,000	No main Reserve is mentioned
Left "	2,000	
Centre ( <i>tip</i> )	10,000	

annalist ascribes to "his trust in God and the escort of angelic legions," but which the critical historian must set down to a more mundane cause, *viz.*, his clear superiority of two to one over his enemy.

### § 9. *Battle of Khajwa.*

First spread a screen of skirmishers (*qarawwals*), a small but picked body under Abdullah Khan. These were the retinue of the imperial hunt, men accustomed to track the deer and the tiger and to take advantage of every cover in the ground. The vanguard was led by Zulfiqar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, the right wing by Islam Khan, and the left wing by Khan-i-Dauran and Kumar Ram Singh (the son of Jai Singh.) Each of these divisions was 10,000 strong and had a number of guns covering its front. Bahadur Khan commanded the *Iltimsh* or small Advanced Reserve. The main Reserves of the two wings, each numbering 3,000 troopers, were under Daud Khan and Rajah Sujan Singh respectively. In the Centre the Emperor's banner waved over a vast host of at least 20,000 men.\* His own right and left flanks were commanded

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\* The actual strength of the imperial army is mentioned neither in the *Alamgirnamah*, nor by Khaf Kh. The former only says that more than one half of the previous day's force i.e., 90,000, was present (p. 256). This would give 45,000 to 50,000. The latter adds that at dawn many of the dispersed officers came back to the presence (p. 53.) Therefore Aurangzib could not have had less than 50,000 men with him after Jaswant's flight; 60,000 would be nearer the truth. Agil

by Amin Khan and Murtaza Khan. Khawas Khan brought up the scanty Rear. Aurangzib rode on a huge elephant with his third son, Muhammad Azam, in his *hawda*. Mir Jumla was seated on another elephant, close to the Emperor's, ready to help him with counsel at any crisis. The army marched slowly ahead in this formation, and clashed with the enemy at 8 A.M.

Shuja had been impressed by yesterday's vast assemblage of the imperial host, whose number rumour had swollen to above 90,000 men. He knew that he could not adopt the customary plan of battle, making his force correspond, division for division, to the enemy's dispositions. His small force would then have been overlapped and swallowed up by the vastly extended front of an enemy who outnumbered him as three to one. So, with great judgment he made a new formation to-day: all his army was drawn up in one long line, behind the artillery. His Right was commanded by his eldest son Zain-ud-din Muhammad and Sayyid

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Khan (p. 78) estimates the imperial force thus: Van, right wing, and left wing, 10,000 each; Right and Left Reserves 3,000 each. The number in the Centre (under the Emperor) is unfortunately not given. But it must have been twice as strong as either of the wings, because the *Alamgirnamah* mentions 43 officers as present in it, against some 20 in each of the wings (pp. 246-248). The statement of the *Ahkam* that when the battle began Aurangzib's army "did not number even one-fourth of Shuja's" is an absurd exaggeration and occurs only in the India Office MS. of the work (f. 34a).

Alam (5,000 men), and his Left by Hasan Kheshgi (4,000 men). Behind these two wings stood their Reserves, each 2,000 strong, under Isfandiar Beg and Sayyid Quli respectively. In the Centre rode Shuja with his second son, Buland Akhtar, (10,000 men), his front being led by Shaikh Zarif and Sayyid Qasim. There was apparently no main Reserve. With true generalship Shuja determined to assume the offensive, and make up for the smallness of his number by the moral superiority which the attacking party always has. The first stage of the battle justified his forecast.

The battle began at 8 A.M., with a furious artillery duel; cannon, rockets and muskets were discharged on both sides, doing great havoc. One ball struck Zain-ud-din's elephant, wounding the driver and the servant at the back, while the rider and mount escaped scatheless. The two Vans now closed together and plied their bows.\*

The first move was made by Sayyid Alam with Shuja's Right. He charged the imperial left wing, driving in front three infuriated elephants, each brandishing a two-maund iron chain in its trunk.

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\* For the battle of Khajwa see *Alamgirnamah*, 257—265; Masum, 102b—105b; Khafi Kh. ii. 53-56 (mostly a repetition of the *Alamgirnamah*); Kambu, 20a & b; Aqil Khan, 75—79. The last adds many incidents which the Court historian has omitted. Masum is of special value as giving a picture of the battle as seen from Shuja's side. Otherwise, the *Alamgirnamah* has been my chief authority.

Neither man nor beast could stand their impetuous onset. The imperial Left, which had no prince or great general to command it, broke and fled. The panic spread even to the Centre; the soldiers ran about in confusion; the faint-hearted fled without waiting to be attacked. [K. K. ii. 56; Kambu, 20b.] To make matters worse, a false report of the Emperor's death suddenly spread through the ranks and took away the hearts of the soldiers. Many fled away; "even veterans of the Deccan wars and old servants of the Emperor joined the stream of flight." [Aqil, 76.]. So great was their panic that some of the fugitives did not halt before reaching Agra. Jaswant's mysterious appearance and rapid flight had created along the route to Agra a story of the Emperor's defeat and capture. The later arrivals from the field confirmed the news, gave circumstantial details of the disaster like eye-witnesses, and announced the speedy advance of the victorious Shuja to release Shah Jahan. Agra then must have resembled Brussels just after Waterloo!

But the battle had yet to be fought and won. The enemy, after clearing the left wing, pushed on towards the Centre, where only 2,000 troopers now remained to guard the Emperor. But Murtaza Khan from the *Iltimsh*, and Hasan Ali Khan from the Left Reserve, each with a handful of men, flung themselves forward and barred the enemy's path.

The Emperor, too, boldly turned his elephant's head to the Left to confront the enemy. Backed thus by the Centre, these few brave officers successfully repelled Sayyid Alam, who galloped back by the same path that he had come.

But the three elephants continued to advance wildly, their wounds having made them fiercer than before. One of them came up to Aurangzib's elephant. It was the critical moment of the battle. If the Emperor had given ground or turned back, his whole army would have fled. But he stood like a rock, chaining the legs of his elephant to prevent its flight. [K. K. ii. 56.] At his order one of his matchlockmen, Jalal Khan, shot down the *mahut* of the attacking elephant, and immediately afterwards some imperial elephants surrounded it, a brave royal *mahut* nimbly leaped on its back and brought the riderless beast under his control. The other two elephants ran away in front of the Centre towards the right wing. The Emperor now got breathing time, and turned to succour his Right, which had been hard-pressed in the meantime.

For, encouraged by the success of Sayyid Alam's charge, the enemy's Van and Left, led by Buland Akhtar, Shaikh Wali, Shaikh Zarif, Hasan Kheshgi, and others, had attacked the imperial Right. In spite of their small number, their gallant charge dislodged their opponents; many of the

perialists fled, but the captains kept their places, though with very few men at their back.\* All this time so severe was the stress of the fight on the Left that Aurangzib had no time to think of his Right. Now, freed from the danger on his Left, he looked to the Right and found there signs of confusion and flight. His first thought was to hasten to reinforce his hard-pressed division. But even in the greatest difficulty and danger, his coolness and presence of mind did not desert him.† It at once struck him that, as his own front had hitherto been turned towards the Left, if he were now to face suddenly round and march to the Right, the rest of the army would interpret this *volte face* as flight. So, he first sent orderlies to the Van to tell the generals of his real object and to urge them to fight on without fear or doubt.

Then he wheeled the Centre round and joined the right wing. The succour came not a minute too soon. The elephant of Islam Khan, the commander of that wing, taking fright from a rocket, had fled uttering and shaking the troops of that division. The commander of the right wing artillery and his son had been slain. But Saif Khan and Akram Khan, the leaders of the vanguard of the Right,

\* Kambu, 20a; Masum, 102b & 103a.

† Alamgirnamah, 261 & 262.

with a few men kept their ground, and were fighting hard to stem the enemy's advance.

Just then the Emperor arrived and reinforced them. This was the decisive move of the day. The tide of battle now rolled resistlessly against Shuja. The imperial Right, newly strengthened, made a counter-charge and swept away the enemy from before them, with great carnage. Shaikh Wali Farmuli, the leader of Buland Akhtar's Van, with some other commanders, was slain. Hasan Kheshgi, the general of Shuja's left wing, fell down wounded. Shaikh Zarif, a Daudzai Afghan, after a heroic fight in front of the Emperor, was captured covered with wounds. Buland Akhtar fled to his father. [A. N. 263.]

Meantime the imperial Van, under Zulficar Khan and Sultan Muhammad, had beaten back the attack on it, advanced, and shaken the enemy's front line. There the Bengal leader, Tahawwur Khan, with a handful of men, offered a bold opposition and saved the fugitives from slaughter. But so thick was the shower of cannon-balls, rockets and bullets from Aurangzib's army that no man could stand it. The front line of Shuja began to gallop back to a safe distance in twos and threes at a time.

There was now a general advance of the whole imperial army, Right, Centre, and Left. "Like masses of dark clouds, they surrounded Shuja's own

division, the Centre," his two flanks having been laid bare by the defeat and flight of his right and left wings. Many of his personal attendants perished from the imperialist fire under his own eyes. The cannon-balls carried off a head or half a body at a time. Some of them, weighing 16 or 20 lbs, flew about his own head.\* Therefore, at Mir Isfandiar Mamuri's advice he left the dangerous prominence of the elephant's back and took horse.

#### *§ 10. Rout of Shuja's army.*

This was the end of the struggle.† All was now lost. The sight of the empty *hawda*, visible from the furthest limits of the field, struck terror into his soldiers' hearts. Their master was slain, so they imagined. For whom would they fight any longer? They had been sorely tried by Aurangzib's artillery and wanted only a decent excuse for flight. This was now found in the riderless elephant. In a moment the whole army broke and fled.

Shuja's shouts to his men to stand firm fell on unheeding ears; he could not arrest the tide of flight,

\* Masum, 103a-104a, (last scene graphically described).

† Bernier's statement, copied by Stewart, that Shuja was on the point of gaining the victory when he lost all by dismounting from his elephant, merely gives the bazar gossip. None of the contemporary authorities on whom my account of the battle is based, supports such an idea, which is also naturally improbable. Indeed, the battle had been already lost and Shuja was in imminent risk of being captured, when he took horse.

but stood in the field as a helpless "spectator of the hand of Fate." A few of his captains, who had been gallantly facing the enemy, now looked around and saw with amazement the field behind them deserted, and none of their followers present at their back. The enemy, emboldened by the sight, hemmed them round. It was only left for them to do and to die, and this they did. Sayyid Alam alone broke through the ring of his adversaries. [Masum, 104.]

Already the craven-hearted had begun to buy safety with desertion to the victor's side. While Aurangzib was advancing from his own Right, first Murad Kam Safawi (surnamed Mukarram Khan), then Abdur Rahman Khan (son of Nazar Muhammad Khan, the ex-king of Balkh), and Sanjar Beg (the son of Alawardi Khan), left Shuja and joined him. Under their guidance the Emperor skirted Shuja's artillery on his left hand and charged the enemy's Centre, as narrated before.\* But the victory had been already won. A courier now galloped up to him with the happy news that Shuja had fled from the field with his sons, Sayyid Alam, Alawardi Khan, and a small remnant of his army.†

Immediately the imperial band struck up the

\* Kambu, 20b; *Alamgirnamah*, 263 & 264.

† Aurangzib's own account of the battle is given in the *Ruqaat-i-Alamgiri*, No. 19 and the Paris MS., 2b.

'music of victory,' which conveyed the happy news to every soldier in the field. The battle was over. Aurangzib descended from his elephant, and knelt down on the field to thank the Giver of Victory. Shuja's entire camp and baggage were plundered by the imperialists. One hundred and fourteen large and small pieces of cannon, and eleven of the celebrated elephants of Bengal became the victor's spoil, as also did a small portion of treasure and jewels which had escaped plunder by the soldiers.  
[A. N. 265.]

### § 11. *Criticism of tactics.*

Reviewing the battle, we must give the palm of generalship to Shuja. Aurangzib showed great firmness and presence of mind, but no military genius. Shuja's plan of battle was admirable; it would have succeeded if he had not been so hopelessly outnumbered, and if Sayyid Alam had been supported from behind and pressed his charge home. The latter, after routing the left wing of Aurangzib, was confronted by the Centre, checked, and forced to retreat. If he had made a longer stand there, he could have utilised the opening made by the rush of his two furious elephants in front of the enemy's Centre, and crashed into Aurangzib's Right from behind, at the very time when that wing was shaken by the charge of Buland Akhtar from the front and

the stampede of Islam Khan's elephant. This would have annihilated both the wings of Aurangzib; and after this splendid success his Van and Centre, left alone in the field, would have been demoralised and easily defeated. But either Sayyid Alam was not a stubborn fighter, or Shuja was too timid to risk his all on one throw by denuding his Centre of men to support his victorious Right. In fact, he was held in check at his own position by Aurangzib's Van. [Aqil, 78; Masum 103a.]

NOTE. The most original source for Sulaiman Shukoh's campaign against Shuja has been lately discovered. The Jaipur State archives contain copies of more than a hundred letters that passed between Jai Singh and the Mughal royal family during Shah Jahan's reign, the majority of them having been written by Dara. Among these 38 refer to the campaign against Shuja and range in date from 5 Dec. 1657 to 5 June 1658;—27 of them were written by Dara and 7 by Shah Jahan to Jai Singh; two were replies of that Rajput chief to Shah Jahan and one to Dara. These letters (which contain the dates of writing and the dates and places of receipt) enable us to follow the campaign, the course of diplomacy, and the policy of the imperial Court in minute detail.

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## CHAPTER XX.

BATTLE OF DEORAI (AJMIR), 12th—14th MARCH, 1659.

### § 1. *Fugitive Dara enters Cutch.*

We have seen how Dara had been pursued all the way from Lahor to Tatta in Lower Sindh and finally dislodged from that town. Leaving it on 18th November, 1658, he had struck inland to Badin, 55 miles eastwards, and then marched for three days along the northern shore of the salt lagoon or *Rann*, suffering unspeakable hardship through lack of water. That year the rainfall had been scanty, and the tanks on this route were all dry, while the few wells contained only a small supply of muddy water. Many of his transport animals perished of thirst and his soldiers were brought almost to death's door. The lagoon was eighty miles broad with many quicksands, and no drinking water at all. But everything must bow to necessity. Dara had no choice but to enter the *Rann* (27th November) with his tender wives and daughters in order to reach Gujrat.\*

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\* A. N. 282-283. *Badin*, 55 miles east of Tatta. Dara probably crossed the *Rann* at *Rahimki Bazar*, 30 miles s. e. of Badin. Jai Singh afterwards reached the northern shore of the *Rann* at "the village of *Rahman*" (Paris MS., 103a), which I take to be another name of the same place.

Crossing the Greater or Western Rann he reached the village of Luna, at the north-western end of the island of Cutch. Then, making his way through the desert and along the sea-coast by a difficult and untrodden path, under the guidance of some local zamindars, he arrived at the capital of the island. The Rajah hospitably received him, and overcome by the personal charm of Dara and the hope of matching with the imperial house of Delhi, he betrothed his daughter to Sipahr Shukoh\* and gave every help to Dara to make his progress easy. The fugitive, replenishing his power in the dominion of his new friend, crossed to Kathiawar. Here the leading chief, the Jam of Nawanagar, offered him presents and the necessary provisions and conveyances.

### § 2. *Dara occupies Ahmadabad.*

Growing stronger as he advanced, he entered Gujerat. The local officers and jagirdars on the way were forced to follow him. On his arrival before Ahmadabad with 3,000 men, Fortune smiled on him unexpectedly. Shah Nawaz Khan, the newly

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\* The Rao of Cutch, "when he appears in public, alternately worships God in a Hindoo pagoda and a Mahomedan mosque.... The royal family of Cutch have never objected to form matrimonial alliances with Mahomedans when the match was suitable, or when a political object was to be gained...The Jharejahs employ Mussalman cooks, and eat from their hands." (*Burnes's Visit to Court of Sindie & History of Cutch*, ed. 1839, p. xiv.)

arrived governor of the province, cherished resentment against Aurangzib for having imprisoned him at Burhanpur on his refusal to join that prince in the rebellion against Shah Jahan. True, Aurangzib had married the Khan's daughter, but that lady was dead, and Shah Nawaz Khan felt no natural attachment to his persecuting son-in-law who had treacherously imprisoned Shah Nawaz's second son-in-law, Murad Bakhsh. Besides, he had taken charge of Gujrat so recently that the officers and troops serving in that province had not been yet brought under his control. His military force was small and too divided by mutual jealousy to offer an effective opposition to the invader.

Whether inspired by revenge or cowardice, Shah Nawaz Khan submitted at the very outset. With his chief officers he advanced to Sarganj, four miles from the capital, to welcome Dara, admitted him into the fort (9th January, 1659), and opened to him the treasury containing ten lakhs of Rupees belonging to Murad. Dara spent one month and seven days in Gujrat, and by lavishly spending money soon raised his army to 22,000 men in that "land bristling with soldiers". One of his officers took peaceful possession of Surat from Aurangzib's governor, seized the imperial revenue, extorted contributions from the citizens, and brought away 30 or 40 pieces of artillery to his master. In the

Ahmadabad palace Dara held Court, occupying a lower seat than the Emperor's, out of respect for his father. But Shah Nawaz Khan's importunity led him to appear at the window where the Emperors were wont to show their faces to the public.\*

Having gathered military strength, and secured a good park of artillery, material, and money, Dara cast about for a plan of operations. Which way should he turn? The Deccan tempted him most. He had long held friendly correspondence with Adil Shah and Qutb Shah; he had opposed Aurangzib's invasions of their territory, and at the end of these invasions he had interceded with his father and secured lenient terms for them. Aurangzib was as much their mortal foe as his, and he might count on their assistance from vindictiveness if not from gratitude. Dara, therefore, at first wished to march into the South and set up his authority there, and then, by joining forces with Golkonda and Bijapur,

\* For Dara's journey from Sindh to Ahmadabad and his doings there.—*A. N.* 296—299; *Khafi Khan*, ii. 62-63; *Masum*, 136b-137a; *Aqil Khan*, 80-81; *Ishwardas*, 43a (meagre). The Persian accounts speak of a chief named Bahàrà or Rao Bahara in this quarter. From Jai Singh's despatches (*Paris MS.* 109a and 96a) he can be identified with the Rao of Cutch. I think that the Mughals called him so from Bharmal (or Bahara Mal), the Rao who lived in Akbar's time and fought with the imperial Government. (*Imp. Gaz.* xi. 78). Once or twice Jai Singh speaks of 'the zamindar of Cutch' without using the title *Bahara* or *Rao*, but this need not mean that the latter was a different person.

take revenge on the common enemy of the three. The report that such a movement was contemplated by him reached Prince Muazzam, the governor of Aurangabad, and he set about enlisting troops to be better able to bar the path of his uncle. But a new hope drew Dara off from this enterprise.

The news reached Gujerat that Shuja was rapidly advancing from the east, while Aurangzib was absent in the Panjab. Now was the time for Dara to make a dash on Agra from the west and release Shah Jahan. Soon rumour brought the flattering news that Aurangzib's army had been routed in a battle with Shuja near Allahabad and that Jaswant Singh had returned home loaded with the spoils of the vanquished imperial camp. The golden opportunity had come.

### *§ 3. Jaswant Singh invites Dara to Ajmir.*

Dara hesitated no longer. On 14th February he started for Ajmir, leaving one of his officers behind as governor of Gujerat, and carrying away with himself the servants, children and wives of Murad, as well as several local officers like Shah Nawaz Khan. Three marches afterwards he learnt the truth that Aurangzib had triumphed over Shuja; but this disappointment was made up for by a stroke of unexpected good fortune. Maharajah Jaswant Singh sent one of his high officers to Dara with a

letter professing his devotion to Shah Jahan and asking Dara to reach Ajmir quickly, where the Rathors and other Rajputs were ready to join a leader who would take them to the rescue of their captive sovereign. With Jaswant's promised help a vast Rajput army could be easily raised.

Ajmir is the very heart of Rajasthan, "the centre round which the homes of the Rajput clans cluster." East of it lie Kishangarh and Jaipur, in the south Mewar, in the s. e. Kota and Bundi, in the west Marwar, and in the north-west, beyond Marwar, are Shekhwati and Bikanir. Therefore the Mughals, and following them the English, have held the isolated district of Ajmir as a means of planting their feet on the breast of Rajputana and dominating all the Rajput clans with ease. With Jaswant as his right hand man, Dara would find Ajmir a most convenient place for raising a vast Rajput army in a short time. On the way he received more friendly letters from Jaswant, till he reached Mairta, three marches from Jodhpur, full of high hopes.\*

These hopes were soon dashed to the ground; for, in the meanwhile Aurangzib had succeeded in securing Jaswant. After the battle of Khajwa, the Emperor, justly angry with Jaswant for his treachery on that day, wanted to make an example of him.

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\* A. N. 229—300, 311; Aqil Khan, 81-82. *Mairta*, 37 miles n. w. of Ajmir and 68 miles n. e. of Jodhpur (*Ind. At.* 33 S. W.).

He despatched an army of 10,000 men and guns under Muhammad Amin Khan to invade Marwar, expel Jaswant, and place Rai Singh Rathor on his throne. For a time Jaswant meditated resistance, gathered troops, and offered an alliance to Dara. But he soon realised his own impotence. "As Agra and Delhi had fallen in a twinkle into Aurangzib's hands, how long could the fort of Jodhpur hold out against his power?" After waiting with all his troops for some days in uncertainty at Mandur, his old capital, and then learning that the army of his chastiser with his rival had reached Lálsunth and was ravaging the country, he lost heart and fled to the hill-fort of Siwana. Meantime, Aurangzib had realised the wisdom of not driving Jaswant into his enemy's arms. In the impending conflict with Dara, Jaswant was the decisive factor. His adhesion would mean an addition of 20,000 of the hardiest warriors of India to the ranks of his ally, as well as unrivalled local influence in Rajputana.

#### *§ 4. Aurangzib detaches Jaswant from the side of Dara.*

So, Aurangzib made Jai Singh write a friendly letter to Jaswant, professing true friendship for him and a natural reluctance to see such a great Hindu prince meet with utter ruin. As a friend, Jai Singh pointed out the folly of defying Aurangzib and the

certainty of utter destruction as its result. He therefore tendered his good offices as a mediator with the Emperor, to secure for Jaswant a full pardon and restoration to his title and *mansab*, as well as a high post under the Crown, if he gave up Dara and returned to the path of loyalty. This letter reached the Rathor chief at a critical time, when the future looked darkest of him. He at once closed with the offer, decided to side with Aurangzib, and began a retreat to Jodhpur. Hence it was that Dara on reaching Mairta saw no sign of Jaswant's coming. Alarmed and shaken in his mind, he halted and sent a trusty Hindu named Dunichand to urge the Maharajah to keep his promise. Jaswant gave the lying reply that he was waiting in expectation of raising more men and organising his force, but urged Dara to advance to Ajmir where he would join him with his Rajputs.

From Ajmir Dara again sent Dunichand to bring Jaswant. But the embassy was fruitless; Jaswant had clearly given up all intention of going to Ajmir. The unhappy Dara made a third attempt. Stooping from his dignity under the force of necessity, he sent his son Sipihr Shukoh to Jodhpur to entreat the Maharajah to come to Ajmir, by appealing to his sense of honour and the sacredness of promises. Jaswant received the prince with courtesy, but did not move from his purpose. After

wasting three days in vain expectation and being put off with smooth words, Sipihr Shukoh at last returned to his father in disappointment. A Rajput of the highest rank and fame had turned false to his word. Of all the actors in the drama of the War of Succession, Jaswant emerges from it with the worst reputation : he had run away from a fight where he commanded in chief, he had treacherously attacked an unsuspecting friend, and now he abandoned an ally whom he had plighted his word to support and whom he had lured into danger by his promises. Unhappy was the man who put faith in Maharajah Jaswant Singh, lord of Marwar and chieftain of the Rathor clan.\*

But there was no escape for Dara. By this time Aurangzib had arrived near Ajmir and a battle could not be avoided. Dara, plunged into despair by Jaswant's faithlessness and the defection of other Rajputs who were influenced by his example, had to prepare for battle, whether he wished for it or not.

### *§ 5. Dara entrenches a pass near Ajmir.*

Conscious of the smallness of his own force and the overwhelming strength of the enemy, Dara

\* For Jaswant's dealings with Dara,—*A. N.* 300, 309—312; *K. K.*, ii. 65-66; *Bernier*, 85-86; *Ishwardas*, 43a; *Kambu*, 21a (meagre); *Aqil* 81—84. The Mughal invasion of Marwar after Khajwa is fully described in *Ishwardas*, 41b—43a.

wisely changed his plan. Instead of fighting a pitched battle in an open plain, he decided to hold the pass of Deorai, four miles south of Ajmir,\* in the narrow breadth of which a small host can keep a superior force of assailants back. His two flanks were protected by the hills of Bithli and Gokla; while behind him lay the rich city of Ajmir, where his officers had deposited their property and families and whence he could easily draw his supplies. He ran a low wall south of his position, from hill to hill across the valley, with trenches in front and redoubts at different points. The entire line was divided into four sections, each under a different commander with artillery and musketeers. On the right, at the south-western corner of the position, close to the hill of Bithli, lay the trenches of Sayyid Ibrahim (surnamed Mustafa Khan) and Jani Beg (Dara's Chief of Artillery) with a thousand barqandazes besides other soldiers. Next came the trenches of Firuz Miwati, and beyond them, on a hillock overlooking the pass, were mounted some big guns. Here, at the centre of the lines stood Dara with his staff. On his left the line was continued by the third section of the trenches (held by Shah Nawaz Khan and Muhammad Sharif Qalich Khan, the chief officer of

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\* Deorai is given as *Dorai* in *Indian Atlas*, (Sheet 34 N. E.),  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles south of Ajmir, a little to the east of the Rajputana Malwa Railway line.

Dara), and the fourth section under Sipihr Shukoh at the south-eastern corner adjoining the hill of Gokla.\*

The position was admirably chosen, and its natural strength was greatly increased by art. Two hill ranges running beyond Ajmir, rendered its flanks absolutely secure, as they could be turned only by making a very wide detour and threading the way through another defile. In front, the enemy toiling up the slope from the plain below and crowded together within the narrow pass, would suffer terribly from Dara's artillery ranged on an elevation and his musketeers standing safe behind their earthworks.

### § 6. *Battle of Deorai.*

In this position Dara waited for the enemy. Marching from the Ramsar lake Aurangzib entered the valley from the south-east and halted one mile from Deorai (11th March). About two miles in front of him Dara's trenches barred his path and four miles further north lay the city of Ajmir.

That very night a gallant imperial officer named Purdil Khan with 150 men climbed a mound a little north of Deorai and midway between the two armies, and passed the night there. The dawn revealed the

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\* For Dara's dispositions,—A. N. 313-314; Khaf Khan, ii. 67; Aqil Khan, 84; Ishwardas, 43b.

party to the enemy who sent skirmishers to dislodge them. But the imperial army pushed forward a body of 2000 men to assist in holding this advanced post, while Dara supported his skirmishers with an equally strong force.\* The contest raged for more than four hours; but the enterprise and tenacity of Purdil Khan had borne fruit: the imperial artillery had been safely dragged to this position of vantage under cover of his resistance, and the post firmly secured. Dara's advanced troops retired baffled behind their lines. The whole imperial army now moved forward. The Van and the right wing took post opposite the eastern trenches, close to the Gokla hill, and the left wing faced the trenches near Bithli. It was impossible for Aurangzib's army to be fully deployed; the other divisions were held back from the fighting line and surrounded Aurangzib's tent which was now pitched  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the enemy's position. That day (12th March) his guns were carried half a cannon-shot forward and disposed before the enemy's guns in the centre of the line.

It was evening before this general movement, shifting of camp, and disposition of the artillery and the attacking divisions could be completed. Then

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\* For the battle our authorities are *A. N.* 314—326; *Aqil Khan*, 84—87; *Khafi Khan*, ii. 68—71; *Kambu*, 21b-22a (very brief); *Ishwar-das*, 43b-44b (brief); *Masum*, 137b-138a (bare mention). For the bazar gossip about the course of the fight, *Storia*, i. 342-343; *Bernier*, 87-88 (a still more incredible tale.)

the battle began in right earnest. First, as usual in Mughal warfare, there was an artillery duel. From the sunset of the 12th to the dawn of the 13th, there was incessant firing from both sides. "Earth and heaven shook with the noise." "Clouds of gunpowder smoke covered the field." [A. N. 315; Aqil 85.]

The 13th passed in the same manner. From morning to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the artillery duel continued. The imperialists were busily engaged in digging trenches to cover their front; but bands of brave men made sorties from Dara's lines, fell on these trenches, and after killing men and horses returned to the shelter of the hills. In the afternoon, from the right and left of Dara's army 2,000 steel-clad cavalry swarmed over the wall and entered the field, brandishing their swords and spears. The imperial army accepted the challenge, and a hot hand-to-hand combat raged in mid-field till the sun went down.

Dara's artillery and muskets from their high position showered death on Aurangzib's gunners and troops. But the cannon-balls of the imperialists fell on the stone-walls of the enemy or on the hill-side, doing no harm. All the night of the 13th also the guns continued booming, but evidently as a precaution against a surprise or night-attack.

The imperial generals recognised the strength

of the enemy's trenches as impregnable. "As the lines were strongly fortified and ensconced in inaccessible hills, the efforts of the imperialists to capture them did not succeed." Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan realised that an attempt to storm the enemy's trenches by a cavalry charge would lead to a fruitless loss of life. So an assault was forbidden. The night was spent in a council of war. Next morning (14th)\* Aurangzib assembled his generals, rebuked them for their delay in achieving success, and urged them to do their utmost to capture the enemy's lines.

A new plan of attack was also adopted. The conventional method of each division engaging the one opposed to it and the artillery opposing the enemy's artillery and trying to breach the earthworks, was abandoned as having proved itself useless after a waste of two days' time and much ammunition.

Aurangzib's generals decided to make a concentrated attack in overwhelming strength on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches, at the enemy's left,† while

\* Both the *Alamgirnamah* (319) and *Aqil* (88) declare the 29th Jamadi-us-sani as the date of the victory, which corresponds to 14th March, 1659 A.D. Both the *Alamgirnamah* and Jai Singh speak of the day as a Sunday, but 14th March was a Monday. From A. N. (330) it is clear that Jamadi-us-sani that year had a thirtieth day. In the history of the pursuit given in the next chapter the first few dates may be inaccurate by one day as the result of the above irreconcilable difference.

† Kambu (21b) says that this attack was made at a treacherous

the imperial left wing was to keep the enemy's right wing in play. The success of the scheme, however, was to depend not on the attack in front but on a secret movement to turn the enemy's left. On Dara's right the high and steep hill of Bithli, running for a length of several miles forbade any attempt to climb it. But the Gokla hill on his left was much shorter in length, and lower in height, with gentler slopes and throwing off spurs on its eastern face, which was close to the assailants but hidden from Dara's position by the summit. Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills was serving under Aurangzib with a body of his Rajput clansmen expert in mountaineering. His followers had discovered a path by which the back of the Gokla hill could be scaled. Aurangzib ordered the ascent to be made and lent a party of musketeers from his own army to support the attempt.

Towards evening when the gunners on both sides were tired with the day's firing, Rajrup sent his infantry up the back of the Gokla hill, while he appeared with his cavalry in front of it to divert the

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hint from Shah Nawaz Khan. Bernier, 87, also. Masurn (138a) states, "Dara ascribed his defeat to the treachery of Shah Nawaz Khan, and on this *false suspicion* slew him." But there is no more reason for believing in Shah Nawaz Khan's treachery here than in that of Khalilullah at Samugarh or of Alawardi at Khajwa. Indeed, Khafi Khan (ii. 70-71) holds that Shah Nawaz courted a hero's death to avoid the disgrace of looking Aurangzib in the face.

enemy's attention. A body of one thousand troopers sallied out of Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches and encountered Rajrup. The other imperial generals had been smarting under the Emperor's reprimand in the morning, and now the sight of the enemy within easy reach of their weapons roused their martial ardour. Dilar Khan with his Afghans galloped into the fray from the right side of the artillery; Shaikh Mir from behind the guns turned to the right and came up to the front line alongside of Dilar Khan. Shaista Khan with the right wing, the artillerymen from the middle, and Jai Singh with the Van, all flocked to this point to support the fighters. The left wing also made a forward movement against Dara's extreme right.

The fight now became general. The bulk of the imperial army was massed in front of the enemy's left, where the assault was delivered. Shaikh Mir and Dilar Khan together advanced on Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches in reckless valour. The imperial artillery reopened fire with great rapidity and prevented the other divisions of the enemy from leaving their trenches and marching across the front to aid their hard-pressed friends in the plain on their left, who got supports only from the trenches immediately behind them. The hardest fight raged in this part of the field: Dara's men obstinately defended their lines, and the rival generals freely exposed

themselves to encourage their men. From Dara's second and third trenches cannon-balls and bullets were showered upon the assailants. Hill and plain were enveloped in a thick pall of smoke.

According to one account Dara's artillerymen were corrupted by Aurangzib and fired blank charges. But his musketeers at all events fought valiantly, and the slaughter in Aurangzib's ranks was heavy at this point. The vigour of the onset, however, did not abate. The blood of the imperialists was fired by the fierce passion of combat; their horsemen dashed on towards the trenches in the face of a hail of bullets; the wounded who fell were trampled under the horses' hoofs beyond recognition, but fresh troops from behind pressed forward to take their places. [K. K. ii. 70.] The attack was persisted in for over an hour with undiminished vigour. Wave after wave of imperialists swarmed up to the charge; and at last they pushed all the enemy out of the field and won the ground to the edge of the trenches. Now, if ever, Dara's lines were to be entered, or all this loss of life would be vain.

By this time Rajrup's men had toiled up the back of the Gokla hill, while the enemy were absorbed in the severe contest in their front. They planted their banners on the top and raised a shout. The imperialists were filled with joy and the assurance of success, and Dara's left wing was seized

with despair at its rear being turned. An attack from this quarter had not been expected at all, and it had been left unguarded.

The exultant imperialists redoubled their efforts to enter the trenches. But many of Dara's men still resisted with the courage of despair. To overcome the last opposition, Shaikh Mir drove his elephant forward. A bullet struck him in the breast and he felt that his end had come. But this faithful servant's last thoughts were still about his master. He told his kinsman Sayyid Hashim, who was sitting behind him in the same *hawda*, "I am done for. Clasp me round the waist and prop my head up, so that my followers may not know of my death and give up the fight in despair. I see clear signs of a victory to our arms, and very soon the imperial band will strike up the music of triumph." [K. K. ii. 71.]

### § 7. *Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches stormed.*

The struggle in Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches was most terrible; "the firing was severe, the enemy resisted to the utmost. Shaikh Mir was slain and Dilir Khan received an arrow in his right hand." But the fight continued. The devotion of Shaikh Mir and the valour of Dilir Khan's Afghans carried the day. The imperial banners were planted in the trenches. Jai Singh entered with the Van and

brought fresh strength to the assailants. "The enemy totally lost heart and firmness." [A. N. 323.]

The resistance in the third section of the lines was at last overpowered. Then a heavy slaughter of the vanquished began. Shah Nawaz Khan, standing on a height, was encouraging his men by voice and gesture when his body was blown away by a cannon-ball. Muhammad Sharif (Dara's Paymaster) was shot through the stomach with an arrow; two others of his generals, Muhammad Kheshgi and Abu Baqr, were put to the sword. Shah Nawaz's son, Siadat Khan, got three or four wounds. The rank and file broke and fled under cover of the darkness.

For, in the meantime the shades of night had closed on the scene, and made any general advance of the troops or direction of the battle impossible. Shaikh Mir's followers, too, at the death of their chief, got out of hand and dispersed for plunder, instead of continuing the fight. The sun set on a scene of wild confusion and tumult. "In the darkness swords played; friends could not be known from foes; the warriors of the two armies fell down fighting side by side." [Kambu, 22a.] But gradually as the night advanced, the truth became known that the battle had been already decided. True, only one of the four entrenchments had been

captured; but it was enough. Dara's lines were fatally pierced. The redoubt on his extreme left, commanded by Sipîhr Shukoh had been rendered untenable by the Jammu hillmen seizing its back and the imperial troops who had entered Shah Nawaz's position turning its right. Thus Dara's left wing was entirely gone. His Right remained intact. Askar Khan still held the redoubt on his extreme right and kept the imperialists back. Firuz Miwati's post, the second redoubt, was also uncaptured, and there were still about 6,000 men to uphold Dara's cause; but their chief was gone.

From his high position at the back of the Centre, Dara had been watching every phase of the battle. He had been steadily sending up supports to his hard-pressed third division by the path in its rear. He had also ordered Shah Nawaz Khan, who was with him at the time of the attack, to hasten back to his redoubt and guide the defence. Up to sunset Dara had striven hard to maintain the fight; he had constantly put heart into his men and urged them to make a firm stand. But the capture of Shah Nawaz Khan's redoubt and the turning of the Gokla hill shattered all his hopes. It became clear to his men that further resistance was vain. Dara's comrades in these circumstances refused to throw away their lives and prepared for flight. Pleading with them was useless. Safety lay only in a hurried escape,

for which the darkness of the night and the dispersion and disorder of the victors presented a golden opportunity.\*

Fearing such a reverse, Dara had placed his harem and treasure on elephants, camels and mules, and kept them on the bank of the Anasagar lake, five miles behind the scene of battle, with an escort of troops in charge of his faithful eunuch Khwajah Maqul. He had intended to take them with himself in his flight.

### § 8. *Flight of Dara; plunder of his camp.*

But when Shah Nawaz Khan's redoubt was carried and the victors pressed on towards Dara's position, the luckless prince had not a moment to lose. Accompanied by his son Sipahr Shukoh and his general Firuz Miwati and followed by only ten or twelve of his men, he fled in headlong haste towards Gujrat by the first road he could reach. Terror and bewilderment urged him on, without leaving him the power to turn aside for his family at the appointed place or to send them orders to save themselves.†

\* Kambu, 21b—22a.

† A. N. 325, 409. The slaughter was estimated by Ishwardas at 5000 men on Aurangzib's side and ten thousand on Dara's,—the last figure being too high for a force which numbered less than 22,000 men and held an almost impregnable line of which three-fourths were untouched by the enemy. One hundred and fifteen elephants were killed on the two sides taken together (44a.) Kambu says that a heavy slaughter took place in Shah Nawaz Khan's trenches after the imperialists had forced them.

Meantime the condition of the ladies was most pitiable. Ever since midday they had been kept in the saddle on the tiptoe of suspense for the terrible news of a disaster in the field and the order to escape. All the forenoon the cannon had boomed in the near battle-field; then there was a lull; but about two hours before sunset it broke out with redoubled vigour; the horizon was filled with smoke, and the horrid din of battle, louder than the last two days', reached their ears. Something terrible was happening. Their suspense became acute; but no news reached them. About sunset the first signs of the dispersion of a great army were seen: soldiers began to run away in groups from the field; the fugitives approached the city; then the camp of Dara's army became a scene of wild confusion and noise, as it began to be plundered. Parties of victors were seen advancing to the city, slaying and looting. They approached the lake; and yet no news of Dara, no messenger, no order from him reached the agonised women and the anxious eunuch. But these signs told their own tale beyond the chance of mistake: Dara had been ruined and put to flight. The faithful servant by hard exertion removed the ladies with 12 elephants and some mules and camels, from this place of danger and fled by the path between the skirt of the hill and the valley. All but a few of the guards deserted their charge. [A. N. 325, 409.]

For, the country round Ajmir had become a wild scene of plunder. In addition to the camp-followers of both the armies, whose trade it was to engage in plunder whichever side might win, thousands of Rajputs had assembled in the neighbourhood of Ajmir at the call of Dara, but had held back from the fight at the defection of Jaswant, and were hovering round like vultures soaring over their expected prey. This night and the next day they got their chance. Most of Dara's property and transport animals were looted. His mules laden with bags of gold coins were driven away by the very Rajputs of Ajmir district whom he had appointed as his treasure-escort! All his camp and base were swept bare by the plunderers from the victorious army, the camp-followers, and adventurers who profit by tumult and confusion. The stores of various departments and most of the money were carried off by the Rajputs and the aboriginal Mairs. "Booty beyond calculation was seized by the troops." "Dara took away nothing beyond the jewels he wore on his person and some gold coins placed in the *hawdas* of his women." "Wounded soldiers who had fled from the field were stripped of their all, and wandered crying in the hills."\*

When night dropped the curtain on the terrible scene of the day's slaughter, and Dara fled away,

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\* A. N. 325-326, 329, 410; K. K., ii. 73; Aqil, 88.

none of his officers (except Firuz Miwati) accompanied him, as their property and families were in Ajmir. Next day they submitted to the victor and entered his service. Askar Khan, Sayyid Ibrahim, Jani Beg and other officers who occupied Dara's extreme right, had held their positions till about 9 P.M. Then the news of Dara's flight reached them, and towards the end of the night they came to Saf Shikan Khan begging for quarter. The wounded Muhammad Sharif accompanied them, but, in spite of medical treatment by his chivalrous enemy, he died.\*

The details of the situation and the full extent of his success became known to Aurangzib next morning (15th March). He mourned the death of Shaikh Mir, greatly rewarded that faithful servant's clansmen, especially Sayyid Hashim, and ordered him to be buried with full honours in the hallowed enclosure of saint Muin-ud-din Chishti's tomb. Here, too, was buried Shah Nawaz Khan, who had fought against him and, if we can believe Khafi Khan, had courted death to escape the shame of looking his hostile and victorious son-in-law in the face. In the consecrated soil of the *dargah* of Ajmir, the two chief victims of the rival hosts are united in death. Aurangzib himself visited the holy shrine the day after the victory, did homage to the saint's mortal

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\* A. N. 325-326; Aqil, 87-88; Kambu, 22a; K. K. ii. 73-74.

remains, and presented Rs. 5,000 to the attendants as a thanks-offering for the victory. A strong force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan was detached in pursuit of Dara.\*

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\* *A. N.*, 330—332; *Khafi Khan*, ii. 72, 74; *Storia*, i. 342.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THE END OF DARA SHUKOH.

#### § 1. *Miserable flight of Dara from Ajmir to Gujerat.*

From the ruin of his last hopes at Ajmir Dara fled with his second son and only one general, Firuz the Miwati. His women, too, were removed from danger by his faithful eunuch Maqul. All the night of 14th March and the whole of the next day they pursued their flight by different roads, till at last towards the evening of the 15th they met together on the way and reached Mairta, 37 miles north-west of Ajmir. Here the miserable victims of Fate, worn out by their twenty-four hours' precipitate march, rested for a moment. But the enemy, flushed with victory, was sure to give them no respite. So, in that very night the wretched prince and his family had to get up and resume their march with the same haste as before.\*

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\* The history of Dara's flight and the pursuit by the imperialists is given in great detail in Jai Singh's despatches to Aurangzib contained in *Haft Anjuman*. A general narrative with much supplementary information is given in A. N. 409—415, 418-419. Bernier's personal observations (88—97.) Kambu 22b, Aqil 87, and Ishwardas 44a and b are very brief. Masum 138b—145b, though a little confused about the route, supplies very useful details about the capture and

Only 2,000 troopers accompanied Dara when he left Mairta. Many times that number had run away from the battle, but they took other routes and never joined him,—some scattered to the right and left of his line of flight, and one party of the fugitives with his elephants moved in a different direction altogether, *viz.*, north-east towards Sambhar.

At Mairta the pursuers were six days behind; but the rumour of their coming preceded them everywhere, and at every halting place robbed the unhappy prince and his followers of their sorely needed rest and lent wings to their flight. Covering thirty miles or even more a day, they fled southwards to Gujerat by way of Pipar (16th March) and Bargaon, and on the 29th reached a place 48 miles north of Ahmadabad, hoping to find a refuge in that city. Their misery was extreme. The baggage and tents had been abandoned in the wild rush to escape from the battle-field, and now all along the route various necessary articles and even treasure had to be sacrificed for want of porters. "The heat was intolerable, the dust suffocating," and the path a sandy waste. Bands of Kulis, a tribe of professional robbers, followed the fugitives day and night, pillaging and slaying stragglers. Horses, camels, and oxen perished from the heat and overwork.

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execution. *Storia*, i. 345—355, is of little value, as Manucci was invested in Bhakkar all this time.

The French physician Bernier, retracing Dara's path a few days later, noticed too often by the roadside the sickening "sight of dead men, elephants, oxen, horses, and camels; the wrecks of poor Dara's army."\*\*

In the meantime the hunters had got on the right trail and were following it with relentless vigour. So fast had been Dara's flight and in so many directions had his followers scattered that for three days after the battle none knew Dara's condition or the line of his flight. At first a rumour arose that he had turned north-east towards Sambhar. But when the pursuing force under Jai Singh and Bahadur Khan reached Mairta (20th March) the truth became known to them. Every path was closed to Dara. The Emperor had written to the Maharajah of Jodhpur to arrest Dara if he entered his kingdom. Jaswant got the letter three days after Dara had left Marwar; but he immediately set off in pursuit and reached Bhinmal, whence he turned aside to join Jai Singh in the march to Gujerat. Jai Singh sent off letters to the princes and zamindars in every direction to bar Dara's path,—to Sirohi and Palanpur in the south, Daiwara in the south-east, to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch and the zamindars of Lower Sindh, and to the officers of

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\* H. A., 94b-95a; Bernier, 88—92; A. N. 410; Kambu, 22b. *Pipar*, 35 miles s. w. of Mairta. (*Ind. At.*, 34 N. W.) *Bargaon*, 22 miles s. of Bhinmal (Sh. 21 N. E.)

Gujrat. Thus it was that everywhere Dara found enemies warned of his coming and ready to seize him.\*

The civil and military officers of Gujrat decided to adhere to Aurangzib; they arrested Sayyid Ahmad Bukhari, the governor left by Dara at Ahmadabad, and took possession of the city and fort. Dara's harbinger returned from Ahmadabad with the dismal news that he would be resisted if he tried to enter the city. This reply reached him at his halting-place some 48 miles north of the capital of Gujrat. It was break of day when the party became aware of the destruction of their last hope of a refuge, "and (Bernier records) the shrieks of the females drew tears from every eye. We were all overwhelmed with confusion and dismay, gazing in speechless horror at each other, at a loss what plan to recommend, and ignorant of the fate which perhaps awaited us from hour to hour. We observed Dara stepping out, more dead than alive, speaking now to one, then to another; stopping and consulting even the commonest soldier. He saw consternation depicted on every countenance, and felt assured that he should be left without a single follower."

\* Aqil Khan, 87; *H. A.*, Paris MS. 95a—96b, 97b, 108a. Bhinmal, 25 N. 72-20 E. (*Ind. At.* 21 N. E.); Sirohi, 24-53 N. 72-55 E. (*Ibid.*). Palaripur, 24-10 N. 72-30 E. (*Ibid.* 21 S. E.); there is a Dailwara, 9 miles n. of Udaipur.

*§ 2. Dara's flight through Cutch to Sindh.*

Nothing now remained for him but flight; but to which side? The north, east, and south were closed to him; only on the west the path to Cutch lay open. This he took of necessity. Misfortune had made him totally destitute of power and influence. "Neither his threats nor entreaties could procure" a single horse, ox, or camel for Dr. Bernier who attended his sick wife. Dara's retinue had dwindled down to four or five hundred horsemen, with only a couple of elephants laden with gold and silver coins. Even Bernier had to stay behind because of the absolute lack of transport. In this miserable condition Dara turned (29th March) westwards to the Kari district, where Kanji, the Kuli chieftain, escorted him faithfully to the boundary of Cutch. On the way the fugitive was joined by Gul Muhammad, his late faujdar of Surat, with 50 horse and 200 foot musketeers. From Viramgaon, "reduced to the poorest and sorriest dress,—a tunic of thin linen and shoes worth eight annas,—with a heart broken into two and constantly shaking with fear, accompanied by one horse, one bullock-cart, five camels for his ladies, and a few other camels for transport, his retinue shrunk to a few men," the heir to the throne of Delhi crossed the Lesser Rann and reached Bhuj, the capital of Cutch. But he found his former

friend and protector changed; for, in the meantime Jai Singh's letters "full of hopes and threats," urging the arrest of the fugitive, had reached the ruler of the island and done their work. Dara prayed for a place in his dominions to hide his head in for some time; but the Rao could not afford to offend the imperialists, especially as their rapid approach was noised abroad. He, however, harboured Dara for two days and then escorted him to the northern boundary of his island, whence Dara crossed the Greater Rann and reached the southern coast of Sindh (beginning of May), with his retinue still further diminished.\*

Here, too, Dara found his path closed in the east and north by his rival's forethought and genius for combination. Aurangzib had sent Khalilullah Khan, his governor of the Panjab, down to Bhakkar, to prevent Dara's marching further up the Indus, and he had posted men to close the eastern route to Jasalmir. Jai Singh also had warned the imperial officers in Lower Sindh to be on the alert.

After crossing the Rann, Dara found Badin held by a thousand imperialists under Qubad Khan, and he had to give up the hope of entering that village to refresh his men and animals after their terrible hardships in crossing the vast salt marsh. Aurangzib's

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\* A. N. 410-411; Bernier 89—91; H. A., Paris MS. 97a, 100b—101b; Ishwardas, 44a.

local officers and Jai Singh's advanced detachments were converging on the prey from north, east and south-east. Only one path of escape still remained open : Dara turned to the north-west, crossed the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to flee to Persia by way of Qandahar. On the bank of the Indus even Firuz Miwati's love of homeland prevailed over his constancy ; he left his master's hopelessly lost cause\* and set off to join Aurangzib.

*§ 3. Jai Singh's pursuit of Dara through Gujarat and Cutch.*

We now turn to the pursuers. Jai Singh reached Mairta on 20th March, six days behind Dara, and there learnt the true route of his flight and immediately set out southwards after him by way of Jalor and Sirohi. On the way, one march beyond Sirohi, he was joined by Jaswant Singh and his Rathor army (31st March), and then, "in order not to allow Dara time to gain composure at Ahmadabad," the imperialists pushed on, marching from 16 to 20 miles a day, "in spite of scarcity of water, want of fodder, and exhaustion of the horses and transport-cattle." Reaching Sidhpur on 5th April, they learnt that Dara had been refused entrance into Ahmadabad and had turned aside towards Cutch.

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\* Paris MS. 104, 108a, 102a; A. N. 411.

Jai Singh had before this sent letters to the princes of northern Kathiawar and Cutch urging them to bar Dara's path and seize him. Now he wrote to them again to be up and doing on the Emperor's side. The pursuing army marched on to Ahmadabad to refit. Their misery was hardly less than that of Dara. The year was one of drought in Gujerat; and this vast army of 20,000 men moving together exhausted the scanty water-supply and fodder in their path. It was summer and the forced march broke down the horses and cattle; grass was very scarce and grain so dear that even six seers of *bajra* (spiked millet) could be had for a Rupee with difficulty. To encourage the soldiers and compensate them for the heavy loss of transport cattle, cash salary was distributed among them, probably at a higher rate than usual. For this purpose Aurangzib had wisely sent up a sum of money from behind.

From Sidhpur to Ahmadabad, owing to "the utter scarcity of water both by the road-side and at the halting places," the army had to advance in three divisions, at intervals of one day's march from one another. Some delay thus occurred. Ahmadabad was reached about 11th April. Halting there for probably one day only, Jai Singh distributed  $2\frac{1}{2}$  lakhs of Rupees from the treasury to his troops to enable them to provide themselves with enough water and fodder for the journey, and on the 12th set out

again. Turning his face to the west, he arrived (22nd) in the Pathri district, west of Viramgaon, and there, getting further news of Dara's movements, advanced towards Halwad, *en route* to Cutch. On 3rd May he reached a place 6 miles from Halwad and there learnt that Dara had crossed the Rann and entered Sindh again.\*

On the 13th the pursuers reached the capital of Cutch. In this country, never trodden by Mughal troops before, as Jai Singh proudly writes, his letters and the rumour of his approach had already done their work. The Rao had refused to harbour the Emperor's enemy in his land and had personally conducted him out of it. As Jai Singh approached Bhuj, the Rao sent his son in advance to welcome the imperial general and then personally received him with due honours outside his capital (13th May), and gave him a bond solemnly asserting that Dara was not in his territory. Jai Singh halted there to learn the truth, and soon got news from the Mughal officer of Badin that Dara had reached Lower Sindh. A small detachment of 500 under two officers was at once sent ahead with orders to hasten onwards and

\* H. A., Paris MS. 94b—101b. Jalor, 25°21' N. 72°41' E., 32 miles n. e. of Bhinmal (*Ind. At. Sh.* 20 S. E.) Sidhpur, 23°55' N. 72°27' E., 63 miles north of Ahmadabad. (21 S. E.) Virangam, 23°7' N. 72°7' E., 30 miles w. of Ahmadabad; Patri, 18 miles w. of Virangam; Halwad, 23°1' N. 71°15' E. (*Ibid.* 22 N. W.)

cross the Rann, while the main army was to move more slowly at night.

*§ 4. Jai Singh crosses the Greater Rann : sufferings of his army.*

In crossing the Greater Rann the army suffered frightful privations. The Rao of Cutch had turned unfriendly, and refused to supply a guide across the salt marsh ; one of his grandsons accompanied Jai Singh, but only to the shore of it. At one halting place, six miles south of the Greater Rann, they found a few wells and the soldiers with all their exertions got out of them only some drops of water mixed with mud, with which they were forced to quench their thirst. Next day they heard of three or four wells, ten miles from their camp. The soldiers hastened thither for the precious water ; a few got it, while the others returned with their thirst unquenched after twenty miles of fruitless marching. Towards evening the army arrived at the southern edge of the Rann, at the village of Lauh (?=Luna), and began to cross the salt plain at night. The Greater Rann was here 70 miles in breadth, in the whole extent of which not a drop of drinking water could be found, nor for 10 miles beyond its northern shore.

The army plunged into this dreary wilderness at sunset. Up to midnight the moon lit up their path, and when it set, torches were kindled at every

mile's interval to guide the soldiers on. No trooper or follower was lost in this trackless plain. It was two hours after dawn when the crossing was over and the northern shore was reached. An hour afterwards they came to the village of Rahman, into the small tank of which the whole army, dying of thirst and worn out by their toilsome march, rushed. In a moment it was filled with struggling men and the water was turned into mud. In their agony of thirst, men and beasts crying for water wandered to the *nala*s of the village and drank up the putrid water, "the taste of which made life itself bitter to them." It was only after marching on till noon that they reached their camping ground at Kulabi, and got rest.\*

The experience had been most terrible: the army had marched 80 miles without halting, and that march had consisted of wading through sand over a roadless wilderness with no water to slake their thirst. The horses and camels were so worn out by their long journey and scantiness of fodder and water that, after crossing the Rann as the sun grew hotter and they were urged to travel eight more waterless miles before reaching a suitable place for camping, they fell down dead in large numbers along the road. At every halting-place, many transport-cattle lay down, never to rise again. So disastrous

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\* H. A., Paris MS. 102b-103b, 109a-110a.

was the march to them that out of Jai Singh's personal contingent of 4,000 troopers, less than a fourth had horses left for riding on. The loss was equally great in Bahadur Khan's division. Afterwards the Emperor made some amends by presenting 200 horses to the former and 100 to the latter general.

Jai Singh had thus achieved a most remarkable military feat; but he had to pay a heavy price for it. Even before reaching the Rann, the privations of the pursuing army had been very great: dearth of food had been added to the long familiar water-famine. At places grain had sold at a seer per Rupee, and even at this price there was not enough for all. "At other places no food at all could be procured." His soldiers were dead beat; and his camels, horses and other transport animals had been almost exterminated. Halting was enforced on him by outraged nature, and his progress in Sindh was slow, as the remaining cattle were unable to walk more than eight or even six miles a day.\* The southern coast of Sindh had been reached, probably near Rahim-ki-bazar, about 18th May, but it was the 29th before he arrived at Nasarpur, 7th June before he reached Hala, and the 11th of that month before he struck the Indus near "the river of Siwistan." Here he learnt that Dara had crossed

\* H. A. Paris MS., 103b—104a, 106a, 108a; A.N. 433.

over to the right bank of the Indus and entered Siwistan, intending to go to Qandahar with the help of the Maghasi tribe.

Jai Singh's task was done; the enemy was no longer on the Indian soil. So, he wrote to the Emperor asking to be recalled to Court,—“When appointing me to this service, your Majesty had told me that so long as Dara was not captured or killed, or did not quit the empire, I should not withdraw my hand from him. I have left no means untried to accomplish the first two alternatives. I have, at no place, however hard and difficult to traverse, taken thought of the scarcity of water and grain or of the predominance of lawless men. But God ordains everything, and so the third alternative has come to pass. As your Majesty has now been freed from the mischief of that [enemy], I beg to submit that, in view of the extreme privations borne by the army and the weakness of the horses and transport cattle, which have not strength enough to move more than six or eight miles a day,—I should be recalled to Court.”\*

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\* H. A., Paris MS. 105a—106a; A. N. 412. Manucci asserts that Jai Singh deliberately carried on a slack pursuit in order to leave Dara time to escape to Persia. There is nothing improbable in this suspicion, as no old general of Shah Jahan, whether Indian Muslim or Rajput, could have willingly consented to bring about the capture of his eldest son, since all knew that if they did it the result would be his murder by his victorious rival. But I can find no semblance

With the object of returning to Northern India, Jai Singh was slowly moving up the Indus towards Bhakkar, when about the middle of June he received the startling news that Dara had been captured on the 9th of that month and that the imperial generals must hurry on to take charge of the prisoner.\*

### § 5. *Dara hesitates to flee to Persia.*

We left Dara in Sivistan bent on making his escape to Qandahar and Persia. In the trans-Indus country he was attacked and plundered by the Chandi tribe† and barely escaped capture at their hands by fighting desperately. The Maghasis whom he next visited were more hospitable; their headman, Mirzai Maghasi, welcomed the royal suppliant in his house and promised an escort of his men to the frontier of Qandahar, only twelve marches off. But Dara's women were utterly opposed to leaving India and entrusting their lives to

of slackness in the pursuit, that is not satisfactorily accounted for by the utter exhaustion of the troops and loss of transport, so graphically described in Jai Singh's letters to his master.

\* *H. A.*, Paris MS. 108a; *A. N.* 414-415.

† *A. N.*, 412, has "the country of Chand Khan" or 'of Jandban' according to a different reading. Khafi Khan, ii. 82, has Jawian. Jai Singh's letter has Rukhandia, (Paris MS. 105b.) I get the correct name of the tribe from Masson's *Kalat*, 334. "The Pat of Shikarpur, [between Kach Gandava and Shikarpur] separates the lands of the Maghazzis, subjects of Kalat, from those of the Chandi tribe, dependent on Sind."

the savage Baluches or their honour to the Persian king. His beloved wife, Nadira Banu Begam, was seriously ill, and the privations of a journey through the desolate Bolan Pass and the inhospitable hills beyond up to Qandahar, would have killed her. Others of his party, too, needed some days' rest after the fatigue and hardships of the terrible two and a half months' ceaseless flight through desert and salt marsh in summer heat,\* before another and more terrible journey could be undertaken.

The last glimmering sparks of ambition also influenced Dara to linger in India. He wanted to make another effort before finally giving up the contest for the throne. His plan was to take the armed help of any friendly Baluch chieftain, relieve the fort of Bhakkar which was gallantly holding out under his eunuch Basant against Aurangzib's forces, deposit his treasure and women in that island fortress, and then march into Afghanistan from the south, secure the adhesion of its imperial governor (once his partisan), and finally with a fresh army at his back enter India again through the Khaibar Pass and try to wrest the crown of Delhi with fair hope of success.†

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\* "The Afghans have a proverb. 'The sun of Sind will turn a white man black, and is sufficiently powerful to roast an egg.'..... The mountain tribes say of Sindh, '*Duzak ast*,' it is pandemonium." (Postans's *Sindh*, 11 and 14.)

† A. N. 412; H. A., Paris MS. 105a and b; Bernier, 94-96;

Dara, therefore, changed his mind, and looked about for a chieftain in that neighbourhood who would give him a safe shelter and the services of his clansmen. Such a friend he hoped to find in Malik Jiwan, the zamindar of Dadar, a place nine miles east of the Indian end of the Bolan Pass. Years ago this Afghan chief had offended against the State and been sent by the governor of Multan, bound in chains, to Delhi, where Shah Jahan had sentenced him to be trampled to death by an elephant. Dara, then at the height of his father's favour, had been interested in the case by one of his servants, and had successfully begged the condemned man's life and liberty from the Emperor. He now looked for Jiwan's gratitude in his own need. Giving early notice of his coming, he reached Dadar under the guidance of Ayub, a servant sent by Jiwan in advance. Two miles from the fort the chief himself welcomed his honoured guest and patron, and took him to his house, showing him every respect and care (probably 6th June).

### *§ 6. Death of Dara's wife.*

On the way to Dadar the greatest of all misfortunes had overtaken Dara. His wife Nadira Banu, who had been long ailing of diarrhoea, and

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Masum, 139a; *Storia*, i. 347. K. K. (ii. 83) supports Bernier by saying that Dara wanted to contest the throne again.

was heart-broken at the loss of her eldest son, succumbed to hardship and want of medicine and rest. She was a daughter of Prince Parwiz and grand-daughter of the great Akbar on both sides of her parentage, and had borne her husband all his three sons and one daughter. Dara was frantic with grief at losing his constant companion and counsellor in weal and woe. "The world grew dark in his eyes. He was utterly bewildered. His judgment and prudence were entirely gone." "Death was painted in his eyes. He became helpless and weak through intense grief. Everywhere he saw only destruction (staring him in the face), and losing his senses became utterly heedless of his own affairs."

In spite of the warnings of his son and followers, Dara, stupefied with grief, entered Jiwan's house, wishing to spend there the three days of mourning, instead of at once marching towards the Persian frontier. His wife's last wish had been that her body should be laid in the soil of Hindustan. So, after two days he despatched her corpse to Lahor, in charge of Khwajah Maqul, to be buried in the graveyard of the renowned saint Mian Mir, his own spiritual guide. By a supreme act of folly he sent his most devoted officer, Gul Muhammad, with all the seventy troopers still left at his side, to escort the coffin. In a fit of magnanimity which can be ascribed only to utter despair and apathy to his

own future, he left to his companions free choice between returning to their homes and accompanying him to Persia. None, he said, would be forced to go into exile and peril for his sake. [Kambu, 23a.] Thus it happened that no devoted officer or brave captain, not even a single common soldier of his own, now remained with Dara. He became utterly helpless and dependent on his host's fidelity.

§ 7. *Dara is treacherously made prisoner by Malik Jiwan.*

And too soon was he to learn the strength of an Afghan's gratitude or faith when opposed to cupidity. On 9th June, when Dara began the march towards the Bolan Pass, the treacherous Jiwan with his wild clansmen surrounded the party, captured the rich prize and brought them back to his village. Against these human "wolves and robbers" of the desert, the few eunuchs and servants who still followed Dara could offer no defence. Only his second son, the lad Sipihr Shukoh, gallantly struck some blows for freedom, but he was overpowered, his arms were pinioned behind his back, and the party was dragged back to their host's house, now their prison.\*

Malik Jiwan, with his greed sharpened by the

\* For the capture of Dara, Masum, 139b—142a; A. N. 412—414, 419; Kambu, 22b-23a; K. K., ii. 83-84; *Storia* i. 347—351; Bernier, 95-96; H. A. Paris MS. 108 (dates).

hope of reward from Aurangzib, sent fast couriers with the news of the capture to Bahadur Khan and Jai Singh, who had reached the left bank of the Indus near Siwistan. But they had learnt of the event earlier from their agent Qazi Inayetullah, whom they had sent to instigate the zamindars of the Bhakkar district against Dara. They at once hastened forward, leaving their camp and baggage behind, and making a forced march through mid-summer heat and raging simoom. Near Bhakkar they crossed over the Indus to the right bank (20th June) and pushed an advanced detachment on to bring the captives away, while the two generals marched more slowly behind. On the 23rd Dara, with his son and two daughters, was delivered by Jiwan to Bahadur Khan, and the imperialists set out on their return. The fallen prince was speechless with despair and utterly dazed by calamity; he consented to everything that his captors suggested. They made him write a letter to the eunuch Basant, ordering him to give up to the imperialists the fort of Bhakkar with Dara's property and family lodged there, and sent the eunuch Maqul to carry it as a proof of Dara's ruin.

### § 8. *Captive Dara is brought to Delhi.*

The pursuers, at last successful after more than three months' chase through desert and jungle, in

summer heat and sand-storm, began their return march to Delhi, carefully guarding the prisoners. The Indus was recrossed above Bhakkar on 28th June. Passing over the rain-swollen rivers of the Land of Five Waters with due caution for their important charge, they arrived outside Delhi\* on 23rd August, 1659.

The first news that Aurangzib received of the downfall of his rival, was on 2nd July, from Malik Jiwan's letter forwarded by the faujdar of Bhakkar. He read the letter out in open Court. "But so great was his control over his emotions, that he did not go into exultation over it, and rarely referred to the capture, nor did he order the imperial band to play the music of victory." The true reason of his moderation was that the news seemed too good to be true. But when, on 15th July, Bahadur Khan's despatch arrived, reporting that he had taken charge of the captive, there was no longer room for doubt. Rejoicings were ordered in Court, "to inform the public, who were still sceptical about Dara's capture."<sup>†</sup>

On arriving outside Delhi the miserable prince and his son were handed over to Nazar Beg, a slave

\* H. A. Paris MS. 108b, 107, and Ben. MS. 35b-36a (for the removal of Dara to Delhi). Paris MS. 2b-3a (Aurangzib's instructions to Jai Singh about guarding the prisoner). A. N. 418, 419, 430.

† A. N. 414-419; Masum, 142a; Kambu, 23b.

sent by Aurangzib to work his purpose on them. The Emperor ordered that the captive should be paraded through the capital in order to let the people see with their own eyes that it was he and none else, so that in future no counterfeit Dara might raise his head in the provinces and by winning the support of the credulous create disturbances against the Government.

§ 9. *Dara in chains paraded through Delhi with insult.*

On 29th August the degrading parade was held. To complete his humiliation, Dara was seated in an uncovered *hawda* on the back of a small female elephant covered with dirt. By his side was his second son, Sipihr Shukoh, a lad of fourteen; and behind them with a naked sword sat their gaoler, the slave Nazar Beg, whose heart shrank from no act of cruelty or bloodshed at the bidding of his master. The captive heir to the richest throne in the world, the favourite and pampered son of the most magnificent of the Great Mughals, was now clad in a travel-tainted dress of the coarsest cloth, with a dark dingy-coloured turban, such as only the poorest wear, on his head, and no necklace or jewel adorning his person. His feet were chained, though the hands were free. Exposed to the full blaze of an August sun, he was taken through the

scenes of his former glory and splendour. In the bitterness of disgrace he did not raise his head, nor cast his glance on any side, but sat "like a crushed twig." Only once did he look up, when a poor beggar from the road-side cried out, "O Dara ! when you were master, you always gave me alms ; today I know well thou hast naught to give." The appeal touched the prisoner ; he raised his hand to his shoulder, drew off his wrapper and threw it to the beggar.

If Aurangzib had wished to make Dara ridiculous to the public, the result proved the contrary. The pity of the citizens swept every other feeling away. Dara had been popular with the lower orders for his magnificent display and lavish charity, and now all classes were moved to sympathy at the sight of fallen greatness. Bernier, an eye-witness of the scene, writes, "The crowd assembled was immense ; and everywhere I observed the people weeping, and lamenting the fate of Dara in the most touching language...From every quarter I heard piercing and distressing shrieks,...men, women, and children wailing as if some mighty calamity had happened to themselves." But not a hand was raised in rescue, for, the prisoner was girt round by squadrons of cavalry clad in shining steel, with drawn swords in their hands, and mounted archers with arrows placed ready in their

bows, led by Bahadur Khan on an elephant. In this manner the ignominious procession entered the New City or Shahjahanabad by the Lahor gate, traversed the whole length of it, through Chandni Chawk and Sadullah Khan's Bazar, by the foot of the fort, till it passed out to the suburb of Khizirabad in Old Delhi. There Dara was lodged in the Khawaspura mansion, amidst a strong guard, to await sentence.\*

### § 10. *Dara sentenced to death as a heretic.*

That evening his fate was the subject of a debate in the Emperor's Hall of Private Audience. Danishmand Khan pleaded for his life; but Shaista Khan, Muhammad Amin Khan, Bahadur Khan, and Hakim Daud demanded his death for the good of Church and State. The malignant influence of his younger sister Raushanara was thrown into the scale against Dara, and her clamours silenced the feeble voice of mercy in a Court where most ministers shaped their opinions after their master's inclinations. The pliant theologians in the Emperor's pay signed a decree that Dara deserved death on the ground of infidelity and deviation from Islamic orthodoxy. "The pillars of the Canonical Law and Faith apprehended many kinds of disturbance from

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\* *Storia*, i. 354-355; Bernier, 98-99 (an eye-witness); *A. N.* 431; Khafi Khan, ii. 86; Ishwardas, 44b-45a; Kambu, 23b; (for Dara's public parade).

his life. So, the Emperor, both out of necessity to protect the Faith and Holy Law, and also for *reasons of State*, considered it unlawful to allow Dara to remain alive any longer as a destroyer of the public peace." Thus does the official history published under Aurangzib's authority justify this act of political murder.

The doomed prince's agent tried hard to save his life by running to different mediators, but in vain.\* Dara learnt of his fate and made a last appeal to Aurangzib's pity. He wrote, "My Lord Brother and Emperor! the desire of kingship is not at all left in my mind. Be (it) blessed to you and your sons. The plan of slaying me which you are cherishing in your heart is unjust. If you only grant me a house fit for (my) residence and one young handmaid out of my own handmaids to wait on me, I shall employ myself in praying for your (good) in the retired life of a pardoned man."

On the margin of the petition Aurangzib wrote in his own hand in Arabic, "You first acted as a usurper, and you were a mischief-maker."† For Dara there could be no pardon from Aurangzib. For more than sixteen years Dara had been a blighting

\* A. N. 432; Khafi Khan, ii. 87; Masum, 142b; Bernier, 100-101; *Storia*, i. 356.

† British Museum, Or. MS. Addl. 16881, f. 77a; Addl. 26,240 f. 55; I.O.L. 3301, f. 29b.

shadow on Aurangzib's life : he had robbed his younger brother of the sunshine of their father's favour ; he had thwarted his plans and backbiten him at the imperial Court ; his had been the secret influence behind the throne that accounted for Shah Jahan's attitude of coldness and undeserved censure towards the able viceroy of Multan and the Deccan ; he had intrigued with Bijapur and Golkonda in open opposition to Aurangzib in the wars against them sanctioned by the Emperor himself ; every enemy of Aurangzib had found a ready patron in Dara ; Dara's officers had insulted and calumniated Prince Aurangzib without any punishment from their master ; his sons had monopolised all the favours of Shah Jahan, leaving none for Aurangzib's offspring. All these Aurangzib had borne with patience and even with affected humility for sixteen long years. Now at last he had got his chance of revenge ; and he was not the man to give it up.

A riot on the 30th precipitated the end of Dara. The populace of Delhi had marked the traitor Malik Jiwan in yesterday's procession ; but in the presence of the strong escort they could not vent their indignation except by cursing and pelting at him. This ungrateful wretch and perjured host had been appointed a Commander of One Thousand Horse and raised to the peerage under the title of Bakhtiyar Khan, as the price of his treachery. On thirtieth

August, as he was going to Court with his Afghan followers, the populace of Delhi, instigated by Haibat, a gentleman trooper (*ahadi*) of the imperial army, and joined by the ruffians, beggars and other desperadoes of the city and workmen from every lane and bazar, besides Dara's friends, mobbed the party. From abuse they quickly passed to hurling stones, clods of earth, and sweepings at the traitors, and finally growing bolder assailed them with sticks. From the house-tops on both sides the women showered ashes and pots of filth on the heads of the Afghans and spectators mingled in *melee* below. The tumult and noise were very great. Some of Jiwan's followers were slain outright, and some wounded; and if the prefect of the city police had not come to the rescue with his men, not one of the Afghans could have escaped from the crowd with life. The newly created Khan, going to his first audience at Court, was brought away in safety under cover of a wall of shields formed over his head.\*

### § 11. *Murder of Dara.*

Immediately Aurangzib passed the order for Dara's execution, and entrusted the task to Nazar Beg and some other slaves under the supervision

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\* For the riot, K. K. ii. 86; A. N. 432; Bernier, 99; *Aurangnamah* gives new details.

of Saif Khan. Early in the night (30th August) the wretches entered Dara's prison in order to separate Sipihr Shukoh from their victim before attempting the deed of blood. On their hideous features and relentless eyes Dara read his doom. Starting up he approached them, and falling on his knees cried out, "You have come to murder me!" They pretended that their order was only to remove Sipihr Shukoh to another place. The boy, too, knelt down, nestling close against his father's body. Nazar with a malevolent glance bade him get up. In madness and despair Sipihr began to weep and clung to Dara's legs. Father and son hugged each other tightly, with loud cries of grief. The slaves grew more threatening in their tone, and then tried to drag the boy away by the hand. At this Dara wiped his own tears and calmly appealed to the slaves to carry his entreaty to his brother to leave Sipihr Shukoh with him. But they scornfully replied, "We cannot be anybody's messenger. We have only to carry out our orders." Then with a sudden rush they tore away the boy from his father's arms by sheer force, took him to a side-room, and prepared to despatch Dara. That prince, knowing that his end was near, had already prepared for a last desperate struggle. He had secured a small penknife and concealed it in his pillow. Now he tore the cover open, grasped the knife, and attacked the slave who was advancing

to seize him. This small instrument was driven with such force into the wretch's side that it stuck fast in the bones. Dara tugged at it, but in vain. Then he flung himself blindly on them, dealing blows with his fist right and left. But the slaves were accustomed to such bloody work; they fell on him in a body and seized and overpowered him. All this time Sipihr Shukoh's agonised shrieks were reaching his father's ears. A minute after the room grew still; the daggers of the slaves finished the work; the struggle ended in a pool of blood.

### § 12. *Dara's grave.*

The severed head was sent to Aurangzib, to satisfy him that his rival was really dead, and that no fraud or substitution of victims had taken place. By Aurangzib's order the corpse was placed on an elephant, paraded through the streets of the city a second time, and then buried in a vault under the dome of the tomb of Humayun, without the customary washing and dressing of the body, without a funeral procession following it. Beside him lie not only that royal ancestor, but also two of his grand-uncles, the younger sons of Akbar.\*

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\* For the murder and burial of Dara, Masum, 143b—145b (most graphic account, followed by me); Bernier, 102; Tavernier, i. 354; *Storia*, i. 358; Kambu, 24a; A. N. 432-433; Khafi Khan, ii. 87 (all very brief.) The popular story of the insult done to his severed head by Aurangzib, rests solely on the doubtful authority of Bernier and Manucci. Masum says,— "When the head was carried to Aurangzib

Two centuries rolled by, and then the dynasty of the Great Mughals closed in a still bloodier scene. On 22nd September 1857, not far from the spot where the mangled remains of Dara Shukoh were laid in earth, Princes Mirza Mughal, Mirza Quraish Sultan, and Mirza Abu Bakht, the sons and grandson of the last Emperor of Delhi, and one of them his chosen heir, were shot dead in cold blood by a foreign soldier, as devoid of principle as of pity, while they were vainly protesting their innocence and crying for an inquiry into their past conduct.\* The bodies of the last of the legitimate Timurids were flung like carcases on the terrace of the Police Office and exposed to the public gaze, as Dara's had been. In brothers' blood did Aurangzib mount to the throne, and in the blood of his children's children did the royal name pass away from his race.

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he remarked, 'As I did not look at this infidel's face in his lifetime, I do not wish to do it now.' " (145b). *Aurangnamah* gives full details, some new.

\* "Unscrupulous, unprincipled...[Hodson] was a man without fear, if not without reproach...In slaying them as he did he was guilty of an outrage against humanity." Holmes's *Indian Mutiny* (4th ed.), 372, 377. "The spirit of the condottiere now came into play [in Hodson's mind.] A more brutal or a more unnecessary outrage was never committed...Not a single item of evidence had been adduced to substantiate the charge [that the princes had instigated the massacre of Europeans in May.]" Malleson's *Indian Mutiny* (ed. of 1879), ii. 77, 80. With their dying breath the princes vainly appealed to Hodson to make a *tahqiqat* (investigation) into their conduct, before shooting them.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### THE END OF SULAIMAN SHUKOH.

#### § 1. *Sulaiman Shukoh hastens to return to Dara.*

Early in May 1658, Sulaiman Shukoh, then pondering on how he should force or turn Shuja's wall from the hill to the river at Mungir, received a summons from his father to return quickly to him, as Aurangzib and Murad had overwhelmed Jaswant in Malwa and were marching on Agra. A peace was hastily patched up with Shuja, through the exertions of Jai Singh, and the imperial army soon set out on its return. On 2nd June when he reached Kora, 105 miles west of Allahabad, fast couriers brought to him the fatal news of his father's crushing defeat at Samugarh five days earlier. A letter from Shah Jahan sent with them urged him to make a rapid march with his army to join his father at Delhi. Dara, too, wrote to the imperial officers requesting them to accompany his son. But it was in vain. The news of Dara's downfall produced the greatest excitement in his son's army; the soldiers were distracted or openly hostile to the fallen cause; the road to Delhi was long and would soon be blocked by Aurangzib's men. What was Sulaiman Shukoh to do? The youthful prince, bewildered by the

calamity, took counsel with Jai Singh. The Rajput general advised him either to push on to Delhi or to fall back on Allahabad and there wait within its sheltering walls for news of his father. For himself, Jai Singh openly refused to follow the losing side any longer; he would go away with his troops and join the new Emperor. The hapless Sulaiman waited another day and held a second consultation. Dilir Khan, the Afghan general, advised him to cross the Ganges at Allahabad, go to Shahjahanpur, the home of a large Afghan colony, and there raising an army of his clansmen wait for fresh developments. Only on such conditions was he willing to accompany the prince. Sulaiman had no help but to obey. So, he ordered a retreat to Allahabad (4th June). But meantime Jai Singh had convinced Dilir Khan of the folly of such unselfish devotion; these two generals with their contingents parted company with the prince at Kora, and so also did all the other imperial officers and many newly enlisted troops\* whose home was in this *doab* country. Only 6,000 men, less than a third of Sulaiman's army, accompanied him in the retreat to Allahabad, under the guidance of his guardian, the faithful Baqi Beg. While he should have flown on wings to his father's side,

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\* *Masum*, 147a-148b; *A. N.* 168—170. Manucci says that Sulaiman conspired to murder Jai Singh and Dilir Khan at an interview (*Storia*, i. 284—287).

if he was to reach him at all, he wasted a week's time here in distraction, daily consultation, and the maturing of conflicting plans. He was burdened with a harem of women and "furniture and articles of pomp beyond imagination." Couches of gold, chairs of gold and silver, jewellery, gold plate, rich clothing,—in short every gift that a loving father and a doting grandfather could bestow on him on his first campaign, accompanied him and impeded his march. He could not carry them and yet he was loath to leave them. Some advised him to seize and govern the country from Allahabad to Patna and there build up an independent power. Others counselled him to retreat to Patna and by joining Shuja raise a strong force against Aurangzib. But the Sayyids of Barha, who were among Dara's chief followers, pressed him to make a wide loop round Delhi, march by the northern side of the Ganges, through their home the Middle *Doab*, and then cross the Ganges and the Jamuna at the foot of the hills, near Nagina and Saharanpur, in order to reach Dara in the Panjab without fear of interception by Aurangzib's forces.

§ 2. *Sulaiman marches from Allahabad to Hardwar.*

This last course Sulaiman Shukoh adopted. Leaving his surplus property, heavy baggage, stores,

and harem attendants in the fort of Allahabad in charge of his father's trusty servant Sayyid Qasim of Barha, he crossed the Ganges with light kit (14th June), passed by Lucknow and Moradabad, and rapidly moved on Nagina, where he plundered the Government treasury of two lakhs of Rupees and some private property also. But numbers of soldiers deserted him daily, and his following rapidly dwindled from the 6,000 men who had left Allahabad with him. Even for his diminished numbers he could not secure a crossing over the Ganges to the right bank. "At every ferry.....the men took their boats to the other side at the report of his approach, and he could not cross. So he was forced to proceed further up the river towards Hardwar in the hope of crossing with the help of the local zamindars." At Chandi, situated in the Srinagar State opposite Hardwar, he halted for some days, and sent his officer Bhawanidas to the Rajah of Srinagar to beg his help.\*

But in these few days of enforced waiting his path was completely barred by strong forces of the enemy and his further progress rendered impossible. As early as the middle of July, Aurangzib from Delhi had sent an army under Shaista Khan to the Hardwar side to oppose Sulaiman Shukoh's attempt to cross the Ganges. On 24th July another

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\* A. N. 125-126, 148, 170—173; Masum, 148b—151a.

detachment was sent under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to guard the right bank of the Jamuna and prevent Sulaiman's flight across that river.\* Thus the young prince's path was closed on the south and the west; he was cut off from his father and the Panjab.

While Shaista Khan was advancing to the right bank of the Ganges near the hills, a very enterprising officer, Fidai Khan, fired by the new honours and favours received from the Emperor, outstripped him, reached the ferry of Puth, south-east of Hapur, in the expectation that Sulaiman would naturally cross the Ganges there in his westward movement from Lucknow. Here he learnt from a letter of the Rajah of Kumaun, the neighbour and therefore the enemy of the Rajah of Srinagar, that the fugitive was marching northwards to Hardwar in order to cross the river there with the help of the latter Rajah. Fidai Khan by hard riding covered 160 miles in one day and reached the right bank of the river at Hardwar in the afternoon. Sulaiman with several thousand men occupied the opposite bank, wishing to cross there that very afternoon. Only 50 troopers had been able to keep up with Fidai Khan in his strenuous march. But his appearance was enough. At once the rumour spread that this bank was held

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\* A. N. 148, 159-160; 126 (Khan-i-Dauran sent to besiege Allahabad); Aqil Khan, 71.

by the vanguard of the imperial army and that their main body under Shaista Khan was approaching. Sulaiman Shukoh lost heart, and durst not force a passage across. The precious moment was lost, and he had to turn back from the Ganges towards the Srinagar hills in search of an asylum.\* His best followers, the Sayyids of Barha, who had their homes in the Middle Doab, round Sambal, feared for the safety of their wives and children and refused to enter the hills.

His most faithful officer and chief manager of affairs, Baqi Beg, a Badakhshani, who had served Dara from his boyhood, died on the way. At the death of such an experienced able and resourceful leader, confusion fell on Sulaiman's party. The master-mind which had firmly held the men together was gone, and the party broke up into flying atoms. "At the death of such a faithful follower, utter despair and confusion overtook Sulaiman." More than half the party with him fled back to their homes. His force was reduced to 2,000 men.†

### *S 3. Sulaiman flees to the Garhwal Rajah.*

In despair of making his way to the Panjab, Sulaiman had appealed to the mercy of Prithwi Singh, the Rajah of Srinagar, and marched to his

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\* Aqil Khan, 71—72. *Path*, 28°41' N. 78°15' E., 8 miles s. of Garh Muktesar. (*Ind. Atlas*, 49 N. E.).

† Masum, 152a; *A. N.* 174.

frontier. Here the Rajah's men met him and guided him into their country. Four marches from the capital, the Rajah himself waited on the august guest and offered him a refuge in Srinagar on condition of his being accompanied by his family and a few servants only; but his army, horses and elephants were to be dismissed, as the country was poor and the roads bad.

The miserable suppliant hesitated before consenting to render himself utterly powerless and become absolutely dependent on his strange host. He spent a week in meditation and consultation. But there was no escape for him. The path to Hindustan was effectually closed. At Hardwar, Sambal, and the Middle *Doab*, strong forces of the enemy vigilantly waited for him; and a fourth force was already on the march to invest Allahabad, while Aurangzib himself had entered the Panjab. A dash to the plains would only make Sulaiman Shukoh fall into the jaws of death.

At last he made up his mind to accept the Rajah's terms. Those of his servants who wanted to desert him but were deterred from the attempt by the roads out of the hills being guarded by the Rajah's men, now advised Sulaiman not to trust his life to the hill-people, but to return to Allahabad. To lend support to this counsel, they showed him a forged letter purporting to have come from his

father's devoted commandant of Allahabad and reporting that Shuja had arrived there with a vast army. Sulaiman, therefore, changed his mind, thanked the Rajah for his offer of hospitality, gave him some presents, and returned to Nagina. There all the traitors fled away, leaving only seven hundred men with him.

Despair seized Sulaiman Shukoh as he discovered the real motive of his faithless advisers. He decided to return to Srinagar. But his troubles were only beginning. Next day, when he set his face towards the hills, "all the servants of the various departments and stores,—foragers, camel-drivers, and elephant-men,—fled away. From 700 men his train sank to 200 only. With such a diminished retinue and transport it was impossible for him to supply conveyances to the ladies of his harem, who numbered two hundred. The enemy were close behind; there was no time to be lost. So, he made up his mind to distribute his women to anybody who would take them. At the very proposal these "ladies of spotless honour" who "had so long been kept in seclusion with care, became frantic with grief, plucking their hairs out and slapping their own cheeks." But misfortune is pitiless. Some of the women were given away to new masters, many others were abandoned, and only the highest ladies of his harem accompanied the prince on the few

passing through many intermediaries ever reached Aurangzib. For years afterwards wild tales came to India of Shuja having gone to Persia; and sharpers counterfeiting his son Buland Akhtar appeared in different parts of India. One such was arrested near Allahabad as late as 1699. A false Shuja headed a rising near Murang (Purnia) in 1669 and another in the Yusufzai country in 1674.\*

To remove the uncertainty, Aurangzib desired that Mir Jumla, the new viceroy of Bengal, should after conquering Assam lead an army into Arracan to recover Shuja's family if possible. [Talish, 25.] When Shaista Khan, Mir Jumla's successor, conquered Chatgaon from the Maghs (1666), he evidently got no certain news of Shuja, or it would have got into the official history. The European traders who had free access to Arracan were likely to be best informed, and I believe that the truth lies in what they have recorded of Shuja's fate.

From this source we learn, "Many dwellers in Arracan, Mogul and Pathan,...showed themselves inclined towards him [Shuja]. He planned an outbreak intending to slay the king and take his kingdom, and then advance once more to test his fortune in Bengal." The king of Arracan heard of the plot and "planned the assassination of Shah Shuja. Shah Shuja with a few men fled into the

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\* M. A. 405 and 84. Orme's *Fragments*, p. 50.

jungle. The Maghs....pursued the poor prince,... cutting his body into pieces." This story is based on the report of a Dutch merchant named Jan Tak to Aurangzib. The official records of the Dutch factory first state that on 7th February, 1661, when Shuja's house was surrounded by the Arracanese, he set fire to it and escaped with his family and followers towards Tippera. But they finally take a different view and assert, "Although there can be no certainty, the fact is that he was killed in the first outbreak," and that his followers concealed the fact and spread the false news that he had fled into the jungle. [Storia, i. 374-376.]

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## CHAPTER XXV.

### GRAND ENTHRONEMENT OF AURANGZIB

#### § 1. *The extraordinary grandeur of Aurangzib's Coronation.*

Of all the coronations of Muhammadan rulers of India, that of Aurangzib was undoubtedly the grandest. True, Shah Jahan was the most magnificent of the Great Mughals. But when he ascended the throne in 1628, he had not yet made the Peacock Throne nor acquired the Kohinur diamond; and his chaste white marble palaces, set with many coloured stones, which still excite our admiration at Agra and Delhi, were yet to be. All these were present at Aurangzib's accession.\*

Another circumstance lent greater lustre to the son's coronation than to the father's. During the year before his enthronement, Aurangzib had gained a series of hard-fought victories over his rivals and made himself the undisputed sovereign of India. Of his three brothers, Murad Bakhsh was a close prisoner in his dungeons, Shuja had been defeated at Khajwa and Dara Shukoh at Ajmir, and both were in course of helpless flight. The

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\* Description based on *A. N.* 347—349, 351—354, 362—370, 388—398, 405; *K. K.* ii. 76—80, 86—88.

coronation that followed these grand victories naturally combined all the pomp and splendour of an oriental enthronement with the solemnity and grandeur of a Roman triumph.

The essential element of a Muhammadan coronation is the act of the king's *sitting on the throne*; hence its Arabic name *jalus* or 'sitting.' No high-priest has to anoint the new sovereign's forehead with holy oil or sandal-paste, as among the ancient Jews and Hindus, nor place on his brows a diadem, as is the practice with Christians. The Muslim sovereign mounts the throne fully dressed, with a cloth turban bound round his head. Diamonds and jewels glitter on that turban; an aigrette (*jigha*) with nodding tassels of pearls adorns the front part of it; but no crown of the type familiar to Europe from ancient times is necessarily worn by him. The Persian sovereigns, however, put on a crown of this pattern, with a narrow base and wide indented top.

No Muslim coronation is complete unless the new sovereign's name and titles are publicly proclaimed from the pulpit (*khutba*) and coins bearing his name are stamped (*sikka*). To these must be added, in most cases, his assumption of a title different from that he held as a prince, the offering of presents and largess by the nobles and officers, and the granting of titles, promotions and bounties

by the new sovereign. Large sums are given away in charity to scholars, holy men, and beggars. Music, dance and illuminations at night complete the festivities.\*

The Court astrologers were of opinion that Sunday, 5th June, 1659, was a most auspicious day, and all arrangements were made for Aurangzib's enthronement on that day. A year earlier he had gained the crown of Delhi, but he was then too busy pursuing his rivals to hold a grand coronation, and only a hurried and curtailed ceremony had been gone through on 21st July, 1658. All the celebration and rejoicing had been left over for the present occasion.

### § 2. *Emperor's grand procession through Delhi.*

On 12th May took place the Emperor's grand entry into Delhi, after the glorious campaigns of Khajwa and Ajmir,—though a march through the streets is no necessary part of a Muslim coronation festival. Early in the morning the imperial procession started from Khizirabad, a suburb of Delhi, where the Emperor had encamped on his return from the war. First marched the band, making a

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\* Weighing the king against gold and silver, which were given away as alms, was a Hindu practice which our Mughal Emperors adopted and even the orthodox Aurangzib countenanced. It took place every year at the two birthdays, solar and lunar, of the sovereign, but was no part of the coronation celebrations.

deafening clangour of kettle-drums, tambourines, big brass drums, brazen pipes and trumpets. Next came a long file of huge elephants, richly caparisoned in gold and silver, their housings being of embroidered velvet and cloth of gold, thick set with flashing gems, with golden bells and silver chains dangling from their bodies. Each carried on its back an imperial standard of polished balls slung from a pole, as ensigns of Turkish royalty. Then were led forth a troop of choice horses, of the Persian and Arab breeds, their saddles decorated with gold, and their bridles set with jewels; behind them were marshalled female elephants and dromedaries. Then marched dense columns of infantry consisting of musketeers and rocketmen, carrying flashing blades. Behind them and girt round by a vast crowd of nobles and ministers, came the loftiest elephant of the royal stables, with a golden throne strapped to its back, on which sat the observed of all observers, the undisputed lord and master of all he surveyed, Aurangzib Alamgir Ghazi, Padishah of Hind.

### § 3. *Appearance of Aurangzib.*

He was a few months over forty. Long years of campaigning in many lands had saved him from the stolid rotundity which bespeaks the indolent and self-indulgent life of so many Eastern princes. His

frame was somewhat thin, but tall and symmetrical. His face was rather long than round ; it had lost the fulness that marked it in early youth, but had not yet acquired the sharpness of nose and chin, the hollowness of cheek, the beetling eye-brows and long grey beard which European visitors to his Court noted on it thirty years afterwards. Under that broad, unwrinkled forehead beamed two cold piercing eyes, whose serenity no danger or fear could disturb, no weakness or pity relax.

On his right, left and rear rode his troops in due order, each division keeping its proper position. The citizens gazed with wonder on the veterans who had defeated the choicest troops of Bijapur and Golkonda, and nearer home had crushed Shuja and Dara, captured Agra fort, and made Shah Jahan a prisoner.

From the backs of the elephants handfuls of gold and silver coins were incessantly flung among the crowd right and left, as the procession moved on. In this order the imperial cortège wended its way through the bazar of Old Delhi and entered the fort by the Lahor Gate. Then all dismounted : the Emperor sat down for a while in the Halls of Public and Private Audience in succession. The nobles laid before him large sums to be given away in charity for averting evil from him. Finally, he retired to the harem.

The decoration of the two Halls of Audience for the coronation ceremony proceeded apace. A lavish display was made of all the precious things which the sovereigns of the richest empire in Asia had acquired in three generations, and all the rare articles which the most skilled artisans of home and foreign countries had made for sale.

#### *§ 4. Decoration of the Diwan-i-am.*

The ceiling and forty pillars of the *Diwan-i-am* (Hall of Public Audience) were draped in gold-embroidered velvet and cloth of gold and silver from Persia and the famous flowered brocades of Gujrat. From every arch hung polished balls set with jewels, enamelled, or of plain gold, by means of golden chains. In the middle of the Hall a space was fenced round with a golden railing. Within it, amidst the dazzling lustre of diamonds, rubies and topazes, stood the towering Peacock Throne, one of the wonders of the East. Before it was stretched a most costly canopy of state, held up by four slender columns encrusted with gems; its corners were fastened with strings of precious pearls instead of ropes. On the two sides of the throne-enclosure stood two jewelled umbrellas, with tassels of pearls hanging from them. Right and left of the imperial throne were placed two golden couches, covered with enamel work. Behind it benches of gold were

laid, and on them were displayed the Crown weapons,—jewelled swords, targes, shields, and spears. The courtyard in front of the Hall was covered with awnings of embroidered velvet borne aloft on silver poles, and similar canopies were stretched on all sides of it. Below were spread costly carpets of many coloured patterns. The outer sides of the Hall were enclosed by a silver railing. In the arena itself there was a second silver railing, forming an inner enclosure, while the outermost fence was of red painted wood. On the two wings were pitched lofty pavilions overspread with bright coverings. The door and walls of the Hall were tapestried with embroidered velvet, flowered velvet, European screens, and gold tissue from Turkey and China. The enclosures round the courtyard of the Audience Hall were furnished by the nobles from their own stores, in a befitting style, for the accommodation of their retainers.

From this the reader may guess the style in which the Hall of Private Audience (*Diwan-i-khas*) was decorated.

### § 5. *Aurangzib mounts the throne.*

The astrologers had declared 3 hours 15 minutes from sunrise as the auspicious moment. The whole Court anxiously hung on the lips of the astrologers, who keenly watched their (water) clocks

and sand-glasses. At last they gave the signal; the precious moment had arrived; the Emperor, who had been sitting dressed and ready behind a screen, entered the Hall of Public Audience and mounted the throne. At once there was a loud burst of joyous notes from the imperial band in attendance. The musicians began their songs; the nautch-girls began their dances.

An eloquent chanter mounted a lofty rostrum (*mimbar*) and in a clear ringing voice read the *khutba* or public proclamation of the Emperor's name and titles, prefaced with the praise of God and the Prophet, and followed by the names of his predecessors on the throne. As every such name fell from his lips a fresh robe of honour was bestowed on him. And when he came to the recital of the Emperor's own titles, he got a robe of cloth of gold as well as a cash reward. Trays of gold and silver coins and plates heaped over with pyramids of pearls and jewels, were showered in the Emperor's name among the assembled courtiers who picked them up as tokens of good luck.

The courtiers did homage by bowing low and raising their hands to their forehead, while they shouted 'Long live the Khalif of the Age!' The Emperor rewarded them all with robes of honour (*khilat*). The royal attendants swung round perforated flasks of scented water, and splashed the

assembled throng with liquid fragrance. Trays of betel leaf (*pan*) were distributed to all. The air was charged with the fragrance of *attar*, musk and ambergris. The smoke of burning incense and aloe wood sweetened the atmosphere.

That day new coins were struck. Shah Jahan had inscribed the Muslim confession of faith (*kalimah*) on one face of his coins; but the pious Aurangzib forbade the practice, lest the holy text should be defiled by the touch of infidels! So, his coins bore on one face a Persian couplet meaning,—

“This coin has been stamped on earth  
like the shining full moon,  
By King Aurangzib, the Conqueror  
of the World!”

The reverse bore the name of the mint-city, the year of the reign, and the Emperor's full title in the Tughra script : *Abul Muzaffar Muhi-ud-din Muhammad Aurangzib Bahadur Alamgir Padishah Ghazi*.

### § 6. *Emperor holds a Court in the harem.*

Formal letters were sent to all the provinces and cities to announce the glorious accession. In this way two hours and forty-eight minutes were spent in the Public Audience. Then he retired to the harem and held another Court there, at which the princesses, wives of nobles, and other ladies

"surrounded this Candle of the Assembly of Royalty like a swarm of moths." They offered their dutiful congratulations and scattered large quantities of gold and silver, pearl and jewel, in honour of the Emperor, while he made rich presents to them in return. His sister Raushanara Begam, who had supported him during the war of succession and watched over his interests in the harem of Shah Jahan, in opposition to her elder sister Jahanara, the partisan of Dara Shukoh, now received five lakhs of Rupees in cash and kind. Aurangzib's four daughters got 4, 2, 1.6, and 1.5 *lakhs* respectively.

Thereafter the Emperor betook himself to the Hall of Private Audience, to which only a select few had entree. Here he presented to his four sons 3, 2, 2, and 1 *lakhs* respectively. Other gifts were made to the nobles, officers, scholars, poets and musicians. Forty-eight minutes were passed here.

The poets taxed their brains to compose verses the numerical value of whose letters when added together would express the date of the accession. The most successful of these chronograms were highly rewarded and handed down to posterity.

As the Roman proprætors on assuming office declared the laws they intended to follow, so the Mughal Emperors at their accession often made changes in the established usage. Aurangzib, for instance, restored the lunar Hijera year in all public

elephants whose drivers still clung to him faithfully. The party, now reduced to two hundred souls, made a precipitate flight, covering long distances every day without daring to halt, as the enemy was close on their track. Qasim Khan, the imperial *jagirdar* of Moradabad, reached Nagina only 18 hours after Sulaiman had left it, and learning of the fugitive's route he continued the pursuit without halting there. The news of the approach of the imperialists and the rapidity of the flight dissolved Sulaiman Shukoh's party ; most of his men deserted him, and at last with his wife, a few other ladies, his foster-brother Muhammad Shah, and only seventeen followers, he reached the entrance to the hills.\* The Rajah of Srinagar gave him an asylum, promising to harbour the suppliant in spite of the danger and loss that were sure to befall him for his hospitality.

The host was all kindness and attention to his princely guest in distress. "He repaired the old and ruined palace of his ancestors, lodged the prince in

\* Masum, 151b—153b; A. N. 173—177; Khafi Khan, ii. 42 (says that the Rajah treated Sulaiman like a prisoner in greed of his gold and jewels.) Sulaiman's flight to Garhwal took place at the beginning of August, 1658, as the detachment sent by Aurangzib from Delhi on 24th July under Shaikh Mir and Dilir Khan to watch the Jamuna above Saharanpur against the fugitive, returned to Aurangzib some miles east of Rupar on the Satlej on 10th August with the report that Sulaiman had entered Srinagar. (A. N. 167)

it, and day and night served him attentively. He considered the arrival of such a prince as a divine grace, because no such event had ever happened [to his dynasty] before." The Rajah even gave his daughter in marriage to Sulaiman, in order to mingle his blood with that of the imperial house of Delhi.\*

For a year Sulaiman enjoyed peace in his rude but safe shelter. He must have been sighing for the comforts of civilised life, the luxuries of his father's Court, and the power and wealth of a ruling prince. According to Masum, his evil counsellors, —or, as is more probable, his own restless ambition prompted him to sally forth from the hills and raid a Mughal village in the plains, in the hope of re-establishing his authority and assembling his father's old retainers and other officers from the neighbouring tract. The only result of the expedition was the plunder of his all by his faithless followers and his return in naked poverty to the Garhwal hills again. [Masum, 154.]

#### *§ 4. Aurangzib invades Garhwal to secure the surrender of Sulaiman.*

Aurangzib had already warned the Rajah that, if he did not wish to see the ruin of his house, he

\* Masum, 153b, 156a.

must yield the fugitive. Prithwi Singh tried evasion and pretended that Sulaiman Shukoh had found an asylum in a neighbouring hill-State and not in Garhwal. But the falsehood failed in its object. At the end of a year, Aurangzib now triumphant over all his rivals, was free to turn to Sulaiman Shukoh. On 27th July 1659 he sent Rajah Rajrup of the Jammu hills with a party of imperial troops to influence Prithwi Singh, either by persuasion or by threat, to surrender his guest. For a year and a half the hill-Rajah struggled against temptation and fear in the sacred cause of hospitality. Reinforcements in pioneers artillery and musketeers were sent to Rajrup in October 1660.\* But a campaign among the rugged hills of Garhwal was a slow and doubtful expedient. Aurangzib therefore fell back on diplomacy. He intrigued with Prithwi Singh's all-powerful minister and virtual ruler of Garhwal, and promised him his master's throne if he brought about the capture of Sulaiman. This man, corrupted by ambition, administered to the prince a poison in the form of medicine. Sulaiman experimented with it on a cat and learnt of its deadly property. When he disclosed the plot to Prithwi Singh, the Rajah in righteous indignation cut the wretched minister to pieces. [Masum, 157b—159b.]

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\* A. N. 421, 589; Masum, 156b—157b.

Aurangzib next employed Jai Singh, his agent in all intrigues with Hindu princes. The Rajput chief wrote to Prithwi Singh professing his own extreme sorrow at the impending ruin of a Hindu ruler like him, and pressing him to give up Sulaiman as the only means of saving himself from the imperial vengeance. The Garhwal Rajah was old and refused to undertake the sin and shame of betraying an accepted refugee. But his son and heir, Medini Singh, was more worldly-minded; the hope of rewards from Delhi conquered his scruples. There was also the fear of losing their kingdom, as Aurangzib was instigating the neighbouring and rival hill-Rajahs to invade and annex Garhwal. The three Mughal generals who had invaded the country, had seized and established outposts in some parts of it and pressed the Rajah hard.\* So, Medini Singh overruled his father and decided to give Sulaiman Shukoh up to the Mughals. A submissive reply was sent to Jai Singh with a promise to obey the imperial order. On 12th December 1660 Aurangzib despatched Jai Singh's son, Kumar Ram Singh, to the foot of the hills to bring away the captive. Hearing the news, Sulaiman tried to escape over the snow to Ladak, and when pursued by the Garhwal troops he offered resistance. His foster-brother and some other companions were slain,

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\* Probably by cutting off his subjects' access to the plains.

and he himself wounded in the vain struggle for freedom against heavy odds. On 27th December he was sent down to the plains and delivered to Ram Singh,\* and on 2nd January 1661 brought to the fort of Salimgarh at Delhi.

### § 5. *Captive Sulaiman before Aurangzib.*

On 5th January the prisoner was placed before his dread uncle in the Hall of Private Audience of the Delhi palace. His youth, extreme beauty, martial fame, and present misery deeply interested the courtiers and even the ladies of the imperial harem in his fate. The eldest and most favoured grandson of Shah Jahan, he might under happier stars have one day adorned the throne of Delhi and sat on the seat of state in the very hall where he now stood as a captive in chains with a secret and ignominious death before him. As a European eye-witness describes the scene, "Many of the courtiers shed tears at the sight of this interesting young man ... The principal ladies of the Court,...concealed behind a lattice-work, were also greatly moved. Aurangzib spoke to him with apparent kindness, to relieve him of the fear of a death-sentence, 'Be comforted; no harm shall befall you. You shall be treated with tenderness. God is great, and you should put your trust in Him. Dara, your father,

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\* A. N. 600—602; Agil 105; *Storia*, i. 378—380.

was not permitted to live only because he had become a *kafir*, a man devoid of all religion.' The prince made the *salam* or sign of grateful acknowledgment...He then told the Emperor, with much self-possession, that if it were intended to give him the *pousta* to drink, he begged that he might be immediately put to death. Aurangzib promised in a solemn manner, and in a loud voice, that this drink should most certainly not be administered, and that his mind might be perfectly easy. [Bernier, 105; *Storia*, i. 380.]

### § 6. Sad end of Sulaiman.

The *pousta* is a drink made of poppy-heads crushed and soaked in water for a night. This was the potion generally given to princes confined in the fortress of Gwalior, whose heads the Emperor was deterred by public shame from taking off. A large cup of this beverage was brought to them early in the morning, and they were not given anything to eat until it was swallowed. This drink emaciated the wretched victims, who lost their strength and intellect by slow degrees, became torpid and senseless, and at length died.

But the fate that Sulaiman Shukoh had dreaded more than death itself, was meted out to him by Aurangzib in violation of his 'solemn promise.' The captive was sent to Gwalior (on 15th January)

and there ordered to be plied with the drink of opium-seeds. In this dismal State-prison the hapless prince dragged his miserable life on for a year, and finally, in May 1662, "he was sent to the next world through the exertions of his keepers." His career that had begun with so much promise and splendour was cut off at the age of thirty. On the Gwalior hill he was buried close to another princely victim of Aurangzib's ambition, and Sulaiman Shukoh and his uncle Murad Bakhsh were united in death in that unhonoured cemetery.\*

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\* Kambu, 24b; Ishwardas, 41b; Bernier, 107; *Storia*, i. 380; A. N. 603 (silent about his fate); Inayetullah's *Ahkam-i-Alamgiri*, 286b, 302b.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE PURSUIT OF SHUJA AND THE WAR IN BIHAR.

#### § I. *Shuja's retreat from Khajwa, pursued by Mir Jumla.*

After the victory Aurangzib marched through Shuja's camp, near the tank of the village of Khajwa, and halted for the night on the other side of it. To give the enemy no time to rally, he despatched a pursuing column under Prince Muhammad that very afternoon. Supplies, including horses, dress and arms, were given to him from the imperial stores, as all his property had been plundered by Jaswant in the morning. Reinforcements were soon afterwards despatched under Mir Jumla, as joint commander-in-chief, raising the pursuing force to 30,000 men. [A. N. 265-269.]

The unhappy pretender to the throne rode away 30 miles from the fatal field, before he halted to give repose to his exhausted body and drooping spirits. After four days of flight he crossed the Ganges and encamped at Jusi, opposite Allahabad. Dara's commandant of Allahabad shut the fort-gates in his face, and invited the imperialists to come and take delivery of the fortress, (which was done on 12th January, 1659). [A. N. 285, Masum 105b.]

On reaching Bahadurpur, east of Benares, Shuja stopped for some days, repaired the wall and trenches round his former camp, and thought of making a stand there against his pursuers. If the worst came to the worst, he could retreat in his flotilla, which lay moored at hand. Seven large guns were brought away from Chunar and mounted on the ramparts. Sultan Muhammad, who had no boats, could not cross the flooded Ganges near Bahadurpur; so he marched back upstream, forded the river near Allahabad, and advancing by way of Kheri and Kunit arrived two stages from Chunar.\*

This fact, joined to the news that Fidai Khan, another officer of Aurangzib, was marching north of the Ganges from Gorakhpur towards Patna, alarmed Shuja, and he fled precipitately to Patna, arriving at the garden of Jafar Khan in its suburbs on 10th February, 1659. Here some precious days were wasted in marrying his son Zain-ud-din to the daughter of the old and retired officer Zulfqar Khan Qaramanlu, in the vain hope of thus buttressing up his fallen fortunes. Meantime the enemy

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\* A. N. 492; Aqil Khan, 91. *Kherec* is in the Khyragarh Dist. *Kunit* is near Bindhachal, 10 miles west of Mirzapur. (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 88.) The whole history of the war with Shuja is given in great detail in a Persian poem named *Aurangnamah*, belonging to the Haidarabad State Library, and written by a Rozbhani follower of Mir Jumla. It merely confirms and supplements the narrative given by the official history, A. N., and Masum (the Shujaite.)

arrived within 20 miles of the town, and there was another rapid flight to Mungir, which was reached on the 19th. Sultan Muhammad arrived at Patna about the 22nd, eight days after Shuja had left it, and here he was joined by Fidai Khan. [A. N. 493, Aqil 91-92.]

At Mungir Shuja made a longer stand (Feb. 19th—March 6th). The ground favoured the defence against an invader from the west. The city of Mungir stands in a narrow plain,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles wide, bounded by the Ganges on the west and the Khargpur hills on the east. Along this plain runs the most convenient road from Patna to Bengal. If it were blocked, the invader would have to make a long detour through the desolate hills and jungles of the Santal Parganas and Birbhum, far away from the Ganges and its populous cities, and strike the river again only in the neighbourhood of Murshidabad.

During the period of Afghan rule, a wall and moat had been run in front of Mungir, from the hill to the river-bank, for the defence of the town. Last year, when opposing Sulaiman Shukoh, Shuja had repaired these old defences, raised bastions every 30 yards along the wall, and connected the ditch with the stream. Guns were now landed from his boats and mounted on the walls, the trenches were regularly manned by his soldiers, and Rajah Bahroz,

the *zamindar* of Khargpur, undertook to guard the southern hills, through which ran a difficult path to Rajmahal. [A. N. 493.]

Early in March Mir Jumla approached Mungir, and finding the main road barred, did not waste his time in attempting the siege of the town, but bought over Rajah Bahroz. Under the Rajah's guidance the imperial army marched through the hills and jungles of Khargpur, and making a detour round Mungir, threatened to seize Shuja's rear.\* That prince, on hearing of Bahroz's desertion and the unexpected movement of his enemies, fled from Mungir on 6th March. At this, Mir Jumla, who had reached Pialapur, 40 miles east of Mungir, left part of his army there under Prince Muhammad, while he himself hastened westwards to Mungir,† to take possession of it and appoint governors on behalf of the Emperor.

\* A. N., 494 & 495; Aqil Khan, 92; Masum, 113b. *Khargpur* is due south of Mungir. (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 112).

† There is a *Pialapur*, 4 miles south of the Pir Pointy Station on the E. I. Ry. Loop Line, and 11 miles east of Colgong. It is more than 65 miles east of Mungir. *Tarrapur*, 6 miles due east of Khargpur, in Rennell's *Atlas*, Sh. 2, exactly corresponds to the description in the text. But the form *Pialapur* is given too often to be taken for a copyist's error for *Tarapur*. There is a second Pialapur 'n the Mungir district, with a hill close to it. (*Pioneer*, 3 Jan. 1912, p. 2), but I cannot find it in the *Atlas*.

§ 2. *Mir Jumla's turning movement  
at Sahibganj.*

At Sahibganj\* Shuja made another halt of 15 days (March 10th to 24th), built a wall from the river to the southern hill, barring the narrow plain through which the road runs. He had mistaken Mir Jumla's westward march from Pialapur as a sign that the imperialists were tired of crossing the hills and jungles and would now pursue him along his track by the southern bank of the Ganges. So he hoped to detain them long before his wall at Sahibganj. His right was protected by the river, his left by the Rajmahal hills stretching southwards in a long line from the Ganges to Birbhum. To guard against the imperialists again turning his left flank by making a detour through the hills, he sent his follower Mir Isfandiar Mamuri to Khwajah Kamal Afghan, the *zamindar* of Birbhum and Chatnagar, with orders to oppose such a move and close the path on the south.

But again the gold of the imperialists upset his plans. As at Mungir, so here too, Mir Jumla won over the trusted *zamindar* and purchased a safe

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 495, gives "Rangarnati, 33 *kos* from Mungir and 15 *kos* from Rajmahal." Aqil Khan (92) gives *Garhi*, i.e., Teliagarhi. The place meant is undoubtedly *Lalmati*, half a mile south of the Sahibganj station on the E. I. R. Loop Line (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 112). It is situated midway between Teliagarhi and Sikrigali.

passage through his lands. After twelve days of toilsome march through the hills south-east of the Mungir district, in which Rajah Bahroz acted as guide and provided rations and fodder, the imperialists emerged from the jungles\* and entered the *zamindari* of Birbhum. The chief town, Suri, was passed on 28th March.

Here a strange occurrence damped the ardour of the imperialists and weakened their strength. It had been known that Dara Shukoh had again made head in Gujrat, and that the Emperor had hastened thither to oppose him. On 13th March 1659, the two armies clashed together near Ajmir; Dara's power was destroyed for ever, and he was fleeing helplessly before the pursuing imperialists. But rumour, with her usual love of falsehood, wafted to the Mughal army at Pialapur the news that Aurangzib had been routed at Ajmir and had fled to the Deccan abandoning everything. Distance magnified the extent of the disaster, and the tale received many embellishments as it flew from mouth to mouth. The whole army was thrown into alarm and confusion. Mir Jumla's flanking movement through the hills was suspected to be not an attack on Shuja's rear, but a covert design to flee with Prince Sultan Muhammad to the Deccan by the unfrequented route of Chota Nagpur and Orissa !

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 496 and 497; Aqil Khan, 92.

The Rajput contingent was particularly upset. Their homes in the far west were exposed to the victorious enemies of Aurangzib. The wrath of Dara would descend heaviest on the house of Jaipur, as Jai Singh had deserted Sulaiman Shukoh and won over Jaswant Singh to Aurangzib's side, and both he and his son Ram Singh had done signal service to the new Emperor. This march through the hills was bad enough, but the outlook before them was worse still. What could they expect on reaching the Deccan, even if the march there were safely accomplished? To join the broken ranks of a defeated pretender to the throne, and to be for ever exiled from home and chased hither and thither with the fugitive Aurangzib! Better return west through Patna and Allahabad and make peace with Dara, or at least push on to Rajputana in time to guard their homeland.

The Rajputs brooded over the matter and slowly made up their minds. Some days after leaving Pialapur they stopped waiting on the prince like other officers, at the times of his starting and dismounting. Then, on 26th March, after the day's advance they did not occupy the respective quarters marked out for them in the encampment, but all the Rajputs of the different divisions collected together and took up a position behind the camp. Next day they followed the main army at some distance,

keeping their tents and baggage with themselves.  
On 30th March, two stages beyond Birbhum, the Rajput contingent, 4,000 strong, seceded from the army and set out on their return towards Agra.\*

Mir Jumla did not waste any time in trying to dissuade them or even to punish their desertion, but pushed steadily on towards his objective. He had still some 25,000 troopers† with him, double the strength of Shuja,‡ and every moment was precious to him if he hoped to cut off the enemy's retreat to Dacca.

Shuja, hearing that the imperialists had gained a passage through Birbhum, evacuated Sahibganj and hastened to Rajmahal (about 27th March.) But he could not find safety anywhere on the right (or western) bank of the Ganges. Therefore, leaving Rajmahal, he planned to cross the river at Dogachi (a few miles south of the town), remove his family and army to Tanda (4 miles west of the fort of Gaur), and prolong the struggle with the help of his

\* A. N. 497 & 498. Aqil, 93, (reason of the Rajput defection). *Aurangnamah* ascribes it to the news of a general order for temple destruction by Aurangzib.

† The Rajput contingent that seceded is numbered 4,000 men by Aqil. Masum's estimate of "about 10 or 12 thousand troopers," is an exaggeration. All the Rajputs did not return, Rajah Indradymna remained loyal. Aqil says that two Muhammadan officers accompanied the deserters.

‡ Masum (116a) says that Shuja had not more than 5 or 6 thousand men.

powerful flotilla, against which Mir Jumla's purely land force could make no head.

*§ 3. Alawardi Khan's plot; he is put to death.*

But treachery was brewing in his ranks. The advance of the imperial army in his rear destroyed his last chance of success; their arrival at Belghata, 30 miles from his position, supplied his wavering followers with protectors close at hand in case they deserted. Fidelity to Shuja now meant only a choice between two miseries, *viz.*, slaughter by the overwhelmingly superior imperial army, and voluntary exile to the dreadful land of the savage Arracanese. "Many of his old and trusted followers" now conspired to desert him. The leader of the malcontents was Alawardi Khan, a noble who had governed Bihar in the closing years of Shah Jahan's reign, and joined Shuja's standard at Patna when that prince made his first attempt for the throne in 1657. Shuja had promoted him to the rank of his chief adviser, used to call him *Khan Bhai* (My noble brother), and had recently created him *Amir-ul-umara* or 'Premier Noble.'\*

The plan of the traitors was to lag behind at Rajmahal after Shuja had gone to the ferry, and to slip away to the imperial camp when he would be across the river. Shuja certainly went to the ferry

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\* Alawardi Khan, *A. N.*, 21, 422, 499—501; *Masum* 114a—115b.

of Dogachi (1st April, 1659), but a storm prevented his embarkation that night, and he had to return to his tent, 5 miles from the river. The conspirators had not foreseen this delay. The plot had already got wind. Shuja heard of it at the end of the night, and acted with unwonted promptitude and decision. He had left two officers at Rajmahal to superintend the transport of the men and stores that were to follow him.

Next morning (2nd April), he galloped from his tent to the city, a distance of 10 miles, and alighted in his garden in the suburbs.\* He was in a towering rage and kept shouting to his officers to bring Alawardi Khan. Man after man was sent on this errand. Meantime Alawardi Khan was guarding his house with his own retainers, against any attack. Shuja's officers came in rapid succession and gathered round his house with their troops, waiting for the prince's order to storm it. At this Alawardi lost heart; his partisans were terror-stricken. So, when the *diwan*, Mirza Saraj-ud-din Muhammad Jabri, arrived to fetch him, he easily consented to leave his stronghold and accompany him to the prince.†

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\* Was it the *Nageswar Bag* garden given in Rennell, Sheets 2 and 15?

† The official history accuses Shuja of having induced Alawardi to come out of his house by a false promise of safety, and then

Alawardi, with his younger son Saifullah, was taken to the prince outside the city. They were immediately seized and handcuffed by the loyal soldiers, placed on an elephant, and carried back to the city with Shuja. Here at the palace-gate they were beheaded publicly. Two other *mansabdars*, who had joined the plot, shared the same fate.

#### § 4. *Mir Jumla occupies Rajmahal.*

After passing three more days at Rajmahal, Shuja, on 4th April, crossed the Ganges at Dogachi, and encamped at Baqarpur on the opposite bank, with the flotilla guarding his front. The imperial army after leaving Birbhum, had turned to the n. e., wishing to strike the Ganges above Murshidabad and block Shuja's line of retreat to Dacca. It had reached Belghata\* when it heard of Shuja's evacuation of Rajmahal, and immediately made a dash northwards to seize that town. The Van, under Zulfiqar Khan, entered it on 13th April, and established their own

treacherously executed him. (*Alamgirnamah*, 500). But the *Tarikh-i-Shujai* does not support the charge. It says, "Mirza Saraj-ud-din Muhammad, a confidential servant of the prince, offered to bring Alawardi, went to the latter, and told him all the case (*haqiqat-i-hal*). The latter had no help but to come with one or two *mansabdars* engaged in the same plot" (f. 115a). I have accepted his account as more likely to be true under the circumstances. Alawardi had no chance of escape if he resisted arrest.

\* *Belgotta* in Rennell, Sh. 2, about 2 miles west of Jangipur and 4 miles south of the battle-field of Gheria.

government there. Some 4,000 of Shuja's soldiers, having failed to get boats at Dogachi, returned helplessly to Rajmahal and submitted to the imperialists. Thus the whole country west of the Ganges, from Rajmahal to Hughli, passed out of Shuja's hands. [A. N. 501 & 344.]

The river Ganges, after flowing due east for four hundred miles from Allahabad, takes a sudden turn to the right below Sikrigali and sweeps southwards for about 80 miles to Bhagwangola, where it again turns to the east. East of this stretch of the river lies the district of Malda with the ruins of Gaur, on the west stands Rajmahal, and south of it the district of Murshidabad.

In its upper courses the rocky soil, as at Chunar, Benares, Mungir, and Teliagarhi, confines the river to a fixed bed. But after leaving Sikrigali, it flows through a softer ground and gives free play to its fondness for changing its bed or splitting up into many streams. Thus the valley of the Ganges, between the Rajmahal hills on the west and the upland of Barind at the back of Malda on the east, is intersected by countless thin serpentine brooks and *nalas*, dry sandy deposits marking the deserted beds of the river, and the one or more streams of the Ganges and the Mahananda. "The earth is as water" here, and travelling is extremely difficult. On the north of this tract, the main artery of the

Ganges receives many straggling branches of the lower Kushi, on the east the Kalindi, the Mahananda (the river of Malda), and several of its own ramifications. On the south, a little east of Suti, the original Ganges branches off in a thin tortuous stream, which still bears the name of Bhagirathi or the Holy Ganges, and flows past Murshidabad, Nadia, and Calcutta, to the sea. But its main current flows eastwards by Rajshahi and Goalnand in a vast volume of water known as the Padma.

During the rains much of this valley is flooded. As the rains stop and the flood subsides, innumerable water-courses (*nalas*) and lakes are found to intersect the land. Only a few of the *nalas* carry off running water; all the others first grow stagnant, then their ends dry up, and they form slimy pools and soft morasses. Only in their last stage, in the hottest part of summer, do they present the solid land again, but immensely changed from its last year's configuration. This process goes on year after year, making fantastic variations in the surface of the ground.

### § 5. *The relative strength of the rival forces.*

Shuja had a hopeless inferiority of troops. He had brought back about 10,000 men from Khajwa. Of these some had been lost by desertion, and many others had been intercepted by the Mughal capture

of Rajmahal.\* On land he could not have made an hour's stand against the imperialists. But he had an artillery of big pieces admirably served by European and half-caste gunners. He was also strong in an arm peculiarly suited to the theatre of the war, an arm in which Bengal, of all the provinces of the empire, enjoyed a notable superiority, and the lack of which paralysed his enemy's efforts. Bengal is the land of waterways, and its *subahdar* (viceroy) used to get a large assignment on the revenue (*tankhah*) and extensive *jagirs* (fiefs) for maintaining a flotilla (*nawwara*)† to patrol the rivers, convey officers and troops, and resist the pirates of Sondip and Chatgaon. The Mughals were proverbially bad seamen. Expert cavaliers, they were powerless on board a ship. The deep had unknown terrors for them, and even a voyage down a river was a penance to be gone through with set teeth and breathless expectation of its end, when they would tread on solid land again !

Mir Jumla's army was a purely land force. He had not brought a single boat with himself, nor could he get any in Bengal, as Shuja had anticipated him by seizing and sinking all the private boats in this part of the country. For want of water-transport

\* Aqil, 95; Masum, 116b and 126a.

† Talish's Continuation, tr. by me in *Journal and Proceedings*,  
A. S. B., June 1906 and June 1907.

Mir Jumla was confined to the western bank, unable to cross over and attack the enemy, or advance on Dacca, as many rivers intersected his path. Shuja, on the other hand, could mount his guns and men on his boats and employ this extremely mobile force anywhere he pleased along the entire Mughal line from Rajmahal to Suti. But he was too weak in troops to take the offensive against an enemy so overwhelmingly superior on land. The Bengali nursery tale of the duel between the alligator and the tiger aptly typifies this stage of the war.

After a council of war with his generals, headed by Mirza Jan Beg, Shuja had decided to evacuate the western bank of the Ganges, to remove his headquarters and family to Tanda, (where he would be protected by the Ganges and a labyrinth of *nala*s on his west), to resist the hostile movements of the imperialists, and to utilise the precious months thus gained through the enemy's want of a fleet in "recruiting his shattered power." [Masum, 116.] The plan was the best under the circumstances; but it failed through Mir Jumla's wonderful activity in procuring boats from remote places, the Emperor's fine strategy in sending another army under the governor of Patna to make a diversion on the left bank of the Ganges and turn Shuja's right, and lastly through both the roads for the arrival of hardy recruits from Oudh,

Allahabad and Bihar being closed to Shuja by the Mughal occupation of Rajmahal and all the country west of the Ganges.

Shuja, making Tanda his base, entrenched on the eastern bank at various places opposite the entire Mughal front, which stretched from Rajmahal to Suti, on the western bank. On his own side Mir Jumla placed pickets at every ferry and road to prevent Shuja's deserted followers at Rajmahal from crossing over to him. After the occupation of Rajmahal (13th April, 1659), his first object was to get boats, without which he could not take one step forward. By persistent efforts for a fortnight he succeeded in securing a few,—*kosas*, *khaluahs*, and *rāhwáras*, from distant or obscure places. [Masum, 118a.]

### § 6. *Mir Jumla's first coup.*

Taking up his quarters at Dogachi,\* about 13 miles south of Rajmahal, he carried out his first bold and well-planned stroke. In midstream opposite his post there was a high island, which formed a half-way house to the other bank. A detachment from Shuja's army had already occupied it, and

\* Dogachi is given in the *Indian Atlas*, Sh. 112, about 13 miles south of Rajmahal. There is another Dogachi, 14 miles further south; but that is not the place meant in this history. Dunapur is given on the same sheet as *Dugnapur* near the s. e. corner.

begun to entrench and erect batteries, in order to molest the imperial camp in co-operation with their flotilla. Mir Jumla resolved to wrest it from them. Under his careful arrangement and personal supervision, his few boats made several silent and secret trips after midnight, transporting to the island 2,000 soldiers under Zulficar Khan and some other high officers, with 22 hatchetmen and a few guns. The morning discovered their arrival to the enemy, who fled away in their boats, carrying off their guns. The imperialists occupied the deserted position and hastily entrenched. Next day they repelled a formidable attack by Shuja's entire flotilla, sinking some of the boats. A party of the enemy that had landed on one side of the island and was trying to throw up entrenchments, was gallantly charged by a body of Afghans under Taj Niazi and driven out after a severe and bloody struggle. A second attempt of the enemy's combined forces to recover the island was defeated two days later, and the imperialists were left in undisturbed possession of the captured post. [A. N. 501-503.]

But here their success ended. Shuja, warned by the past, now guarded his defences carefully, his flotilla daily cruised up and down the river, exchanging fire with the Mughals on the western bank, and his army and guns were massed opposite Dogachi. It was hopeless for Mir Jumla with his

half dozen boats to carry his army across in small bodies or effect a landing by surprise at this point in the face of such a powerful and vigilant enemy.

So, he made other arrangements and bided his time. The imperial army was distributed along the entire western bank : Muhammad Murad Beg was left in command at Rajmahal in the extreme north ; the prince with Zulfiqar Khan, Islam Khan, and the bulk of the army, remained at Dogachi 13 miles southwards, facing Shuja. At Dunapur, some 8 miles further south, Ali Quli Khan was posted, while Mir Jumla himself with six or seven thousand troops occupied Suti, the southernmost point of the Mughal lines, 28 miles south of Rajmahal. [A. N. 504.]

Here he collected about a hundred boats of various sorts, and daily watched for an opportunity to land on the other bank by surprise. The enemy had erected a high battery of eight large guns opposite him, which did great damage to his followers and cattle on the riverside. An expedition sent one night in ten boats was detected by the enemy and repulsed. Next day the attempt was repeated, and succeeded by its very audacity. In the broad glare of noon, when the wind had freshened and the enemy were off their guard, he embarked 20 imperial troopers and a party of his own retainers and sent them over. Quickly going across with the help of the wind, they fell on the battery, drove nails into

the port-holes of the two largest guns and carried off the other six without any loss. This splendid feat struck terror into the enemy's heart. Shuja's general, Nurul Hasan, who had been thus caught napping, was removed from his command. [A. N. 505.]

But Mir Jumla was soon to learn the fickleness of fortune. Encouraged by the success of his first two coups, he planned another on a much grander scale. But this time Shuja was on the alert. His able and devoted officer Sayyid Alam of Barha with a picked force now commanded at this point. He left the trenches and batteries on the riverside scantily guarded as before, but posted his troops and fierce war-elephants behind them in ambushes cleverly masked in front. Mir Jumla had either not taken the precaution to reconnoitre and ascertain the enemy's strength there (as Masum says), or he had committed the fatal mistake of despising the enemy. But he was destined to get a lesson which made him extremely cautious and even slow for the rest of the campaign.

### § 7. *Mir Jumla's third coup fails with heavy loss.*

At dawn (3rd May) when the first two or three boats of the expedition sent by Mir Jumla reached the opposite bank, Ihtamam Khan landed with some men and assaulted the enemy's trenches,

driving them out and planting the imperial banner there. Then Sayyid Alam issued from his ambush and fell upon this small party, which gallantly defended itself in the captured redoubt. Some of the boats were busy trying to land their men; most others had not yet reached the bank; these lost heart at the sudden appearance of the enemy and rowed back to their own side; only six boats were left behind. The enemy growing bolder turned aside from the redoubt to attack the boats, leading two elephants with them. The imperialists were perplexed; of many troopers the horses had not yet landed, and even those few who were mounted could not gallop on the loose sand. To complete their misery, some of the enemy's fast boats (*kosas*) now surrounded them, and a confused naval battle began in which the odds were against them. Zabardast Khan, though wounded, cut his way through the ring of the enemy. His brothers and nephews, in another boat, were trying to disembark and aid Ihtamam Khan, when another party of the enemy, 200 strong, with a furious elephant (a noted fighter named Kokah), fell on them. It gored Shahbaz Khan with its tusk and sank two or three boats. Two other captains were slain. Of the common soldiers, "many were drowned or slain, and the wounded were made prisoners."

After disposing of the boats, Sayyid Alam

turned upon Ihtamam Khan, who was helplessly cooped up in the redoubt. The Khan fell fighting, with many of his men; the rest surrendered. "The very pick of the imperial army thus perished miserably; 500 of them were taken prisoner, and some of these were afterwards put to death by order of Shuja,"\* or released according to *Aurangnamah*.

Meantime Mir Jumla had been a helpless spectator of this reverse from the western bank. In vain did he command and entreat his fugitive boats to return to the aid of their brethren; they were too demoralised to face the Bengal flotilla again. He was deeply mortified; the disaster dimmed the lustre of his hitherto victorious career; he had lost a choice body of men and given cause of exultation to his enemies, both across the river and in his own army.

Soon afterwards the imperial party had to meet with a loss which paralysed it for a time, and would have been disastrous but for Mir Jumla's wonderful courage, presence of mind, and mastery over men. Late in the night of 8th June, his camp at Suti was startled to hear that Prince Muhammad had deserted his post at Dogachi and fled to Shuja!

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\* A. N. 506—509; Masum, 118a-119b; Aqil, 95.

§ 8. *Prince Muhammad discontented, flees to Shuja.*

Sultan Muhammad had been long chafing under the tutelage of Mir Jumla. Youthful flatterers were not wanting to tell him that he was the hero of Khajwa, and that while the other divisions of the imperial army had been routed or shaken, his alone had stood its ground and beaten back the enemy's onset. Was he not more worthy of the throne than his father, especially as he was beloved by his captive grandfather? To these dreams of ambition were added the tenderer ones of love. Years ago, when the Emperor Shah Jahan was holding Court at Kabul, the Princes Aurangzib and Shuja had taken leave of him to go to the provinces assigned to them. Their way lay together up to Agra. In jealousy of their eldest brother Dara, they had vowed to unite against him on their father's death, and the vow had been strengthened by each entertaining the other for a week at Agra and betrothing the young Sultan Muhammad to Shuja's little daughter Gulrukhan Banu, "Lady Rose-cheek". [Aqil, 10.] Their fathers' quarrel had broken off the match when the pair came of age. Shuja, whose servants and agents in Rajmahal kept him constantly informed of the state of the Mughal army, had been sending secret messages to the

prince, offering him the throne and the hand of his daughter. The temptation was too great for a young man, with his heart sore against his father and his father's confidant.

So, one dark and rainy night (8th June), he slipped out of Dogachi in a small open boat with only five confidential servants and some gold coins and jewels, and went over to Shuja's camp, where he was welcomed, married (after a time) to his betrothed, and made his father-in-law's chief commander and counsellor.\*

Meantime alarm and distraction reigned in the imperial camp. The news flew from tent to tent. But there was a born ruler of men on the spot : Mir Jumla at Suti firmly kept his own men quiet, and the morning after the flight rode to the prince's camp at Dogachi, harangued the leaderless troops, put heart and hope into them, and restored order and discipline. A council of war was held; all the other generals agreed to obey him as their sole head. Thus through his heroic exertion, the army weathered the storm; "it lost only one man—the prince," as Aqil Khan pithily puts it.

It was now the middle of June. The torrential rains of Bengal suspended operations, and the army went into cantonments. Mir Jumla with about

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\* Sultan's flight, *A. N.* 511, 406 and 407; *Masum*, 120b—124a; *Aqil*, 96.

15,000 men fixed his quarters at Masumabazar (Murshidabad), "a high tract of land, with abundance of supplies." Zulfiqar Khan and many other officers with the rest of the army stayed at Rajmahal. Evidently the posts at Dogachi, Dnapur, and Suti were withdrawn. [A. N. 512.]

The moral effect of the prince's flight was very great. Coming so soon after the reverse of 3rd May, it damped the spirit of the imperial army and suspended its activity. The Emperor was alarmed at the news; he sent out strong reinforcements, and himself left the capital for Allahabad, to be within easy reach of the Bengal army, should the danger increase and roll westwards. The Shujaites were correspondingly elated, and now for the first time in the war took the aggressive. Their enemy's force was split up into two bodies separated by sixty miles of almost impassable road. They had only to wrest Rajmahal from Zulfiqar Khan, and then march south and crush Mir Jumla. A daring blow achieved the first of these objects with startling quickness and ease.

§ 9. *Rajmahal water-locked, is recaptured  
by Shuja.*

The rains had converted the environs of Rajmahal into one marshy lake (*jheel*), except at the n. w. corner where the hills approach it. Boats

plied even in the midst of the city. The enemy's flotilla prevented Mir Jumla from sending the promised supplies from Murshidabad by water. Harchand, the Rajah of the Majwa hills, stretching west of Rajmahal, on receiving Shujah's subsidy, stopped the coming of supplies from that side, and robbed every grain-merchant (*banjara*) who ventured to send even a bullock's load of grain to Rajmahal. "Not a grain of corn reached the city, the troops were weakened by abundance of water and dearth of (solid) food." "Scarcity reached its extreme point. Grain rose to the price of gold. Coarse red rice and *dal* sold at nine seers for a Rupee." In the agony of hunger men ate noxious weeds. The imperial troops in the city were reduced to the last extremity by famine and the loss of their horses and draught cattle; and the discord among their generals made matters worse.

First, Shuja's admiral, Shaikh Abbas, seized a hilly tract named Patura,\* 5 miles south of Rajmahal. From this base he began to make boat-raids into the water-girt city. Then on 22nd August, Shuja suddenly attacked Rajmahal with his flotilla. The commandant, Zulfiqar Khan, was too ill to ride. Rajah Indradyumna alone offered a gallant opposition to the invader. The other imperial officers wavered, held a council of war, could

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\* Pattoorah, 5 miles south of Rajmahal, (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 112.)

not agree to anything, but quarrelled with each other, and fled at night for Murshidabad, evacuating all their positions,—the city on the bank, the up-land (a spur of the hill), midway between old and new Rajmahal, which was their main camp, and the causeway leading from the hill-side to the new town. All their property was seized by Shuja, who thus recovered his capital and re-established himself on the western bank of the Ganges.\*

The rainy season wore off without any further adventure. At its close Shuja, with an army now raised to 8,000 men, marched from Rajmahal against Mir Jumla, who issued from Murshidabad and took post behind a deep *nala* near Belghata, throwing two bridges over it and fortifying their heads.

#### § 10. *Shuja's advance towards Murshidabad.*

The scene of the war now was the same which a century afterwards witnessed the final contest between the English and the Nawab of Bengal, Mir Qasim. Belghata is only four miles south of the battle-field of Gheria, and Dogachi about the same distance from the famous lines of Undhua Nala.

On 6th December, 1659, Shuja came in front of Mir Jumla's position. After spending some days in cannonade and skirmishing, he attacked the

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\* A. N., 516—519; Masum, 125; Aqil, 98, (graphic description).

right bridge with all his force on 15th December and seized its head. In this obstinate contest both sides lost heavily. Their gallant leader Ekkataz Khan being slain, the imperialists fled to their own side of the *nala* and burnt the bridge of boats to prevent pursuit. While this fight was raging, Mir Jumla crossed the *nala* by the left bridge and marched on Shuja from behind. Catching up the enemy's rear on the bank of the Bhagirathi near the village of Gheria, which was afterwards the scene of two other memorable combats,—Alawardi Khan's triumph over Nawab Sarfaraz Khan in 1740 and the rout of Mir Qasim's troops by the English in 1763,—he dispersed it with loss. But their main army came back and faced him in battle order, behind their guns, which did great execution and arrested the Mughal advance. Evidently there was a disorderly shrinking back among the imperial troops. The Court historian tries to explain it away by saying that, as the officers disobeyed Mir Jumla's orders, the different divisions were separated too far, and the enemy could not be charged. At sunset Mir Jumla had to return baffled to his camp, after a little fruitless cannonade. Two days afterwards the Shujaites again came upon the imperial army and did some damage with their powerful artillery.\*

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\* A. N., 519—525; Masum, 131a—133b. Aqil (99—103) tells a

In this arm Mir Jumla was very weak. He had dragged only light pieces with himself by the land route from Allahabad, while Shuja could take his big guns in and out of his boats, and had also enlisted excellent gunners from the Europeans of Hughli, Tamluk; and Noakhali. Mir Jumla, without wasting any more men and ammunition, quietly retired to Murshidabad, as he was every day expecting a diversion in another quarter, which would send Shuja flying back to his own base. That prince, emboldened by the enemy's retreat and ignorant of the danger in his own rear, marched parallel to the Mughals down the other bank of the Bhagirathi, to Nashipur (12 miles north of Murshidabad), in order to cross there and cut off the imperial army from the last-named town.

The Emperor with his usual foresight had ordered Daud Khan, the *subahdar* of Bihar, to march upon Tanda along the left or northern bank of the Ganges and co-operate with Mir Jumla who was on the right bank. The Khan had started from Patna as early as 13th May, 1659, but the

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story which cannot be reconciled with the other two histories. He says that Mir Jumla surrounded Shuja in the village of Gheria and could have captured him if he had boldly made a night-attack. In the morning Shuja escaped. This passage is incomprehensible to me; it does not look like an invention, but bears the stamp of an eye-witness's report. But it is contradicted by the official history. Masum on the contrary asserts that if Shuja had charged he could have defeated Mir Jumla!

rains, the many flooded rivers of North Bihar, and the enemy's flotilla and trenches on the river-banks had brought him to an absolute halt at Qazi-Keria, opposite Bhagalpur. Early in December he resumed his advance, forced a passage across the Kushi, swept away a Shujaite detachment under Sayyid Taj-ud-din of Barha, Jamal Ghori, and Khwajah Mishki, which barred his path, and was in full march from the north-west towards Malda, (by 20th December). Shuja at Nashipur heard this dismal news in the night of 26th December and at once beat a retreat towards Suti, intending to cross the Ganges there and fall back on Tanda.\*

### § 11. *Mir Jumla gives chase to Shuja.*

Mir Jumla had been waiting for this development. He now sprang forward in pursuit. Starting at 9 A.M. next day, he sighted the fugitive enemy behind a *nala* flanked with swamps. After an ineffectual artillery duel, Shuja fled from his position next morning, at 3 A.M. Very timely reinforcements with artillery, material, 700 rockets, and 12 *lakhs* of Rupees now reached Mir Jumla from the Court. At sunrise he crossed the *nala*, continued the chase, and at night halted at Fatihpur, 8 miles behind the enemy's former position. Next morning (28th December), he advanced further, and

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 513, 514, 524-526; *Masum*, 134a.

came upon the enemy's army beyond Chilmari, near Suti.

Four or five days passed in a fruitless exchange of fire, the men on both sides standing to arms all day; but there was no fight at close quarters, though the scouts and patrols had daily skirmishes. Nurul Hasan now deserted to the imperialists. In the night of 1st January, 1660, Shuja fled northwards to Dunapur, and thence in great disorder and confusion to Dogachi, Mir Jumla following hot at his heels, though delayed by bad roads, *nalas*, and broken bridges. By this rapid march the imperial general had outstripped his heavy artillery, and so when the enemy turned at bay behind the *nala* of Dogachi, his men shrank from forcing a passage across in the face of Shuja's big guns. He therefore advanced by the left side towards Rajmahal (2nd January), Shuja marching parallel to him on the other side of the *nala*, with the Ganges on his right. That prince was now in a terrible dilemma: how could he cross the Ganges so close to an active enemy? If he went over first, his army would desert him; and if they were transported before him, he would be captured by the enemy. So he dug a deep moat round his camp, entrenched, mounted guns, and then marched over the Ganges with his whole army by a bridge of boats, (9th January).

Next morning, Mir Jumla at Dogachi, hearing the news, pushed forward a detachment to occupy Rajmahal and open the river-side road to Mungir, which had been so long closed by the enemy. On 11th January, the imperialists recovered Rajmahal. The whole country west of the Ganges was now lost to Shuja for ever. It only remained to crush his power on the eastern side of the river.\*

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\* A. N., 526—532; Masum (134a) is extremely brief; Aqil (101—103) evidently refers to this stage of the war; but there is probably a gap after p. 100 in the A. S. B. MS. of Aqil Khan which I have used.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE END OF SHUJA.

#### § 1. *The military situation in Bengal in 1660.*

Preparations were quickly made for invading the eastern bank of the Ganges, and events moved apace. Daud Khan had now arrived at a place on the left bank of the Ganges, some 16 miles north of Rajmahal. A contingent of 2,500 Afghans under Dilir Khan had been sent by the Emperor to reinforce the army in Bengal. These crossed the Ganges (9th January, 1660), at the ferry of Kadamtali\* and joined Daud Khan. Another equally necessary sinew of war reached Mir Jumla in the form of seventeen *lakhs* of Rupees from the Court. [A. N. 533.]

Last year Mir Jumla had attempted to cross the Ganges near Suti and march north-eastwards on Tanda, i.e., to attack Shuja from the south-west. This was a bad plan, as it involved the crossing of one large and many smaller rivers close to the enemy's position and in the teeth of his powerful flotilla. It was rendered impossible by Mir Jumla's lack of boats. This year his plan of campaign was

\* K. K. ii. 93. *Kadamtala* is 9 m. due n. n. e. of Rajmahal (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. II2). The *Alamgirnamah* gives its alternative name as *Dodha* (which I cannot find in the maps).

brilliantly novel ; he would attack the enemy from the opposite point, i.e., the north-east. He would make a wide detour round the enemy's position. He would cross the Ganges 10 miles above Rajmahal, join Daud Khan near Akbarpur (due east of Sikrigali), pass over the shallow upper courses of the Mahananda and some *nala*s, reach Malda, and then turn sharply south, cross the Mahananda again, swoop down upon Tanda from the east, and thus completely encircle Shuja in his net. All the while he would keep a screen of men in front of the enemy's trenches along the Kalindi river, and deceive him with feints. Shuja's position was a long line, stretching north-west to south-east, from Samda\* (opposite Rajmahal) to his base at Tanda (south-west of the ruins of Gaur). His head-quarters were at Chauki-Mirdadpur, in the middle of this line. There was an off-shoot of defences north-eastwards to Malda. Mir Jumla's plan, therefore, was to describe a semi-circle round this line, from the north of Rajmahal through Malda to Tanda or Tartipur. It was only his immense superiority in number (five times the strength of his enemy) that enabled him to carry out such a vast

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\* *Samdah* is given in Rennell, Sh. 2 & 16. *Chauki Mirdadpur* (*Indian Atlas*, 112) is 8 m. east of Rajmahal. Tanda is *Tarrah* in Rennell, Sh. 16, about 4 m. west of the fort among the ruins of Gaur. *Tartipur* is the *Toortiepoor* of *Indian Atlas*, Sh. 119.

turning movement while holding the western bank of the Ganges in force.

The Mughal general first posted troops at various points from Sikrigali to Suti, to guard the right bank and prevent a repetition of the enemy's blow of last year. Then, with the help of the 160 boats brought from Patna by Daud Khan, he carried his army over the three streams into which the Ganges was split up near Kadamtali, some 9 miles north of Rajmahal (15th Jan.—7th Feb.), and joined hands with Daud Khan. But the big *char* (island) of Samda, east of Rajmahal, remained his head-quarters till 29th February.\* The two generals now co-operated to distract the enemy and converge on Malda.

The rest of the story is soon told. Shuja offered an obstinate resistance along the banks of the Kalindi and the Mahananda. But he was hopelessly outnumbered from the first. The imperialists were delayed only by their lack of boats, and by the dense jungles and countless *nala*s that barred their path; their only losses were from drowning. The enemy were too few to face them in the open plain, and no more pitched battles took place. The details of the marching and counter-marching through this labyrinth of *nala*s are neither interesting

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\* A. N., 534—536; Aqil, 103; Masum, 134b.

nor instructive to the student of the art of war. It will suffice to trace the outline only.

Shuja had built a wall and a double line of entrenchments along the Kalindi (a branch of the Mahananda) barring Mir Jumla's direct route to Tanda. But the latter made a feint in his front, turned the enemy's flank by a swift march northwards, and safely crossed both the easternmost branch of the Ganges and the Mahananda. He now despatched a column towards Malda on the eastern bank of the Mahananda, (8th February.) [A. N. 537-541; Masum, 135.]

Ruin now stared Shuja in the face. On his west stretched the Mughal lines from Rajmahal to Suti; on his north they occupied various points from Samda to the Mahananda, and now another force was moving southwards, to hem him round on the east and finally to cut off his only line of retreat in the south. At this time Prince Muhammad deserted him and sneaked back into the Mughal camp at Dogachî as secretly as he had left it, (8th February).\* The luckless youth was sent closely guarded to his relentless father and doomed to sigh out the remainder of his life in a captive cell of the rock-prison of Gwalior. Only four years before his

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\* A. N., 542-544, 546; K. K. ii. 99-100. The Poem asserts that Sultan's flight was due to his wounded vanity at Shuja having summoned Sayyid Alam from Dacca to his aid.

death did he gain even a limited amount of liberty and transfer to the prison of Salimgarh (Delhi).

### § 2. *Mir Jumla advances on Malda.*

On 29th February Mir Jumla finally left Samda, and on 6th March he reached Malda. At Mahmudabad, a few miles below Malda, he spent a month in active preparation for his crowning stroke. "He bade adieu to ease and rest, spending days and nights in exertion, in order to dispose of Shuja, and prevent the war from being dragged on till the coming of the rainy season,"—which would mean the loss of another year. A short distance further down the stream was the ferry of Bholahat,\* where a detachment under Dilir Khan was entrenched. Four miles below it an obscure ford was discovered, which the enemy had neglected to guard well. The water was shallow for only a thin strip across, but very deep on both sides.

Everything being ready, Mir Jumla left Mahmudabad at 3 A.M. on 5th April; united with Dilir Khan's force on the way, and after a march of 10 miles down the bank came to the ford at dawn. The enemy were taken by surprise; they had posted only a small force with some guns on

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 547 & 548. This work as well as the Poem (544, 545, 547, &c.) spells the name as *Baglaghat*. From the bearings given it must be *Bholahat* (*Indian Atlas*, Sh. 119; & Rennell, Sh. 16).

the opposite bank. Without a moment's delay the imperialists began to ford. The leaders drove their elephants into the water; then the cavalry plunged in. "The soldiers rushed into the river from right and left, front and rear, troop after troop like a succession of waves." All order was gone; many swerved aside to avoid the enemy's shower of shot and bullet. In the rush of so many men and beasts the water was thrown into waves, the sand was kicked away, the two lines of sticks which marked the borders of the ford were knocked off, and the right track was lost. The smoke of gunpowder darkened the sky. Vast numbers went beyond their depth on the two sides. Swimming was impossible for mail-clad troopers on barbed horses. More than a thousand brave soldiers were drowned,—Fatih, the son of Dilir Khan, a heroic Afghan youth of 20, being among them.\*

But even this heavy price was worth paying for the passage across.† It was the decisive move of

\* This is the estimate of the *Alamgirnamah* (550). Masum has "about 2,000," Aqil "nearly 3,000 men," and the Poem 3,500 troopers. Descriptions of this disastrous fording are given in Masum, 161, K. K. ii, 94—97, and A. N., 548—551. From the Poem it seems to have been a long affair and not much of a surprise.

† The heavy loss of men, however, did one harm to Mir Jumla. He could not with decency leave the dead uncared for, and so he had to spend the whole of that day in "dredging the river for the corpses of the drowned men" to give them burial. Otherwise, he could have made a dash for Tanda immediately after fording, and

the campaign. All was now over with Shuja. His men, after some hours' fight, evacuated their trenches on the bank, leaving all their guns behind. Reinforcements under Sayyid Alam and Prince Buland Akhtar arrived when it was too late, and they fled at the sight of the triumphant Mughals. The prince hastened to Tanda in distraction. Sayyid Alam carried the dismal news to Shuja at Chauki-Mirdadpur.

### § 3. *Shuja's flight from Malda to Dacca.*

The imperialists were now on the right bank of the Mahananda with nothing but eleven miles of road and the narrow brook of the Bhagirathi (or Bagmati) between them and Tanda. Swift must be Shuja's flight to Dacca, if he did not wish to see the net completely drawn round him and his only path of retreat cut off from the south. Dazed at the news, he held a hurried consultation with Mirza Jan Beg, who gave him the only advice possible in this case,—“You should cling to nothing here, but flee at once to avoid capture.” So, at nightfall he hastened back from Chauki-Mirdadpur to Tanda. [Masum, 162a.]

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captured Shuja's capital in the afternoon of 5th April, while Shuja was still at Mirdadpur, ignorant of Mir Jumla's crossing. Then Shuja would have been caught there instead of gaining a day (6th April), for his escape to Dacca. Thus the loss of a single day at this critical time altered the history of the prince and saved Aurangzib from another act of fratricide.

Then ensued all the sad and sickening scenes which attend a sudden fall from power and the hurried flight of vanquished princes. Shuja reached Tanda at dawn (6th April), alighted in a garden outside the city, and immediately proceeding to the *harem* ordered his *Begams* to come away at once "without waiting even to change their dress."\* By great exertions and constant supervision he loaded his treasure in two strong boats (*ghurabs*), and a selection from his property and stores in two others, and sent them off. Then leaving Tanda for ever, he went to the river bank at 4 P.M. and embarked. His two younger sons, (Buland Akhtar and Zain-ul-abidin), his chiefs, Mirza Jan Beg, Sayyid Alam of Barha, Sayyid Quli Uzbak, and Mirza Beg, a few soldiers, servants, and eunuchs, —300 men in all,—accompanied him in 60 boats (*kosas*.) This was the sole remnant of the splendid Court amidst which he had ruled three provinces, and the vast army with which he had twice contested the throne of Delhi! The other officers and servants parted from the victim of misfortune, and went their own way. [A. N. 552.]

The 6th of April was a very busy day with Mir Jumla. Early in the morning he set out from the fatal ford towards Tanda, but on the way turned sharply to the left to cut off Shuja's retreat at Tartipur

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\* Masum, 162a. Here the work ends abruptly

on the Ganges. Hastening thither with a light division, he seized 400 loaded boats of the enemy's flotilla, left a detachment in charge, and then with only 400 troopers, made a forced march backwards to Tanda, arriving there at midnight.

He was not a minute too early. All through that day Tanda had been a scene of wild terror and confusion. The soldiers, deserted by their master, roved about in disorder, plundering his unguarded property. Treasure loaded on 6 elephants and 12 camels, which was being taken by the eunuch Sandal (the custodian of Shuja's *toshak-khanah*) to the bank for embarkation, was looted by the ruffians, as also were some led-horses of the prince. "Men ran about in disorderly groups. Great tumult and confusion prevailed. Everyone plundered what he could lay hold of."

But next day (7th April) Mir Jumla restored order; he seized for the Government all the property he found, and worked hard to recover what the ruffians of the army had looted. The women left behind were taken care of; guards were posted round the *harem*, and its officers and eunuchs ordered to do their duties as before. [A. N. 552.]

The fugitive prince could not keep all that he was carrying off. Mughal troops had now hastened to the bank along his route down the river. His two treasure-laden *ghurabs* were seized at Tartipur,

and 30 boats of his flotilla (with many officers and men on board) were captured at Sherpur and Hazrahati. His servants, who had refused to part from their families merely to show an unavailing devotion to a ruined man, now submitted to the victor (9th April), and were graciously taken into the imperial service. Two of them, Mir Murtaza of the artillery and Ibn Husain of the flotilla, afterwards covered themselves with glory in the Assam war and the capture of Chatgaon.

#### § 4. *Shuja's flight from Dacca to Arracan.*

After spending twelve days in settling matters at Tanda and organising an administration for the conquered districts, Mir Jumla left it for Tartipur (19th April). Thence he set off next day by land to Dacca. [A. N. 554-555.]

On 12th April, Shuja reached Dacca, a bankrupt in fame and fortune. But it was to be no asylum to him. The *zamindars* were all up against him, and he was too weak either to chastise them or to face Mir Jumla, who was coming hot foot on his trail. He had already begged succour from the pirate king of Arracan, but no reply had yet come. The near approach of the imperialists, however, left him no choice. On 6th May, he bade farewell even to his eastern capital, and with his family and a few faithful nobles and servants glided down from

Dacca to Dhapa, 8 miles southwards. Next day he reached Sripur (probably short for Sirampur.) At every stage soldiers and boatmen deserted him in large numbers; even his old ministers and confidential servants forsook their doomed master. On the 8th, shortly after leaving Sripur, he met 51 Magh and Feringi boats (*jalbas*), sent by the governor of Chatgaon under orders of the king of Arracan.

Next morning starting from the *pargana* of Lakhi-deh (=Lakhipur), he halted 8 miles from the fort of Bhalua,\* and made a mad effort to secure its surrender by inviting its commandant to an interview and then treacherously imprisoning him. But the party sent by him with the captive commandant's letter ordering his men to surrender the fort, was attacked and captured by the garrison.

On 11th May a Magh general arrived from Chatgaon with three more ships. Seeing Shuja's power hopelessly broken and his fortune gone, he refused to support his wild plan of an assault on the fort of Bhalua. An open quarrel broke out between the fallen prince and his barbarous allies. They frankly told him, "Our king had ordered us to help

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\* Dhapa is given as *Daapeka Kella* in Rennell, Sh. 12. Sripur is evidently *Serampur*, and Lakhideh *Luckipour* of Rennell, Sh. 9. Bhalua is Rennell's *Bullooah*, 10 m. s. e. of Luckipour.

you in fight, if you had any chance of success or held a single fort. But you cannot take even Bhalua unaided! So, you had better at once start in our ships for Arracan, or we shall leave you alone and return to our country." The cup of Shuja's misery was now full. He abandoned all hope and steeled his heart to accept the former of these terrible alternatives and embark for Arracan. [A. N. 556-561.]

The news spread consternation among his family and followers. The piracy of the Arracanese of Chatgaon in the rivers of East Bengal had made them too well-known to the people. Whole districts in Noakhali and Baqarganj had been depopulated through their ravages and remained deserted even so late as 1780, when Rennell drew his maps. Their daring attacks, ferocious cruelty, uncouth appearance, barbarous manners, lack of religion and caste, and practice of eating unclean animals,—all caused them to be regarded by the people of East Bengal, Hindus and Muslims alike, with a mixture of terror and loathing, to which history affords the only parallel in the Hun invasion of the Roman Empire and the Cossack raid into France after Leipzig. The dread of captivity under them was enhanced by the unknown dangers of their mysterious country, which was believed to

be full of pestiferous jungles and separated by the perilous ocean from all civilised lands.\*

And now Shuja was to go there! But to him it was a lesser evil than to fall into Aurangzib's hands. The fate of his father and two brothers made him shun the idea of surrender. Shah Jahan, the kindest of fathers, was pining away in dishonoured old age as a prisoner in the very fort where he had once held Court as the "King of Kings." The liberal and accomplished Crown Prince, Dara Shukoh, had been brought in chains to Delhi, paraded through the streets with every mark of humiliation and then, after the mummery of a trial, murdered by slaves. The gallant and generous Murad Bakhsh had been sentenced to captivity by his disinterested helper, his "darvish brother" Aurangzib! The handsome young and heroic Sulaiman Shukoh had been hunted into the land of hills and snow.

No! better, better far the cruellest death in the most barbarous of foreign lands than such an end as that of Dara or Murad. Farewell to Hindustan, with all its wealth, joys and culture, if Aurangzib was to be its king. Shuja's mind was soon made up. Others might stay behind, but for him Hindustan was no longer a home.

So, on 12th May, 1660, he finally left the

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\* Talish's *Continuation* translated by me in my *Studies*.

province which he had ruled for twenty years and the country where he had spent 43 years of his life, and sailed for Arracan with his family and less than forty followers. History has preserved some account of these men who were faithful unto the last. Ten of them were Sayyids of Barha under Sayyid Alam, and twelve others were Mughals under Sayyid Quli Uzbak;\* the rest were evidently servants. To the Sayyids of Barha belonged the hereditary right of occupying the place of honour in the Emperor's line of battle. It was only fitting, therefore, that Sayyids of Barha were found ready also to stand by their master's side in the hour of his supreme misfortune and danger.

### § 5. *The end of Shuja.*

Mystery shrouds the end of the ill-fated prince whose history we have pursued so long. The author of the *Amal-i-Salih* (21a), writing in 1671, says, "Up to this time none knows anything about Shuja's fate in Arracan. It is utterly unknown in what country he is and what he is doing, or whether he has been sent to the realm of the dead." Sixty years later, Khafi Khan was no better informed. He remarks (ii. 109), "In Arracan all traces of Shuja disappeared,—none [in India] got any sign of him." Nothing save the vaguest rumour

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\* *Alamgirnamah*, 561; Khafi Khan, ii. 110.

transactions, abolished the celebration of the Persian New Year's Day (*nauroz*),—an innovation borrowed by Akbar from the heretical Shias of Iran,—appointed *Censors of Public Morals* to put down wine-drinking and other vices condemned by Islam as sins, and lastly he abolished many cesses and the transit-duties and police-fees on grain.

### § 7. Illuminations and festivals.

The next day and for weeks afterwards, the festivities continued. Presents (*peshkash*) suited to the high occasion were received from the nobles, officers, courtiers, and feudatory princes, while they received in return titles, robes of honour, promotions of rank, and gifts in cash and kind,—such as elephants, horses, jewelled swords daggers and pen-cases, necklaces of pearls, jewelled aigrettes waistbands and other ornaments.

At night both banks of the Jamuna river were illuminated. “The surface of the river looked like a flower-garden” of light. The nobles fitted out boats with planks on which lamps were arranged in tiers, and as they plied up and down the stream the bands seated on the decks discoursed sweet music. Myriads of people lined the banks to feast their eyes on the spectacle.

But the grandest display of fire-works was made by the imperial Artillery Department (24th

June),—evidently because it contained experts in the manufacture of powder and had an unlimited supply of the material. These were let off on the level bank of the river outside the Hall of Private Audience (*Diwan-i-khas*) in the fort. The Emperor beheld it from a balcony on the eastern wall of that Hall, which looked out on the river.

Early in July news arrived of the arrest of Dara, and it heightened the joy of the Emperor and his courtiers. The coronation festivities were prolonged for more than two months, and formally ended on 19th August. The reign was ordered to be reckoned from 1st Ramzan 1068 A. H. (23rd May, 1658), in all official papers, because his second or grand coronation took place in this month of the year 1069.

